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	Abstract	
This thesis presents a development of the concept of post-liberalism to analyse processes of 
statebuilding in Central Asia by the example of Kyrgyzstan from a decolonial angle. Recent 
debates in peace, conflict and intervention studies have conceived of ‘post-liberal’ and ‘hybrid 
forms of peace’ as modalities of resistance against and re-negotiation of a globally dominant 
‘liberal peace’ template promoted by Western governments and the international intervention 
architecture. The approach of this research questions the global dominance and prominence of 
the ‘liberal peace’, the possibility of resistance and agency against it, and of emancipation of 
people in post-conflict or transition countries in the global periphery. By introducing 
‘imaginaries of statebuilding’ – understood as mental constructs structuring people’s thoughts 
and actions – as novel analytical concept, the study captures the complex and contradictory 
processes of reception, adoption and resistance against globally dominant notions of capitalist 
economic development, democracy, and peacebuilding and security practices. In the empirical 
part, practices of peacebuilding and community security – and their embeddedness in the post-
liberal trajectory of statebuilding – are analysed by the example of local crime prevention 
centres, territorial youth councils, and a national level NGO network working on police reform 
and participatory provision of public security. The research demonstrates how exclusion, 
structural violence and precarity are reproduced and feed into patterns of post-conflict 
governmentality which exist in sync with seemingly emancipatory and contextually meaningful 
ways of coexistence and steps towards institutional reform. These negative effects of the 
combination and hybridisation of the three identified imaginaries of statebuilding – a ‘Western 
liberal peace’, ‘politics of sovereignty’ and ‘tradition and culture’ imaginary – are critically 
reflected upon. Entry points for more fundamental critique and social/political practice are 
provided throughout the dissertation and, in the conclusion, synthesised into a new decolonial 
approach towards peace, conflict and intervention research. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
What are the conditions for transition towards democracy and a free market? Why have many 
countries failed to democratise and liberalise and how long will it take until they do so? Why 
are some countries and regions more authoritarian and prone to conflict and social unrest than 
others? How is it possible to promote peace and security and a democratic path towards 
development, both on national and global levels? What are the everyday sources of peace?  
 These are questions that inform a great deal of inquiry in the disciplines of political 
science and International Relations (IR) and their sub-fields of comparative politics and peace 
and conflict studies. Since the end of the Cold War, much research has been produced on 
countries in formerly Socialist Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The post-Soviet space became 
an area of interest for scholars of peace and conflict studies, and those interested in 
‘transitology’ and democratisation. The way the questions above are posed may appear 
straightforward for scholars in this field and for social scientists in general. However, they also 
exhibit a use of concepts such as democracy, authoritarianism or liberalism in a naturalistic, 
taken-for-granted manner. Similarly, the word ‘peace’ is used in a way suggesting that the 
definition of peace, and thus the ways to inquire forms of peace and achieve peace through 
practices and policies, is more or less straightforward.  
 This research is not advocating to discard the above questions and the concepts they are 
framed with. Yet, given the increasingly polarised, unequal and partly conflict-laden 
trajectories that countries across Eurasia have taken since the end of state Socialism, there 
appears to be a need to critically reflect upon the guiding questions, concepts and approaches 
to research and fundamentally rethink some of them (see Petrov 2014, Heathershaw 2013 for 
peace and conflict studies). This concerns, on a basic count, the way in which concepts and 
approaches are used in the study of peace, conflict, intervention, development and politics. As 
Jutila et al. have pointed out, rather than conceiving of themselves as ‘physicians of global 
		2 
society’ (2008: 623) who develop the right tonic in the form of social and economic policies 
that address social ills and foster the development of peaceful and prosperous societies, social 
researchers should reflect on how the concepts they use may reproduce and entrench forms of 
knowledge that enable, justify and (re-) produce hierarchy, exclusion, inequality and conflict 
(see also Barkawi and Laffey 1999, Duffield 2001).  
This line of argument has led to the emergence of a sizeable body of ‘critical’ research, 
which has mounted a significant challenge against the project of Western-dominated ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’ and the structural violence, suffering and entrenched peripheralisation it has 
produced in its often well-meaning attempts to bring peace and development to post-conflict 
countries (Duffield 2007, Pugh et al. 2008, Richmond and Mac Ginty 2009). Similarly, critical 
voices in the debate on transitology and democratisation have provoked the re-consideration of 
concepts and the development of more nuanced and context-specific approaches towards the 
study of post-Socialist countries (Art 2012, Gunitsky 2014, Cooley and Snyder 2015). These 
critical perspectives and their confrontation of orthodox scientific mainstream and policy-
making debates has produced new experiences and impressions about the nexus between 
knowledge, power and questions about peace, conflict, development and democracy.  
Yet, when taking stock of this academic critique of foreign policy, development 
assistance, intervention and peace-/statebuilding, one starts to doubt the ability – perhaps even 
the possibility, in the first place – of academic research to inform and shape a well-considered, 
non-intrusive, and still effective policy approach that will lead to sustainable trajectories of 
social, political and economic development in post-conflict and post-Socialist transition 
countries. Indeed, the different disciplines under the broad label of ‘international studies’ have 
to ask themselves: What can we do? (Brunner 2014) How can scholarship more effectively act 
upon policy makers not to pursue narrow, national strategic interests or implement projects that 
benefit elites and capital at the expense of vulnerable populations? And, given this elite, capital, 
		3 
and imperial bias of geopolitical actors’ agendas, is the informing and shaping of policies even 
a viable way for academic scholarship to bring about change in the world? Are there other ways 
of improving people’s lives that have more immediate effects and a more transformative 
potential than the standard from-knowledge-to-policy-making trajectory?  
The answer I offer in response to these questions is two-fold: First, as regards the 
question about democracy, peace, conflict and development, I argue that new concepts and 
approaches are needed to research the dynamics of societies in Central Asia and beyond. Based 
on previous literature in peace and conflict studies, I develop the concept of post-liberal 
statebuilding to capture and analyse the combination of different discourses and practices of 
social ordering, peace- and statebuilding and security provision in Kyrgyzstan. Analysing 
discourses, practices, policies and institutional formations through a post-liberal lens helps to 
capture the nuance and ambiguity which is at play in the interpretation and re-appropriation of 
concepts like peace, security, or democracy in contexts like Kyrgyzstan, the country this 
research project is focused on. It also provides a viable alternative to objectifying and labelling 
political attitudes, agendas and ways of thinking as ‘un-democratic’ or ‘authoritarian’. 
Furthermore, tracing the shift of forms of statebuilding and their underlying processes through 
a post-liberal lens foregrounds a productive and comprehensive critique of statebuilding and 
democratisation processes since the break-up of the Soviet Union.   
The second contribution of this research is its methodological focus on practices of 
statebuilding, specifically ‘community security’. Thus, rather than taking a broad and macro-
level approach in looking for different ways in which the state produces forms of peace, security 
and order, I look at a specific field within the wide variety of domains within peace, conflict 
and security research. My research shows how ideas about social order and community shape 
		4 
discourses and practices of community security1 and thus reflect – and feed back into – broader 
patterns of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, I exhibit the nexus between post-Socialist state 
ideology on the one hand, and seemingly apolitical and rational practices of community security 
on the other. Furthermore, by inquiring processes of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and 
transition on the basis of the practices through which they are done, I aim to provide an 
empirically-grounded analysis of social processes instead of limiting the research to a 
discursive-semiotic perspective. This focus heeds the calls to overcome the discursive fixation 
which confines much peace and conflict scholarship – and political/social scientists in general 
– to a ‘myopic gaze’ that deduces social dynamics, agency and resistance from public discourse 
(Lewis 2017) and does not sufficiently take into account the events and ‘non-events’ of 
peacebuilding (Visoka 2016).    
Although I aim to contribute to a rethinking and reconfiguration of social inquiry2 into 
peace, conflict and transition through my research on post-liberal statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan, 
I do not claim to have final or clear answers to the questions raised above. Rather, I regard the 
act of asking critical and reflexive questions about the relationship between scholarship, policy 
and processes of societal (post-conflict) transition, and the search for answers to them, the key 
                                                
1 In an analogy to the definition in the Saferworld Community security handbook (2014: 3), I 
understand community security as process aimed at reducing or eliminating threats to people’s 
health and wellbeing in the physical, mental and other dimensions they deem important. 
Correspondingly, it is understood to be a process involving or being driven by people in 
communities – i.e. municipalities, districts, or other low-scale entities – themselves, rather than 
state institutions, administrations or law enforcement. The understanding of community 
security as an end-state, where threats are reduced to a minimum or eliminated is only insofar 
relevant for the research, as it presents the goal towards which the different organisations and 
initiatives examined are working (see III.3).  
2 I prefer this term as well as ‘research’ or ‘studies’ to the idea of social science, which suggests 
that people practicing ‘science’ will be able to make explanatory if not predictive theoretical 
pronouncements (Flyvberg 2001). This concept of scientific conduct has been pulled into doubt 
by arguments that the idea of doing social science independent of positionality and interests is 
elusive and may have problematic links with selective societal interests and power structures 
(Cox 1981, Weber 2004 [1904]).   
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contribution of this dissertation. In the remainder of this introduction, I further elaborate the 
contribution to debates around these issues.  
 
I.1 Rationale for the study 
The research is intended to fill the gap outlined above, namely to ask critical questions about 
the role and effects of theories and concepts, and the positioning and potentials of social inquiry. 
More constructively, the aim is to develop an approach to research that can help apprehend 
answers to these questions. This rationale has changed since the initiation of the research project 
based on my progressively increasing perception of the limitations of the possibility of 
understanding, explaining or ‘knowing’ process of peace, conflict and transition.  
 Initially, the project was aimed at inquiring processes of social ordering and 
statebuilding and to look for the forms, degrees and expressions of ‘local agency’ therein. The 
in-depth study of the literature and my fieldwork experiences led me to the conclusion that 
‘agency’ is a problematic term, as it appears to signify a somewhat deterministic assumption 
about the possibility that people enact their desires, hopes and visions of a better life in a 
significant way. Although I do not want to categorically deny this possibility, I realised that 
using the concept of agency would be imprecise if not misleading. Instead, this thesis will 
critically examine the effects and implications of post-liberal forms of statebuilding by situating 
them against the concepts of governmentality and decoloniality.  
I understand governmentality primarily in a social sense, i.e. in terms of the effects of 
government on the ordering, disciplining and structuring of society according to the needs of 
government (Gordon 1991: 4) – and, thus, implicitly, capital and empire. Decoloniality I see as 
an opposite ideal-type, a social modality where hierarchy, subjugation and any violent forms of 
ordering are absent. This understanding, drawn from decolonial theory (e.g. Mignolo 2011, 
2012, Tlostanova 2010), is utopian especially when taken as a goal for the set-up of social 
relations in a given country or global society at large. Still, the concept is useful in looking for 
		6 
different ways in which the capitalist-colonial system is challenged, especially because it 
holistically captures the problems of inequality, hierarchy and violence in the late modern 
capitalist order. It also presents a useful entry point for considering processes of peace, conflict 
and intervention from the perspectives of the people primarily involved and affected by these 
processes instead of turning upon them an analytical gaze, which will necessarily be biased and 
limited for capturing the implications of international assistance and statebuilding and security 
practices (Sabaratnam 2017, Lottholz 2017b). Thus, the concept of decoloniality allows a more 
fundamental critique of the limits and contradictions of peacebuilding than other concepts, such 
as ‘empowerment’ or ‘emancipation’, which have hitherto been invoked in peace and conflict 
research (Richmond 2014, Maschietto 2016). I have decided to situate the study in a decolonial 
research paradigm, which seeks to not only uncover the legacies and continued effects of 
imperial and colonial domination, but also the limits of scholarship to challenge and help 
overcome the latter (Turner and Kühn 2016, Lottholz 2016b: 140).  
The rationale of providing a more evaluative than deterministic perspective emerged 
from my engagement with questions about scientific epistemology and disciplinary make-up of 
peace and conflict studies. The field appears to be, although mostly implicitly, too immersed in 
the logic of scientific positivism and causality, judging from a critical angle that is informed by 
a reading of formative controversies in anthropology and social science at large - specifically 
the ‘writing culture’ and ‘Third World feminism/women of colour’ debates (Lottholz 2017b, 
see II.2), and the controversy on research participants’ objection in the ethnography of aid 
(Mosse 2006, 2005, Bekmurzaev et al. 2018). This scientistic self-understanding is partly 
understandable given the orthodox scientific episteme in which mainstream social science 
research is formulated, and in light of policy makers’ and funders’ demand for the production 
of new theories and concepts that promise to make policies more effective.  
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However, as I will try to show, it is also possible to generate impact outside of the nexus 
between scientifically framed knowledge and policy. Practice-based and activist research 
approaches have developed over the last years and present different ways in which researchers 
can support a given community in their struggle without alluding to the generalisability or 
applicability of their findings beyond the specific research context. The second rationale is thus 
to show how a ‘practice-based’ and ‘cooperative’ approach to research can yield more 
analytically meaningful insights and help, furthermore, to satisfy scholars’ ambition to have 
impact and make their work the basis for concrete actions and results. Looking at the concrete 
practices and ways in which people make sense of challenges to peace and security on the 
communal level has proved the most viable way to overcome the discursive-deductive logics 
and lack of empirical grounding in peace, conflict and intervention research discussed above.  
A third rationale is on a theoretical, conceptual level and is of interest to both scientific 
and more decolonial, supra- or post-disciplinary research. It is to demonstrate the value of the 
concept of ‘post-liberalism’ in the context of post-Soviet Central Asia and post-Socialist 
Eurasia more generally. While the two former rationales will be developed especially in the 
first two, methodological and theoretical chapters and in the conclusion3, the analysis as such 
will be focused on the shift from a liberal to a post-liberal modality of statebuilding and social 
order in Kyrgyzstan, specifically the interplay of practices and imaginaries of social ordering 
in (re-)producing this post-liberal trajectory. I further show how ‘imaginaries’ – understood as 
semantic vehicles that channel different discourses into the practices of statebuilding and social 
                                                
3 In this sense, I do not conceive of my practice-based and cooperative approach as an additional 
object of study whose mechanisms, effects and outcomes are to be analysed. I have nevertheless 
chosen to frame the entire research project through this rationale as reducing it to a 
methodological or theoretical aspect would re-produce the scientific logic which, as I argue, 
reduces the potential of peace and conflict studies to bring about progressive social change. 
Systematically reflecting on why and how research needs to be done differently is in this sense 
an essential part of my project and figures mostly in the theoretical and reflective, rather than 
analytical, parts of it (i.e. chapters II, III and VIII).     
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ordering – are useful to better trace the different levels of the production of meaning. This way, 
I create a productive link between the realm of discursive and semiotic interpretation on the one 
hand, and the realm of practices, which is seemingly apolitical, mundane but, as other authors 
have argued, the main domain for the establishment, stabilisation and normalisation of large-
scale societal changes.  
 
I.2 Research objectives 
Three objectives guide the theoretical part of this research. The main one is to identify the 
imaginaries which are most influential for processes of community security and statebuilding 
in Kyrgyzstan and to inquire:   
How do imaginaries of statebuilding shape community security practices in Kyrgyzstan? 
The trajectory from imaginaries to practices is not understood in a one-way logic: I conceive of 
the link between imaginaries and practices or discourses of community security as a circular 
one, where imaginaries filter certain societal (both nationally and globally circulating) 
discourses into the sphere of community security. The practices and discourses produced in the 
field of community security, on their part, feed back into the wider sphere of societal discourses 
and the imaginaries of statebuilding. This cycle, then, over time and under influence of globally 
dominant discourses relating to security, peace and conflict, or poltico-economic change, 
affects the production of post-liberal understandings of society, politics and transmits this shift 
into discourses and practices of statebuilding and community security (see III.3).  
In answering the question about the influence of imaginaries of statebuilding on 
community security practices, a decisive question is: How do imaginaries of statebuilding in 
Kyrgyzstan relate to one another? As the analysis will show and as I discuss in the 
conclusion, there are clear contestations, synergies but also ambiguities between the three key 
imaginaries of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan that I identify. Unpacking these modalities of 
relation is the second key objective besides answering the main research question.  
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I use the concept of post-liberalism to capture social and political dynamics that cannot 
be captured by the binary of democratic vs. authoritarian forms of order. I am not interested in 
the ‘top down’ logics of government observable in Kyrgyzstan. Rather, my focus is on how the 
political regime in Kyrgyzstan is legitimised, enacted and reproduced, and thus indirectly 
wields power and is stabilised in subliminal, non-obvious and possibly unintended ways. The 
third objective of the research is thus to find out how specific ‘local actors’ such as local 
government, civil society and the population at large help produce, challenge and re-shape 
post-liberal forms of statebuilding. This theme implicitly underlies all of the empirical 
chapters IV-VII, as they are intended to present peacebuilding and community security 
initiatives through a post-liberal lens and demonstrate how this shift is being reproduced, and 
more rarely, challenged or diverted, by the involved actors. In chapter VIII I answer this 
question explicitly through a summary of the empirical analysis.  
A fourth objective is to use the critical normative concepts of governmentality and 
decoloniality to evaluate the instantiation and reproduction of regressive forms of social order 
and hierarchy in this post-liberal trajectory and ask about the possibility of challenging, 
overcoming or resisting towards the latter from within. This widens the scope of the research 
beyond a mere attempt to understand and theorise the ways in which statebuilding and related 
processes in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia can be seen to be post-liberal. This component thus 
makes for a more holistic contribution to the rich body of literature that has emerged around 
debates on post-liberalism.    
 
I.3 Contribution 
This research builds up on a body of critical, decolonial research within peace, conflict and 
intervention studies and political science/IR more generally. Although hard to define as a field 
of its own, there are some key arguments that help to outline the agenda on decolonial and 
critical peace research. The first one is a decolonial critique of peace and conflict studies, 
		10 
particularly of an approach of ‘critical peacebuilding’, which was expressed in regard to the 
lack of engagement with, and corresponding absence of, the voices from the societies 
intervened upon (Sabaratnam 2017, 2013a, 2011a). Although this is not to be understood as a 
dismissal of the important and well-substantiated critique of the liberal peace, this critique 
asked important questions about the positionality and composition of the group of people 
criticising the way in which peace- and statebuilding interventions are done on a global level 
(Sabaratnam 2013a: 273, Richmond and Mac Ginty 2015: 183). Post- and decolonial 
approaches in critical IR and sociology, specifically global historical sociology, have pointed 
out ways in which the Eurocentrism and structural violence of the international system can be 
tackled in a more systematic manner than it is currently the case (e.g. Shilliam 2015, Bhambra 
2016, 2014, Hobson 2012). This project apprehends peace- and statebuilding through the 
concept of decoloniality (Mignolo 2012, 2011, 2007, Mignolo and Escobar 2013, Quijano 
2000). This poses a novelty in peace, conflict and intervention studies – decoloniality has not 
been used as a frame for larger research projects in the field; and, furthermore, widens the 
geographical horizon of post- and decolonial scholarship, as the ‘Eurasian borderlands’ have 
so far received relatively little attention from decolonial scholarship (for exceptions see 
Tlostanova 2010, Tlostanova and Mignolo 2012, Boatca 2007). 
 Another significant strand in peace, conflict and intervention studies literature that has 
developed out of the critique of the liberal peace is a literature on sociological studies of 
international intervention in post-conflict countries.4 This body has generated a by now 
sophisticated ‘sociology of intervention’ that inquires why and how post-conflict peace- and 
statebuilding produce unsustainable and often fragile forms of peace and security (Bonacker et 
                                                
4 Given the increasing fusion between peace and conflict studies and research focusing on 
different forms of interventions – broadly understood, including non-military intervention such 
as conditionality and assistance and aid in various fields – I use, similarly to Bliesemann de 
Guevara and Kostic (2017) the composite term ‘peace, conflict and intervention’ studies.   
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al. 2010, Bliesemann de Guevara 2012, Distler 2016). This critical inquiry into the failures and 
discontents of international intervention has also inspired researchers to tackle the frictions and 
resistance occurring in peace- and statebuilding interventions through a range of approaches 
including political economy (Berdal and Zaum 2013, Zaum and Cheng 2011) or ethnography 
and project evaluation (Bjoerkdahl et al. 2016, Autessere 2014, Millar 2014a). From a yet more 
critical stance, Turner and Kühn’s sociological analysis of intervention tries to expose how 
intervention is often an act of ‘policing of (colonial) differences globally’; ‘an aggressive 
politics pursuing the preservation of the existing peace of the powerful’ and a ‘managing 
exercise that aims to protect the capitalist core from the non-liberal periphery’ (2016: 8, see 
also Bachmann et al. 2014, Hönke and Müller 2012).  
 Another variation of this critical scholarship has turned the critical gaze back on the 
academic inquiry into peace and conflict itself. The recruitment of social scientists for research 
into the reasons and remedies for the threat of ‘failed states’, terror and insecurity has led 
scholars to confront academia’s complicity with imperial forms of peace (Barkawi and Laffey 
1999); the refusal to engage with the challenge that critical theory poses to peace and conflict 
studies (Patomaki 2000, Pugh 2004); the observation that neither practice nor scholarship on 
peacebuilding produce sustainable peace (Denskus 2007); and consequently, the naivety and 
complacency of scholars’ self-understanding as ‘physicians of global society’ (Jutila et al. 2008: 
623). More recently, scholars publishing in German language have sharpened this critical 
perspective by asking how peace and conflict scholarship, including critical variations, may be 
seen as complicit in reproducing the violence of the global system (Exo 2009); and if the ‘peace 
writing’ industry (Visoka 2016: 16) is not unwittingly instantiating forms of epistemic violence 
vis-à-vis society (Brunner 2016, 2014). Besides the above-mentioned synthesis with decolonial, 
but also feminist research approaches (Cárdenas 2016, Exo 2015, Engels 2014), a way of 
tackling this problem involves a critical conversation on the knowledge production practices of 
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the field (see JISB 2017). By linking this debate with new perspectives on practice theory (e.g. 
Büger and Gadinger 2014, Büger 2014) and participatory and activist approaches (e.g. Hale 
2008), I aim to formulate an approach that is both critical about its own limits and dependencies 
and finds ways to ensure relevance and impact without catering to policy-making audiences.   
I further contribute to perspectives on political and social change that dispense with 
teleological understandings of democratisation, market reforms and ‘transition’ (Art 2012, 
Gunitsky 2014, 2015, Cooley and Snyder 2015). As already pointed out, I regard as problematic 
the uncritical use of concepts of ‘democracy’, ‘authoritarianism’ and different versions thereof 
(Levitsky and Way 2010, Stewart et al. 2013, Bunce and Wolchik 2011). I am interested in the 
discursive self-legitimation strategies of regimes and governments (Matveeva 2009, 
Murzakulova and Schoeberlein 2009, Heathershaw 2009, March 2003) and their drawing on 
registers beyond politics in the usual sense, e.g. identity, culture and history (Kudaibergenova 
2017, Marat 2008, March 2003), and other discourses and practices that elicit positive 
sentiments, emotions and feelings of belonging (Laszczkowski and Reeves 2015, Goode and 
Stroup 2015, Féaux de la Croix and Ismailbekova 2014). Especially recent ethnographic and 
anthropological explorations of ideological conflict and contestation, political mobilisation, and 
the role of customs, traditional values and worldviews in Central Asia provide promising 
insights that this study seeks to draw on and extend (Pelkmans 2017, Ismailbekova 2017, 
Lemon 2016b, Reeves et al. 2014, Reeves 2014). Additionally, in trying to understand the 
community security processes and the people involved in them, I draw on and contribute to 
research into the lifeworlds of development workers, civil society activists and other social 
groups and role models in Kyrgyzstan (Satybaldieva 2017, 2015a, 2009, Féaux de la Croix 
2013a, 2013b, 2011).  
Finally, the thesis presents an application of the concept of post-liberalism, which was 
initially developed in the political science/IR-based inquiry into peace, conflict and intervention 
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(Chandler 2010b, Richmond 2011a, 2010a, 2009a) and was applied in cases in West Africa and 
Latin America (Tom 2015, Graef 2015, Wolff 2013). The debate on the implications of the shift 
towards a post-liberal politics of statebuilding and intervention (Chandler and Richmond 2015, 
Tellidis 2012) has led to the critical consideration of the trajectories of governmentality, which, 
empirically, seem to displace the hopes and ambitions for emancipation and resistance towards 
the ‘liberal peace’ (Graef 2015: ch. 3). I adopt this critical ‘governmentality’ gaze to inquire 
the potentially regressive and subjugating effects of peacebuilding and community security. 
The idea of ‘post-liberal’ and ‘hybrid forms of peace’ offering an alternative to Western-
dominated ‘liberal peace’ (Mac Ginty 2011, 2008, Richmond 2011a, Richmond and Mitchell 
2011) appears, put briefly, optimistic and short-sighted. First, theorising ‘emancipation’ of 
intervened-in populations serves to side-line if not naturalise the fundamentally problematic 
condition of most post-conflict countries, which are caught up in unequal and often neo-colonial 
relationalities of intervention that usually preclude discussion of alternatives to neo-liberal 
capitalist restructuring and rent extraction, and to international intervention and dominance, in 
the first place (Bargues-Pedreny 2016, Finlay 2015). Second, as Lewis (2017: 33 ff.) points out, 
emancipation or other forms of betterment are usually studied in relation to the subjugation 
imposed by the ‘liberal peace’, while other actors who instantiate often worse forms of 
authoritarian post-conflict order – such as Russia or China – and their hijacking of discourses 
of emancipation and freedom remain disregarded.     
These critiques of the attempts to critically engage with the problem of ‘liberal 
peacebuilding’, especially the benign role appointed to the ‘everyday’ realm, ‘local’ actors and 
agency driving the re-negotiation of ‘liberal peace’ interventions (e.g. Randazzo 2016, 
Paffenholz 2015, Zaum 2012) led to a critical reflection on the potential of hybrid and post-
liberal forms of peace and political order to transcend conflict and avoid regression into 
authoritarian dynamics (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2016). Echoing this wary stance, Central 
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Asian studies scholars have contributed perspectives on how peace and security in this region 
are contested and embedded in hegemonic narratives of geopolitics and the ‘war on terror’ 
(Lewis 2017, 2016, Lemon 2016a, Megoran 2017). This research builds up on these critical 
accounts and aims to present insight into how peacebuilding and security policies and practices 
often produce performative, fragile and ‘virtual’ forms of peace (Reeves 2015b, Beyer and 
Girke 2015, Megoran et al. 2014, Heathershaw 2009) and mere conflict management rather 
than transformation (Owen et al. 2018, Lewis 2015a).  
 
I.4 Methodology 
The main methodological concern in this project was to engage with the practices, outlooks and 
lifeworlds of people in Kyrgyzstan and to see how these were linked to the emergence and 
reproduction of post-liberal forms of peace- and statebuilding. I adopt a political sociological 
framework that combines discourse analysis with multi-sited ethnographic and practice-based 
research methods. Drawing on these different approaches has allowed me to engage with 
organisations, actors and people on their own terms instead of imposing my research questions 
or agenda on them. Nevertheless, established conventions of academic inquiry demand that any 
research be subject to scrutiny as to its methodological rigour, appropriateness, ethical and 
positionality aspects as well as the inferences and conclusions it allows one to make. I try to 
address these issues in the following sub-sections after briefly introducing the context and my 
practice-based, dialogical approach to research on post-liberal statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan.    
 
Context 
Kyrgyzstan, officially called the Kyrgyz Republic, is known to have been the one of five post-
Soviet Central Asian republics which was most receptive to international prescriptions of 
societal, political and institutional reforms (Engvall and Laruelle 2015: ix, Omelicheva 2015, 
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see IV.1). Free markets and liberal democracy were the notions underpinning its first president 
Askar Akaev’s slogans promoting Kyrgyzstan as an ‘island of democracy’ and the ‘Switzerland 
of Central Asia’ (Marat 2008: 20). However, this role model type of integration, including the 
implementation of ‘shock therapy’ economic and administrative reform and accession to the 
World Trade Organisation in 1998 brought neither the progress and wealth, nor the political 
stability that people had hoped for when the country embarked on its supposed path to 
democracy and capitalist development in 1991.  
 Instead, Kyrgyzstan became notorious for its two successive revolutions within five 
years, which led to the ouster of Askar Akaev in 2005 and his successor Kurmanbek Bakiev in 
2010. The significantly more violent change in government in 2010 left the country in a limbo 
state, with a series of regional and local conflicts spiralling in what has come to be known as 
the 2010 ‘June events’: violent clashes in and around the southern cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad 
which led to hundreds of casualties and hundreds of thousands fleeing their homes (see 
Matveeva et al. 2012, IV.1). In the aftermath of this conflict, it has become difficult to do 
research or journalism on issues pertaining to the conflict and the ‘inter-ethnic relations’ 
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, the country’s largest minority group which has been said to have 
been disproportionality affected by the clashes. Widely visible detentions or trials against 
foreign journalists and NGOs5 have made it abundantly clear that researchers need to be very 
careful when doing research on the ‘Osh events’ and their aftermath, and that research 
                                                
5 For instance, the US freelance journalist Umar Farooq in 2015 or Dan Church Aid’s Conor 
Prasad in 2013, both whom were detained and questioned by the local GKNB branch under 
suspicion of breaking the law under article 299 of the Kyrgyzstani criminal code as they had 
conducted interviews with Uzbek community representatives and human rights organisations 
(‘instigation of religious or interethnic hatred’). While both of these cases were dropped but led 
to extradition and fines, a court trial against the international NGO Freedom House and a local 
partner sparked more debate, as authorities argued that a pilot survey run Freedom House and 
a national partner NGO had included questions about minority rights liable to break article 299, 
and that the organisation had not sought approval for the survey from the State Agency for 
Local Self-Governance and Interethnic Relations (Gamsumo) (Beishenbek kyzy 2014). 
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participants and interlocutors may be subjected to scrutiny by law enforcement or their 
communities in any case (Bekmurzaev et al. 2018). This context presented extraordinary 
challenges in terms of safety and risk concerns for research participants and myself as 
researcher. In the following sections, I show how I attempted to navigate these challenges 
through a specific approach towards data gathering and communication with research 
participants and partners on the ground.  
 
A practice based, dialogical approach 
In order to appropriately deal with or avoid the risks incurred by peace and conflict research as 
indicated above, and to overcome the limitations of more standard approaches in peace, conflict 
and intervention studies generally, I developed a cooperative, practice-based and dialogical 
approach, which would see its subjects as partners to be engaged in a conversation over a longer 
period, not as one-off or short-term participants in a linear data gathering, or even data 
extraction exercise. Therefore, in approaching potential partners I expressed interest first and 
foremost in their own view of their issue area and their work in it. I offered to accompany (Ru. 
soprovozhdat) their activities and to listen to what they had to tell me about their work. In 
exchange for these insights, I presented different ways of sharing my perspective on these 
practices in different forms and genres of writing, e.g. reports and analyses for internal use, but 
also articles and contributions that would describe my partners’ work in an accessible language 
and thus help to raise awareness about their activities and impacts (e.g. Lottholz 2016c, 2016d). 
In this sense, I used a practice-based methodology which is focused on following practitioners 
in their respective field rather than relying on the accounts and representations they give in 
interviews (Graef 2015: 70). The cooperative component ensured that there would be a two-
way process of sharing and feedback, meaning that partners regarded their engagement with an 
academic researcher as at least potentially useful and not an additional burden (Hale 2006, 
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Lottholz 2017b). Furthermore, this served to ensure whether the framing and scope of my 
research would be perceived as being potentially too provocative or ‘instigating ethnic hatred’, 
of which other organisations or journalists had been accused.  
Instead of a unidirectional form of data gathering, analysis and knowledge production, 
this process is dialogical: interlocutors and co-operators were given the chance to read and 
disagree with my interpretations and conclusions on different stages of the research. The 
research was thus produced together with them rather than about them, as is often the case in 
studies on peace, conflict and intervention (Sabaratnam 2011a: 800). To the extent that I 
devoted all of my research time to inquire the lifeworlds of the practitioners, managers and 
activists in my partner organisations and chose to address the limits and contradictions of their 
work in a constructive and reflective language, it can also be argued that I had an activist stance 
in my research. Demonstrating support for and commitment to my partners’ success was 
prioritised at the expense of a stance that would emphasise neutrality and a distanced, 
supposedly more ‘objective’ position (Hale 2006: 100).6  
 In the course of my fieldwork, I collaborated with the UK-based international NGO 
Saferworld (ch. V); the Osh-based NGO Iret and its partners at the OSCE Centre in Bishkek 
and Osh Field Office as well as the mayoral administration (Ru. meriia) in the city of Osh (ch. 
VI); and finally, the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ (CURR, Ru. Grazhdanskii Soiuz 
‘Za reformy i rezultat’, ch. VII). While my early attempts to initiate partnerships with other 
organisations had been less successful, I was able to convince senior staff at Saferworld’s 
Central Asia Headquarters (in Osh) of my approach to research during a workshop on peace 
                                                
6 This stance made my work more vulnerable to criticism. For instance, a reviewer of my article 
on police reform in Kyrgyzstan (Lottholz 2016c) remarked that my conclusions on the potential 
of new police reform approaches to effect fundamental change were too bold and that my 
presentation of some measures must have sounded like ‘outright cynicism’ to people (reviewer 
comments, 23 March 2016). I further discuss this dilemma of diminished scope for critique in 
circumstances of cooperation with law enforcement actors in chapter VII.  
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and security in Bishkek. I was grateful to be given a desk in the office in Osh, to exchange 
views and knowledge with the organisation’s staff, and to be invited to help collect data on a 
series of visits to so-called Local Crime Prevention Centres (LCPCs, Ru. Obshetvenno-
Profilakticheskie Tsentry) in Osh, Batken and Jalal-Abad provinces. The results of this 
cooperative research and additional follow-up interviews is presented in chapter V.  
 Through my contacts at Saferworld, I got to know people working at the Bishkek head 
office of the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ (CURR), which coordinated the 28 NGOs 
working on police reform and community security under the umbrella of the organisation across 
the country (see ch. VII). I offered to conduct an ‘accompanying research’ (soprovozhdaiushee 
issledovanie) with this organisation, which would include regular conversations at the head 
office, participatory observation at project implementation events in select municipalities, and 
further individual interviews and participatory observation with individual members or member 
organisations of the network in different communities in the country. This case study, which is 
presented in chapter VII, proved to be the most exhaustive one in terms of data gathered. Still, 
during my individual visits and requests to get to know the CURR’s members’ work in different 
localities, I also encountered access barriers and instances where people refused to participate 
in the research (see below and ch. VII).  
 The research on Territorial Youth Councils (TYCs) in chapter VI was conducted with a 
yet wider range of partners and took more time to complete, while my research collaboration 
was completed at the end of July 2015 and the one with the Civic Union intermittently 
conducted throughout the duration of my stay in Kyrgyzstan (June – December 2015). While I 
had already collaborated with the NGO Iret in Osh for my Masters research project back in 
2012, getting consent for a collaborative research on the TYCs required contacting both the 
OSCE presence in Kyrgyzstan and the Committee for Youth Affairs (CYA, Ru. Komitet po 
delam molodezhi) in the mayoral administration in the city of Osh. While I successfully 
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established contact to the former via my partners at Saferworld, it required some efforts to 
arrange a meeting with the CYA’s head and write an official letter asking ‘for permission to 
conduct interviews and focus groups’ to get to know the TYCs’ work and ‘obtain a more holistic 
[obshirnuiu] picture of the [project]’. Hence, it was already mid-November when received the 
approval to conduct this research during the last four weeks of my field research stay.  
  
 
Data  
The general strategy of my data collection was to get to know the initiatives and organisations 
I researched on their own terms, through available documents and publications, interviews and 
conversations, and, finally, participatory observation during events and activities. This way, I 
aimed to trace how these partners and the local level working groups they worked with framed 
and understood challenges, problems and risks pertaining to peace and security, and how they 
sought to address the latter through various measures. The table in appendix 1 lists the kinds 
and volume of primary material that I gathered in my research with different cooperation 
partners and other participants. I conducted semi- and unstructured recorded interviews and 
unrecorded conversations (which I documented with notes); participatory observations at 
community working group meetings and trainings, as well as on national level conferences of 
the different initiatives. When events were conducted in Kyrgyz language7 and not Russian, I 
confirmed the content in subsequent consultations with partners and hired a translator in one 
                                                
7 One limitation of my research approach is that I did not learn Kyrgyz in order to be able to 
engage more closely with people on an everyday level, as anthropological researchers have 
done. Besides the fact that the timeline and funding of the project did not allow this level of 
immersion, it is important to note that community security and peacebuilding projects in 
Kyrgyzstan are mostly conducted in Russian language, as the political and legal terminology 
used is not existent in Kyrgyz vocabulary. See Féaux de la Croix (2013a).    
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case.8 The documents and publications of the partner organisations ate not listed in this 
overview. While these do not constitute a high number in the case of LCPCs in chapter V and 
TYCs in chapter VI, I have added an overview of press coverage on the Civic Union’s work in 
an appendix to chapter VII. My research is further based on participatory observations 
conducted during general societal events, accounts from trips through Kyrgyzstan and the post-
Soviet space, and other interactions that helped me establish a more holistic picture (all listed 
in appendix 1).   
As further discussed in section III.2, my analysis of discourses and practices of 
peacebuilding and community security rests on a threefold understanding of discourse as it was 
developed by Fairclough (1992: 4). Discourse is thus firstly conceived of as text, i.e. spoken or 
written words; secondly as ‘discursive practice’, which denotes ‘the nature of the processes of 
text production and interpretation’; and, finally, social practice, which emphasises the social, 
institutional or otherwise background of a discursive event (1992: 4). While the interpretive 
analysis presented in chapters V-VII seeks to trace the practices and discourses of peacebuilding 
and community and their feeding into a national trajectory of post-liberal statebuilding, I base 
this perspective on my largely primary data (which is partly triangulated with secondary 
analyses and academic literature) on a mapping of ‘imaginaries of statebuilding’ and their 
composite discourses in Kyrgyzstan (chapter IV). This mapping is done with reference to both 
international and domestic academic literature and interspersed with media material and 
observations from my fieldwork. Drawing on this purposively selected literature, which sheds 
(critical) light on the production and formation of meaning, which in turn can be aggregated to 
                                                
8 Most of the interviews and events during which I did participatory observation were conducted 
in Russian, which is the main language of communication in the Kyrgyzstani development and 
peacebuilding/community security sector (see note above). Although the research is thus well-
positioned in terms of local language knowledge, it can also be argued that Russian as the 
language of imperial domination is insufficient to capture genuinely critical and decolonial 
ideas and perhaps also problematic ways of thinking.  
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the imaginaries of statebuilding I define, helps me to develop a contextual grounding for the 
analysis in the following chapters. This contextual overview helps me to build up my study on 
existing scholarship on processes of social ordering, decision-making and policy, although I 
did not define my imaginaries or discourses of statebuilding as heuristic device to shape or 
constrain the focus of my field data analysis and its interpretive outlook.  
 
Ethics, risk and access limits 
In order to minimise the risk faced by myself and research participants and to successfully 
initiative partnerships with organisations in Kyrgyzstan, I attempted to frame my research 
interests and focal points and to navigate the different issues encountered in the course of the 
research co-operations in an open and nuanced manner that was not too focused on problematic 
key words such as ‘conflict’, ‘inter-ethnic relations’ and the like. Given my prior research 
experience in the country and awareness about the political situation, I decided that framing my 
scope on ‘community security and peacebuilding’ practices and their relation to globally 
dominant approaches and templates for social and political ordering, specifically the ‘liberal 
peace’ approach (see project information sheet in appendix 2), was the best way to approach 
and communicate my research. Although this felt self-constraining to the point of self-
censorship, I concluded that it was the only way to make sure that both my research 
partners/participants and I would not get in trouble, given the sensitive reactions on the part of 
security services provoked by unlicensed research into these topics (see context summary above 
and Bekmurzaev et al. 2018, Lottholz and Meyer 2016). In the course of the cooperation 
arrangements with my partner organisations and initiatives, I explored and tested which kinds 
of topics I could inquire in more depth, and which issues were impossible for me to do research 
on given their sensitivity and my foreign origin.  
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Thus, as I show in chapters V and VII, inter-ethnic relations and violent extremism were 
issues on which I could not get a lot of information, although this varied across communities. 
The salience of these topics in a given community also decided over whether I could gain entry 
into these places in the first place. For community security and local administration workers 
from places affected by the ‘Osh events’ and radicalisation and violent extremism, inviting or 
interacting with me was too risky and conspicuous (see sections VII.3, appendix 7 and Lottholz 
and Meyer 2016). Consequently, my attempts to accompany people in their work were carried 
out on a trial and error basis, akin to a ‘grounded theory’ approach, which requires more 
investment of time and patience (Russo 2014). To ensure the participating individuals’ and 
organisations’ safety from any negative consequences, I anonymised all identities of people, 
organisations, institutions and places unless I received explicit consent for disclosing them.9 
While this helped to minimise the risk potentially faced by participating individuals and 
communities, it also limits the possibility of further debate and triangulation with further 
primary or secondary material, which in turn would serve to make the respective persons or 
places identifiable.  
In addition to these limitations, I also experienced instances refusal to participate, as 
well as foot-dragging and at times inconsistent cooperation during my fieldwork. For instance, 
arranging the research with Territorial Youth Councils (ch. VI) took not only time for 
requesting access to these entities’ members, but was also rewarded with only mediocre 
engagement of the participants. This was due to the fact that TYC heads and members were not 
forwarded the detailed information that I provided to the Committee for Youth Affairs of the 
mayor’s administration and the youth council heads whom I met on its premises. When people 
did receive full information on the research project and conditions of participation in it, they 
                                                
9 A separate list with the real names and coordinates of the research is provided to the examiners 
in a confidential supplement to the thesis. 
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were usually very open to share their thoughts and perspectives. However, as I was only given 
limited access to the contact data of the TYCs’ members and the interlocutors who were 
supposed to arrange interviews and interactions on my behalf had a more limited knowledge of 
the project (and interest in its success), the participant recruitment and initial readiness on part 
of some participants were rather limited.  
In a similar way, the heads of local security working groups – or the members thereof 
– working under the umbrella of the Civic Union ‘For reforms and result’ (CURR) were not 
always entirely convinced that my research project was safe for them to participate in. This led 
the members of one territorial council and Local Crime Prevention Centres in a community in 
southern Kyrgyzstan to not engage in my research (see appendix 7), while the head of a 
community security working group in another community said that he would only admit me to 
group meetings if he received clear instructions from the head office in Bishkek. These more 
or less explicit refusals to engage in my research were understandable as the communities in 
question had reportedly been affected by the violence of the ‘Osh events’ and, respectively, the 
recruitment of foreign fighters to Syria. In another case in the cooperation with Territorial 
Youth Councils, I chose not to further follow up my research with a TYC in a district of Osh, 
whose Uzbek majority is reportedly subject to discrimination and marginalisation. While all of 
these communities in which I could not conduct research – or did not feel I could do without 
putting myself and my participants in harm’s way, deserve having their cases examined by 
researchers and journalists who are better resourced or trusted, I decided that the risks faced by 
the people concerned and the ethical issues that would have been raised by me potentially trying 
to push to do research or gather some data anyways, were too significant.    
Against this background, I do not claim to capture the actors, projects and processes 
examined in my empirical chapters in their full substance. Rather, my study is subject to similar 
as other peace, conflict and security research which needs to navigate access regimes that are 
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constrained by the increasing ‘bunkerisation’ (Fisher 2017) and spread of ‘danger zones’ 
(Andersson 2016). The possible risk of research cooperations being terminated due to security 
issues also foregrounded my choice to do research with several partners simultaneously, as 
proposed in the idea of ‘multi-sited ethnography’ (Marcus 1998). While focussing on two or 
only one cooperation in more depth might have enabled a deeper, more wholesome and 
insightful engagement, I found the ‘safe distance’ and less frequent interaction of this multi-
sited approach to be the best way of balancing my ambition to do in-depth empirical research 
with the dependencies, uncertainty, often precarious conditions and psychological pressure I 
experienced during my fieldwork. Besides more structural factors (see Lottholz and 
Kluczewska 2017), these difficulties were also due to my limited ability to convince partners 
of the value and potential usefulness of my research and to play the roles that I was expected to 
play in an often competitive, demanding, masculinised and sometimes unforgiving 
environment.        
 In this sense, my fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan certainly made me aware of my limited ability 
of bridging and combining the roles of researcher, expert, and colleague on the one hand and 
those of friend, confidant and partner, on the other. Given the fact that in Kyrgyzstan data can 
only be gathered through highly personalised and informalised interaction10, I have chosen not 
to do ethnographic fieldwork with an anthropological approach. Such research has yielded 
decisive insights into the dynamics of social ordering, faith and religion, conflict and violence, 
popular mobilisation, social movements and the role of individuals therein (e.g. Ismailbekova 
                                                
10 Information and insights I obtained through interaction in more private settings often 
significantly shaped my views and understandings of the processes I sought to research. Given 
my (likely) inability to ‘mine’ such data in a normal research setting, however, I also felt 
helpless and frustrated with the difficulties faced by foreign researchers in Kyrgyzstan. In order 
to protect both friends and interlocutors, I have tried to draw a clear line between the friendships 
established in the course of field work, and, on the other hand, instances when these friends 
became interlocutors or informants, in which case I made sure they were aware what my 
research was about and how the information they provided would be used. 
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2017, Pelkmans 2017, Hardenberg 2017, Beyer 2016, Reeves et al. 2014, Megoran 2013). 
However, I have perceived the issues of informed consent, possible lack of 
participants’/interlocutors’ feedback and dissent on written work, and corresponding danger of 
objectifying and putting at risk my subjects (see Bekmurzaev et al. 2018) as too challenging in 
a scenario of doing anthropological research and ethnographic fieldwork ‘proper’.11 Spreading 
the participatory observations and interviews across a number of organisations and locales 
seemed to be, alongside comprehensive anonymisation of personal and contextual details, the 
best way to ensure research participants’ protection. Perhaps more importantly, it was also a 
way for me to ensure access: building up the trust and understanding needed to conduct an in-
depth ethnographic study with fewer organisations or individuals would not have been possible 
in the six months of fieldwork I conducted. Finding practitioners in NGOs and activist networks 
who share similar concerns, interests and knowledge with me and know how to navigate the 
difficulties and risks of doing social research in this domain proved the most productive way of 
arranging this multi-sited and practice-based inquiry.    
 
Inferences and conclusions  
As already stated, while I seek to shed light on peace, conflict and transition processes by 
developing my framework on post-liberal statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan, I do not claim to have 
final or clear answers as to why certain processes are occurring and not others. Nor do I venture 
to make any causal explanations. Crucially, I regard the act of asking critical and reflexive 
questions about the relationship between scholarship, policy and processes of societal (post-
                                                
11 I have also not seized the possibility to include insights into life during and after the Soviet 
Union provided in the literature from the region (e.g. Alexievich 2016 [2013], 1992 [1990]) 
and Kyrgyzstan specifically (e.g. Aitmatov 1988 [1980]) or in new socio-psychological and 
psychoanalytical works on post-Socialist countries (Gook 2015, Ashwin 2012, Kay 2006). Still, 
this research took inspiration from these attempts to inquire people’s lifeworlds and make them 
accessible to the reader. 
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conflict) transition, and the search for answers to them, the key contribution of this dissertation. 
This foregrounds an analysis of the ways in which contemporary processes of social ordering 
and change are understood in Kyrgyzstani society and beyond – a perspective I attempt to 
develop though the discourses and ‘imaginaries of statebuilding’, and furthermore means that 
such a perspective needs to be based on the epistemic and practical regimes as they can be 
perceived both through textual data and personal observations, but also (critical) academic 
literature produced in the past decades. In doing so, I seek to point out how understandings, 
practices and process are shaped in such a particular post-liberal way, that people do not see 
alternative ways of more radical discussion, contestation, and critique, which could foreground 
more sustainable, socially inclusive and possibly decolonising practices, policies and 
institutional designs. In this sense, I do not wish to define a practice or a certain situation as 
post-liberal, or to make statements about the causal reasons why they are so or otherwise. 
Rather, I seek to offer a post-liberal lens on the way the Kyrgyzstani state is built through 
community security and peacebuilding practices and discourses in order to bring forward the 
historical contingency and future path dependency in which such trajectories and the lives of 
people in Kyrgyzstan in post-Socialist states more generally are situated.     
 
 
I.5 Thesis structure  
In the first part of this thesis, I present my methodological and epistemological positioning and 
my theoretical argument on post-liberal statebuilding in Central Asia. In Chapter II, I review 
debates in peace and conflict studies as to their methodological and epistemological 
shortcomings, which I try to address. I provide an outline of the critique which critical 
peacebuilding scholarship, despite its valuable critique of the hegemony of the ‘liberal peace’, 
faced for failing to substantially engage with the societies subject to ‘liberal peace’ 
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interventions, and for not grasping the systemic nature of peace- and statebuilding interventions 
as a tool of stabilisation of an inherently unequal and exclusionary capitalist-imperial order. 
Next, I survey the reception of sociological and ethnographic/anthropological approaches in 
peace and conflict studies and show how these syntheses reproduce, contra the assumption of 
critical peacebuilding scholarship, the exclusion of voices of the ‘intervened upon’ as well as 
the academic-scientific approach of the field. In then show how, based on recent contributions 
in practice theory, participatory and activist research, it is possible to overcome these limitations 
by forging a practice-based and cooperative approach to inquiry. 
 Chapter III presents the analytical framework and theoretical contributions to peace, 
conflict and intervention studies. I start by situating the framework in debates on the concept 
of post-liberalism, emphasising the key idea being that the global shift from liberal to post-
liberal forms of governance and statebuilding has brought about a gravitation of social life 
towards entrenched governmentality (rather than emancipation). As a counter-part to 
governmentality, I develop the concept of decoloniality as a form of being, knowing and acting 
which allows more critical and fundamental reflection than concepts like ‘emancipation’ and 
its underlying Enlightenment episteme that informs most peace, conflict and intervention 
research. Furthermore, I introduce the social imaginary, which I understand to be a vehicle 
structuring statebuilding processes by linking discourses and practices in the empirical realm 
with understandings and ideational frameworks situated in the metaphysical realm. To set a 
basis for the empirical analysis, I review literature on community security and show how 
studying processes and practices in this domain can foreground critical insights into post-liberal 
forms of peace- and statebuilding and social ordering.  
 Chapter IV is the first of four analytical chapters on processes of statebuilding in 
Kyrgyzstan and is based on a review of academic literature and journalistic material that help 
to identify the key imaginaries and discourses of statebuilding in this country. After giving a 
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brief overview of Kyrgyzstan’s history since independence from the Soviet Union, I present the 
three imaginaries of statebuilding and their constitutive discourses (four per imaginary) which 
emanate from my analysis. First, I show how a Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary is rooted both 
in the concept of ‘imaginary West’, (Yurchak 2006), and in teleological notions of capitalist 
liberal-democratic modernity and ‘liberal peace’. Next is the imaginary of ‘politics of 
sovereignty’ (based on Gullette and Heathershaw 2015): I discuss how actors may be compelled 
to assert the sovereignty and independence of their country and its people (variously defined) 
through discourses such as the ‘bad West’ and ethno-national belonging, while discourses of 
Soviet modernity and anti-colonialism/imperialism present less confrontational and violence-
prone materialisations. Finally, I show how an imaginary of ‘tradition and culture’ links 
understandings of social order with ancestral traditions, historical heritage and spirituality, 
which foreground forms of communal life and social resilience that can both affirm and 
challenge modern forms of social organisation and ‘politics of sovereignty’.    
 In chapter V, I introduce the reader into the context of community security and local 
government in Kyrgyzstan and present my analysis of the work of Local Crime Prevention 
Centres (LCPCs) in southern Kyrgyzstan. I begin with a brief overview of the changes that the 
country underwent since the Soviet period: given the ‘new’ ‘market realities’ people found 
themselves struggling with since the 1990s, some of the Soviet era social and administrative 
institutions substantially ceased to exist, but were also often sustained by the tireless efforts of 
few ‘responsible’ and capable individuals. Local Crime Prevention Centres, created by a 2008 
law, are bodies tasked with the coordination of the Soviet and ‘traditional’ socio-institutional 
architecture, ideally with the help of international funding. Based on a cooperative research into 
the activities of LCPCs, I show how these make crucial contributions to community life and 
public security. I also show how the changes, dialogue and ‘boundary work’ brought about by 
LCPCs are highly conditional on local administrations’ and other actors’ cooperation and 
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might, if the latter are lacking, take on an unsustainable and performative character, as in the 
case of peacebuilding based on the Soviet idea of ‘people’s friendship’. In the final section, I 
discuss how LCPCs’ practices and discourses are often positioned cooperatively vis-à-vis 
‘liberal peace’ actors and drawing on corresponding human rights and democratic framings, 
but, simultaneously, often enact a ‘politics of sovereignty’ that super-ordinates state security 
interests over post-conflict justice and trans-communal outreach.  
 In chapter VI, I analyse a recent initiative that sought to promote peace and tolerance 
among youth in Osh and other cities: ‘Territorial Youth Councils’ (TYCs) were founded as a 
body for communal outreach in the aftermath of violent clashes in and around Osh and other 
cities in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010. After reviewing its institutional history, I discuss how 
the Osh mayor’s administration (meriia) adopted this institution into its own structure in order 
to promote peace, tolerance and security through contributions of local youth. My empirical 
analysis gives insight into the range of activities geared towards this goal, specifically how they 
reproduce ‘people’s friendship’ and traditionalist discourses on social order while allowing for 
opinions and forms of expression situated in the Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary. I further 
show how both TYCs promote ideas of self-help, self-improvement, and self-realisation that 
resonate with concepts of entrepreneurial subjecthood and individual responsibilisation. While 
TYCs thus seem to be limited to more momentous and pragmatic ways of tackling the problems 
and challenges of youth in Kyrgyzstan, I show that other initiatives are underway which try to 
voice more fundamental concerns in the national arena. In conclusion, I discuss how the 
different approaches and activities of young activists draw on the imaginaries and discourses 
of statebuilding in ways that approximate decoloniality, but rarely significantly enough to pose 
an alternative to overarching trajectories of neo-liberal market governmentality in southern 
Kyrgyzstan.   
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 In the final empirical chapter VII, I examine the work of the Civic Union ‘For Reforms 
and Result’, a national level NGO network which promotes an alternative approach to police 
reform both through national level lobbying and work in local communities. In a first step, I 
conceptualise the organisation’s emergence and its aim of promoting human security against 
the usually paramount agenda of national security. Second, I review the activists’ 
confrontations and exchanges with the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MIA), presidential 
administration and different Inter-Governmental Organisations and INGOs from a sociological 
perspective to indicate the ‘boundary work’ done and barriers faced by the activists. In the third 
section, I present my field work from community security working groups to analyse the 
cooperative security approach promoted by the organisation, which espouses the idea that 
security is most effectively produced in a joint effort of local government/administration, law 
enforcement, civil society and population. Despite its significant contribution, cooperative 
security exhibits important limits in that community security working groups tend to not take 
into account the complex nature of security threats and often define problems and associated 
actors or groups in a way that essentialises, and possibly excludes, different individuals or 
groups within a community. In concluding this chapter, I show how the examined community 
security practices, if not combined with more holistic and national level policy making, are 
liable to give rise to trajectories of post-conflict governmentality and how the persistent 
hampering of more fundamental national level reform presents a materialisation of post-liberal 
statebuilding.  
 In the Conclusion, I first summarise the key findings from the three empirical chapters 
and map the different community security practices within the framework of imaginaries of 
statebuilding. Next, I return to the initial research objectives and discuss how the thesis has 
addressed them, namely the question about imaginaries of statebuilding, the way they shape 
– and become reproduced and shaped by – community security practices, how specific ‘local 
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actors’ reproduce and challenge post-liberal statebuilding trajectories and, finally, how the 
latter entrench governmentality effects of this trend or indicate possibilities of working towards 
decoloniality. I link the latter two points back into the discussion on post-liberalism and its 
implications for re-thinking established concepts of democracy, authoritarianism and 
knowledge/facticity. I also show how my practice-based, dialogical research approach is useful 
in uncovering and tracing the processes of construction, contestation and change in post-liberal 
statebuilding processes, and what steps can be taken in future research to generate substantive 
insights into peace, conflict and intervention in Central Asia and beyond. 
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Chapter II Peace, conflict and intervention research between theory and practice 
 
In this chapter, I situate the thesis within and vis-à-vis recent debates in peace, conflict and 
intervention studies and the intellectual origins and interdependencies of this field. I elaborate 
the critical, decolonial approach outlined in the introduction by surveying the critique put 
forward vis-à-vis the critique of the ‘liberal peace’. On this basis, I develop different pathways 
to re-configure research in a less abstract, scientistic way towards a more context- and practice-
driven approach. To this end, I point out how the recent ‘practice turn’ in IR and social science 
foregrounds a practice-based approach at studying peace, conflict and intervention and how a 
focus on particular practices can enable an analysis that yields decisive insights into how peace 
and security are built and how conflict is prevented and ‘managed’. In this sense, this chapter 
provides a meta-theoretical reflection on the way in which research is, could, and should be 
done, before the next chapter ventures into the academic discourse and constructs the analytical 
framework and the approach to the study of post-liberal statebuilding in the practical field of 
community security.  
 In the next section (II.1), I outline the emergence of and different trends within peace 
and conflict studies conceived of as a ‘scientific’ field and the tensions this gives rise to. I 
discuss the emergence of the paradigm of statebuilding after the dominant ‘liberal peace’ 
template following the official end of the Cold War; the critiques put forward against it by 
critical peacebuilding scholarship; and, finally, sum up the criticisms faced by critical 
peacebuilding scholarship for its methodological and epistemological shortcomings. In section 
II.2, I review literatures which promise to mitigate some of these methodological and epistemic 
shortcomings, focusing on the ‘sociology of intervention’ and the nascent synthesis of 
anthropological and ethnographic approaches/methods with peace-/statebuilding research. 
After concluding that scholarly work in these strands has to overcome the focus on 
Western/international interveners and an empiricist-positivist epistemology, I discuss new 
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insights and potentials for developing practice-based and cooperative research approaches in 
extension of the so-called ‘practice turn’ in IR and social science more generally (II.3). 
 
II.1 Peace, conflict and intervention research: Intellectual heritage and current 
challenges 
Post-Cold War statebuilding and the critique of the liberal peace  
In order to understand the way in which state- and peacebuilding emerged as a paradigm 
throughout the 1990s and was consolidated in the 2000s, one has to re-imagine the world after 
the official end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The break-up of the Soviet Union and other 
communist regimes was widely perceived to signify what Francis Fukuyama called the ‘end of 
history’ (1992), where liberal democracy had proved to be the most viable form of political and 
economic order. Together with a longer tradition in liberal internationalist thinking1, this 
historical determination heralded a new way of thinking about the need to intervene in conflict-
affected countries. After the withdrawal of US and Soviet Union military support and aid, 
different internal conflicts broke out or stirred up again in countries such as Angola, Namibia, 
Somalia, and most tragically in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. The increased perception of 
global chaos in the eyes of ill-equipped international, above all UN, institutions (see Kaplan 
1994) led Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner call for assisting so-called ‘failed states’ in 
situations of institutional collapse. This was to be done, as they argued, with a ‘more systematic 
and intrusive approach’, invoking the parallel of broken families where ‘forms of guardianship 
or trusteeship’ are legitimate (Helman and Ratner 1992: 7; 12; see Lemay-Hebert 2013a).   
                                                
1 Specifically, the idea that liberal democracies perpetuate peace and democratic order while 
avoiding war between themselves (Doyle 1986; 1983), which foregrounds the justification of 
intervention to democratise post-conflict and authoritarian countries in order to make them 
peaceful. 
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 The problem of ‘fragile’ or ‘failed states’ and their implications for global security 
reached their highpoint on the agenda in global politics after the 9/11 attacks, at latest (Hameiri 
2007; Grimm et al. 2014). One indicator of this is the emergence of the Responsibility to 
Protect, a norm passed on the UN world summit in 2005 and obliging states to protect their 
populations from genocide and mass atrocities, and set the basis, or obligation, for international 
community to intervene in ‘emergency’ cases.2 Büger and Bethke show how the different 
epistemic communities of academic experts, policy advisers and decision makers cooperated 
and colluded in the (re-)production of the ‘fragile states’ concept and its translation into 
statebuilding policies which came to dominate post-conflict reconstruction and development 
policies of all major donors (see also Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu 2014, Marquette and Beswick 
2011). Different genealogies (ibid., Lemay- Hébert 2009, Hameiri 2010) have traced the roles 
of dominant thinkers in laying the foundation for statebuilding as a paradigm, for instance of 
Francis Fukuyama (2004, 2995), Robert Rotberg (2004, 2003) and Roland Paris (2004; see 
Lottholz and Lemay-Hébert 2016 for a concise overview).  
 This development of statebuilding as a scientific paradigm (Marquette and Beswick 
2011) to inform policies has led to a consolidation of a hegemonic position of ‘institutionalist’ 
approaches to state- and peacebuilding (Lemay-Hébert 2013a). The problem of fragility and 
failure was almost entirely constructed in terms of functioning institutions, the delivery of 
public goods, and provision of a strong, yet ‘hands-off’ institutional framework for the economy 
(ibid., Lottholz and Lemay- Hébert 2016). The corresponding recipe of restoring, and in the 
worst case imposing, the conduct of Western-style, ‘Weberian’ state institutions, seemed to 
                                                
2 See UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide for a concise explanation 
and the documents that constitute this action principle: 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml (Accessed 15 January 
2015). The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is outlined in the following way, on the website: 
‘Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of 
responsibility where States are accountable for the welfare of their people.’  
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promise success both in theoretical terms and in practical perspective, as a number of 
recommendations came to increasingly inform state- and peacebuilding practices in the UN and 
other agencies (ibid., Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu 2014). This loose consensus was termed the 
‘liberal peace’ and included the main pillars of democratisation, marketisation, economic 
liberalisation and the benchmarks of human rights, rule of law and good governance.3 It became 
the most legitimate, and in fact orthodox, approach to statebuilding, embraced by theorists and 
practitioners alike (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2009, Cooper 2007). Institutionalist statebuilding 
scholars and other advocates of the ‘liberal peace’ arguably understood themselves as 
‘physicians of global society’ (Jutila et al. 2008), who hold the remedy for fixing ‘failed states’ 
and post-conflict societies.  
The idea of statebuilding after the ‘liberal peace’ template and the intellectual hegemony 
of ‘problem-solving’ scholarship, focused on ‘fixing’ failed, failing and underdeveloped states, 
came under heavy critique from different authors which can be subsumed under a broad label 
of ‘critical scholarship’.4 The binary of ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’ theory, which is now 
most often employed in framing debates on statebuilding (Lemay-Hébert 2013b, see for 
                                                
3 Duffield defines the liberal peace thus: ‘The idea of liberal peace … combines and conflates 
‘liberal’ (as in contemporary liberal economic and political tenets) with ‘peace’ (the present 
policy predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction). It reflects the 
existing consensus that conflict in the South is best approached through a number of connected, 
ameliorative, harmonising and, especially, transformational measures.’ (2007: 11) 
4 The term ‘critical’ goes back to the formation of “Critical Theory” by the Frankfurt School of 
Social Sciences in the 1920s, where this philosophical and scientific approach was developed, 
first and foremost, by Max Horkheimer in his pivotal essay Traditional and critical theory 
(1972 [1937]), and later in his work with Theodor Adorno (Horkheimer and Adorno 1944, see 
Rush 2004: 8). While ‘traditional’ theory was valuable as it helped to understand and steer the 
production process in the capitalist system (and social and political processes more generally), 
Horkheimer confronts the problem that ‘the conception of theory was absolutized, as though it 
were grounded in the inner nature of knowledge as such or justified in some or other ahistorical 
way, and thus it became a reified, ideological category’ (1972: 194). Critical Theory, on the 
other hand, would not aim to explain phenomena through mathematical and quasi-natural 
scientific rules, but approach the social world in a more holistic way in order to understand it 
beyond the apparent and measurable, which amounts to a ‘radical reconsideration, not of the 
scientist alone, but of the knowing individual as such’ (ibid.: 199). 
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example Bliesemann de Guevara 2012) can then be ascribed to Robert Cox’ seminal article on 
IR theory. Cox summarises that ‘critical theory can be a guide to strategic action for bringing 
about an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical action which, 
intended or unintended, sustains the existing order’ (1981: 130). Although these two approaches 
to science may be fundamentally different, the distinction is blurred and a lot of overlaps occur 
(see below).   
 A first distinguishable strand in critical scholarship are analyses of the global 
implications of peace- and statebuilding missions and their (unwitting) complicity with imperial 
formations of global politics. Duffield, for instance, observed how the merging of security and 
development served to stabilise substantive levels of disorder in developing countries while 
also limiting the danger they pose to the global environment (2001). This ‘liddism’, i.e. the 
attempt to contain the disorder (with-) in crisis-ridden and war-torn states (see e.g. Jahn 2007), 
was argued to set the basis for the imposition of peace- and statebuilding missions on non-
Western countries as a hegemonic, neo-colonial project of world order (Pugh 2005, 2006, 
Chandler 2006a). The global scope of these more systematic critiques is augmented by 
perspectives pointing out the specific shortcomings and insufficiencies of statebuilding 
missions, especially their delusional and hubristic character (Richmond and Franks 2007, 
Cooper 2007; see Paris 2010 for an overview). One good example is Aidan Hehir’s argument 
that statebuilding has become a ‘hyper-real’ endeavour that aims  
… to create political communities which mirror a vision of the Western state – 
democratic, pluralist, efficient, just, fair – which doesn’t actually equate with existing 
Western states but rather with an idealised composite image of Western democracies. 
(2011: 1074) 
Scholars with an interest in ‘critical peacebuilding studies’ (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2013) 
have mounted a critique vis-à-vis the ‘liberal peace’, which focuses on the failures of liberal 
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peacebuilding and statebuilding missions on the ground (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2009, esp. 
introduction; Richmond 2011a, Mac Ginty 2011a, Tadjbakhsh 2009, Pugh et al. 2008, 
Richmond and Franks 2009, 2007, Bellamy and Williams 2005). The critiques touch upon 
several issues, including:  
i) That the liberal peace would be ‘cold and unfeeling, lacking understanding or 
empathy’ vis-à-vis the populations it seeks to empower and liberate (Richmond 
2011a: 63); 
ii) that it encourages local ownership and participation in statebuilding processes only  
in rhetoric, not in reality (Richmond 2011a: 3, 10, 83; 2010b; Donais 2009; Mac 
Ginty 2008); 
iii) that it would not engage with local needs and welfare (Richmond 2011a: ch. 4; 
2009b; Pugh et al. 2008);  
iv) and, in doing so, undertakes a project of social engineering and biopolitics where 
considerations of global security and stability are prioritised over building a 
sustainable peace (ibid.).  
This critique exhibits a slightly different stance towards the idea of peacebuilding and 
international intervention than that underlying the imperial or colonial critique discussed above: 
intervention and the need for peacebuilding as such are not rejected per se, leading Finlay to 
call this group of scholars ‘critical interventionists’ (2015: 224).5 In this sense, the critique of 
the ‘liberal peace’, it was argued, is caught in a ‘paradox of liberalism’, as it does not offer any 
alternative to the liberal outlook of the orthodoxy in international intervention studies and 
                                                
5 Chandler calls this critique an ‘ideas-based critique’, which leads those scholars to propose a 
re-examination of the concepts underpinning the liberal peace, but also makes this position 
appear as a rather ‘uncritical critique’ (2010a). 
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appears to, instead, unwittingly construct an apology for the failures of liberal interventionism 
(Chandler 2011: 146, 153; 2015, Paris 2010). 
Critical scholars have indeed engaged constructively with the idea of offering 
improvements for post-conflict peace- and statebuilding policies. Examples include Pugh et 
al.’s proposition of a ‘life welfare paradigm’ (2008: 6, 394), the concept of ‘social 
peacebuilding’ (Lidén 2011: 67, 2009) or reform proposals for peace-/statebuilding missions 
that are more effective and sensitive vis-à-vis the needs of recipient populations (Richmond 
2011a; 2014). Different exchanges between the scholars of these respective affiliations 
(Campbell et al. 2011; Newman et al. 2009) have enacted the idea of productive dialogue for 
dealing with problems of the liberal peace by ‘altering and customising, [but] not abandoning 
the ... elements of peacebuilding’ (Paris 2011: 167). As pointed out by Cox, there does appear 
merit in trying to develop alternative approaches to peace- and statebuilding: ‘A principal 
objective of critical theory … is to clarify [the] range of possible alternatives’ (1981:130). Yet, 
the ‘problem-solving critical scholars’ engaging in this kind of theorising have to face up to the 
question as to how and whether at all the ‘better solutions’ they develop are able to challenge 
and transform the conduct of peace- and statebuilding missions, and the intertwining of this 
industry with the interests of global capital and the governments at its behest. To what extent is 
‘constructive’ critical scholarship able to challenge the ways in which inequality, poverty and 
conflict is produced by the peace- and statebuilding industry, in the first place? It appears that 
more critical reflection on the possible omissions of such scholarship and its complicity with 
imperial forms of peace is needed. Instead of such critical reflection and concerns about 
practical relevance, the ‘liberal peace’ debate leaves the impression of theoretical expedience 
and preoccupation with academic ritual (Visoka 2016: 29); a critique that I engage with in turn.   
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A methodological and decolonial critique of (critical) peacebuilding scholarship   
The main line of argument pursued by critical peacebuilding scholarship is that the ‘liberal 
peace’ is – despite its predominance in the international arena and in post-conflict 
reconstruction missions all over the world – being subverted and resisted against in the process 
of its diffusion and implementation. This idea gave rise to concepts such as ‘post-liberal’ and 
‘hybrid forms of peace’, which were believed to be the products of re-negotiation of and 
resistance towards the liberal peace, shaped by the accommodation of locally-specific values, 
needs and interests (Richmond 2011a; Mac Ginty 2008, 2010, 2011, Richmond and Mitchell 
2011). These concepts were also used to theorise the ways in which post-conflict interventions 
might evolve into pathways that would be more acceptable to local populations and thus more 
sustainable than the dominant version of (neo-) liberal peacebuilding.   
Reading the passages positioning the main works on post-liberal and hybrid forms of 
peace (Richmond 2011a, Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2011; Graef 2015), the 
impression emerges that not only much of this research is aimed at an IR audience (Lottholz 
2017b, Paffenholz 2015)6, but that it is also supposed to improve and maintain the dominant 
role of IR (and political science) inquiry into peace and conflict. The following excerpt is a 
good example of this:  
A research agenda is needed which engages with an understanding of the dynamics of 
the relationship between the liberal and the local, and of the interface between the two 
                                                
6 Although Richmond himself points out the narrowness and constraints of IR when it comes 
to peace research, e.g. its ‘narrow set of prescriptions about peace, and … functions of the state’ 
(2011a: 86); ‘its liberal guise’ leading it to assume rights, democracy and rule of law (ibid.: 
129); its problematic conceptions of ‘the state, sovereignty, embedded liberalism and the 
international system’ (118) and focus on the ‘territorial state as the locus of power and order’ 
(125), among other things. See also Richmond and Franks for the criticism of the specific 
ontology and methodology of the ‘peace-as-governance’ framework (2007: 295). Similar 
statements can be found in Mac Ginty (2011: ch. 2). 
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in terms of everyday life for local communities and actors, as well as for more abstract 
institutional frameworks. (Richmond 2011b: 434)  
Thus, it becomes obvious that rather than pursuing the inter-disciplinary research agenda 
mapped out for the inquiry of hybrid and post-liberal peace, critical peacebuilding studies 
remain largely situated within an IR-based paradigm, interested in theory-building and -testing 
and less so in the in-depth study of specific contexts (Randazzo 2016, Paffenholz 2015).    
 The conceptions of ‘post-liberal’ and ‘everyday’ forms of peace (Richmond and 
Mitchell 2011, Richmond 2011a, 2009a, 2009b) are limited by this reluctance to engage with 
the actual anthropological and sociological perspectives which are conferred more analytical 
authority for the study of peace and conflict (see section II.2).  The lack of empirical grounding 
begs the question what the ‘the really-existing “local-local” and “everyday” of post-conflict 
environments’ (Richmond 2009b: 325), which are not be represented in the standard 
peacebuilding approaches, look like, and if they even exist at all.7 The ‘local-local’ is supposed 
to indicate ‘the existence and diversity of communities and individuals that constitute political 
society beyond [an] often liberally projected artifice [of local society]’ (2009b: 341, en. 2), but 
there is little to no evidence of its existence in Richmond’s own research. Although his research 
is generally based on visits of case study countries8, as some scholars have pointed out (Millar 
2014a: 5, Sabaratnam 2011c: 64-81, Zaum 2012), such empirical engagement often remains 
largely anecdotal, especially when compared to the comprehensive argumentation on ‘liberal 
peace’ debates and the need to reform peace and conflict studies methodology. For instance, in 
                                                
7 Sabaratnam argues that Richmond’s work ‘seems to reflect an imagined communitarian space 
characterised by “context, custom tradition and difference in its everyday setting”’ (Sabaratnam 
2011b: 65, quoting Richmond 2010b: 558). She likens this assumption of a non-modern, 
somewhat pure, cultural subject with what Mac Ginty has called ‘last native syndrome’ (Mac 
Ginty 2011b: 217; Sabaratnam 2011c: 223).   
8 For instance, Timor Leste (2011a: ch. 6), Solomon Islands (2011c) or Kosovo and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (2011a: ch. 3, Kappler and Richmond 2011) 
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analysing ‘aspects of the local-liberal hybrid’ (2011a: ch. 6), the analysis hinges on few 
interviews, among which one with a middle-aged district commissioner (166 ff.) is being relied 
on most heavily in assessing the situation after the conflict.9  
These methodological shortcomings generally preclude the view on the actual points of 
view of the ‘local’ or ‘local-local’, which remains imaginary and elusive, as does the 
emancipatory potential of local, everyday forms of ‘post-liberal peace’. Sabaratnam points out 
that it is often not clear why local views would be ethically preferable to Western liberal views, 
other than ‘by virtue of their implicitly “authentic” status’ (2011c: 68) or for the sake of their 
resistance to the liberal peace. It seems that they could instantaneously endorse or embody 
regressive, negative and structurally violent forms of social order.  
Another critic of the liberal peace whose analyses are not exempt from criticism as to 
their cursory nature is David Chandler. For instance, his argument about the ‘fake’ quality of 
how democracy and state institutions are being built in post-conflict environments, namely 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chandler 2000), is almost exclusively based on an examination of 
interveners’ view of the statebuilding process in the country. Thus, the function of a democratic 
government that conforms to certain standards and blueprints in the acceptance of norms of 
international governance institutions and actors is paramount in this work, at the expense of a 
clear perspective of the inner workings of democratisation in Bosnia.10 Sabaratnam raises 
concern with the absence of engagement with local voices in Chandler’s research on Bosnia:  
                                                
9 The convenience of such a source is obvious and not explicitly reflected upon. 
10 In Empire in denial (2006a), for instance, resistance of local views to this illiberal peace and 
the international intervention industry is more inferred from the fact that people keep voting for 
nationalist parties than from any significant examination of the different populations groups’ 
sentiment (ibid.: 154-157). 
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[I]f we are to assume, contra the interveners, that people in post-conflict environments 
are capable of authorising their own politics, why not deal with their expressed views 
on these issues? (2011c: 80).  
This line of criticism is extended to other critical peacebuilding scholars such as Pugh and 
Duffield, all of which seem to be more preoccupied with the inherent contradictions of Western 
power and the correspondingly illiberal and failing peacebuilding practices (2011c: 81 ff.). All 
attempts to critique Western hegemony seem to end up reaffirming the paramount importance 
to the hegemonic forces of the liberal peace (ibid.: 79-80). The absence of non-Western subjects 
limits the attempts of critical peacebuilding scholarship to formulate a radical critique of the 
hegemony of the liberal peace. It might be argued that the focus on resistance towards the 
‘liberal peace’ can be a first step towards taking into account non-Western voices in the study 
of peace- and statebuilding. However, this is hardly a sufficient condition especially given the 
often schematic way in which resistance is more assumed than actually engaged with 
empirically.  
 This critique of the critical peacebuilding scholarship’s critique of the ‘liberal peace’ 
and its development of alternative research agendas along concepts such as post-liberal and 
hybrid forms of peace is largely framed from a methodological and epistemic point of view (see 
also Paffenholz 2015, Graef 2015, Sabaratnam 2013a). The general logic of this strand of 
critical peace research and its shortcomings appears to reflect an underlying problem with the 
production of knowledge in academia in general: The ‘almost exclusive focus’ on the ‘liberal 
West’ at the expense of an abstracted, imagined ‘local’ alterity whom researchers appeared 
reluctant or unable to engage with points to a general Euro- or Western-centrism in 
peacebuilding research (Sabaratnam 2013a), IR and political science (Hobson 2012; 2007; 
Jones 2006; Agathangelou and Ling 2009) and the social sciences more generally (Restrepo 
and Escobar 2005).   
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 In this sense, it appears that much inquiry in peace, conflict and intervention studies – 
whether of critical outlook or not – is susceptible to (re-) produce – or fail to exhibit and 
challenge - the coloniality of the current modern international system. Suárez-Krabbe defines 
coloniality as referring ‘to the fact that the relationship between colonialism and coloniality is 
structural and persisting, in opposition to the idea that colonialism is over’ and ‘that the global 
ethnoracial hierarchy (that emerged with the ‘discovery’ of America) remains the main 
organizing principle of social relations on a world scale’ (2009: 2; Quijano 2000). The idea of 
taking the coloniality of being and knowledge as vantage point for social research was 
introduced by the intellectual collective modernidad/colonialidad (coloniality/modernity) 
around Arturo Escobar, Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano and others. When applied to social 
relations, coloniality can be understood, according to Tlostanova:  
… as the indispensable underside of modernity, a racial, economic, social, existential, 
gender and epistemic bondage created around the 16th century, firmly linking 
imperialism and capitalism, and maintained (though reconfigured) since then within the 
modern/colonial world. (2012: 132) 
From this vantage point, the exclusion, silencing, aggregation and simplification of what is 
called ‘local voices’ in peace- and statebuilding research would appear not only to be a 
methodological or epistemological flaw, but also position such research in complicity with an 
‘imperial peace’ (Behr 2014: 112), as it fails to challenge the Western-centric global order and 
its mechanisms of ‘classifying [humans] in relation to the colonial matrix of power and the 
ontological marginalization of non-western and not quite western people’ (Tlostanova 2012: 
133). Different authors have shown how such a colonial bias can be overcome (Sabaratnam 
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2017, Ziai 2016, Agathangelou and Ling 2009, Jones 2006).11 I present the practice-based and 
dalogical approach to peace, conflict and intervention research, which is foregrounded by such 
a decolonial critique, in section II.3.  
 
II.2 New concepts and approaches to statebuilding: Sociology and ethnography  
The forging of new agendas of peace, conflict and intervention research along sociological and 
ethnographic lines has arguably led to an improvement of the field’s methodological apparatus 
and epistemological orientation. These developments helped to go beyond a mere critique of 
the liberal peacebuilding interventions and give more comprehensive insight into why and how 
situations of protracted conflict and negative forms of peace were entrenched and not overcome. 
The collection Statebuilding and state-formation edited by Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (2012) 
represents a nodal point in the synthesis between sociological literature on state- and 
peacebuilding intervention.12 The different contributions highlight how international 
intervention and assistance can facilitate statebuilding and formation processes, but may also 
stabilise and ossify predatory and reform-averse state structures and situations of protracted 
conflict and crisis. For instance, trusteeship (2012: ch. 7), transnational profiteering networks 
(chs. 4 & 5) and internal groups and actors who act as ‘spoilers’ (ch.3) can hamper and block 
statebuilding processes and establish impractical and structurally violent arrangements (2012: 
parts I and II).  
This analysis of ‘sate-formation under internationalised conditions’ (ibid.: 6) reflects 
the growth of a literature that tries to establish a critical view of the social, political and 
                                                
11 Although it has been pointed out that such a radical re-thinking of social inquiry can only 
happen within limited scope within the current regime of knowledge production in academia 
(Sabaratnam 2015, Nicolson 2017). 
12 For sake of simplicity, this review is not considering historical sociological perspectives on 
state formation (for instance Egnell and Haldén 2013, Hobson and Seabrooke 2001) or socio-
semiotic analyses (e.g. Lemay-Hébert et al. 2013).   
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economic dynamics in countries undergoing international statebuilding interventions – and of 
international interveners’ unawareness of them, leading to trajectories of deepening conflict 
and protracted crises (Pouligny 2006, Heathershaw and Lambach 2008, Lemay-Hébert 2009). 
Such analyses shed new light on the material dimensions (economic, military and other strategic 
sectors) of state- and peacebuilding processes and the political struggles occurring under the 
surface of ‘transitions’ towards democracy and peace. For instance, different authors have 
adopted an ethnopolitical lens to show how institutional mechanisms side-line or reinforce 
ethnic conflicts (Visoka and Gjevori 2013, Visoka 2012, 2011, Finlay 2010, Hehir 2006). 
Authors with a political-economic angle have shed light on the ‘rentier’ economies (Lemay-
Hebert and Murshed 2016) and adjacent organised crime networks forming under conditions 
of international rule; the creation of ‘bubble economies’ around international organisations’ 
compounds, that distort and retard a sustainable and independent path of economic development  
(ibid.: 15-16; Ghani and Lockhart 2008); and the dependency of political power on illicit and 
predatory practices, under-the-surface infighting and connections to organised crime, which 
often render the publicly visible politics a charade (Verkoren and Kamphuijs 2013, Sörensen 
2012, Dauderstädt and Schildberg 2006, Pugh 2004).  
The paradoxical phenomenon is, then, that the emergence of such largely corrupt and in 
many ways neo-colonial intervention complexes is not challenged, but rather normalised 
through different discourses and practises of post-conflict states’ structural adjustment and 
integration into international economic, political and institutional architectures. In order to 
prepare post-conflict states for such transition and integration, bits of territory, authority, rights 
and obligations are handed over to international bodies or staff on the ground, which leads to 
the constitution of ‘global assemblages’ of intervention (Sassen 2006: 22, Ong and Collier 
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2005, Heathershaw 2012: 255, 2014: 44 ff.).13 Furthermore, the delegation of security functions 
to corporate actors such as private security companies and multinational companies (MNCs) 
leads to the emergence of transnational security governance assemblages, which superordinate 
national sovereignty, international governance and security standards over humanitarian, 
human rights and livelihood concerns (Hönke 2013, Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, Titeca 
and de Herdt 2011).  
The instantiation of precarious and negative forms of peace with the help of international 
development, political and corporate actors and structures has also been observed in the case of 
Central Asian post-Soviet states. Heathershaw has provided comprehensive analyses of how 
peacebuilding processes and reform processes in Tajikistan led to the consolidation of a 
‘virtual’ peace amidst the entrenching of a fragile, and highly unequal political economy, while 
the government is concentrated on maintaining its grip on power and on mobilising 
international resources for this purpose (2009, 2011, 2014). He thus concludes that statehood 
and state sovereignty are performed, as for instance in the utilisation of assistance for the 
country’s border regime and politico-technical support for a local government reform, which, 
apart from a new law that is compliant to international standards, did not produce substantive 
change in local government practices (Heathershaw 2014, 2009). Other discussions have shown 
how the integration of capital market and state structures into the global architecture of 
neoliberal financial capitalism enabled state, government and generally elite actors to enhance 
and maintain their wealth – with the help of offshore financial vehicles and money laundering 
arrangements – and thus political power (Heathershaw and Cooley 2015, especially Marat 
2015). Other similar trends in the region is the utilisation of discourses on Islamic radicalism 
                                                
13 This is most apparent in the case of Liberia, where the implementation of the UN Governance 
and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) was accompanied by the 
appointment of foreign staff to national government positions (Andersen 2012: 134), and in the 
installation of international administrations in Timor Leste (see Jones 2012, Lemay-Hébert 
2012 and 2011a) or Kosovo (Visoka 2016, Hehir 2006). 
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and the ‘threat of terrorism’ (Lemon 2016b, Galdini 2016), as well as related programmes for 
police and security forces support and capacity building (Lewis 2011a, 2011b).  
This literature provides a lot of insight into the processes of establishment and 
normalisation of internationalised forms of post-conflict governance, peace- and statebuilding 
in a macro and political discourse perspective. Political sociological analyses of intervention 
further highlight how such often illiberal and ‘authoritarian’ forms of post-conflict 
reconstruction are mis-perceived by interveners. To this end, some analyses look at interactions 
between locals and internationals, and lack thereof, and how they affect the outcome of 
interventions. The UN Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK), for instance, was unable to foster a 
positive development and reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs in post-conflict Kosovo 
and got caught up in the frontline of this ethnic conflict (Lemay-Hébert 2013d: 19, 2009).14 
Hughes (2009) delivers further evidence from Timor Leste and Cambodia on how international 
interveners did not manage to sufficiently engage with the societies they intervened in, at least 
in terms of engaging with people beyond selective elite groups. The ‘symbolic violence’ 
(Lemay-Hébert 2011a: 1834; 2014, Bourdieu 1979) exerted by international interventions 
towards the local population is thus an important insight offered by sociological explorations 
of international intervention.   
Another crucial contribution of the ‘sociology of international intervention’ literature is 
that it shows how the cognitive dissonance, that interveners are often socially distant from 
intervened-upon societies whom they are supposed to engage with and empower, is possible 
and even becomes normalised. Bliesemann de Guevara and Goetze, for instance, look at 
international statebuilders’ habitus, which they define as ‘the entire set of explicit and implicit 
knowledge, attitudes, ways of thinking and seeing the world (Weltanschauungen) [and 
                                                
14 A failure which, in Lemay-Hébert’s view, points to the ‘lack of cultural sensitivity and an 
insufficient understanding of the dynamics of the society, in terms both of power structures and 
of negotiations’ (2009: 39). 
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thus] and expression of the multitude of meanings that a person has conferred to his life, and 
… [the] educational, cultural, social and economic capital at the person’s disposition’ (2012: 
201, based on Bourdieu 1979). They conducted a survey among about 70 former and current 
UNMIK staff in 2008 on their worldviews, life styles, and standpoints in terms of international 
order and political profiles (2012: 202 ff.) and found that, while ‘the large majority of UNMIK 
staff shares the same values of liberal human rights and a reformist yet interventionist approach 
to world politics’, they exposed high sensitivity and deep understanding of the conflict their 
mission dealt with. Yet, the contradictions faced by the mission did not lead any of the 
respondents ‘to a major questioning of the international politics of peace- and statebuilding as 
such’ (ibid.: 208). Such contradictory logics of acting and representing actions and success 
whilst being aware of inherent limitations and contradictions have been shown to underlie 
international intervention and assistance practices from the micro level (Heathershaw 2011, 
Autesserre 2014) to specific institutions (Hunt 2014, Koddenbrock 2015) and the organisational 
bureaucratic culture in general (Mosse 2005, Veit and Schlichte 2012, Distler 2016). The 
literature thus sheds light on the ‘innate conservatism’ characterising state- and peacebuilding 
institutions and actors, which discourage their subjects from reporting problems and demanding 
reforms (N.a. 2016).  
These and other contributions15 elucidate the processes by which the increased 
sheltering and isolation of aid, development and humanitarian workers entrench their inability 
to challenge the environment they work in; its underlying logics of practice and knowledge 
production; and its effects of stabilising and reproducing global (dis-)order rather than 
transforming it. What many of these accounts are insufficiently including, or seem to be taking 
for granted, however, is the ‘local’ perspective on peace- and statebuilding, which is usually 
                                                
15 For instance, on the liminality of aid workers (Smirl 2012, 2016) and the ‘bunkerisation’ and 
‘humanitarianisation’ of peace and statebuilding (Duffield 2010, Koddenbrock 2012, 2015). 
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included in the form of a number of press articles and selective interviews. Local people are 
thus understood to be an implicit part of ‘intervention society’ (Distler 2016), while the 
dynamics of internalisation or challenges and controversies around intervention and post-
conflict peace- and statebuilding policies remain unexplored (Bonacker et al. 2010, esp. 
Bonacker’s chapter). Thus, although it is commendable that sociology and other disciplines 
have made inroads into traditionally IR- and political science-dominated intervention studies, 
the currently prevalent focus on interveners in this literature is ironically reflecting the very 
‘self-referentiality’ of Western interventions initially critiqued by proponents of the sociology 
of international intervention themselves (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012: 15-16). This bias can 
and needs to be balanced by inquiring the legitimisation and fortification of hegemonic forms 
of peace through discourses and practices in the domestic realms of the societies intervened 
upon (Sabaratnam 2017, Millar 2014a, Heathershaw 2009). In the following, I discuss the claim 
that ethnographic perspectives on statebuilding, similarly to sociological ones, can fill this gap 
and provide yet ‘better’ insights into the dynamics of intervention.  
 
The deceptive potential of ethnography and anthropology in peace- and conflict studies  
The reception of ethnography and anthropology in the critical peacebuilding literature can be 
seen as part of the gradual establishment of the critique of the ‘liberal peace’ and corresponding 
research agendas on ‘hybrid’ and ‘post-liberal forms of peace’.16 The interest in previously 
unexplored aspects of international interventions required new methodologies and research 
approaches for a field largely embedded in the scientific discourse of IR and political science 
(see II.1). Different pronouncements that ‘anthropological sensitivity’ was needed to study the 
‘bottom-up’ dynamic of peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2008: 139); that ‘some varieties of 
anthropology and sociology are well placed to capture these dynamics’ (Mac Ginty 2011: 4); 
                                                
16 This sub-section and section II.3 are partly adapted from Lottholz (2017b). 
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or that ‘ethnographic methodology’ could enable ‘an understanding of the local, locality, 
context and their interactions with and against the liberal peacebuilding architecture’ 
(Richmond 2011a: 14, see also 146, 199 ff.) capture the hope that ethnographic methods would, 
in Vrasti’s words, ‘promise a type of knowledge … more empirically accurate than that 
provided by discursive theories of the political’ (2008: 295). 
Gearoid Millar’s An Ethnographic approach to peacebuilding (2014a) presents and 
applies an ethnographic research framework and thus comprehensively forges a way forward 
in this synthesis. The ethnographic approach, it is argued, departs from the point where critical 
peacebuilding scholarship usually stops, as it ‘demands a willingness to study closely the local 
social and cultural context’ and ‘understand how international projects are experienced by 
people on the ground’ (2014a: 3, 2). The added value of this approach is identified in 
‘ethnographic preparation’ (trying to get as thorough knowledge of the context as possible), 
and on the appraisal of cultural differences between the understandings and worldviews held 
by researchers and the researched (ibid., chs. 4 & 5). The book also, however, presents an 
instrumentalist understanding of the potential role of ethnography in studying post-conflict 
transitions. The challenge to ‘fully capture the local experiences of [peacebuilding] projects’ 
(81) is thus framed as methodological question: ‘there are dynamics within societies that 
demand purposeful sampling within a population if “local engagement” is to be achieved’ (83). 
According to this reasoning, the contextual picture of society drawn by the researcher can be 
approximated to the ‘real’ empirical situation so that data gathering and analysis enables the 
best possible understanding of the effects (and shortcomings) of peacebuilding interventions. 
Therefore, besides having the right methodological toolkit (including ethnographic methods), 
the research also has to be based on the ‘anthropological knowledge developed over decades 
by scholars with a deep understanding of Sierra Leone’s society and culture’ (79).  
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It can be argued that this reliance on ethnographic data gathering and the results of 
previous research is reflective of an empiricist-positivist epistemological approach, which is 
focused on the gathering of data that confirms or disproves a certain theory or argument. It does 
enable Millar to make critical arguments vis-à-vis international interveners. For instance, he 
demonstrates how the post-conflict reconciliation and FDI projects in question benefited mostly 
local elites, who had the educational capital to make sense of the interventions as well as the 
networks and financial resources and professional qualifications to seize the opportunities 
brought about by the projects (94-95). Yet, consistent with this heuristic logic, attention to 
complexity and detail are relegated to a matter of choice: ‘[A]n ethnographic approach should 
not be seen as an extension of anthropology but as a tool for any discipline … even non-
anthropologists unwilling or unable to commit to this mode of ethnography can adopt and 
benefit from (it)’ (Millar 2014a: 6). Still, Millar also adds that adopting this approach requires 
‘a healthy “anthropological imagination”’ (ibid.).  
This ethnographic approach might be effective for engaging multiple audiences, but its 
implications require critical reflection. Especially given the different ways in which 
anthropological research has been utilised by states, militaries and the peacebuilding industry 
(Denskus and Kosmatopoulos 2015, Finlay 2015), it is worth pausing at the point where 
ethnography is offered as a tool to be applied at one’s convenience. What does the ‘healthy 
anthropological imagination’ necessary for adopting this approach look like? The 
understanding implicit in An ethnographic approach and the debates leading up to it implies an 
empiricist positivism for which anthropological strands had been criticised on various 
occasions in the discipline’s controversial legacy (Vrasti 2008, Hale 2006, Restrepo and 
Escobar 2005). 
 In this empiricist-positivist imagination, ethnography is conceived of as a tool for 
gathering data to confirm or refine theories, or to help carry out peacebuilding practices more 
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effectively. However, as Denskus (2007) has argued, a focus on developing the right 
instruments and analysing the effectiveness of peacebuilding in delivering its alleged goals also 
forecloses discussion about how peacebuilding is embedded in, extends and re-produces a 
global web of power relations (see also Turner and Kühn 2016). In this sense, peace and conflict 
studies need to confront the biases and blind spots potentially emanating from its self-
understanding as academic discipline rather than nurturing an illusion of accessing better 
knowledge (and policy) if only the right methodology can be developed. Whether the 
development of a methodological toolkit alone facilitates the field’s potential to contribute to 
the creation of better peacebuilding practices and policies (as suggested by Millar 2014a: ch. 9; 
Paffenholz and Reychler 2005 among others) appears rather doubtful (Denskus 2007, Brunner 
2014, Finlay 2015).  
The idea of instrumetalising ‘peace knowledge’ (Visoka 2015) for the improvement of 
peacebuilding missions across the globe thus invites a further reflection on the limits of peace, 
conflict and intervention studies and their complicity with empire from a decolonial 
perspective. The universalist ontology and the empiricist positivism that inform the 
anthropological imagination in peace and conflict studies are linked to a Western-/Eurocentric 
understanding of the world, according to which ethnographic exploration of the supposedly 
‘savage’ but also ‘pure’ periphery can yield new knowledge to better understand and solve 
problems of peacebuilding in the global periphery (Sabaratnam 2013a). Anthropology is thus 
located in the ‘savage slot’ within the intellectual division of labour of the modern episteme as 
it came about during the Enlightenment (Restrepo and Escobar 2005: 111).17 It is construed as 
a ‘[form] of knowledge that present[s] the West with its own limits by confronting it with 
difference and the unconscious. [It] nevertheless find[s] in Western ratio – and, hence, in 
                                                
17 For instance, Souillac and Fry argue that ‘[a]nthropology, with its vast documentation of 
indigenous societies ... can remind the West of the diversity of successful approaches to creating 
and maintaining peace’ (2016: 75).	
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European dominance – [its] reason for being’ (ibid.).18 This implicit cognitive mapping of the 
world – often implicit and used as a shorthand without bad intentions – depoliticises and 
dehistoricises the way in which the ‘periphery’ or ‘Global South’ have been created through 
the process of imperial expansion and colonialism in the first place.19  
The empiricist anthropological imagination in peace and conflict studies and the 
predominance of positivist epistemology and universalist ontology in this field bear testimony 
to the relative isolation in which the ‘local turn’ and ‘post-liberal’ or ‘hybrid forms of peace’ 
were theorised (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). Writing on the ‘strange case’ of the analogous 
‘ethnographic turn’ in IR, Wanda Vrasti noted how, ‘[d]isregarding the historical controversies 
and political aporias of ethnographic knowledge has been a necessary condition for such a ‘turn’ 
to occur in the first place’ (2008: 195). She and other authors (Restrepo and Escobar 2005) have 
shown how the ‘writing culture’ and ‘Third World feminism’ debates had already pulled into 
doubt and partly done away with ideas about ethnography that have flattered peace and conflict 
scholars in recent years. The main lesson for peace and conflict research from these debates is 
that, rather than accepting abstract and potentially problematic categories and assumptions, 
inquiry should focus on the very effects of categories, assumptions and ideas about how the 
world works (Lottholz 2017b, Finlay 2015). Critical peace research, ethnographic or otherwise, 
should inquire how ‘how so-called communal identities and indigenous practices are produced, 
subsumed and reproduced in peacebuilding, i.e. how they are made useful to government’ 
                                                
18 Richmond notices this ‘fork in the path’ but does not provide an immediate solution or 
positioning on it (2014; 697-698). 
19 Different scholars have thus argued that ‘the local’ is somehow ‘always-already’ global 
(Chandler 2013: 25, Bhambra 2014: ch. 4). In fact, it can be argued then that ‘indigenous’ and 
‘local’ are analytical fictions created from the universalist and positivist vantage point of IR 
and political science-dominated peace and conflict studies (Chandler 2013).  
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(Finlay 2015: 225). Such an endeavour can arguably best be realised through a practice-based 
and cooperative approach to knowledge production, which I propose in turn.  
 
II.3 A practice-based, cooperative approach to research   
As argued above, getting better insights into people’s everyday lives and political struggles 
cannot be seen a question of methodology alone, but, on the contrary, requires letting go of the 
model of an accumulative, scientific approach towards studying peace, conflict and 
intervention. Instead, researchers need to be ready to embrace uncertainty and accept that new 
insights might not serve to improve and sharpen existing theories and approaches (Denskus 
2007: 661, Vrasti 2008, Heathershaw 2013). Rather than imposing analytical frames and 
question on its subjects, it has been argued that research needs to be based on a dialogical 
approach at producing knowledge that develops the questions and ways to answer them in the 
process and not before entering the researched context (Sabaratnam 2011a, Hale 2006, Restrepo 
and Escobar 2005). This means that the prevalent conception of fieldwork as a one-off data 
gathering – or rather data extraction – exercise followed by analysis and output production 
needs to be rethought as a long-term, dialogical process of cooperative knowledge production 
(Bekmurzaev et al. 2018). To fully take into account the way in which people’s worldviews 
affect the conduct and outcomes of peacebuilding projects, arranging a long-term cooperation 
between researcher and relevant organisations or communities appears the most promising and 
potentially effective way.  
Such a turn appears especially pressing given that the global political economy of 
research is very much skewed in favour of framings which not too rarely are politically 
provocative if not exerting epistemic violence upon the subjects of research (Bekmurzaev et al. 
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2018, Bliesemann de Guevara and Kostic 2017, Paasi 2005, Reeves 2005: 76).20 To some 
extent, this creates the need to compete in a ‘political marketplace’ (de Waal 2014) structured 
by the discourses of danger, conflict and insecurity dominating the field, so as to successfully 
apply for funding and produce publications. The epistemic arbitrage people are encouraged to 
engage in appears to be structured and accelerated by the fragmentation of the global political 
economy of knowledge production into different linguistic-epistemic spaces: The knowledge 
generated in post-conflict countries of the Global South or in the post-Soviet space is thus taken 
‘back home’, processed and published to contribute to debates in primarily English-speaking 
journals, books, online platforms and conferences in Europe and the Anglo-American language 
space (see Tietze and Dick 2009). Setting out with the mission of gathering as much and as 
meaningful as possible data on their respective topics, researchers find themselves having to 
balance such ambition against the challenges of field research (Lottholz and Meyer 2016) and 
ensuring participants’ as well as their own safety (Bekmurzaev et al. 2018). Instead of 
entrenching this political economy of knowledge production, a critical research agenda and 
practice should overcome and counteract such trends by establishing cooperative practices of 
research and knowledge production.  
This stance is echoed in Büger and Gadinger’s discussion of the ‘practice turn’ in IR 
and the social sciences. Practice theory, they argue, ‘is not just a new theory, but involves quite 
substantial shifts in thinking about the world and the nature and purpose of social science’ (201.: 
                                                
20 Furthermore, the institutional and administrative apparatus of the academic sector and the 
publication industry that peace, conflict and intervention studies is linked to and depending on 
for its reproduction exhibit myriad dynamics that require critical reflection as to the effects they 
have on the kind of knowledge this field produces. Different scholars have raised awareness 
about how the neoliberalisation of the university (Sabaratnam 2015), and the historical 
constitution and mechanisms of reproduction of peace and conflict studies – from degree 
programmes (Sielschott 2010) to aspects of publication, knowledge dissemination and public 
engagement (Jackson 2015, Brunner 2014) – limit the possibility of critical inquiry to make a 
positive impact (Visoka 2016: ch. 1). Given these constraints, Claudia Brunner has rightly 
raised the uncomfortable question, ‘What are peace and conflict studies able to do?’ (2014). 
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4). Thus, it takes up the idea of studying the situation of specific people and communities in 
order to show how their lifeworlds, daily routines and professional practices lead them to act in 
the way they do. This presents a systematised inquiry and theoretical consolidation of the 
sociological study of intervention I have reviewed above. Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, field, 
capital and doxa (i.e. taken-for-granted, normalised forms of expert and lay knowledge) provide 
the basic tools for practice-theoretical research (Adler-Nissen 2012, Bourdieu 1977). The aim 
of the latter, as Büger and Gadinger (2014: 4) point out, ‘is not to reduce and present abstract 
explanations of social phenomena’ but to ‘come to deeper understanding of how the world 
works in and through practices.’ Practices are thus understood as vehicle through which 
knowledge is constituted and reproduced, making practice-based inquiry a via media between 
theories emphasising technologies and structures of government and hierarchy (as 
conceptualised by Marx and Foucault), and, on the other hand, conceptions of social order and 
ways of life as something inborn, situated within people’s brains and therefore hardly 
changeable (as understood by Weber, Schütz, or Leví-Strauss) (Büger and Gadinger 2015: 451, 
Reckwitz 2002). Practice theory and practice-based research has a longer-standing synthesis 
with security studies (Williams 2007, Bigo 2008, Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, Hönke 
2013) and made inroads into peace- and statebuilding literature (Visoka 2016, Graef 2015, JISB 
2015), on which this project is based (see chapter III).  
The main conclusion from practice theory debates and critical readings of debates on 
methodology and analytical approaches in anthropology and the social sciences generally 
(Lottholz 2017b) is that knowledge production cannot be emancipatory regardless of who is 
doing it and by virtue of the radical and emancipatory outlook of the specific theory or 
methodology used in the process. Rather, in order to describe and engage with political 
struggles beyond one’s own community, it appears indispensable to involve people in a debate 
to establish a commonly shared picture of the problem and ideas for possible solutions. If reality 
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is indeed non-unitary but always dialogical, polyphonic and controversial in its nature21, then 
academic inquiry should make an effort to reflect this complexity instead of presenting a 
condensed version. This does not mean that collaborative knowledge production is a decisive 
fix for social scientists to once again produce a ‘better’ account of ‘reality’. It rather implies to 
let go of the empiricist imagination that there is one ‘reality’ which can have an accurate 
reflection that foregrounds possible action. In this sense, embracing uncertainty, anti-
essentialism and radical perspectivism also comes at a price (Denskus 2007: 661, Vrasti 2008: 
283): where a concrete and unified picture of a problem used to inform targeted actions, 
questions as to how and by whom a problem is brought about – and what constitutes a specific 
problem in the first place – take primacy. This illustrates that a ‘dialogical’ approach risks to 
become more of a dialogue than offering much to base any research on, let alone speak of 
concrete action (Sabaratnam 2011a: 800). This does not mean that practice-based research is 
meaningless compared to other approaches. Rather, it provides a way to engage with the 
struggles of people more thoroughly, literally through their own eyes, rather than merely 
documenting and trying to understand them from a researcher’s or generally academic 
perspective.  
In activist research, this reconfiguration of research towards the lifeworlds and 
viewpoints of the subject is extended into the general positionality and orientation of research. 
Hale (2006, see 2008, Introduction) notes that activist research is not only loyal to the academic 
endeavour but also to the respective political struggle of the research subjects, and often beyond 
the confines of what an academic engagement would include. In this sense, activist research is 
‘compromised – but also enriched’ given its clear positioning with its subjects rather than 
                                                
21 This reflects a dialogical understanding of the world and the corresponding need for a 
‘dialogist’ approach to researching it (Aubert and Soler 2007). See III.1.  
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outside of their struggles (Hale 2006.: 101).22 Activist researchers have tried to support minority 
communities in European metropolises by offering their research as a plane for reflection and 
development of political and community-building activities (Stringer et al. 2014, Pfadenhauer 
2005, Seithel 1990). In another case, academics raised awareness about the major injustice 
surrounding the outbreak of cholera in Haiti, which was evidently caused by UN peacekeeping 
troops without the organisation being held liable for the consequences (e.g. Lemay-Hébert and 
Freedman 2017).23  
Such positive examples notwithstanding, it is important to understand that activist 
research is not an easy pursuit, especially in the current regime of academic knowledge 
production. Most importantly, the criteria by which success or impact of researchers are 
measured in academia are in many ways diametrically opposed to what partners in the world of 
NGOs, policy-making and social movements expect (Hale 2006: 110-111). Partner 
organisations expect researchers to produce outputs that help to raise awareness and, ideally, 
attract financial support. For this purpose, the respective organisation or project should ideally 
be presented in a positive light and in an accessible manner. Academic journals or books do not 
meet these criteria on several counts. Instead, requests to approve the content and framing of 
analyses in such formats present additional labour for partners in the field, with no near-term 
benefits in sight (see Mosse 2006: 946). In my own cooperative research with the Kyrgyzstani 
NGO network ‘Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’’ (CURR; Ru. Grazhdanskii Soiuz ‘Za 
reformy i rezultat’, see chapter VII), I thus tried to be of practical help by accompanying the 
                                                
22 Hale himself, for instance, supports Central American indigenous communities in their 
struggles for land rights (ibid.: 99), which is in keeping with the activist research tradition 
exemplified in the 1971 Declaration of Barbados, which demands an approach to anthropology 
‘which perceives the colonial situation and commits itself to the struggle for liberation’ (Dostal 
1972: 380). 
23 By lobbying national ambassadors to the UN and facilitating debates to establish the legal 
basis for bringing this case to justice, these ‘academic activists’ managed to make an 
unprecedented case for holding the UN accountable for its actions (Ibid.).  
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activists to meetings and trainings in their different communities across the country. Crucially, 
by publishing research insights in genres more familiar and accessible to this organisation and 
its potential supporters (e.g. Lottholz 2016c, 2016d), I showcased how my research could shed 
light on positive change effected by their promotion of new approaches to community security 
provision and cooperation between law enforcement, local authorities and the population.24  
So, logistical support in the field and visibility in journalistic or policy-related genres 
can offer partner organisations some benefits from cooperative research; but these added 
benefits are no insurance against disagreements or disappointment with the aspects emphasised 
and critiqued in academic writing (Mosse 2006: 946). To this end, while the smaller research 
pieces in accessible genres were welcomed, my research did not yield decisive insights for the 
practitioners themselves, but served more to describe, contextualise and provide further 
reflection on the dilemmas the practitioners faced in their daily work. Thus, my interlocutors 
told me that they and their partners in the communities were more or less aware of the aspects 
raised in my analysis and were trying to address them.25 Such dialogical reflection, even if it 
does not yield major new insights, is arguably the very contribution of activist research, whose 
components benefit the researcher and the practitioner in different ways. This shows how 
adopting elements of activist research is useful in forging cooperative and more trustful 
relations in contexts where research participation can put individuals and organisations at risk 
or danger or simply does not seem attractive to them. Although I adopted elements and 
                                                
24 These publications were not released without the editors raising criticism as to the framing 
of the status quo and future potential of changes in community policing in Kyrgyzstan (which 
was said not to be critical enough of violations). This points to the dilemma of cooperating with 
law enforcement actors and maintaining critical distance at the same time, which I will discuss 
in chapter VII.    
25 Interview with representative of CURR; Bishkek/Birmingham, 26 March 2016; 
correspondence with representative of international NGO Saferworld, March 2016. 
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orientations akin to an activist approach, my project can be described as practice-based and 
dialogical rather than activist in the more classical sense.26 
A cooperative and practice-based approach at researching peace, conflict and 
international intervention has already been demanded on different occasions. The need for 
dialogue – not only within academia but between academics and society – and explicit links to 
practice have been reiterated in proposals for a more critical approach to peace research 
(Patomäki 2000, Jutila et al. 2008). The inclusion of action research methodologies into 
peacebuilding research as a bridge between theory and practice has already been discussed in 
the 2000s (e.g. Fischer 2008), not least because of the advent of monitoring and evaluation 
discourse and its ambiguous implications (Millar 2014a: 144). However, these and earlier 
contributions (e.g. Rothman 1997) have left the theory-practice divide intact, conceptualised 
‘action research’ more as analysis tool (primarily for evaluation) and therefore raised doubts as 
to their ability to provide the critical reflection on peace and conflict research in the way the 
discussion above has done.27 In a similar vein, Sabaratnam’s argument that the critique of the 
liberal peace has ‘failed to produce a dialogic account [of the ‘liberal peace’], articulated 
through the perspectives of those supposedly subject to it’ (2011a: 796) and that it is necessary 
‘to think about the links between analytic and political exclusion (ibid.: 800, her emphasis)’ 
foregrounds a dialogical approach towards uncovering the voices of people affected by post-
                                                
26 In order to get better insights into the practices and struggles of organisations, activist 
elements were used in that my positionality as researcher was, at least partly, ‘predicated on 
alignment with a group organized in struggle, and on collaborative relations of knowledge 
productions with members of that group’ (Hale 2008, Introduction: 20). Still, there have been 
strong and valid concerns that calling the overall approach activist would be inaccurate and 
misleading for the reader.  
27 Which is not to diminish the value of action research literature (e.g. Reason and Bradbury 
2001; see Dick 2006 for an overview) for the conceptualisation of action and practice-
theoretical research. Many of the insights and arguments offered in the practice theory literature 
discussed above are already provided in the action research literature but were not picked up in 
peace and conflict studies.  
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conflict intervention; and an activist positioning with their concerns, rather than a distanced 
position of the scientific researcher preoccupied with catering to the Western-centric political 
economy of knowledge production. In the next chapter, I provide more detail on how this 
approach is used to examine peacebuilding and community security practices and their 
implications for the trajectory of post-liberal statebuilding.  
 
II.4 Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the origins, critiques and new pathways in peace, conflict and 
intervention studies methodology and epistemology. I have outlined the critique of peace and 
conflict scholarship, particularly critical peacebuilding inquiry, concerning its activities, 
outcomes and impact. I have further indicated a decolonial vantage point, which scrutinises 
knowledge as to its complicity with, or failure to challenge, capitalist, imperial and colonial 
power structures. I have argued that there appears more that critical scholars can do to fight the 
hegemony of the ‘liberal peace’ and of white, male and otherwise privileged actors in world 
politics. I have pointed to the ways in which anthropologists, and other scholars more recently, 
have decided to take an activist stance and make their knowledge and manpower available for 
interventions in real-world struggles. This indicates an alternative to the prevalent mode of 
knowledge production in an increasingly competitive and precarious political economy, whose 
connection with progressive policy and practice, despite excellence and impact criteria, is 
increasingly pulled into doubt. I have further outlined a practice-based and cooperative research 
approach, which espouses cooperation and engagement with research participants and 
organisations instead of one-off data gathering exercises which feed into a one-way street of 
knowledge extraction from the periphery for audiences in the centre.  
 Two further points should be noted. First, the approach outlined for my project was 
developed in the course of my fieldwork and based on theoretical reflection throughout this 
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research project. It was not formulated ahead of the fieldwork, nor fully detailed in its course. 
The difficulties, pitfalls and learning processes which are part of fieldwork have led me to the 
reflections provided in this chapter. Furthermore, I have discussed and refined this approach on 
different occasions (e.g. Bekmurzaev et al. 2018, Lottholz 2017b, Lottholz and Marschall 
2017). Throughout the empirical chapters V-II and in the conclusion, I will return to the 
discussion of this approach and how it helped me to navigate the difficulties – primarily safety 
and access issues – of doing fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan and how it helped to inquire the process 
in question in more depth and nuance.  
Another point is necessary in regard to the methodological and epistemological critique 
of critical peacebuilding scholarship. By adopting a decolonial angle, I did not mean to pull 
into doubt the purpose or possibility of critical scholarship all along. The main purpose of this 
reflection was to point out the limitations and weaknesses of social science, and peace and 
conflict scholarship in particular, and the need to reflect on its complicity with the capitalist-
colonial global system and its different actors and institutions. The conclusions I have drawn 
from this critique – pointing out the need for practice-based, cooperative and dialogical research 
– are by no means exhaustive, nor do they provide a decisive solution to the outlined problem. 
As I have pointed out, focusing on the engagement with people’s lifeworlds and the translation 
of their views into a perspective compatible with social inquiry complicates or even precludes 
the idea of also working towards practical solutions and policy recommendations for solving 
unjust and conflictive trajectories examined.  
Covering these different aspects is, for one, simply a question of space and time being 
available for the detailed discussion of analysis and, more importantly, of taking seriously the 
obvious concerns about the ability of the international intervention and aid industry and state 
institutions to bring about sustainable forms of peace (Turner and Kühn 2016, Lottholz 2017b). 
On the other hand, there are ways to counter-act the logics and modes of operation of the 
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international intervention architecture ‘from within’; and given the longevity, constant 
extension and reproduction of this system such more ‘pragmatic’ strategies, as proposed by 
Millar (2014a: ch. 9) and similarly by Richmond (2011a), appear equally if not more important 
for the further development of peace, conflict and intervention studies. This research is more 
interested, however, in identifying potentials and instances of decolonial thinking and action in 
more micro, particular settings and aims to show how they may be combined and scaled up to 
effect progressive change, but also hijacked and inverted to merely simulate the latter.  
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Chapter III Post-liberal statebuilding and community security in Central Asia 
 
This chapter situates the research within debates on post-liberal and hybrid state- and 
peacebuilding and presents the theoretical approach for the analysis of imaginaries of 
statebuilding in community security discourses and practices. This serves to specify the 
contribution of the dissertation to peace- and statebuilding debates on the basis of the critical, 
decolonial approach I have outlined in the previous chapter. I also set out my analytical 
framework by discussing the role of imaginaries in processes of statebuilding and, lastly, the 
literature on community security and its interrelation with debates in peace, conflict and 
intervention studies.  
 In the first section, I review recent literature on post-liberal state- and peacebuilding and 
develop the two normative categories of decoloniality and governmentality that inform my 
analytical framework for researching post-liberal governance in Central Asia, which I present 
in more detail as well. In a third step, I conceptualise the role of social imaginaries in 
statebuilding processes by reviewing relevant literature and linking it to the overall inquiry into 
the hybridisation of discourses and practices of statebuilding. Finally, I show how research on 
community security, which is rarely discussed in relation to peace, conflict and intervention 
studies, revolves around the same themes and is exposing the same logics as the ‘liberal peace’ 
debate, namely the problem of governmentality precluding potentials for developing 
‘emancipatory’ practices and policies. The chapter forms the basis for the analysis of the (re-) 
production of imaginaries of statebuilding in community security discourses and practices, 
which I present in the remainder of the thesis. 
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III.1 Conceptualising the global shift to post-liberal statebuilding: Emancipation, 
governmentality, decoloniality    
 
Emancipation vs governmentality?  
The two thinkers that at the forefront of debates on post-liberalism in peace, conflict and 
intervention studies, Oliver Richmond David Chandler, can both be associated with the strands 
of critical literatures reviewed above (III.1 and II.1). Coming from an IR background 
established through publications in a critical realm (Richmond 2008, 2005; Chandler 2009b, 
2004, 2002a and 2002b), both have based their work on largely discourse-focused analysis (e.g. 
Richmond 2011a, 2011c; Chandler 2006a, 2000) and put forward their conceptions of ‘post-
liberal peace’ (Richmond 2011a) and ‘post-liberal governance’ (Chandler 2010b).  
The two authors differ in their critiques of the ‘liberal peace’ (see section II.1) and more 
so in the conclusions they draw from it. Richmond foresees a way to mitigate the shortcomings 
of the liberal peace. In his conceptualisation of ‘post-liberal peace’, he invokes de Certeau’s 
Practice of everyday life (1984) as a way to access the issues that really preoccupy people in 
post-conflict societies, for instance ‘issues of rights, needs and welfare’ (2009b: 331, see also 
2009a and 2011a, ch. 5), which would lie beyond the scope of liberal peacebuilding. The 
recognition of and engagement with such local, ‘subaltern’ points of view would then enable 
interventions geared towards recipients’ needs and a re-negotiation of post-conflict peace- and 
statebuilding (2009b: 331, 2011a).   
 David Chandler’s approach to post-liberalism emphasises how the emergence of 
statebuilding as a paradigm has given rise to post-liberal governance with largely problematic 
and negative implications for political struggle and resistance (Chandler 2010b). Here, ‘post-
liberal’ emphasises that the autonomy of individual states in the international order is limited 
in the post-Cold War world. Developed in reaction to civil wars and conflicts since the end of 
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the Cold War, international norms and principles like the Responsibility to Protect, ‘good 
governance’ and commitment to transparency, anti-corruption and human rights are 
constituting a default design for new states that are being built after conflict, which predisposes 
the way they will be integrated into the international system. By exploring the policies of 
specific liberal peace actors, for instance the European Union and its involvement in South-
Eastern Europe (2000a, 2006a, 2010b: ch. 5), Chandler shows how this path-dependency is 
discursively constructed and consolidated by immense amounts of aid and other assistance in 
the legal, governance, security and military sectors. The way in which such contingencies are 
downplayed and naturalised leads him to argue that the European Union is a case of Empire in 
denial (2006a), under whose aegis peripheral and post-conflict countries have no real choice 
but to conform to all the standards and expectations thrust upon them by Western states. In this 
sense, Chandler’s work points out how the nature of the international order but also life as such 
in the contemporary, late modern period, posit multiple challenges that have to be tackled in 
search of a better life.   
In these two authors’ confrontation of each other’s views on post-liberalism (Chandler 
and Richmond 2015), Chandler generally denies the emancipatory potential that Richmond sees 
in the concept of post-liberalism. He concedes that ‘everyday’ voices of ordinary people in 
post-conflict societies may play a role and have some emancipatory potential, as argued by 
Richmond, given the fact that this everyday and ‘local’ perspective has already been 
incorporated into peacebuilding interventions since the 1990s (Chandler and Richmond 2015: 
19, Carothers and Ottaway 2000).1 Chandler argues that this framework with its focus on the 
                                                
1 Similarly, Richmond and Mac Ginty (2013) diagnose a ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding based on 
the increased level of incorporation of local staff into INGOs and other international actors’ 
operations indicating increased agency, although they remain wary as to the emancipatory 
potential this shift might have.  
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societal sphere and social interaction – where, according to Richmond, a solution to the current 
deadlock may be found – ‘despite its claims to “deeper” and more “bottom-up” or “social” 
understandings of post-conflict peace, remains entirely within the world of superficial 
appearances’ (Chandler and Richmond 2015: 19-20). He bases this argument on Louis 
Althusser’s work about the ideological embeddedness of the subject. According to Althusser 
(2008), the subject is already embedded in ideology through ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ 
(see III.4) and different cultural and religious institutions, and even through social practices in 
the private sphere, all of which are shaping the subject’s cognitive and ideational 
understandings (Chandler and Richmond 2015: 18). Therefore, the barrier to shaping more 
emancipatory, just and peaceful societies cannot be overcome by disclosing the everyday 
perspectives and needs of populations – it is exactly there, Chandler contends, ‘…in the 
“materiality” of the mind-set of the subject, understood to be false, imaginary or ideological, 
due to the problematic societal practices in which they are embedded’ where the problem lies 
in the first place (ibid.: 20).  
Against this impasse situated in the subjectivities produced by technologies of 
government in the post-liberal social order, Richmond holds that the ‘liberal peace’ that 
Northern/Western actors were seeking to install in post-conflict countries around the globe has 
not materialised yet, either. On the contrary, he argues, ‘this is a reconstitution of responsibility 
in which hybrid political dynamics might lead to a hybrid form of peace … [which] involves 
agonistic mediations of difference … in which inequalities are teased out and responded to by 
policy’ (ibid.: 11). Whereas Richmond is thus optimistic that ‘[i]f the international [sic] peace 
and statebuilding project is a form of neoliberal governmentality, the project collapses when its 
subjects refuse that direction’ (ibid.: 9), Chandler remains sceptical of such a potential for a 
critical, reflective agency. The two authors seem to agree to disagree on whether post-liberalism 
bears more emancipatory potential, or whether it is emancipation itself that might conceal 
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instances of ideological embeddedness and counter-hegemonic trajectories. In this sense, the 
binary ‘emancipatory vs. governmentality’ appears to be a useful way to discuss the 
implications of post-liberal forms of peace- and statebuilding (see Graef 2015: 31). However, 
as I show in the following, it is the appropriation of the idea of emancipation that helps to justify 
and legitimise forms of authoritarian governmentality and biopolitical subjectification the 
world over. My argument for inquiring post-liberal forms of peace- and statebuilding from a 
practice-based, emic perspective, and the idea of approaching such inquiry from a decolonial 
angle (see below) is grounded in a common concern with Chandler’s sceptical stance on the 
possibility of emancipatory action and agency.    
 
Decoloniality  
Given the shortcomings of peace, conflict and intervention research at large, and especially in 
light of the contradictions faced by critical peacebuilding scholarship itself (see previous 
chapter), it appears that a more critical reflection on global peace- and statebuilding intervention 
along the lines of decolonial theory is possible, desirable and necessary. More than showing 
how international interveners fail their missions, a decolonial variant of critical peace research 
would show how peace- and statebuilding programmes reproduce and stabilise political and 
economic dynamics going back to Cold War and colonial times (see Turner and Kühn 2016, 
Sabaratnam 2017, 2013b).  
A decolonial approach to peace research would go one step further than critical 
peacebuilding scholars in that it does away with the implicit assumption that peace- and 
statebuilding interventions might somehow fix societies in such a way that they can evolve 
sustainably and stably and attain levels of wealth and well-being comparable to industrial 
countries (Finlay 2015). As different scholars in Marxist political economy and world systems 
theory have argued, the way the global economy has evolved seems to already have made it 
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impossible for all non-developed and non-industrialised countries to reach the level of 
economic growth (and hence, welfare) of the developed world (Held 2007, Duffield 2007, 
Doucet 2016).2 Some have argued that so-called ‘emerging powers’ might be able to challenge 
this disequilibrium and may be able to affect a reversal of the inequality between developed 
and under-developed nations. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that these powers 
increasingly take on a role very similar to that of industrial countries, facilitating the formation 
of regional trade blocs whose cooperation terms they dominate and thereby entrench the 
peripheral status of smaller, non-industrialised economies.  
A decolonial perspective inquires the ways in which the creation, establishment and 
reproduction of modernity – in the form of the nation state, its institutions and corresponding 
forms of knowledge, the Enlightenment or modern ‘episteme’ – produces adverse effects on 
people’s wellbeing – material, physical, mental, spiritual and otherwise (Mignolo 2011). It 
inquires how, on the contrary, the adoption and consolidation of modern forms of social 
organisation leads to the expansion, entrenchment and reproduction of a capitalist system of 
production, which places people into hierarchical relations of exploitative and coercive 
character, which generate and entrench precarious livelihoods. Both the current state of the 
relations of production and social reproduction (i.e. sustenance of livelihood of oneself and 
one’s family), as well past processes leading up the establishment, consolidation and 
normalisation of these relations are of interest for a decolonial perspective.3 The specific 
                                                
2 This seems an inevitable fact not only given the limited energy resources and commodities 
available on the planet, but also, and especially, when looking at the way in which international 
institutional regimes and bilateral economic and foreign policies have served to entrench the 
inequality across (and within) countries across the globe. 
3 In Mignolo’s words: ‘Decolonial thinking … [is] nothing more than a relentless analytic effort 
to understand, in order to overcome, the logic of coloniality underneath the rhetoric of 
modernity, the structure of management and control that emerged out of the transformation of 
the economy in the Atlantic, and the jump in knowledge that took place both in the internal 
history of Europe and in between Europe and its colonies.’ (2011: 10)		
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interest for a decolonial peace research perspective is in this regard the establishment non-
violent social relations and commensurable foundations for livelihoods.  
These considerations from a decolonial angle in peace research lead to the concept 
which I use to normatively assess the trajectories of peace- and statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan in 
the analytical part of this dissertation. Rather than asking what ‘emancipates’ or ‘empowers’ 
people in relation to peacebuilding interventions and state policies, I argue that the concept of 
decoloniality is more useful as it helps to inquire if and how people are able to imagine a way 
of life that does not succumb to the social structure of capitalist modernity and its 
commodifying, hierarchising and alienating tendencies, in the first place. This does not mean 
that I am searching for an actually existing decolonial ‘political project’, i.e. a collective effort 
to create and facilitate justice, equality and wellbeing in the most unconditional and egalitarian 
fashion. Rather, I understand decoloniality as a diffuse, amorphous form of being, acting and 
knowing, which is often only faintly present in the narratives and practices observable in 
people’s lifeworlds (Tlostanova in Megoran et al. 2012: 366). Decoloniality thus rarely takes 
the form of an analytically identifiable ‘political subjecthood’ (Sabaratnam 2011c: 199 ff.) let 
alone agency.4 Furthermore, a decolonial perspective helps to critically analyse the ways in 
which emancipatory political projects enact resistance against imperial and neo-liberal geo-
political and individual interests, but instantaneously produce social formations with 
hierarchical and coercive effects (Owen et al. 2018, see Moreiras 1999). As I discuss in the 
following sections, the (re-) appropriation of emancipatory and empowering ideals for such 
projects can be conceptualised through the concept of governmentality, which is a useful 
analytical counter-pole to the ideal of decoloniality.        
 
                                                
4 Although these loose threads are of major interest for a decolonial project, which imagines 
and conceptualises ways to enact a world beyond the vagaries of capitalist modernity. 
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A decolonial perspective on post-liberal statebuilding in Central Asia 
Based on the discussion of the limits and underdeveloped aspects of the post-liberal lens for the 
study of peace, conflict and intervention (chapter II), I now turn to the implications of the above 
discussion of post-liberalism for a decolonial perspective on statebuilding processes in Central 
Asia. This analysis extends Chandler’s argument that post-liberalism transcends liberal 
understandings of politics and society via processes of ideological embedding and interpellation 
of subjects. This point resonates with recent contributions in the literature on authoritarian 
regimes in the post-Soviet space, which point to the appropriation of the argument for 
democratic choice by increasingly undemocratic political leaders and governments 
(Omelicheva 2015, Szostek 2017, March 2003). The hybridisation of democratic principles 
with regionally and nationally specific understandings of governance and order-making thus 
appear to have led to a specific form of neo-authoritarian governmentality, in two key ways.  
First, a post-liberal understanding of the international political economy and its 
dynamics foregrounds a teleological understanding of globalisation and market integration, 
which in turn helps to justify political ruling and decision-making practices that superordinate 
‘effectiveness’ over democratic deliberation and critical discussion (Omelicheva 2015: 76, 81, 
86-87). Similarly, Chandler has observed how in the currently emerging post-liberal politics, 
the choices available to governments are presented as limited and imperatives of integration 
with existing international institutional architectures and standards of market economy, human 
rights and transparency leave little to no alternative (2010b: ch. 2). This discursive construction 
of a pre-determined integration route is a continuation of the ‘there is no alternative’ rhetoric 
hailing from 1970s and 1980s, the early years of neo-liberal configuration of state-market 
relations (2010b: ch. 3). It also presents a de facto ‘post-conditionality’ regime, where certain 
policies and institutional designs are not affected by loan conditionalities as used to be the case 
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in the 1980s, but are justified in terms of their inevitability and being a natural part of a modern 
state in the 21st century (2010b: 55, Harrison 2001).  
In similar fashion, following fall of the Soviet Union, the presidents of the newly 
independent Central Asian republics constructed their countries’ integration into the 
international economy and their structural and institutional reform as inevitable, although to 
differing degrees, depending on their dependence on international financial borrowing 
(Omelicheva 2015, Broome 2010). Regardless of their degree of integration, trade liberalisation 
and restructuring of the economy, however, it can be argued that all of these polities maintained 
a discourse about the necessity of a strong state and ‘strong-handed’ government in managing 
economic affairs for the benefit of the people (Omelicheva 2015: 91-92). Prozorov traces this 
discourse back into Stalinist times and invokes the term of the ‘effective manager’ (2016: ch. 
1), whose supposed competency in managing economic and political affairs reflects the 
paternalistic logic of policy-making characteristic of other Central Asian and post-Soviet 
countries (Lewis 2016: 389). The distinguishing feature in post-Soviet politics is that ‘state of 
emergency’ kind of policy-making, which gives little space to deliberation, dissent or 
alternative proposals, is normalised, resulting in a top-down mode of governance justified as 
inevitable both in light of the precarious conditions of the global economy, but often also with 
reference to the cultural specificities of the respective country or region (Makarychev and 
Medvedev 2015, Omelicheva 2015: 91-92).  
 The second feature of a post-liberal form of governance discernible in the post-Soviet 
space and Central Asian region in particular is the appropriation of ideas of emancipation and 
empowerment based on cultural values and welfare needs; the very same idea as proposed in 
Richmond’s conception of a ‘post-liberal peace’ (2011a: ch. 3; 2009a). Especially the fact that 
two and a half decades of transition towards a liberal-democratic capitalist order have not 
yielded tangible improvements in the lives of the majority of people in a relatively open country 
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like Kyrgyzstan helps to back claims that this and other countries are in need of a special, 
context-sensitive model of development (Omelicheva 2015: 83, Trevisani 2014). Therefore, the 
main implication of a post-liberal politics based on culture – Central Asian culture’s 
pronounced difference from ‘the West’ – and welfare – whose provision through a liberal-
capitalist model has proven elusive for the majority of Central Asian populations – is a rejection 
of Western norms, assistance and intervention (Omelicheva 2015). The Central Asian variant 
of a peaceful and sustainable post-liberal development path would thus appear to primarily 
transcend or replace the different components of public debate and scientific discourse for more 
paternalistic and charismatic forms of politics.5  
These two trends in the recent politics of Central Asian countries seem to point to the 
differentiation of a ‘neo-authoritarian’ governmentality as a hybrid, post-liberal from of order 
and governance, which might present itself as emancipatory and empowering, but is eventually 
merely perpetuating or entrenching the essentialist and exclusionary tendencies of capitalist 
modernity. The new self-branding and legitimation of authoritarian regimes has been noticed 
in area studies research, which, contrary to earlier research that emphasised the coercive, 
repressive and manipulative practices of political actors (see Levitsky and Way 2010 and 
appendix 4), found that especially Central Asian leaders ‘[a]chiev[e] a degree of “legitimacy” 
which fosters compliance with the existing domestic order’ (Matveeva 2009: 1095). Governing 
methods from the Soviet period – for instance appeals to a common history, belonging and 
civilisational heritage and construction or extension of national ideologies – are used to 
mobilise support and consent extending beyond the status of mere official discourse into the 
realm of everyday interactions and emotions (Schoeberlein and Murzakulova 2009, Goode and 
                                                
5 In the next chapter (section IV.3), I show how this trend is best captured in the imaginary of 
a ‘politics of sovereignty’ (see Gullette and Heathershaw 2015), through which politics is 
conceived of as a technocratic exercise carried out by people authoritative by virtue of their 
expertise or otherwise.   
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Stroup 2015, Féaux de la Croix and Ismailbekova 2014). The significant degree of discursive 
and ideational self-legitimation used by Central Asian regimes thus seems to best be captured 
by the label ‘neo-authoritarian’ (Becker 2004, Nachtwey 2016).6 Situated in a conceptual realm 
beyond the divide between authoritarian, illiberal forms of politics on the one hand and liberal 
ones on the other, the term ‘neo-authoritarian governmentality’ captures the ambiguity of the 
appropriation of the concept of democracy by Central Asian leaders and elites, whose ‘local’, 
context-specific forms of democracy are not rarely enacted at the expense of people who think 
or look differently than the majority in a given country.  
As I have argued above (chapter II), focussing inquiry onto the subjectivities involved 
in statebuilding and political reform processes through a dialogical approach allows to better 
capture the different perspectives on one and the same reality and the modalities of post-liberal 
governance arising therein. Still, such a focus on the different regimes of knowledge and 
processes of ideational/ideological interpellation also brings with it a fundamental challenge. 
This challenge lies in the fact that political contestation does not only concern debates on peace, 
conflict or political systems but the very understandings, or rather standpoints of knowledge 
and facticity in and of themselves (Lottholz 2017a). Different authors have observed that the 
assertion of cultural variation in understandings of knowledge, facticity and ‘truth’ has already 
been applied in political discourse itself, even to the extent that acknowledging the (non-) reality 
of certain events and facts becomes a matter of political loyalty and national or cultural 
belonging (Szostek 2017, Ortmann and Heathershaw 2012, Rosaldo 1993). This leads to a 
conflation of subjectivity and facticity, via political viewpoints and belonging, which has wide-
reaching implications for politics in what Pomerantsev has called a ‘post-truth world’ (2016). 
                                                
6 Becker develops a concept of neo-authoritarian media system in the case of Russia under 
Vladimir Putin (2004: 149-150), while Nachtwey argues that the downward mobility of 
peripheral milieus of German society, both in economic and symbolic terms, makes them 
susceptible to populist political mobilisation and gives rise to a ‘liberalism with authoritarian 
grounding’ (Nachtwey 2016: 78, see also Balhorn 2016).   
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This means that even if people may be aware of the complexity and contestations around, for 
instance, a fragile peace marred by coercive governmental policies or disproportionate 
affectedness of certain groups, conforming to the public discourse on the events and 
disregarding, or even denying, uncomfortable truths becomes a matter of good citizenship or 
even personal security.  
Encouraging people to admit contradictions in their own worldview, or gathering a wide 
enough range of viewpoints to do so by triangulation, thus becomes a methodological, and often 
ethical challenge for the researcher. It also requires a more systematic approach to inquiry 
which embraces the complexity and contradictoriness of the socio-discursive sphere instead of 
taking side with the most reasonable version of competing truths about the history, present and 
future pathways of political and social processes. In this sense, it is necessary to discard the 
neo-liberal episteme (Richmond 2009b: 332, Mac Ginty 2014) – a conception of knowledge as 
something being clearly definable and handy for translation across contexts and into practical 
application– in favour of a ‘post-liberal episteme’, which, according to Pugh, ‘works with rather 
than challenges complex life’ (2014: 316). This is the basis for an analysis of the processes by 
which certain forms of knowledge – whether narratives about past events and history or 
conceptions about democracy, development, or peace – become salient and inform dominant, 
socially grounded, or hegemonic, forms of discourse and corresponding practices of peace- and 
statebuilding.  
In this sense, I understand a post-liberal approach to researching statebuilding processes 
in Central Asia not only as focussed on the way in which liberal politics and policy-making are 
transcended, but also as an epistemological commitment to expose the multiplicity and 
dialogicality of knowledge in Kyrgyzstan, which does not lend itself to an inquiry from a liberal 
Enlightenment episteme with its unified conception of knowledge. More than conceptualising 
the shift from liberal to post-liberal forms of social ordering, political debates and 
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depoliticisation, this approach is intended to depart from the neo-liberal scientific episteme 
identified above by providing more nuance and grasp of complexity in the analysis of 
international(ised) processes of state- and peacebuilding, community security and related 
practices. It does so by departing from a focus on ‘international’ and ‘local’ actors and the 
respective vectors of action, not to say ‘agency’, they exhibit to follow.  
This way, the complex and multifarious ways in which different actors in Kyrgyzstan 
position themselves with, against or in ambivalent relation to actors that could be called 
‘international’ is captured in a way akin to the concept of heteroglossia proposed by the Russian 
philosopher and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin’s conceptualisation of hybridity (1981). In 
complex environments, one and the same semantic unit may have multiple meanings depending 
on the speaker, the audience and their respective intentions and agendas. In such a world, any 
utterance made serves to ‘appropriate the words of others and populate them with one’s own 
intention’ (Bakhtin 1981: 21). The logical consequence is that ‘[t]he subject is surrounded by a 
myriad of responses, each of which must be framed in a specific discourse chosen from this 
available multiplicity’ (Tate 2007: 9). I will attempt to deconstruct and analytically structure 
this multiplicity of meanings and associations surrounding discourses and practise of peace-
/statebuilding and community security through the concept of the imaginary, which I discuss in 
turn. The contribution of Bakhtin’s conception of hybridity and of a focus on hybridity and 
hybridisation in the conceptual/ideational realm (Millar 2014b) is discussed in more detail in 
appendix 4.  
 
III.2 Conceptualising the role of social imaginaries in statebuilding processes 
In light of the above-discussed necessity for peace- and statebuilding research to engage more 
directly with the subjectivities involved in the process and the lifeworlds affected by it, I 
introduce the concept of social imaginary as a device to analyse the nexus between social 
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discourses on the one hand and concrete practices and events on the other. I first introduce the 
concept and describe how it is situated at the intersection of socio-psychological and 
psychoanalytical studies and political and social research disciplines, more generally. After 
that, I discuss the spectrum of theoretical perspectives on the role of imaginaries, ranging from 
those emphasising its potential to encourage and enable agency to those conceiving of it as a 
tool of ideological interpellation and governmentality.  
 
The imaginary as link between material and metaphysical realm 
Although primarily associated with the psychoanalytic theory of Lacan and Freud, the key 
aspect of the concept of ‘imaginary’ is that it links the realm of cognition and ideas with the 
real world and the interactions and processes taking place in it. While the concept has been 
associated with the postmodern turn in the social sciences and its preoccupation with virtual 
and ideational forces, it can be traced back to the works of Durkheim and Marx’s early writings 
on ideology (Elliott 2002: 143). In this sense, it helps to bridge and mediate between the 
structural and materialist determinisms of realist and Marxist social theory and the primacy of 
ideas postulated by radical constructivists.7  
The scholar with whose work the imaginary is often associated is Cornelius Castoriadis. 
His Imaginary institution of society (1987) has become a reference point from which other 
applications of the concept were developed. According to Elliot, Castoriadis ‘conceptualises 
political processes, or pretty much any processes of human interaction as taking place in an 
imaginary, metaphysical realm’ (2002: 154):  
                                                
7 An implicit forerunner of this compromise can be found in the early literature on nationalism 
and nations. In his seminal work, Benedict Anderson defined nation as ‘an imagined political 
community’ (1983: 15) and thereby already lays the ground work for the analysis of political 
processes not only in discourses and narratives situated in the political or public sphere but also 
their reception, appropriation and reproduction in the informal, everyday spheres through to the 
realm of cognition and sub-/unconscious reactions. 
		78 
Those who speak of the “imaginary,” understanding by this the “specular,” the reflection 
of the “fictive,” do no more than repeat, usually without realizing it, the affirmation 
which has for all time chained them to the underground of the famous cave: it is 
necessary that this world be an image of something. (Castoriadis 1987: 3) 
This is reflective of a cognitive psychological approach which conceives of the imaginary as a 
mirror image, in which the world is reflected and thus perceived in a unique way by each 
individual. The perceptions and understandings of the world in this imaginary register are 
subject to different distortions and influences depending on contextual factors.8  
 While this understanding of the cognitive realm foregrounded a potential for radical 
change (see below), the structural linguistic aspect of the imaginary also helps to explain 
stability and normality in the sense that people come to imagine certain behaviours, ways of 
life and political or historical processes as occurring in accordance to a set of inherent and 
universal rules. In this sense, the idea of the imaginary extends both Bourdieu’s practice theory 
– in which he argues that practices as well as everyday life follow a natural order that ‘goes 
without saying’ (Bourdieu 1977: 175, original emphasis) – and, in a more implicit manner, 
Foucault’s observations on how this conduct of life may be regulated and governed (Foucault 
1991). Castoriadis himself argues that the imaginary is not a mere projection or mirage, but 
emanates from ‘proper’, physical things and actions in the ‘real world’, which can be as diverse 
as ‘a machine gun, a call to arms, a pay check and high-priced essential goods, a court decision 
and a prison’ (Castoriadis 1987: 109). 
 The imaginary thus helps to analytically capture the establishment, consolidation, 
normalisation and reproduction of the modern capitalist order. Charles Taylor has added more 
                                                
8 This subjectivist approach squares with Bakhtin’s dialogical imagination in its emphasis on 
the polyphonic, multifarious and also unpredictable, uncontrollable nature of imagination 
(appendix 6). 
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nuance to this conception, arguing that the ‘modern social imaginary’ is the ‘way we understand 
our society’:  
It incorporates a sense of the normal expectations that we have of one another, the kind 
of common understanding which enables us to carry out the collective practices that 
make up our social life. (Taylor 2007: 30) 
He further advances from Castoriadis’ position by way of indicating an entry point for the 
analysis of the imaginary as the ‘way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings, and 
this is often not expressed in theoretical terms; it is carried in images, stories, and legends’ 
(2002: 106). This foregrounds a broad perspective on the different ways in which imaginaries 
materialise in visual artefacts, stories, and, importantly in the case of Kyrgyzstan, history, or 
specifically historiography as a technique for utilising representations of the past for shaping 
the way in which society is imagined.  
 This sets the basis for a conception of technologies of government that is less 
deterministic regarding the role of language and discourse (something that Foucauldian and 
Lacanian approaches have been criticised for), and puts a balanced emphasis on the basic 
cognitive and discursive predispositions of a specific societal imaginary and the corresponding 
processes of reception of and reaction to certain discourses or imageries. Such processes are 
conceptualised in Valaskivi and Sumiala’s discussion of ‘circulating social imaginaries’ (2014). 
They make the conceptual step from conceiving of one imaginary as a cognitive plane on which 
people’s understanding of societies is based (Castoriadis) to thinking about several, co-existing 
and possibly competing or contradicting imaginaries of what society is and should be. They 
also provide an idea about the movement of such imaginaries through space and time: ‘social 
imaginaries do not hang in the air, but are attached to material objects and representations, and 
that, as they travel and take different paths from one location to another’ (2014: 240). An 
imaginary ‘gains its power from the circulation in different materials, mediated places and 
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spaces (including both virtual and physical places), and in the shared encounters between 
individuals created by circulation’ (ibid.).  
 Under certain circumstances, the (re-) production of an imaginary might thus be a rather 
straightforward process, such as in the case of a ‘highly media-saturated’ society with an 
‘affective economy of virtual encounters, remediation and circulation’ (2014: 240).9 They 
emphasise, however, that the patterns of circulation are not necessarily linear but may take 
multiple and hard-conceivable routes. Sneath, Holbraad and Pedersen re-affirm this non-
deterministic stance, arguing that: 
While it is amply clear ... that the effects we call imaginary may indeed serve a variety 
of purposes (divination, politics, ethics, and so on), it is also fundamental to bear in 
mind that the emergence of these effects qua underdetermined ‘technologies’ is, 
precisely, not purposeful (2009: 26).  
This statement distinguishes the idea of the imaginary from a conceptualisation as a technology 
of government, i.e. utilisation of discursive, material and practical items for ordering, 
structuring and regulating society. While Sneath and others may be right that such change may 
not be in itself purposeful, it is nevertheless important to analytically consider the ways in which 
technological advancements are used by governments to improve their leverage, as well as by 
social actors to resist or evade the reach of the latter.  
 A first conclusion is that imaginaries can be understood as mental constructs 
materialising in different ways, e.g. in images, stories, and legends (Castoriadis 2002: 106) or 
different kinds of discourses and narratives circulated through certain types of media (Valaskivi 
and Sumiala 2014; Sneath et al. 2009). Furthermore, an imaginary need not always be explicitly 
formulated, but can be implicit in, and made up by, a number of such elements. In this sense, I 
                                                
9 Such as the US, where, as they show, an absolute personality cult around Apple founder Steve 
Jobs emerged and was propelled into global consumption circuits (ibid.).  
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understand the imaginary as a prism or filter that influences people’s processing of and relation 
to images, discourses and implicit understandings of how things should be done and work their 
way in the world, e.g. in specific ‘real-world’ practices such as peace- and statebuilding or 
community security. The experiences and perceptions people make in such a specific field will 
in turn feed back into their understandings of how things work and should be done, in the 
process challenging, re-shaping, but also confirming and reproducing the imaginaries that 
inform their thinking.  
Thus, a cyclical understanding of the production of meaning and understanding in social 
and political life emerges, which, as illustrated below, I apply in my analysis of imaginaries of 
peace- and statebuilding in chapters IV-VII. In this sense, I see the imaginary as a higher order 
of discourse or a group of discourses with a common denominator, or, to use Laclau and 
Mouffe’s description of discourse, ‘nodal points’ that ‘fix meaning’ in a more significant way 
than their composite or related discourse (1985: 100, Lewis 2017: 34). My understanding of 
discourse is based on Fairclough’s three-fold conceptualisation of discourse as text, i.e. spoken 
or written words; ‘discursive practice’, which denotes ‘the nature of the processes of text 
production and interpretation’; and, finally, social practice, which emphasises the social, 
institutional or otherwise background of a discursive event (1992: 4). As indicated already in 
my outline of a dialogical approach to capturing the heteroglossia, i.e. multiplicity of meaning 
underlying signifiers (Bakhtin 1981), I am interested especially in how particular practices or 
discourses of peacebuilding present hybridisations and combinations of potentially 
contradictory discourses and imaginaries of peacebuilding.    
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Figure 3.1: Cyclical production of meaning between imaginaries and specific practical  
fields; All figures are author illustrations  
 
The imaginary between radical alternatives and ideological interpellation 
To further conceptualise the usefulness of the imaginary for inquiring processes of post-liberal 
statebuilding and social ordering, it is worth identifying the different potentials of change and 
stabilisation that have been theorised for this concept. As already pointed out, the fact that the 
imaginary is created and reproduced in people’s minds made some theorists argue that it has an 
inherent potential for creativity, unpredictability and even ungovernability – after all, people 
can be considered free to think what they want regardless how their behaviour and different 
aspects of life may be regulated or restrained.10 This view on the imaginary, especially 
pronounced in Castoriadis’ theory, stands in contrast to the structural-linguistic understandings 
of the psyche and the self in society that dominated the psychoanalytic theory of Freud, de 
Saussure and Lacan. According to that line of argument, language, understood as a system of 
                                                
10 In this sense, the imaginary appears a suitable concept to inquire the processes of 
hybridisation in the conceptual realm as discussed by Millar (2014b, see appendix 6).    
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signifiers, has the effect of placing the individual within the world as it gradually accesses the 
different discourses and rules and regulation or more generally ‘the way things are done’. This 
linear conception of individuation and the emergence of social structures foregrounded critical 
studies of conformity, normalisation and corresponding pathologies and problems, such as the 
apolitical and authoritarian tendencies of late modern societies (e.g. Marcuse 1964, Castoriadis 
1982).  
 One of the most notable works in this critical tradition is that of the Marxist philosopher 
Louis Althusser who argued that, by virtue of becoming part of capitalist society and passing 
through and interacting with ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’, people are constituted as subjects 
not only in the social sense, but also as subjects of capitalist ideology or variations thereof. 
Despite the diverse agendas and audiences of these apparatuses – ‘specialized institutions’ such 
as schools, universities, churches, trade unions, political parties, newspapers and the media in 
general (2008 [1970]: 18), Althusser argues that they are unified in their functioning ‘by 
ideology’; an ideology which is ‘in fact unified … beneath the ruling ideology’ (ibid.: 20, his 
emphasis).11 On this basis, Althusser formulates a class critique of the process by which 
individuals are becoming subjects of the modern state, i.e. the differentiation and normalisation 
of social structures, practices and understandings that Bourdieu, Castoriadis or Taylor theorised 
in the following years. More than just a process of becoming a subject or citizen of the modern 
state, Althusser conceived of subjectification as a process by which people were also, 
unwittingly, made part of the ideological project of a respective state, or rather its ruling class:  
[I]deology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the 
individuals … or ‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects … by that very precise 
                                                
11 The most dominant of these apparatuses is the school which, says Althusser, as it ‘drums into 
[children] ... a certain amount of ‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, 
arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state 
(ethics, civic instruction, philosophy)’ (2008: 29). 
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operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along 
the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’ 
… the hailed individual will turn around. By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degrees 
physical conversion, he becomes a subject. 
In this sense, living according to the normalised rules and rituals of capitalist society, an 
individual becomes interpellated as a subject of the ruling class ideology, a process as simple 
as it is inevitable.12 Althusser’s critical account of capitalist modernity is especially crucial for 
its pointing out how the ideology of the ruling class is not confined to that class and its 
supporters and affiliates, but in fact permeates all aspects of life via Ideological State 
Apparatuses which more or less directly propagate, stabilise and reproduce this ideology. 
Consequently, people’s imaginary understood in Castoriadis’ holistic sense, as an 
understanding of or consciousness about life, would be completely formulated out of this 
ideological interpellation and, therefore, unlikely be able to formulate a critique or ideas about 
a life alternative to the current one (Althusser 2008: 74, see also Chandler in Chandler and 
Richmond 2015).    
 Contrary to this somewhat pessimistic conception, other theorists have attributed a 
critical potential to the social imaginary. Castoriadis, according to Elliot,   
…offers a more differentiated view of the subject’s imaginary capacities for self-
representation and reflection, particularly as these capacities extend to issues of social 
domination on the one hand and resistance and autonomy on the other. [He] is cognizant 
of the dual nature of radical imagination: its omnipotence and illusion on the one side, 
                                                
12 Althusser also anticipates the normalisation or depoliticisation of this mechanism when 
stating that ‘one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation of the ideological character 
of ideology by ideology: ideology never says ‘I am ideological’. … individuals are always-
already interpellated by ideology as subjects’ (2008 :49-50). 
		85 
and the curtailments necessary to participation within the social imaginary on the other 
(2002: 155).  
So, Castoriadis believed that reflection, critical thinking and actions towards an alternative 
model of society were possible, but also, following the line of Althusser and critical theory 
scholars, acknowledged the limits posed to such an endeavour by the mechanisms of ideological 
interpellation and normalisation. This made it hard for him to reconcile the idea of a critical 
alternative with his disillusion with the vastness of the media and cultural industry, the 
entrenched trajectories of depoliticisation and privatisation in Western societies (Castoriadis 
1982). Echoing Althusser’s denial that any critical projects could be developed out of the 
ideologically contaminated sphere within the modern state, Castoriadis argued that radical 
alternative projects would have to be developed in autonomy from the latter: ‘We have to create 
the good under imperfectly known and uncertain conditions. The project of autonomy is end 
and guide, it does not resolve for us effectively actual situations’ (1989: 400).13  
 Arjun Appadurai posited the paramount significance of the imaginary in light of the 
proliferation of media and cultural industries and argued that it can be ‘a form of negotiation 
between sites of agency … and globally defined fields of possibility’ (1996: 31). Echoing the 
idea of imagination as a subversive or resistant activity, Appadurai focuses on how fields as 
diverse as professional cricket and life in local neighbourhoods in Mumbai affords small but 
not insignificant ‘pleasure of agency’ (1996: 111, his emphasis). This stance was criticised for 
being relativistic at best and elusive at worst. For instance, while Appdurai argued that the 
                                                
13 This idea of autonomy can be seen as a precursor for the idea of ‘de-linking’ put forward by 
Walter Mignolo, and to decolonial perspectives more generally. According to Mignolo, to 
evade the logics and imperatives of capitalist-colonial governmentality, a decolonial project has 
to ‘de-link’ from the institutions, actors and exchange relations of the global political economy 
(Mignolo 2012). A decolonial project within the capitalist-colonial political economy would, 
on the other hand, be dependent on consequent resistance and tactics for the subversion and 
utilisation of the system’s logics against itself. 
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Society for the Promotion of Area Resources (SPARC) in Mumbai was an example of ‘deep 
democracy’ mediating between the imaginaries of local communities, on the one hand, and the 
interests of national and international actors, on the other (2002), Whitehead and More argued 
that he underappreciated the ‘ways in which various NGOs may become unwittingly positioned 
as part of the consensual wing of post-liberalisation governance’, in which responsibilities were 
arbitrated and effectively downplayed to the detriment of poor city dwellers (2007: 2428).  
This exemplifies the limitations of a conceptualisation of imaginaries as a potential site 
for the construction of better lives, or even agency: if the terms of such imagining are the ones 
established and shaped by capitalist modernity, then the alternative that is being imagined 
cannot but reproduce this order and its historical legacies. As I show in the discussion of the 
different imaginaries of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan in the following chapter, the implication 
of this critical approach is to see different understandings of what social order should look like, 
e.g. the Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary, on the one hand, and the imaginary of ‘politics of 
sovereignty’ on the other, not (only) in terms of their mutual contradiction, but rather in terms 
of their formulation out of, and inextricable links with, the modern capitalist-colonial system 
and its logics of producing identity and difference. In the following and final section of this 
chapter, I show how this system has produced regressive outcomes in the well-meaning 
initiatives to promote community security and crime prevention in a number of countries.   
 
III.3 Community security as practice of peace- and statebuilding  
As I have already argued in chapter II (especially section II.3), rather than conceiving of peace- 
or statebuilding in the macro perspective and with the universalistic ambition of discussing 
what sustainable peace should or should not look like, peace, conflict and intervention studies 
should focus on specific areas within the large pool of practices associated with the field in 
order to produce more theoretically focused and empirically grounded research. At first glance, 
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it would appear that community security is of central importance for post-conflict 
reconstruction, reconciliation and peacebuilding studies. The absence of this concept from the 
peace and conflict studies literature14 indicates an omission in the literature that this research 
aims to fill.  
Community security has caught more attention in policy circles, with organisations such 
as the UK-based international NGO Saferworld and UNDP being the most significant advocates 
(see Saferworld 2014, 2007 and UNDP 2009, see also). These outputs from existing projects 
provide a good basis for the discussion of the relevance of community security for statebuilding 
processes as they sum up the literature and policy knowledge about community security. One 
puzzle about this literature is that most of the analysis is framed as concerned with the practice 
of ‘community policing’ rather than the goal of ‘community security’ (e.g. Ferreira 1996, 
Saferworld 2007). This is also the case in more academic studies, where all contributions to 
‘community security’ thinking have been made with primary attention to policing – specifically 
‘community’ or ‘plural policing’ – and security sector reform (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009, 
Brogden and Nijhar 2005, Albrecht and Kyed 2014, Ryan 2011). ‘Community policing’ 
appears to be understood as synonymous with community security, which seems inaccurate, 
though, as certainly not all practises of community policing will also increase the feeling and 
measureable indicators of community security.  
This key difference foregrounds my argument that about the role of community security 
practices and their role for building, extending, consolidating and maintaining functions of state 
power. To the extent that community security includes practices of community policing – i.e. 
surveillance and maintenance of order through patrolling and other actions, we can say that it 
helps to maintain state power and structures, thus reproducing governmentality. The counter-
                                                
14 Apart from little search results in peace and conflict journals, one indication of this side-
lining of community security is by the Routledge Handbook of Human Security (Martin and 
Owen 2014), in which the idea of ‘community security’ is not discussed at all. 
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model to such governmentality is the idea that community security practice can also include 
ways of (re-) ordering and steering society in more positive ways, e.g. by identifying and 
treating root causes of crime and conflict or by encouraging and strengthening solidarity to 
mitigate and help people deal with them. The latter might include methods more directly 
relating to crime and security, e.g. crime prevention, education about different criminal 
practices and on how to avoid them. As I show in chapter V, in Kyrgyzstan community security 
actors do not only focus on security and crime prevention as such, but try to improve the 
situation through significant engagement in the spheres of education, culture and everyday life. 
Still, both practices examined in Kyrgyzstan and contributions in the literature leave open 
questions as to the wider issues affecting people’s lives and thus levels of crime, such as social 
injustice, economic precarity and insufficient state policies.  
To illustrate this ‘situatedness’ or ‘embeddedness’ of community security and crime 
prevention practices within a field of tension between governmentality and more sustainable, 
decolonial modalities of social ordering, I review the emergence and development of 
‘community safety’ from the 1980s until the early 2000s and show how it became superseded 
by a more policy-focused concern with ‘crime prevention’. Based on this insight into the 
overlap of cultural and communal rituals and practices on the one hand and technologies of 
government on the other, I discuss how community security and community policing are 
situated at the intersection of statebuilding, peacebuilding and security practices and academic 
discourses and point out their relevance for my analysis of community security practices in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Community safety: From crime prevention to neoliberal governmentality 
A survey of debates and policy-measures around ‘community safety’ illustrates the trade-off 
between ambitions to empower and give voice to communities and, on the other hand, to 
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employ communities’ knowledge and forms of social ordering and regulation to deliver results 
in crime reduction and stabilisation and order in the face of political-economic restructuring. 
Although largely constrained to the Anglo-American countries, tracing the debate in that 
context yields a useful insight: That the agenda of the national government and competent 
ministries – in that case reduction of crime and containment of unrest – will inevitably play 
some role if community safety programmes wish to receive support from official bodies, which 
is normally a prerequisite for the structural and financial changes required to introduce and 
maintain practices of policing that are more responsive to local needs.  
 This ‘path dependency’ or ‘top-down’ logic is apparent in two distinctive ways: First, 
while ‘community safety’ and ‘crime prevention’ had been used as mutually supportive goals 
of local government and public management programming, a gradual skewing of the agenda in 
favour of ‘crime prevention’ is obvious. The aspect of community safety is, for instance, 
conspicuously absent from works that proclaim to devote attention to both community safety 
and crime prevention (e.g. Tilley 2005a).15 Hughes has argued that, in contrast to crime 
prevention, community safety was widely perceived to be too vague and not ‘susceptible to 
[sic] technicist-cum-administrative measurement of success or failure, nor focused on clearly 
targeted crime and victimisation events’ (Hughes 2013: 27). However, the focus on measurable 
results, at the expense of intricacies of policy implementation in communities, produced 
secondary effects of social exclusion and ‘othering’ of certain groups within respective 
communities. Most instructive in this regard is the observation that in the UK, ‘much of the 
                                                
15 In the introduction to his Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety, the 
supposedly most comprehensive volume in this issue area, its editor declares (Tilley 2005b: 7):  
… in this introduction, the language has all been of ‘crime prevention’. … The coverage 
certainly goes beyond police crime control competences and includes associated crime 
harms as well as crime per se. Yet it does not extend to issues unrelated to crime.  
Furthermore, one of the most comprehensive genealogies does not mention any significant 
efforts to develop the concept of community safety in an equally significant way as the aspect 
of crime prevention (Hughes 2013). 
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impetus for community-based “solutions” were crucially liked to and inscribed in a broader 
racialised discourse about managing the “race and crime” debate in which black communities 
throughout the 1980s were often pathologised and “othered”’ (Hughes 2013: 25, see also 
McLaughlin 2002).  
Different contributions have declared this problematique of ‘otherness’ the main pitfall 
of the new interest in community-based forms of public management: it is in fact impossible to 
appropriately represent a community, as communities are always hierarchised and already 
structured by power relations, which are reproduced in communal practices (Crawford 1998: 
244; Hughes and McLaughlin 2003: 7). This leads to irremediable tendencies to civilise or 
assimilate people who do not comply to a certain standard of behaviour – something that might 
be regarded a necessary evil but is nevertheless unpleasant for the involved parties and brushes 
aside the structural reasons and sources of people’s inadequacy (Young 1990, Young 1999, see 
also Behr 2014). Other critiques have shed light on how certain measures that supposedly 
increase safety for some members of a community can render others more exposed (e.g. Gaetz 
2004), especially when certain problems are not addressed, such as in the case of domestic 
violence, family cohesion or child-rearing issues stemming from the increasing social 
polarisation and spatial separation of families observable in Britain (Crawford 1998: 246). 
Such perspectives are reflective of a broader synthesis between critical sociological, 
criminology and public policy perspectives and critical studies on governmentality which 
evolved in the course of the 1990s (e.g. Rose 1996, 1999a, 1999b, 2001; Gordon 1987 and 
Young 1990). The attention of these scholars had been caught by the emergence of a new moral 
discourse on the significance of community as the central unit of social life; a locus of political 
legitimacy, for facilitating grass roots democracy and local problem-solving. This new 
discourse, most clearly expressed in the writings of Amitai Etzioni (1993, 1997), was taken up 
most prominently by Tony Blair’s New Labour movement which promoted problem-solving 
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and crime prevention on the community level in its 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, among other 
legislative initiatives (Crawford 1998: 237, Hughes 2007: 29). New Labour and other policy-
makers shared this enthusiasm and the idea of the Third Way – i.e. the community being the 
most significant domain in life and facilitating decisions and life opportunities as a mediator 
between market forces and the state (Rose 2000). This reasoning appeared deceptive to 
Foucauldian and specifically governmentality scholars. Nikolas Rose was most vocal in his 
criticism stating that: 
Community, rather than the ‘social’ is the new territorialisation of political thought, the 
new way in which conduct is collectivised ... in a double movement of autonomisation 
and responsibilisation. Once responsibilised and entrepreneurialised, they would govern 
themselves within a state-secured framework of law and order ...  Communitarianism 
thus promises a new moral contract, a partnership between an enabling state and 
responsible citizens, based upon the strengthening of the natural bonds of community 
(1999b: 475-476). 
The critique put forward by Rose and other scholars vis-à-vis the utilisation of the community 
is that the responsibilisation and autonomisation of communities, i.e. equipping them with 
budgets and decision powers to manage their affairs, is done in ways that naturalise both the 
constraints within which this empowerment of communities takes place and the limits to social 
and economic development. This indicates not merely a decentralisation, dispersion and 
pluralisation of social control (and Hughes and McLaughlin 2003: 5, Garland 2001: 126), but 
also a transfer of responsibility and accountability for the overall economic and societal 
conditions in which local politics are conducted. This trajectory is reflective of the rise of a 
post-liberal form of governmentality diagnosed by Chandler (2010b, Chandler and Reid 2016): 
budgetary responsibility and decision-making powers are devolved to the communal level; and 
the responsibility for ensuring employment and social reproduction are discursively appointed 
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to individual households (Chandler and Reid 2016: ch. 2); while demands for redistribution and 
social welfare are fended off with invocations of competitiveness imperatives and/or policy 
conditionalities dictated by the global economy.16  
In other words, while a more centralised governmental apparatus is directly responsible 
for dealing with the problems and repercussions of political, economic and social developments 
its national policies cause, a decentralised and community-based approach at social ordering 
and crime prevention emphasises each community’s own responsibility to facilitate not only 
the solution of problems, but also the design and implementation of measures that prevent social 
problems in the first place. Many of the concepts used in peace- and statebuilding, 
democratisation and other forms of assistance and intervention – for instance ‘ownership’, civil 
society involvement and community-based activism and service provision – have already been 
tested in a different form in the community safety and crime prevention policies and practices 
in the UK, US and other Western countries. A critical analysis of community security 
foregrounds a more grounded perspective on the reasons, origins and widely used justifications 
for the decentralisation, responsibilisation and entrepreneurialisation of communities by central 
authorities, and the implications such moves have for the emergence of neo-authoritarian 
governmentality and adjacent forms of ethnic and racial profiling.  
  
The dilemmas of community policing and community security beyond Anglo-America   
The discursive patterns and governmentality tendencies of the community safety and crime 
prevention debate were not constrained to the Anglo-American world. The conveyor belt for 
the new public policy approach that put the community at the centre of attention and action 
                                                
16 This trajectory is observable in discursive strategies that justify why central government can 
not do anything about certain problems which are inevitably brought about by such things as 
inflation, pressures for global competitiveness and corresponding ideas about budget cuts and 
austerity (see Pratt 1986, Crawford 1998, Young 1999, Cameron and Palan 2004, Fansworth 
and Irving 2012).  
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was, specifically in the security sector, the concept of community policing, which emerged in 
public policy discourses throughout the 1970s, and soon caught the attention of policy makers 
on a global level. Based on cases of relative (and not always uncontested) success in Western 
settings such as Northern Ireland, community policing became a major export good among 
Western policy approaches throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In their analysis of this Western 
export practice, Mike Brogden and Preeti Nijhar (2005: 4 ff.) note that the demand for this 
export – and thus the basis for creating a whole ‘cottage industry’ of consultants, experts and 
educators – was not so much created by the needs in the localities where community policing 
practices where introduced and established, but much more by the constellation of the good 
governance and ‘security and development’ agendas (see II.1). Especially security sector and 
police reform programmes that mushroomed during the 2000s created an immense global 
market for ideas and practical approaches to community policing.  
Alongside other scholars (Ryan 2011, Albrecht and Kyed 2014, Jackson and Albrecht 
2011), Brogden and Nijhar raise attention towards the problems and trade-offs of community 
policing, echoing the critiques of governmentality scholarship and critical perspectives on 
security sector reform. Their ‘ten myths’ of ‘Anglo-American community policing’ (Brogden 
and Nijhar 2005: ch. 3) raise the issues indicated in the above discussion, e.g. the problem of 
doing justice to all members of a community (49 ff.); the reverse problem that community 
security initiatives might backfire in case actors feel like they can or do not want to provide the 
kind of accountability demanded from the population and civil society (52 ff.); or the idea that 
more fundamental institutional change on the national level of given countries can occur thanks 
to community policing initiatives (the ‘myth of organisational change’, 76 ff.). They also 
criticise the universalist and Eurocentric thinking that underpins many of community policing 
advocates’ philosophy. This ‘myth of the Anglo-American model’ (79 ff.) would lead policy-
makers to take an imagined Western model of Weberian rational-legal state institutions and 
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their adaptation via community policing for granted, while ignoring other philosophies and 
practical approaches at social ordering and securing economic exchange, livelihoods and 
wellbeing. These criticisms of community policing form a useful backdrop to a final 
consideration of the trade-offs that in the implementation of community policing projects.  
Lisa Denney and Sarah Jenkins echo this critical stance towards community policing 
both in regard to its historical legacy and current practices. They argue that histories of 
formation of states and political systems, as well as their approaches to managing emergencies, 
conflict and inequalities, foreground current police-society relations in ‘fragile and conflict 
affected states’ (Denney and Jenkins 2013: 17 ff.):  
Given that one of the biggest challenges in many [fragile and conflict affected states] is 
that the police are unresponsive to local needs and perceived as contributing to 
community insecurity and injustice, a centralised and top-down approach to reform can 
miss some of the most pressing reform priorities. … However, a more bottom-up 
approach to policing, such as that provided by COP [community policing], can help. A 
focus on community policing, specifically, reinforces the importance of connecting the 
provision of safety and security to local needs. (2013: 7) 
In other words, community policing needs to be made more compatible with its ‘end users’’ 
needs (Luckham and Kirk 2012) and needs to be democratised. This is in itself part of the 
problem, however, as ‘it is rarely, if ever, possible to speak about the community in a singular, 
cohesive sense, as this suggests a uniformity and homogeneity that rarely exists’ (Denney and 
Jenkins 2013: 14). The core problem, if not the impossibility, to holistically grasp the opinion 
of a community as the basis for collective action, hence creates the risk that community policing 
projects may re-produce, firstly, inequalities between communities, as communities better 
endowed with time, money and skills to participate in projects and fulfil their criteria such as 
		95 
reports writing, internal mobilisation etc. In this scenario, ‘community policing may be most 
effective in the places least in need of it’ (2013: 33).  
Secondly, community policing may reproduce power structures and inequalities within 
communities: If people in a locality have already established certain patterns and modes of 
doing things, then these naturalised hierarchies are unlikely to be challenged, so that women, 
young people and minority groups run a risk of not having their points of view adequately 
included in community policing programming (ibid.; see Baker 2002, Jackson 2011). The best 
illustration of this is Ruteere and Pomerrole’s (2003) analysis of civil society-supported 
community policing projects. Their findings from a community policing partnership project 
between the Nairobi Central Business District Association (NCBDA) suggest that, while the 
main interest of the businesses who initiated and financed the project were served, this was at 
the cost of small business, shop and kiosk owners, as well as hawkers and homeless people all 
of whom depend on the income they are able to generate in the central business district. The 
latter became increasingly inaccessible due to frequent harassment and checks run by police, 
who detained or demanded bribes from people who do not fit in the ideal profile for visitors of 
the inner city (2003: 596 ff.). Similarly, a community patrolling project initiated by the Kenyan 
Human Rights Commission (KHRC) in cooperation with the dwellers of an informal settlement 
in a suburb of Nairobi, has slowly turned into a vehicle for local landlords to assert their own 
interests against tenants who are considered untrustworthy and in too high fluctuation to be 
entrusted with matters of community security programming and implementation; an exclusion 
that especially affects women and young people (598 ff.) Ruteere and Pommerolle thus question 
‘whether community policing as it is currently implemented in Kenya may not be just a 
reproduction of the undemocratic order that defines the wider Kenyan society’ (599).  
 This leads to the more general question of how specific community policing/security 
projects are embedded in wider social relations and national security politics. As Denney and 
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Jenkins note, because the range of objectives to be reached by community policing is so large 
and the meaning of the term so ambiguous, the very idea of community policing (at least from 
the perspective pronounced in this work) can be diluted if not altogether defeated (2013: 11). It 
is obvious, for instance, that governments and the police will be interested in the potential that 
community-based approaches have for intelligence collection and hence crime 
prevention/reduction. ‘Increasingly, however,’ as Denney (2015: 9) argues, ‘the very 
assumption that community policing can reduce crime is being questioned’ as it ‘suggests crime 
is caused by dynamics the community has information about, which, when shared with the 
police, will allow for crime prevention through deterrence.’ This does not, as she argues, 
‘sufficiently appreciate the social causes of crime that community policing is not likely to help 
address through intelligence collection’ (2015: 19, see Elison and Pino 2012)  
Furthermore, echoing the critique of the responsibilisation, entrepreneurialisation and 
thus autonomisation of communities and the corresponding shifting of responsibility from 
governmental and state agencies to the decentralised level (e.g. Rose 1999b), Denney and 
Jenkins (2013: 33) have identified the risk the ostensible empowerment of communities to deal 
with their problems on their own may detract attention away from reforms at the national level 
that would improve the accountability of police and security forces in the first place. This is 
reflective of a broader trend of making communities, or the subjects of neoliberal politics more 
generally, adaptable and resilient to the shocks and externalities stemming from economic and 
political conduct which, especially in developing countries, often takes forms that are 
disconnected from people’s livelihoods and interests (see Chandler and Reid 2016).  
 In sum, this section has reviewed the problem that, rather than re-configuring security 
and social ordering mechanisms towards the specificities of the respective context, community 
security or policing arrangements may also reproduce existing power relations, hierarchies and 
forms of exclusion in a given community. As community policing/security practitioners need 
		97 
to operate on the basis of a clear analysis of problems and ways to tackle them, the question is 
how capable such initiatives are to address or at least be aware about more fundamental, not 
immediately obvious reasons for security risks and crime, such as social injustice, corruption, 
or organised crime. While community security practitioners may not be able to tackle or even 
identify such underlying, more fundamental problems, they will be the ones made responsible 
for the maintenance of social order and security and may find themselves in a dilemma between 
performing this role according to the protocol on the one hand and addressing the deeper 
problems on the other.  
This community policing dilemma is directly linked to the dilemmas and fallacies of 
hybrid and post-liberal forms of peace: Given the fact that such supposedly alternative 
modalities are always embedded in established modes of ordering, it seems questionable, from 
a critical decolonial perspective, what innovation or emancipation such approaches have to 
offer beyond mere rhetoric. The key question is thus whether community security (and 
‘community policing’ and related ones) can serve to create forms of peace, order and security 
that reflect the needs, preferences and desires of people living in a respective community, or, 
and to what extent, these practices are influenced and co-opted by state security agendas and 
preferences.17 The former scenario would present a form of post-liberal peace that is in sync 
with a substantive notion of human security. There appears ample possibility, however, as 
indicated above, to instrumentalise the emancipatory aura of this idea for justifying or covering 
practices and policies that lead to exclusion and forms of governmentality. This seems 
especially likely given the fact that human security, especially given its origin in policy making 
and multilateral institutional settings in the early 1990s (Krause 2005: 2). has in fact become 
                                                
17 This is also reflected in the understanding of community security as a process driven by 
people in a given community (municipality, or district) themselves (see Saferworld 2014: 3), 
rather than something merely done by state institutions, administrations or law enforcements 
(see Introduction). 
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‘institutionalised and co-opted to work in the interests of global capitalism, militarism and 
neoliberal governance’ (Turner et al. 2010: 83, see Chandler 2008).  
  
III.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have situated the framework for the analysis of imaginaries of statebuilding in 
debates on hybrid and post-liberal peace- and statebuilding, hybrid regimes and transition 
literature and discussed the concepts of ‘imaginary’ and ‘community security’. In section one,  
I have shown how the concept of post-liberalism was discussed in terms of its implications for 
a more emancipatory trajectory which would allow space for the expression of local agency, 
and, on the other hand, forms of governmentality rooted in people’s ‘false consciousness’ and 
interpellation in regressive ideologies. In discussing the broader implications of a post-liberal 
lens on politics in Central Asia, I have argued that local-ness and authenticity could be 
problematic as they are often instrumentalised for presentation of practices, policies and regime 
forms as a choice of ‘the people’, or as the best available alternative. I have shown how, 
specifically, the two items invoked in Richmond’s conception of post-liberal peace, i.e. culture 
and welfare, have often been invoked by Central Asian leaders to assert their political authority 
vis-à-vis Western interference and domestic contenders and thus illustrate the regressive of 
post-liberal trajectories of political reform and statebuilding. I have also developed a more 
fundamental notion of progressive normative figuration, that of decoloniality, which is posited 
in a critical position vis-à-vis the capitalist-colonial system and its trajectories of 
instrumentalisation and inversion of ‘emancipatory’ politics for the entrenchment of 
authoritarian forms of social and political order.  
 In the remainder of the chapter, I have set the basis for the analytical framework by 
discussing its core element: the imaginary. Reviewing the works of Castoriadis and others, I 
have shown how the imaginary can be understood as a conceptual vehicle linking the practical 
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and material realm (the ‘real world’) and a metaphysical space with different discourses and 
ideational frameworks. In this sense, the imaginary links the world, and specific domains of 
practice in particular, with wider socio-discursive frameworks and regimes and facilitates the 
structuring and shaping of the former by the latter; but also a feedback in the other direction, 
which indicates a circular movement of ideas and discourses between the two realms. 
Furthermore, the imaginary, as I show in the next chapter, links the way in which practices are 
done and conceived of in the present with notions of social order based on past experiences and 
history, as well as with corresponding (and perhaps contrasting) ideas of what society should 
look like in the future. For instance, I will show how a distinct understanding of the importance 
and role of tradition and culture in Kyrgyzstan foregrounds certain practices and the existence 
of social institutions linked to Kyrgyz history.  
 In a last step, I have shown how the practico-discursive domain of community security 
shares commonalities with epistemic (scientific) discourses in peace, conflict and intervention 
studies. This forms the basis, I have argued, for analysing the way in which concepts and ideas 
under the ‘liberal peace’ umbrella are promoted and applied in different contexts and what kind 
of trajectories such dissemination and diffusion of ideas gives rise to. As I have shown, the field 
of community security is, very similar to debates on the liberal peace, heavily skewed towards 
practices and policies that super-ordinate concerns of security and measurable outputs over 
individual or group welfare and wider, less clearly perceptible concerns pertaining to security. 
Thus, the same way as the community safety debate in the US and UK was mostly preoccupied 
with crime prevention as a means for safety, was the global discourse on community security 
framed in terms of community policing as means to creating security. In both cases, other, less 
direct means for achieving safety and security played no sizeable role, which has led scholars 
to argue that the community safety debate and the better-known discourse on community as the 
		100 
core entity of social life (most notably in the 1990s ‘Third Way’ agenda) are inherently skewed 
towards instantiating governmentality and creating forms of profiling and othering.  
Especially the issue of marginal individuals or sub-groups within a community was seen 
as problematic and proved to be a limitation in community policing practices, which, as 
research in Africa shows, can be captured by the interests of large business and property owners 
and working to the detriment of people who because of their social standing and economic 
situation cannot engage in such initiatives and practices.Therfore, the outcomes produced by 
community security initiatives have often revealed the face of a neo-liberal security regime with 
limited access for all members of the involved communities. More basically, community 
security initiatives may not produce the overall measure of security (among all of the members 
of a community) as they claim or appear to, which can lead to substantial levels of exclusion if 
the same biases and omissions are repeated across a number of communities.  
These issues and limitations of community security, which betray the initially promising 
impression of the idea of organising security on the community level, point to the tension 
between governmentality and emancipation discussed in the literatures on post-liberal peace 
and the imaginary. In the empirical chapters, I use this exposition to show how community 
security initiatives in Kyrgyzstan exhibit similar positive potentials but sometimes suffer from 
the same limitations and dependencies. In the next chapter, I discuss the three most pertinent 
imaginaries of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan and the different discourses on social and political 
order constituting them, in order to set out the discursive and ideational background against 
which community security is discussed and practiced.  
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Chapter IV Imaginaries and discourses of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan 
 
In this chapter, I review the literature on processes of peace- and statebuilding, transition and 
social ordering in Kyrgyzstan. I present the different discourses and imaginaries of statebuilding 
which are most clearly discernible and instructive for understanding current societal debates in 
the country. It is the first of four analytical chapters on processes of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan 
and is conceived as a review of academic literature, journalistic material and, to lesser extent, 
fieldwork data. Based on the understanding of the interactions between practices and discourses 
in specific practical or ‘real world’ realms, imaginaries of statebuilding, and their composite 
discourses (see III.3), I identify the key imaginaries and discourses of statebuilding in 
Kyrgyzstan, whose reproduction and hybridisation I analyse in the following empirical 
chapters. I begin by giving a brief overview of Kyrgyzstan’s transition since its independence 
from the Soviet Union to outline the field of tension in which different discourses have evolved 
and form specific imaginaries, and, furthermore, introduce the framework which maps the three 
imaginaries of statebuilding and their composite discourses (IV.1). Subsequently, I survey the 
respective discourses constituting the three imaginaries of the Western ‘liberal peace’ (IV.2), 
‘politics of sovereignty’ (IV.3) and tradition and culture (IV.4). In a final step, I discuss further 
details about the framework and situate it vis-à-vis normative categories of assessment, i.e. 
governmentality and decoloniality (IV.5). I use the term ‘imaginaries of statebuilding’ for sake 
of simplicity but understand this term as an umbrella for the terms political and social order, 
peacebuilding or -making, and community security.1    
The imaginaries of post-liberal statebuilding and their respective discourses as I have 
mapped them are analytical ideal-types that I have identified as most relevant for the analysis 
                                                
1 In this sense, it is also possible to focus on non-state forms of peacebuilding and order-making. 
Still, I concentrate the analysis on the way the latter are overshadowed by, or made useful for, 
state actors and structures.  
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of statebuilding, social order and transition in Kyrgyzstan as I came to see it based on my own 
experience of visiting and doing research in the country since 2012, and based on the literature 
from international and, although to more limited extent, Kyrgyzstan’s national academia.2  
  
IV.1 Kyrgyzstan’s transition and imaginaries of statebuilding 
The ongoing processes of integration and differentiation of Kyrgyzstan’s role and position 
within the Central Asian region and the global political economy and its different institutions 
are shaping the understandings and imaginaries of its internal structures and processes. 
Kyrgyzstan was arguably the country in Central Asia that was most open to international 
prescriptions of political and institutional reforms (Engvall and Laruelle 2015: ix, Omelicheva 
2015). Both in light of its historical status of net receiver of transfers during the Soviet Union 
in exchange for raw materials like cotton, minerals, and agricultural produce and given the 
considerable investments needed to maintain its costly mining industries (Pelkmans 2017), the 
newly independent country had no leeway to resist to the lending conditionalities imposed by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), as opposed to its neighbours Uzbekistan or 
Kazakhstan (ibid., Broome 2010). 
However, as its first president Askar Akaev’s openness to international assistance for 
democratisation, liberalisation and integration (see Marat 2008) did not yield any welfare 
dividends, he faced more and more criticism for the increasing influence that the IFIs and 
Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs, e.g. UN institutions, the WTO, or OSCE) wielded in 
                                                
2 Other scholars, based on another outlook, other experiences and other material, may well 
come up with different imaginaries, through which the same processes as I analyse them are 
understandable in a different way.	 Liu (2014), for instance, finds that the main ‘political 
imaginaries’ of Uzbeks in Osh are an Islamic one – akin to the discourse of ‘traditional’ Islam 
in the ‘tradition and culture’ imaginary (IV.3.1), on the one hand, and, on the other, that of a 
social order led by a khan – a paternalistic and authoritarian leader who guarantees security and 
wellbeing development, embodied in the figure of the first president of independent Uzbekistan, 
Islam Karimov. 
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the country. In this light, Boris-Mathieu Pétric (2005: 323) has argued that ‘Kyrgyz society has 
gone from being subordinate to Moscow to dependence on the international community’, as the 
loans and grants came in exchange for conditionalities and economic ‘shock therapy’. The 
corresponding rolling back of the state in the welfare and education sector was compensated by 
UNDP, UNICEF and multiple smaller NGOs, and even political, legal, social and security 
affairs were increasingly outsourced to a network of IGOs (such as the OSCE or EU). 
Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan’s failure to reap the benefits of transition was blamed on external 
economic dynamics allegedly not in the remit of control of the national leadership (Akaev 2002: 
193, Marat 2008).  
         The economic downturn endured by the majority of Kyrgyzstani society and the 
proliferating reports of Akaev’s cronyism and manipulative actions finally led to his ouster in 
what came to be known as the ‘Tulip revolution’ of March 2005. Akaev’s successor Kurmanbek 
Bakiev pledged to improve the country’s situation with a rigorous anti-corruption programme, 
thus again subscribing to a reformist agenda that did not only address the perceived domestic 
political needs but conformed to international donor agendas of ‘anti-corruption’ and ‘good 
governance’ (Marat 2008). The removal of Bakiev in April 2010 brought instability and 
conflicts along the lines of loyalty with different political players and along ethnic lines (mainly 
between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz political community). These dynamics culminated in the so-
called ‘Osh’ or ‘June events’ taking place from 10-14 June 2010; communal clashes in and 
around the southern Kyrgyzstani cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, during which hundreds of people 
were killed, numerous properties and business destroyed and hundreds of thousands of people 
fled their home.3 
                                                
3 In this conflict that spread out from the city of Osh on the 10th of June 2010, 470 people were 
killed, about 110,000 left the country to Uzbekistan and 400,000 were internally displaced; 
although none of these numbers could be confirmed in detail (KIC 2011: ii, see Matveeva et al. 
2012 for a comprehensive analysis of the events themselves). 
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In much of the academic and analytical literature, the Osh events are presented as the 
culmination point of a difficult development of Kyrgyzstan since its independence. The 
contestation between the Uzbek minority and different political groupings are often presented 
as the significant fault-line of an ‘ethno-political conflict’, but it is also clear that other 
dynamics linked to Kyrgyzstan’s economic and political reform, such as collapse of institutions 
and social systems as well as political dynamics along lines of clan membership and 
geographical divisions, played a role (Megoran et al. 2014, Bond and Koch 2010). While many 
international actors argued that Kyrgyzstan was in need of comprehensive assistance not only 
for post-conflict reconstruction but also for political and legal reform in order to reach basic 
human rights and governance standards, even classifying it as a ‘failed state’ (Wilkinson 2011), 
the representation of the conflict and the conclusions to be drawn became a major site for the 
reassertion of the country’s sovereignty (Gullette and Heathershaw 2015, see IV.3).  
In this sense, different discourses that can be grouped under a ‘politics of sovereignty’ 
imaginary (ibid.) pose resistance vis-à-vis the ‘Western liberal peace’ imaginary that has come 
to dominate discourses and practices of transition and reform. Contesting the interference and 
conditionalities of Western and international actors, arguments situated in this imaginary 
invoke Kyrgyzstan’s ability to take care of its own business, as well as its dignity, historical 
achievements and greatness. The latter are themes that can be situated in a separate imaginary 
of ‘culture and tradition’, which, although often invoked and used to demonstrate that 
intervention, advice or assistance are not needed, also includes discourses of harmony, 
acquiescence and peaceful coexistence that are combinable with ‘liberal peace’ notions of 
social and political order. In the following three sections, I discuss the different imaginaries and 
their respective discourses, which are illustrated below.  
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Figure 4.1: Imaginaries of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan 
 
IV.2 The Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary 
This imaginary contains the main idea that Kyrgyzstan should be reformed after the model of 
Western, liberal-democratic countries and according to ideas of free markets and free trade, 
privatisation, rule of law, human rights good governance, among others. However, instead of 
understanding the ‘liberal peace’ or the ‘West’ as globally dominant in an ahistorical, 
ideological way, as is done in much of political science, IR and (critical) peacebuilding 
literature, it is possible to trace the roots of the hegemony of the West back to its historical roots 
and collectively shared discourses. Based on the key discourse underlying this imaginary, that 
of the ‘imaginary West’, I identify three further composite discourses, which are most 
significant for understanding the reception and reproduction of the Western ‘liberal peace’ 
imaginary. 
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IV.2.1 The Imaginary West 
The imagination of ‘the West’ as a geographical and political space has been quite vivid in the 
Soviet period and has continued to inform people’s perception about the world and their 
country’s position in it. In his seminal work, Everything was forever until it was no more (2006), 
the Russian sociologist Alexey Yurchak develops the concept of the ‘imaginary West’ as the 
‘elsewhere of late Socialism’. His argument about the reproduction of this imaginary is that 
Soviet authorities, knowing that it would be hard to ensure a complete prohibition of the 
consumption and circulation of Western cultural and entertainment goods (music, movies, etc.), 
chose to assert their control over the interpretation of any material from and views on the West. 
The Communist Party thus gave citizens explicit guidance on which elements of Western 
culture were desirable and legitimate to consume and which ones were too bourgeois and 
counter-revolutionary and, therefore, to be despised. According to Yurchak: 
The emergence of the Imaginary West was not in contradiction with the ethics and 
aesthetics of state socialism; on the contrary, and somewhat paradoxically, cultural 
products and forms of knowledge on which the Imaginary West was based were 
explicitly enabled by the socialist project itself. (2006: 160)  
The result of this filtering and definition process (mostly conducted through Party-controlled 
media and corresponding societal discourse) is a relatively clear-cut distinction between a 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ (‘extreme’, harmful) West (2006: 166-170). Needless to say, this portray 
might not have been shared by all citizens, but the salience of this imaginary was proved 
through Yurchak’s own research and is apparent in post-Soviet states until this day. The 
‘imaginary West’ informs people’s way of rationalising their societies’ and their own 
positioning in the global political economy and the possible vectors for individual and social 
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development (Pilkington et al. 2002, Rausing 2002, Burrell 2011).4 Crucially, the West is seen 
as the place where society and economy function in an efficient way, making migration towards 
the West or emulation of Western concepts and models of development, free markets and 
democracy desirable (Manolova 2017).5 
Kyrgyzstan’s incomplete or only superficial adoption of democracy, a free market 
system, the rule of law, human rights and good governance – all of which can be glossed as 
‘liberal peace’ model (Tadjbakhsh 2009, see II.1) – has been repeatedly emphasised by both 
politicians and commentators, who appear to attribute the blame for the failed transition either 
to specific actors and groupings or the entire country and its ‘system’.6 The main problem is 
seen in the concentration of power and organisation of politics along family, clan and kinship 
structures, which have been argued to fuel the continuous erosion of political institutions’ 
accountability, privatisation of public offices and state assets and emergence of parallel shadow 
markets while public goods provision and institutional efficacy drop to a minimum (Engvall 
2016, Tucker 2011, Gullette 2010).  
In addition to this salient but not unproblematic ‘corruption’ argument, different authors 
have shown how discourses of danger and state weakness or failure have dominated the 
Western gaze upon Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia more generally, and especially so in the 
                                                
4 Especially the superior quality and high symbolic value of Western consumer goods gave rise 
to large black markets in the Soviet and other Socialist economies (Yurchak 2006: 171 ff.) and 
to a fetishism with food, clothing, cars and other consumer goods from the West (Burrell 2011). 
5 While this positive imaginary of the ‘West’ is the basis for a Western- and Eurocentric view 
of questions about development and politics – according to which European or Western 
countries in general make up the benchmark for Kyrgyzstan’s ideal development path – the 
West is also constructed as anti-ideal of a ‘bad’ and ‘immoral West’, a discourse I discuss as 
part of the ‘politics of sovereignty’ imaginary (next section). 
6 For instance, in a volume looking back at 20 years of ‘democratic development’, Baktygulov 
posits that: ‘[Kyrgyzstan’s] short history of democratic experiments was the history of errors 
and mistakes. The wasting of the resources of society and the inefficiency of the political system 
continue to undermine the [efforts] of citizens and limit the possibilities for creating a 
prosperous society’ (2012: 186). 
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context of the global ‘war on terror’ (Megoran and Heathershaw 2011, Wilkinson 2011, Reeves 
2005). Wilkinson (2011) has shown how such concerns were emerging during Kurmanbek 
Bakiev’s tenure after the ouster of Akaev in 2005 and how the formal sovereignty of the 
Kyrgyzstani state has made international organisations and individual countries refrain from 
major political interference or assistance, thus allowing Bakiev to consolidate his power and 
silence or curb opposition with increasingly authoritarian means. The combination of little 
popular legitimacy and repressive means of authority assertion thus led to the constitution of a 
‘Potemkin state’, which, after the ousting of Bakiev in April 2010, appeared unable to quell the 
inter-communal clashes in late May and early June the same year in the south of the country 
(Wilkinson 2011: 120; Matveeva et al. 2012). Both the conflict and its slow and ambiguous 
recovery with reported irregularities in post-conflict justice and rehabilitation of affected 
communities have made the country a prime destination for ‘liberal peace’ style peacebuilding 
and conflict prevention activities supported by international agencies and donors (Reeves 
2015b, 2014, 2005, Megoran et al. 2014).7 Thus, Kyrgyzstan’s distance from the Western ideal 
of democratic governance and ‘liberal peace’-building is framed through concepts such as 
corruption and ‘failed statehood’, whose hegemonic status is further elucidated by the discourse 
exhibiting a teleological understanding of how Kyrgyzstan should evolve.   
 
IV.2.2 Globalisation and capitalist development teleology 
The teleological understanding of capitalist development and the corresponding endorsement 
or at least acceptance of market integration imperatives are arguably based on Marxist-Leninist 
teachings of national economics during Soviet times (Lottholz 2017a). Drawing on the 
                                                
7 The rude awakening brought about by the ‘Osh events’ made the international community, 
mainly the UN agencies, the OSCE, EU and major donors such as the US or Germany rush to 
the assistance of the Kyrgyz Republic, both in the form of humanitarian aid, post-conflict 
reconstruction and institutional reform (Wilkinson 2011). 
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literature on capitalist development in post-Socialism (Rabikowska 2009: 177, Peshkopia 2010, 
Amsler 2007), it can be argued that Marxist-Leninist notions of equality and progress were 
replaced with new ideal model of a liberal-democratic society, which was embraced with the 
same metaphysical idealism, if not Hegelian historical determinism and teleological thinking, 
with which people once worked towards a communist society. Central Asian politicians and 
intellectual milieus of society thus became part of a global movement that believed that liberal 
democracy and integration into the world economy could bring economic development and 
prosperity to any country (Carlson 2013: 128-129), thus embracing Fukuyama’s ‘end of 
history’ thesis (Fukuyama 1992). The formerly telos of a Communist society, which was to be 
reached via different stages of Socialism, had now been replaced with the telos of liberal 
democracy and a free trade capitalist economy.8 
This reasoning can be explained as ‘rooted in the fetishisation of capitalism by the 
postsocialist societies… [which] reflects [a] deeply ingrained teleological way of perceiving 
the future’ (Peshkopia 2010: 24) in post-Socialist countries. Hence, people perceive and adjust 
themselves to new ‘market realities’ and economic imperatives, while participation in politics 
as a way to improve economic policy-making are not perceived as reasonable alternatives. In 
his analysis of how the Central Asian ‘generation 1991’ perceived, internalised and coped with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Christopher Schwartz finds that many people in this generation 
embraced democracy as a new ideal end state, towards which their country should develop 
(2013: 191). He demonstrates how even one of his respondents’ father, who had grown up 
during the ‘golden years’ of Soviet Socialism, adopted free-market values and was at some 
point accepted within his community: 
                                                
8 Different authors have argued that the insertion of the local and national economy into 
international competition, structures and institutions is accepted as an inevitable fact by post-
Soviet societies at large (e.g. Collier 2011). 
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Namazaliev’s impression is that his father was a trailblazer, albeit a tragic one: most of 
the other Kyrgyz in the village were still under the sway of communist ideology and 
condemned him as a capitalist, ‘but now, it’s not that way; everybody understands that 
this is fine, this is how it should work [sic], people are now more market-oriented.’ 
(Schwarz 2013: 197) 
This passage signifies how even part of the generation who had lived under the Socialist regime 
for most of their life found a chance in the breakdown of this system and the newly pursued 
path towards democracy and economic liberalisation.9 While such uncritical adoption of the 
new ideology of the day is of course not the only reaction to new realities (see IV.3.1), 
Kyrgyzstan’s development path has become routinely framed within a market economy and 
trade-relations paradigm, which justifies the republic’s dependence on international markets 
with its landlocked mountainous location and de-industrialised structure (Lewis 2015b). In a 
recent interview, president Atambaev expressed the lack of alternatives to the recent accession 
to the Eurasian Economic Union quite bluntly: ‘Then what do you suggest? We have six million 
people. Should we maybe close ourselves in and live like in the jungle [v djungliakh]? We have 
to develop, we need a market’.10 This exemplifies how the political establishment is ready to 
accept the unequal terms under which the EEU and possibly other economic treaties are 
negotiated. Both in this official discourse and in the sense-making narratives of people at large, 
ideas of development within the new global market form a standard template for discussion 
(see Kudaibergenova 2016), while ideas about strong regulation, state investment, subsidisation 
                                                
9 In this sense, the teleological thinking about national development during Soviet times thus 
created the basis for an uncritical adoption of the capitalist liberal-democratic development 
model in its often neo-liberal and socially detrimental variant. 
10 ‘Kyrgyzstan’s president: We will solve our problems on our own [Prezident Kyrgyzstana: 
svoi problemy my reshaem sami] Euronews, 20 February 2017, accessed 20 October 2017, 
http://ru.euronews.com/2017/02/17/kyrgyz-president-almazbek-atambyev-talks-to-euronews 
He also pointed out that thanks to the EEU the more than half a million Kyrgyzstani migrant 
workers were finally granted working rights after having lived abroad like ‘slaves’. 
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and steering of the economy are largely eschewed for their association with the Socialist legacy 
(Amsler 2007).   
 
IV.2.3 ‘Made in Kyrgyzstan’ 
To understand contemporary processes of social change in Kyrgyzstan, it is necessary to take 
account of a perspective somewhat oblivious to such ‘politicised’ views. In generational terms, 
‘Made in Kyrgyzstan’ refers to the generation who have been born after the fall of the Soviet 
Union and in its last years, and who, therefore, see the development of the country and their 
personal life walks not in the same field of tension as is suggested by the other discourses within 
this imaginary.11 This generational focus also foregrounds an awareness that the political 
contestations on Kyrgyzstan’s Socialist legacy and its integration into world markets and 
regimes of democratic governance is less of a question than a presumed necessity to these 
younger people, for whom the Soviet Union appears a distant past, with the corresponding 
sentimentality and nostalgia being hardly understandable, much to the chagrin of many middle-
aged and older people (Féaux de la Croix 2013a, Satybaldieva 2017).  
For young people, it seems to matter most is the fact that Kyrgyzstan is a unique country 
and that their everyday lives as well as memories of growing up are valuable in and of 
themselves, regardless of the country’s economic or political situation or its significance in a 
global perspective (Kirmse 2010, 2009).12 This also foregrounds an ambitious attitude among 
young entrepreneurs and professionals who are, empirically, a minority within the population, 
but nevertheless live by the role model of a new entrepreneurial creative group who put their 
                                                11	 Ibanez-Tirado expressed this ostensible unaffectedness by the transition and its political 
implications by citing one of her respondents’ question: ‘How can I be post-Soviet if I was 
never Soviet?’ (2015: 192).	
12 For an illustration from Uzbekistan see Liza Premiyak and Hassan Kurbanbaev, ‘We run this 
town’, The Calvert Journal, no date, http://calvertjournal.com/features/show/7457/tashkent-
youth-uzbekistan-photography  
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country on the map of the world. Kasymov and Nikonova (2006: 123) quote the statement of a 
member of a working group on the National Poverty Reduction Strategy, that by promoting the 
‘Made in Kyrgyzstan’ brand, new firms in niche markets such as handicrafts, food and natural 
products ‘can become key exporters of local goods outside Central Asia, but only under certain 
conditions: adequate management, adequate marketing, and adequate technologies’. Although 
these sectors have indeed developed, the majority of people lack the managerial skills or 
education to marketise their goods in a national and international market.        
 People’s perception of political and social issues, as well as their participation in civil 
society and politics, are thus dominated by the idea that a young person can achieve everything 
in life if they only work hard enough and start to embrace their personal dreams early enough. 
In this sense, ‘Made in Kyrgyzstan’ also denotes the idea that life styles, identities and 
personhood are manipulable and subject to one’s personal effort at self-actualisation. In line 
with this ethos, which resonates a great deal with perceptions about Western conceptions of 
individualism (Schröder 2013: 243) and entrepreneurial personhood (Makovicky 2014), 
Kirmse finds that the context of cultural globalisation in Kyrgyzstan, with multiple media and 
life-style consumption portfolios available and creating a ‘market place for identities’ (Kirmse 
2010: 389 ff.) can lead to contradictory combinations of interests and pastimes13, which are, 
however, carefully crafted and usually, especially in front of family and neighbours, dismissed 
in favour of conformity with the frames and role models of gender, ‘Kyrgyz-ness’ and Islam 
predominating in Kyrgyzstani society (ibid.: 399).  
 Kirmse and other authors also shed light on the dreams and imaginations of young 
people in terms of their future life goals, ranging from material riches in the form of cars and 
houses to professional self-realisation and success at home or abroad (Kirmse 2009, DeYoung 
                                                
13 Kirmse shows how possible identities and orientations are ranging from Russian gangster 
rap, Bollywood, Sunni Islam to social relations with overseas Christian missionaries. 
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2010). While these dreams of the future resonate with the visions of young people all over the 
world, the opportunity structure for realising them is certainly more limited in Kyrgyzstan, and 
leads to selection and social stratification (Satybaldieva 2015b).14  The prospects of ‘making it’ 
to the top quintile of the generation of young Kyrgyzstani professionals are rather bleak, 
however – a fact often disregarded or realised later by people. Without a foreign university 
degree or at least experience of working or living abroad, people are often confined to join the 
local labour market in the NGO or corporate sector, which have on average long working hours 
and low salaries, making it hard to sustain a family (Satybaldieva 2017).  
Given the relatively small size of the business sector, especially the small share of firms 
paying a living wage and the bleak economic conditions in non-urban areas, people are forced 
to take on either two or three jobs at a time or by subsidising wages with subletting income 
(ibid., Sanghera and Satybaldieva 2009). Young people have thus also become a part of the 
transnational migrant economy that emerged over the 1990s (see next sub-section). Especially 
in families who do not expect to be able to afford higher education for their children, labour 
migration is regarded a matter of course, almost a ‘rite of passage’ akin to the introduction of 
young folks into nomadic herding cycles (Schröder and Stephan-Emmerich 2016). With wealth 
and luxurious lifestyles on display in most bigger cities, it is understandable how the 
inequalities among youth are giving rise to rivalries and conflict, and make some young people 
turn to networks of businessmen-politicians and their sports clubs to fashion a masculine 
                                                14	Stipend programmes of academic exchange services and bilateral donors, which enable years 
abroad in the US or participation in summer schools and language trainings, or the scholarships 
and fee waivers to support studies at the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek or at 
foreign universities are the main sources of hope for many young people, who take additional 
tuition, extracurricular language courses and internships to shape ‘excellent’ CVs and acquire 
the language skills they need to have a chance in the applications submitted (Schröder 2013, 
Kirmse 2009). Interestingly, while scholarships and grants are proclaimed to aim at nurturing 
critical thinking, sustained intellectual engagement and social impact, the salaries in the 
academic or NGO sector are simply not competitive with those in international corporations 
(see e.g. Schröder 2013: 252).	
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identity and gain access to career paths in the world of shady business or organised crime 
(Kirmse 2010: Radnitz 2010). 
 
IV.2.4 Hard work, perseverance and coping strategies 
Finally, ideas about hard work, perseverance, and coping mechanisms and non-interference into 
politics have become popular among people, not least in light of the political instability 
affecting the country. This perceived virtue of adapting to the processes of transition thus 
facilitates the ongoing salience of a Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary in national politics and 
statebuilding, but appears to equally effect entrenched destitution, individual responsibilisation 
and biopolitical subjectification. This discourse thus is a crucial materialisation of the historical 
legacies and perceptions of geographical and cultural specificity that foreground the post-liberal 
politics examined in this thesis. It works as counterpart to the notion of ‘paternalistic care’ 
going back to Soviet days (Lewis 2016: 391), according to which authority for economic policy-
making and provision of welfare is ‘put into the hands of rational political leaders … for the 
sake of a better economic life’ (Peshkopia 2009: 27).15  
The accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2015 is further deepening 
Kyrgyzstan’s position as marginal economy providing cheap migrant labour and raw materials 
(Leonard 2015)16 and has further stripped the domestic economy off significant livelihood 
opportunities apart from labour migration. With almost a fifth (1.5 million; IRIN 2015) of the 
country’s overall population leaving for Russia or other CIS countries in order to secure a living 
for their families, the burden on the life circumstances of many Kyrgyzstanis is imaginable. 
                                                
15 These leaders are, implicitly, supposed to have (or be able to develop) the necessary techno-
scientific competencies (Makarychev and Medvedev 2015: 46; Heathershaw 2009: 66, 
Prozorov 2016: ch. 1, section III.2). 
16 A choice that has been constructed as necessities in a way clearly hegemonic discourses of 
international market integration (see Lewis 2015b, Kudaibergenova 2016, see IV.2.2). 
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Apart from the dire psychological effects of this reconstitution of Central Asians as inferior 
citizens in the community of former Soviet states,17 it is obvious that this social dispersion puts 
a high burden on families and has led to the general deterioration of the nuclear family as an 
institution within Kyrgyz society (see chapter V). Such hardship notwithstanding, migration to 
the countries of the former Soviet Union or beyond (e.g. to China, Europe or the US) has 
become an established practice for sustaining livelihoods (Schröder and Stephan-Emmerich 
2016, Thieme 2008). At the same time, the maintenance and engagement with social structures 
and networks during migration and the attendance to duties in the home community help people 
to cope with the conditions of a life dispersed by market forces (Schröder and Stephan-
Emmerich 2016, Reeves 2011, Thieme 2008). Both ancient traditions and cultures as well as 
the virtues of Islamic faith are invoked in the promotion of hard work, perseverance and coping 
strategies for the maintenance of harmony and unity under such harsh conditions (Satybaldieva 
2015b, Beyer 2013, see IV.4).18  
Whether through such refuge into fatalism or in reference to tradition, spirituality and 
religion (Satybaldieva 2015b), it appears that many people have become accustomed to deal 
with the hardship wreaked on them by the transition without complaining, hoping that things 
will get better at some point in some way or trying to improve their situation with labour 
migration and multi-local livelihoods (Ismailbekova 2013, Thieme 2008). This discourse on 
                                                
17 Fryer et al. describe the situation of migrant labourers as such (2014: 172): 
Though most migration is voluntary, the conditions for migrants are often difficult, if 
not outright inhumane. Central Asians have found themselves tricked and trafficked into 
conditions of near-slavery, abused and deceived by employers, robbed, and victimized 
by a Russian public that has been increasingly xenophobic and violent against migrants 
from the former Soviet “South”. 	
18 Most illustratively, Satybaldieva (2015b: 116) shows how people engage in a ‘politics of 
patience’ as they ‘tend to accept their circumstances, choosing to improve their own conditions 
and finding virtues in self-restraint, self-responsibility, endurance and determination … taking 
pride in not complaining, in overcoming difficult obstacles, and working hard’. Her informants 
agree with one another that, ‘if we work, things will slowly improve’ (ibid.: 117).   
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hard work, perseverance and coping is thus an important part of the Western liberal peace 
imaginary, as it renders the suffering and adaptation required in neo-liberal market reforms 
more acceptable. On the other hand, it is exactly these discourses and positionings that have 
given rise to disappointment, resentment and positions decidedly rejecting Western and more 
general international influence in the attempt to assert the sovereignty of the country.      
  
 
IV.3 ‘Politics of sovereignty’  
This imaginary unites the discourses which can be attributed to Kyrgyztsanis’ striving for 
independence and freedom from external and domestic interference into politics and criticism. 
David Gullette and John Heathershaw (2015) have analysed the ‘affective politics of 
sovereignty’ apparent in debates around the ‘Osh events’ of June 2010, thus providing the basis 
for the broader conception of ‘politics of sovereignty’ that I propose here. They argue that 
sovereignty should not only be researched in terms of its legal, political and international 
implications, as has predominantly been the case in the disciplines of political science, IR and 
legal studies, but that it should be ‘considered in terms of its affects as well as its effects’ on 
people’s thinking and behaviour (2015: 123).19 Much in the same way as I have discussed the 
imaginary as interface between the material and ideational realms (III.3), they contend that ‘[t]o 
study the affective politics of sovereignty is to study the emotive, psychological, and embodied 
discourses of state politics in its full social context, symbolic, and material’ (131).  
 I understand ‘politics of sovereignty’ in a broader sense than Gullette and Heathershaw. 
While they focus on the particular role played by affective attachments, feelings and the ‘make-
                                                
19 In this sense, they implicitly develop an analysis of the role of imaginaries – in this case the 
imaginary of a strong, sovereign, state – in political discourse and actions, particularly the 
‘affective attachments between personal identity and national sovereignty, and how these 
feelings produce the state through its discourse of popular sovereignty and the make-believing 
of state space’ (2015: 130). 
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believing of state space’, I include a wider variety of enactments and discourses of sovereignty, 
which might be seen as formalistic and legalistic as in the case with sovereignty discourses 
studied in political science and IR. Still, people’s engagement with and support for such 
sovereignty discourses is equally important in terms of its effects on social order and political 
decisions, for instance when people invoke ideas about sovereignty, ‘titular ethnicity’ or 
territorial integrity and claims going back to Soviet times. Relatedly, I examine the ethno-
nationalist discourse alongside and in relation to another three discourses of politics of 
sovereignty.  
 The key tension in this imaginary is captured by the ambiguity between discursive 
positionings that invoke, on the one hand, pride with belonging, history and collectivity that do 
not stand in contradiction with individuals or groups who identify themselves otherwise, and, 
on the other hand, positionings that exhibit a readiness to engage in different forms of coercion, 
violence and exclusion to maintain or improve their perceived relative situation. The former is 
mostly the case with the discourse I labelled ‘Soviet modernity’ (IV.3.2), which denotes the 
acknowledgement of and pride with life quality and achievements made during the Soviet 
period. The latter position can be glossed as ‘ethno-nationalism’ (IV.3.3), a sentiment that the 
Kyrgyz ‘titular’ and majority ethnic group should be dominating the political agenda (Megoran 
2017, Wilkinson 2014a, Laruelle 2012). To develop a better understanding of these discourses, 
which are key to understanding the recent violent conflict in Kyrgyzstan and current 
peacebuilding and security policies and practices, I further examine the discourse of the ‘bad 
West’ (IV.3.1) as the counter image of the idealistic imaginations of ‘the West’ in the previous 
section and trace what I gloss as ‘anti-colonial discourse’ (IV.3.4) to shed light on the historicity 
of nationalist ‘politics of sovereignty’.  
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IV.3.1 The ‘bad West’ 
This first discourse is the flip-side of the ‘imaginary West’ element in the Western ‘liberal 
peace’ imaginary discussed above. As Yurchak has argued, Soviet ideologues tried to delineate 
people’s perception of the West into good, acceptable elements (such as knowledge of certain 
authors, music and a sense of cosmopolitanism and tolerance) on the one hand, and the 
‘extreme’ and harmful features of life in the West, on the other (2006: 166-170). Although not 
all of the population believed in the pictures conveyed in newspapers and television the 
portrayal of life in the West and Western societies as inferior in light of their moral weaknesses, 
greed and lack of solidarity appeared convincing to many people and continues to inform their 
understanding of world politics and ideas of development and capitalism to this day.  
Especially in light of the disappointment with the market reforms, free trade and 
democratisation, many people came to see the West as an ideal place whose level of 
development and societal efficiency it was not possible to reach; and whose ideas were not 
desirable or compatible with Central Asian ‘culture’ (Omelicheva 2015: 91). The West has thus 
also been imagined as the source of the neo-liberal development agenda and as primary 
reference point for the elite project this model embodies in Kyrgyzstan (Pétric 2005) and 
Central Asia at large (Trevisani 2014, Tadjbakhsh 2009). Ideas hailing from Soviet times, that 
market exchange and consumption are morally inferior and undesirable (Humphrey and Mandel 
2002) informs the West’s construction as an anti-ideal associated with moral decay, capitalist 
greed and social inequality (Makarychev and Medvedev 2015: 45, 50, Omelicheva 2015: 81). 
In her analysis of senior Kyrgyzstani development workers’ view on society, Féaux de la Croix 
exemplifies these feelings with her interviewee’s opinions that that the years of transition have 
made young people to ‘just care about money’, have made them lose respect for elder people, 
which used to be a virtue of Kyrgyzstani society in the Soviet days, and have stripped them off 
morality or spirituality (dukhovnost) (2013a: 225-228). Although this is attributed to the general 
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lack of education or nurturing (vospitanie), it can be argued that the situation is perceived as 
brought about by the transition towards a capitalist market economy based on a Western 
template. Critical and anti-capitalist traditions in the West are in this instant reduced to 
insignificance, and the West is implicitly constructed as the source of the market idea, as well 
as the mainstay of this economic system with all its adverse effects.     
Furthermore, the imaginary West informs argumentative patterns in domestic political 
debates on human rights and other issues, in relation to which international actors make pressure 
to comply with global standards. Both in such political discussions and in societal discourses 
in general it is commonplace to point out that Kyrgyzstani human rights activists and NGOs 
receive financial support from the United States or other influential geo-political actors, and 
that no neutrality of positive contributions are to be expected from such ‘grant-eaters 
[grantoiedy]’ and ‘foreign agents’ (Féaux de la Croix 2013b: 452, Marat 2013: 16). A 
particularly politicised issue are the rights of LGBT people (lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender), who are generally perceived as ‘a perversion of Western origin at odds with local 
values and identities, with many arguing that there is no such thing as a gay, lesbian or 
transgender Kyrgyz’ (Wilkinson 2014b). The fact that LBGT activism came to be seen as 
‘imposition of foreign norms by an aggressive group of morally corrupt deviants demanding 
“special rights” to violate local values’ (ibid.) exemplifies the construction of an imaginary 
West as source of amoral and sexually permissive and deviant ways of life, whose influence 
the people of Kyrgyzstan have to resist against. This reflects the general logics with which ‘the 
West’, or external forces in general, are invoked as the culprits behind the dire situation of the 
country’s economy and different challenges to its sovereignty.   
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IV.3.2 Soviet modernity 
This discourse stands in more implicit tension with the imperialist agenda of ‘the West’. It 
denotes the acknowledgement, pride and nostalgia that is felt towards the Soviet period. While 
especially the literatures on post-Soviet transition and democratisation appear to not have 
positioned themselves explicitly or consistently vis-à-vis this issue, it is crucial to understand 
the meaning that a large part of post-Soviet populations still confer to the Soviet past and, 
perhaps even more importantly, the cognitive dissonance that such people have endured in the 
past decades which largely obliterated all the achievements and systems of meaning and 
organisation which had been established under great effort and strain during Socialism (Cornis-
Pope 2012, Kay 2006, Féaux de la Croix 2013a).  
The Soviet history of the Kyrgyz Republic and Central Asian republics more generally 
is often understood as synonymous with the origin of their modern form of statehood. Scholars 
on Central Asia broadly agree that it was the Bolshevik conquest of Turkestan and the social 
transformation campaign during Stalin’s reign which lead to the establishment of Central Asian 
nations (e.g. Khalid 2007, Roy 2007, Hirsch 2005, Brubaker 1994). While there had been forms 
of social organisation under the Russian empire and before (see Borubashov 2013 and IV.4.2), 
the decisive shift brought about by the Bolsheviks lay in the supposed liberation of the lower 
classes, and the cultural and social rekindling of the region.20 Given the absence of a 
comprehensive historical reflection on the downsides of Soviet Union’s reign in Central Asia21, 
                                                
20 Although this transformation did of course not happen without resistance and took a 
significant toll in the form of deaths, loss of property and livelihoods during restructuring and 
collectivisation campaigns, and most importantly the purges of the 1930s (Khalid 2007, Haugen 
2003). 
21 It is not possible to cover these historical processes and the tremendous suffering they have 
wreaked on the Central Asian populations here, not least because of the little insight on such 
aspects afforded by archives. Roy (2007), Khalid (2007), Central Asian Survey 2007, and to 
some extent Heathershaw and Herzig (2013) cover these aspects, although a comprehensive 
history of the Gulag in Central Asia appears to be lacking.  
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its image is dominated by the well established idea that it was sacrifices under Stalin’s rule and 
during World War II that made the relative welfare and rise in living standards during the post-
Stalin era possible in the first place (Féaux de la Croix 2013a: 228, Sievers 2013: 5).    
The process foregrounding the founding both the Kyrgyz and other Central Asian 
republics and the territorial quarrels in the contemporary period is the national territorial 
delimitation (NTD, natsoinalnoe razmezhivanie), which took place roughly from 1924 until 
1936. In its course, ethnicity, which, much to the incomprehension of both Tsarist 
ethnographers and their Bolshevik successors, had hitherto been largely insignificant22, was 
elevated to be the major principle by which people, or rather nations (Russian etnos), would be 
distinguished and governed (Roy 2007: 61). The underlying idea was that of ethnogenesis, a 
combination of primordialist and constructivist conceptions of nationalism, according to which 
nations were forming based on common history, heritage and ancestral lines, a process also 
depending on and malleable through the steering of economic conditions, education and 
political engineering (Laruelle 2008). The division of Central Asia into republics along ethno-
national lines was thus supposed to ‘accelerate history’ (Haugen 2003: 169) and consolidate 
the nations of the Soviet Union. This ethno-national, primordialist discourse was constantly 
balanced with an internationalist rhetoric of the ‘peoples’ friendship’ (druzhba narodov) 
emphasising solidarity and brotherhood between different nations and propagating the idea that 
with the reaching of Communism and equality of people, ethnic belonging would gradually 
lose its meaning and, thanks to intermarriage of people from different ethnicities, finally fade 
away (Edgar 2007: 585, Simon 1991: 307).  
                                                
22 The people of Central Asia had lived in different dynastic, religious, pre-modern territorial 
arrangements such as the Khiva and Kokand khanates as well as the emirate of Bukhara on the 
territory of the later Uzbek and Tajik SSRs, as well as under Tsarist protectorates (Haugen 
2003: ch. 2). 
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The idea of ‘peoples’ friendship’ (Ru. druzhba narodov) in a multi-ethnic and 
multicultural Soviet society  served as a mobilising vehicle against the adverse effects of many 
Soviet policies (Marat 2008, Tlostanova 2010, Edgar 2007). Most importantly, it was used to 
mitigate people’s grievances over being cut off from their ‘home’ national republics23, which 
was inevitable as the central authorities attempted to take into account both the ethnic 
composition and economic and industrial production concerns in the delimitation (Haugen 
2003: 181). While the running of political affairs and administration was dominated by the 
respective ‘titular ethnicities’, the status of minority groups was secured through so-called 
‘positive discrimination’, meaning that they were granted cultural and linguistic rights as well 
as certain kinds of benefits and welfare provision (Martin 2001: 17, Reeves 2014: 123). This 
toeing of a thin line between the reification and indeed promotion of ethnic identity on the one 
hand, and a civic nationalist emphasis on Soviet citizenship on the other, was fairly successful 
in forging a peaceful coexistence among Central Asian peoples, especially until the Soviet 
economy came under increasing strain in the 1980s.24  
As already discussed in IV.2.3, positive associations with Kyrgyzstan’s Soviet 
modernity appear to significantly depend on people’s generational belonging, as people who 
had grown of age by 1991, i.e. whom Schwartz calls ‘generation 1991’ (2013) or Yurchak’s 
‘last Soviet generation’ (2006), often associate positive memories with their life back then, 
                                                
23 Haugen (2003, esp. chs. 5, 7 & 8) traces the negotiations between the different Central Asian 
delegations and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 
detail to show the fluidity and contingency of the borders as they were drawn. As a result of the 
NTD, Tajiks in Bukhara (Uzbek SSR), Uzbeks in Osh (Kyrgyz SSR) and Kyrgyz living in the 
environs of Andijan (Uzbek SSR) became minority groups in the respective republics (ibid. ch.  
8, see also Liu 2012).  
24	Until then, especially during the Krushev and early Brezhnev eras (from 1953 until the mid-
1970s), it has been argued that the Central Asian SSRs managed to negotiate the gravely 
necessary economic reforms and re-orientation towards livestock and foodstuff farming as well 
as industrial development (Loring 2014) and relative cultural autonomy (Laruelle 2008, 
Kalinovsky 2013). 	
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despite the possible downsides. As I show in chapters V and VII, the discourse of Soviet 
modernity particularly foregrounds a sensitivity towards the duties of citizenship along these 
generational lines, which in turn shapes people’s (non-) engagement in and approaches towards 
local community security practices.  
 
IV.3.3 Ethno-nationalism 
As already indicated, the propagation of a civic nationalism super-ordinating Soviet citizenship 
over ethnic identities aimed at brushing over discontent and grievances stemming from the 
Soviet republics’ territorial delimitation, but succeeded in doing so mostly in times of relative 
economic prosperity, if at all. As a counter perspective, there are already multiple analyses of 
the significant role of ethnicity in life during the Soviet Union and the institutional racism and 
chauvinism experienced especially by Central Asians in relation to their ‘European’ 
counterparts, and amongst each other (Sahadeo 2007, Igmen 2012). In Kyrgyzstan, dynamics 
of social change and spatial restructuring of both urban and rural areas gave rise to a particular 
ethno-political legacy standing in palpable tension with the ‘peoples’ friendship’ discourse 
throughout the Soviet and much of the post-Soviet periods. This trajectory was especially 
pronounced the southern part of the Kyrgyz SSR.  
With the increased urbanisation and partial industrial restructuring of the southern city 
of Osh from the 1960s onwards, more Kyrgyz started moving to the city whose central areas 
had been inhabited by a sizeable Uzbek population (Megoran 2017: ch. 4, Liu 2012). The city 
administration shifted began restructuring Osh into a modern industrial town, in which the 
traditional Uzbek mahalla neighbourhoods were supposed to give way to multi-storey 
residential buildings and urban infrastructures such as parks, boulevards and squares (Harrowell 
2015). The assertion of Kyrgyz interests also led to the increased staffing of administrative and 
intellectual posts with Kyrgyz at the expense of Uzbeks, who had been strongly represented in 
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this area due to their high educational attainments (Megoran 2013). Despite these changes 
forcing them to retreat into farming and other professions, Uzbeks managed to maintain their 
relative wellbeing as perceived by large swathes of poor and needy Kyrgyz coming to Osh from 
the country side (ibid.). With the Soviet economic model stagnating more and more in the 
1980s, increasing numbers of people from rural Kyrgyzstan migrated to the urban centres and 
tensions in the competition for jobs, state-provided housing and scarce land erupted into deadly 
clashes in and around Osh and Uzgen in the year 1990 (Tishkov 1995). Since independence, 
the marginalisation of Uzbeks and other national minorities intensified due the increasingly 
precarious economic situation and the perception that Uzbeks, traditionally more successful in 
trade and business, were generally better off than Kyrgyz (Bond and Koch 2010).  
The first president of the newly independent Kyrgyz Republic, Askar Akaev, attempted 
to mitigate these tensions and conflicts by promoting an agenda of ‘interethnic unity’ (Ru. 
mezhdunarodnoe soglasie, lit. international, meaning between different nationalities or 
ethnicities) by emphasising the multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of a tolerant Kyrgyzstani 
society under the slogan ‘Kyrgyzstan is our common home’ (Kyrgyzstan – nash obshii dom) 
(Marat 2008: 14). His initiatives included the creation of a ‘People’s Assembly’ (Assambleia 
narodov Kyrgyzstana, Assembly of the peoples of Kyrgyzstan) as a forum for the 
representatives of minorities and for the celebration Kyrgyzstan’s traditions and historical 
legacies (Omelicheva 2015: 81). The epos of Manas (see above) was made a bedrock of Kyrgyz 
national identity, as its poems and narrations became a mandatory part of school teaching and 
cultural life of the country (van der Heide 2015). With it, however, Akaev also started to 
embrace the idea of ethnogenesis and, drawing on the work of Lev Gumilev, a prominent 
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theorist during the 1960s, drew connections between the Manas epic and the ethnogenesis of 
the Kyrgyz (Gullette 2008).25  
Neither Akaev nor his predecessor Kurmanbek Bakiev decided to draw on the ethno-
nationalist register for mobilising support among the electorate and the elites, which led to its 
emergence as a strongly and increasingly accepted discourse among opposition politicians in 
the course of the 2000s (Laruelle 2012). Some politicians even went so far as to say that the 
Kyrgyz, being the majority or ‘titular’ ethnic group of the country, ‘are the masters of the house, 
the other nations and peoples [are] tenants [Kyrgyzy v strane khoziaeva doma, a ostalnye narody 
i natsii kvartiranty.]’ (cited in Gullette and Heathershaw 2015: 132-133). Different authors have 
argued that the 2010 clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan, which disproportionately led to the 
destruction of Uzbek properties, businesses and loss of Uzbek lives, have to be seen as 
expression of such sentiment and the feeling of Kyrgyz that their sovereignty as ‘titular’ ethnic 
group and majority was being ‘imperilled’ (Laruelle 2012, Wilkinson 2014a).26 
 The challenge for current research is that the topic of inter-ethnic relations and the 
ethno-nationalist sentiments is virtually banned from public discourse in Kyrgyzstan. 
Authorities have argued that compensation, re-construction and reconciliation since the ‘Osh 
events’ have been largely effective, while several authors have noted the ongoing 
discrimination and marginalisation of Uzbeks especially in the city of Osh (Harrowell 2015, 
Ismailbekova 2013, 2015, Ismailbekova and Karimova 2018, Megoran 2013, Isakova 2013, 
                                                25	While Akaev maintained that this legacy could be claimed regardless of ethnicity, making 
Manas a hero for Kyrgyzstanis of all ethnicities, this civic, modern conception of nationalism 
was not appropriate for rallying more conservative and ethno-nationalistically inclined groups, 
especially from rural and southern districts of Kyrgyzstan (Laruelle 2012, 2008).	
26 Although, rather than portraying the Kyrgyz as perpetrators and reinforcing the perpetrator-
victim division, of which international NGOs and the international community have been 
accused, some authors have pointed out that the fears and frustrations underlying this discourse, 
as well the mechanisms making them a legitimate political sentiment, have to be understood in 
their own right instead of being dismissed as irrational and uncivilised (Megoran 2017: ch. 4, 
2013, Gullette and Heathershaw 2015). 
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2015). Such critical accounts are not only denied or relativised; but researchers and journalists 
trying to inquire such topics have recently been targeted by the State Committee for National 
Security (GKNB) (Mets 2015).27 Although none of the trials against foreign journalists or NGOs 
led to draconian jail sentences or fines, the logics behind these investigations appears to be one 
of securitising and monopolising the discourse on inter-ethnic relations in order to keep foreign 
researchers and organisations from criticising the situation the ground (Bekmurzaev et al. 
2018). Peacebuilding and community security projects reflect these regimes which attempts to 
sanitise the post-Osh reality of Kyrgyzstan, as they do not explicitly or not exclusively focus 
on inter-ethnic relations, or, when it is unavoidable, only do so in cooperation with authorities.  
 
IV.3.4 Anti-colonial discourse 
A fourth discourse discernible within the ‘politics of sovereignty’ imaginary is that of anti-
colonialism. In opposition to the other three discourses, this line of argument rejects 
interference not only from Western powers, but is also critical vis-à-vis the colonial and 
exploitative implications of the Soviet Union as well as the Russian Federation, its prime 
successor state. While opinions on the effects of the incorporation into the Soviet empire have 
been diverging, different scholars have shown that the terms of the Kyrgyz SSR’s integration 
was in many respects of colonial nature (Loring 2014, Pelkmans 2017) – as it was made to 
serve as a raw material producer for the centre and thus was reliant on foodstuff and fuel 
deliveries from the latter – and that the racial and civilisational discourse informing the politics 
between the republics’ leaderships and people often had a strong undertone of white Europeans’ 
supremacy over their counterparts in the ‘Eastern Republics’ (Sahadeo 2007). These sentiments 
had already led to fierce battles for political power and control between Central Asian political 
leaderships and Moscow during the late 1980s perestroika period (Lewis 2012), and the 
                                                
27 For further details, see discussion in the Introduction. 	
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campaigns of post-Soviet Central Asian leaders and their ‘nationalising regimes’ (Brubaker 
2011) fortified this reassertion sovereignty vis-à-vis the interests of the Soviet successor states.    
In this sense, most anti-colonial modes of thought seem to be inextricably linked to 
discourses of Kyrgyz nationalism, and specifically to the ethno-nationalist variant discussed 
above. The state-sanctioned historiography of the past two and a half decades has spawned 
different protagonists of Kyrgyz history who were seen as martyrs and fighters for the interests 
of the Kyrgyz, even in the absence of a consolidated Kyrgyz statehood in the days before the 
Soviet Union. Similar to the re-discovery and utilisation of the Manas epic by Akaev in the 
1990s, the stories of these new heroes were thus explored and moulded into a wider narrative 
about Kyrgyz statehood. The sourcing, rehashing and circulation of stories of heroic figures 
from periods of past greatness can be understood as a ‘politics of sovereignty’, which sought to 
‘write the nation’ in historiographic terms (Kudaibergenova 2017). Going back into history 
enabled a more substantive and emotive mobilisation than did the civic nationalist discourse of 
Kyrgyzstan being a ‘common home’ with its emphasis on diversity and tolerance, which was 
not convincing for the entire population, especially given the continuity with the Soviet Union’s 
ambiguous legacy in the country.  
This difference is most apparent in the above-mentioned introduction of the epic Manas 
by president Askar Akaev in the early 1990s. The epic’s underlying idea about the strength, 
resilience, and pride of the Kyrgyz is a unifying feature for the stories of other heroes 
embodying the historic ‘politics of sovereignty’ of Kyrgyzstan (Bagdasarova and Marchenko 
2017).28 Three of these serve as good examples, which have also been promoted in the form of 
                                                
28 Erica Marat explains why the epic was the best choice to build a stronger national ideology:  
The epic recounts the history of major intertribal and inter-ethnic battles and victories, 
it delineates the foes and friends of the Kyrgyz people and reflects the philosophy of 
national unity, and it relates the heroic actions of the protagonist and his followers. Its 
hero, Manas, is the ideal, collective image of what it means to be a male, warrior, 
defender of the motherland, exemplary son, husband, and father. The epic depicts the 
Kyrgyz people’s lifestyle and the value system of their societal relations. (2008: 15)  
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movie productions of recent. The first figure, who has been honoured with multiple memorials 
and streets named after her across Kyrgyzstan, is Kurmanjan Datka, who in recent 
historiography and popular imaginaries has become regarded as a ‘mother of the nation’ 
(Canning 2015). Born in the tribe of the Mungush in the Alai mountains (south of the city of 
Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan), Kurmanjan ran away from her arranged marriage, entirely 
defying the patriarchal tradition of the time.29 She acquired the title datka or ‘righteous ruler’ 
after the assassination of her husband Alymbek datka by the Russian army, which was 
encroaching on the Kokand khanate, which governed the lands of today’s southern Kyrgyzstan 
(Pannier 2015). As there was no scope to defeat the Russian army in the long term,30 the tragic 
key moment of this story is when Kurmanjan datka accepts the execution of her son as a 
sacrifice she has to make in order to reach a ceasefire, which incidentally is the foundation for 
a decades-long peace upheld thanks to the ‘queen’s’ tolerance and ability to persuade the 
Kyrgyz not to raise their arms against the Russian colonial forces (Pannier 2015).31 
Another historic hero celebrated for his standing up for the Kyrgyz national interest is 
Iskhak Razzakov, the first chairman of the council of ministers of the CPSU in the Kyrgyz 
Autonomous SSR32. Having defended the research into and teaching of the epos Manas in the 
early 1930s, Razzakov was removed from office by the Stalinist regime, a course of events 
earning him retrospective hero status in the newly independent Kyrgyz Republic, where the 
                                                	
29 This already makes her a ‘hero of freedom for Kyrgyz women’ whose life is otherwise 
determined and regulated by traditions.  
30 Although legend has it that the young woman and her army became respected among the 
Russians for their bravery and sophistication (virtues the protagonist instilled by reminding her 
soldiers of the legacy of Manas) and the model character of this army, all of which earned 
Kurmanjan datka the title ‘tsaritsa Alaia’ (empress of the Alai, female form of tsar). 
31 In this sense, Kurmanjan datka’s heroism, selflessness and strategic thinking, tolerance and 
striving for peace and unity make her a historical hero but also demonstrate the dilemmas of 
life under imperial rule.	
32 The predecessor of the fully self-governed Kyrgyz SSR, existing from 1926 to 1936, Haugen 
(2003: 167). 
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movie on his life story was much celebrated in 2015. The next, and final, example of resistance 
towards the Soviet regime and its policy of de facto colonisation of the Kyrgyz ASSR and other 
Central Asian republics is Yusup Abdrakhmanov, who as early as 1929 demanded more 
autonomy in the policy making for the republic’s leadership in order to facilitate its economic 
development and mitigate dependency on foodstuff imports from other republics (Loring 2014: 
80 ff.). Abdrakhmanov’s labelling of European CPSU members advocating the entrenchment 
of the KASSR’s position as a raw material and grain producer as ‘colonisers with party cards’ 
(ibid.: 79) is a rare instance of the explicit assertion of Kyrgyz interests through an 
imperial/colonial framing. These figures stand out in a legacy characterised by cooperativeness 
and of only implicit resistance of many generations of Kyrgyz(stani) political actors. 
With political actors seemingly unable or unwilling to challenge problematic 
developments such as the current integration into the Eurasian Economic Union, a lot of 
resistance, which can be associated with anti-colonial/-imperial forces, is located in decentral 
realms of popular protests and activism. The vibrant protest culture of the country springs up 
to pre-empt interference in a wide range of issue areas.33 An example of protests with a 
pronouncedly anti-Western and sovereignty-related underlying concern are the demonstrations 
against the deployment of an unarmed OSCE mission to southern Kyrgyzstan for the 
monitoring of post-conflict stability and the reconstruction process after the 2010 events. Under 
the slogan ‘Say No to a ‘Kyrgyz Kosovo!’, demonstrators decidedly rejected the idea as an 
expression of Western interference into affairs which the country was to handle itself (Gullette 
and Heathershaw 2015).34 
                                                
33 In 2006, for instance, a broad coalition of civil society actors rallied against the country’s 
classification as the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC), which would have led to the 
imposition of the IFIs’ loan conditionalities (Marat 2006). 
34 This and other forms of popular support arguably encouraged political decision-makers to 
reject the report of the international ‘Kyrgyzstan’s Inquiry Commission’ (KIC 2011) as a biased 
analysis that was ‘creating a threat to the national security of the Kyrgyz Republic’, and to 
declare the commission’s chair Kimo Kiljunen a persona non grata (Wilkinson 2014a: 430).    
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Another phenomenon of anti-colonial actions and defence of Kyrgyz heritage and 
culture is the emergence of vigilante groups, which police people’s behaviour at home and 
abroad. Kyrk chyro, literally translated ‘Forty riders’ and constituted in historical reference to 
the warriors in the following of the ancient hero Manas according to the legend, raid clubs and 
businesses run by non-Kyrgyz people or catering international visitors (mostly night clubs or 
saunas) to expose their lack of morality and decadence and rid the Kyrgyz working in these 
businesses from their engagement with foreigners (Region.kg 2015). An even more bizarre 
form of radical (ethno-) traditionalism are the attacks carried out by the so-called ‘Patriots’ 
[patrioty]; groups of young men who track down Kyrgyz women in Moscow and other diaspora 
communities (RFE/RL 2012, 2016).35 Such intrusive and violent measures to police the 
reproduction of the national gene pool and moral purity – the justification purported by the 
vigilantes – demonstrates the extreme ways in which people react to the subjugation and 
marginalisation of Kyrgyzstan and its people. These expressions of anti-colonial discourse 
indicate the potential sentiments and corresponding problems that initiatives on social order, 
community security and statebuilding have to deal with in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
 
IV.4 Tradition and culture 
The third imaginary of statebuilding is most appropriately glossed as ‘tradition and culture’ and 
refers to the rich cultural and historical heritage of the Kyrgyz, which, especially since its 
revival after 1991, has been crucial in shaping perceptions of desirable social relations and ways 
of life. The status of traditions themselves which is subjected to contestation in the current 
period of their revival and instantaneous confrontation and mixing with multiple influences 
                                                
35 Often recorded on video, these groups aim to exert control by interrogating Kyrgyz women 
about their interaction with non-Kyrgyz men and unwillingness to date and marry Kyrgyz men. 
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from different parts of the world.36 Contestation on such delineation are most apparent in the 
religious sphere, where the traditional Kyrgyz denomination of Hanafi Maskhab (a sub-domain 
of Sunni Islam) is said to have been infiltrated and displaced by the entrance of Shiia and other 
strands from the Middle East, which makes the discourse of ‘traditional’ vs ‘foreign’ Islam a 
significant object of examination (IV.4.1). Traditions, customs and culture are crucial in all 
spheres of life, from the family and household to the community and nation. Ideas of tradition 
and original and pure Kyrgyz culture serve as a basis for social organisation and ways of life; 
a fact that can be glossed as ‘traditional institutions and concepts of social order’ (IV.4.2). That 
traditions are also understood to foreground a more harmonic way of life and relation of people 
and nature, is captured in a discourse that can be glossed as ‘traditional knowledge for a better 
life and better society’ (IV.4.3). Finally, the discourse of ‘tradition as link between human, 
                                                
36 In this sense, the delineation between this and the imaginary and the ‘politics of sovereignty’ 
discussed above might not be straightforward at first sight, because Kyrgyz traditions are often 
invoked in the discourses constituting Kyrgyz ‘politics of sovereignty’. However, it can be 
argued that the difference between the two is that the tradition and culture discussed in this 
section is actually present in people’s lived realities – and used to play a part in it already before 
the ‘traditionalist’ revival from 1991 onwards. The tradition and culture invoked in the ‘politics 
of sovereignty’ usually appear as stylised and hybridised with other modes of thought and 
action for precisely the purpose of presenting the dignity and sovereignty of the Kyrgyz(stani) 
people. This degree of instrumentalisation or ‘invention’ of tradition and culture (Hobsbawm 
and Ranger 1983) does not mean that the traditions and cultural practices reviewed here are 
necessarily more substantive or ‘genuine’. As Kyrgyz tradition was subject to profound 
politicisation, classification and regulation, the lines between officially sanctioned tradition 
under Russian imperial and Soviet rule and other merely tolerated, undesired or illegal customs 
and practices were often blurred (Beyer 2006: 160, Hirsch 2005). Consequently, many practices 
that are widely understood as customs are actually denied the status of proper Kyrgyz tradition, 
as for instance the widespread practice of bride-kidnapping (Langford 2015, Kleinbach and 
Salimjanova 2007).  	
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natural and spiritual domain’ (IV.4.4) helps to shed a critical light on the creation of a modern 
state, urban infrastructures and mass scale social organisation and to demarcate a critical frame 
of thinking about statebuilding and social organisation from a decolonial perspective.   
 
IV.4.1 ‘Traditional’ vs ‘foreign’ Islam 
Since independence in 1991, Islam has been strongly embraced both in Kyrgyzstan and Central 
Asia more broadly (Wolters 2014), a ‘revival’ attributed to the ideological vacuum left after the 
fall of the Soviet Union (Lipovsky 1996). Islam was made a core feature of Kyrgyzstan’s post-
Soviet nation building project, with the president and high officials identifying as Muslims, the 
main Muslim holidays declared as national holidays and extensive building programmes for 
mosques, which in 2012 counted 1700, up from a handful in 1991 (Tromble 2014: 531). Still, 
authorities also tried to keep a wary distance to religion as they were aware of the potentially 
radical and politically transformative ambitions rooted in different variations of it. According 
to André Biard, they ‘hoped to annihilate any pan-Islamist dimension by promoting a “good” 
national and traditionalist Islam’ (2010: 326). This was done through different state and semi-
state bodies, most importantly the State Agency for Religious Affairs and the Spiritual 
Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan or Muftiat.37  
The dominant discourse thus distinguishes a ‘good’ and ‘traditional’ Islam that does not 
challenge the social order and authorities in Kyrgyzstan from newer, more orthodox ideas 
gaining traction among believers. In fact, Islam itself had been brought to Kyrgyzstan, or rather 
the country’s nomadic forebears, by Arab armies invading the Siberian lands and the Chui 
valley and more southern areas making up the present-day republic and converting the nomadic 
population since the 8th century AD onwards (Kargiannis 2005: 137). The denomination 
                                                
37 The latter is officially declared an independent body but, given the little average competency 
in religious matters and ideological alignment with state policies and interests of its 
representatives, is regarded as corrupted and a tool of government (Khamidov 2013). 
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predominant in Kyrgyzstan, Hanafi Maskhab, can itself be seen as a hybrid of Islamic teachings 
and the customs of different nomadic tribes (Toktogulova 2007). Besides pious and diligent 
conduct of faith, the Hanafi Maskhab also espouses a number of festivities (called toi or ash), 
exchange and community relations and sacrifice rituals that are regarded as wasteful in more 
orthodox interpretations of Islam (ibid.). Especially the permissive stance vis-à-vis alcohol 
consumption and socialising between men and women makes ‘traditional’ Kyrgyz Islam appear 
half-hearted and even sinful; many of its practices are considered as shirk (idolatry) and bidaiat, 
i.e. ‘innovations’ not mentioned in the Islamic scriptures and thus not to be practiced by 
orthodox Muslims (Tulebaeva 2017: 82). 
Tulebaeva’s analysis (2017) dissects the value conflict between traditional Kyrgyz 
Islam (salttyk islam) and the newer, more orthodox trend of musulmanchylyk (lit. ‘according to 
a religious way’), which prescribes rituals and ways of life directly derived from the Quran and 
teachings hailing from the Middle East, Turkey, India and Bangladesh. Contestations in the 
religious sphere do not only concern questions of choice, taste and personal conviction, but are 
highly politicised as a matter of maintaining ‘old’ interpretations of Islam and the notion of salt 
– meaning ‘culture’, ‘cultural practices’, customs and traditions with a local specificity (Beyer 
2009) – that refers to heritage handed down through generations and is considered as inalienable 
from Kyrgyz people.38 The proponents of salttyk islam or Kyrgyz ‘traditional’ Islam thus 
present it as ‘the Islam that has been coming from our ancestors’ and is worth preserving, while 
adherents of musulmanchylyk criticise it as a ‘tool of enemies who want to destroy the religion’ 
(Tulebaeva 2017: 95).39 
                                                
38 Correspondingly, Kyrgyz are seen to be Muslims by virtue of their ethnic identity and are 
also referred to as ‘cultural Muslims’ (Tulebaeva 2017: 78). The notion of being a ‘good 
Muslim’ does not necessarily depend on piety and diligence but on a minimal level of 
maintenance of and awareness about one’s relationship with Allah (Montgomery 2007). 
39 Conversely, in their zeal to strive for the abundance (yrysyk) and yiman (conscience, honesty 
and good manners) promised as reward for piety and diligence, the numerous supporters of neo-
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The salience of the topic was exemplified in debates unfolding around the spreading of 
billboards in the country’s major cities, which pictured groups of women in traditional Kyrgyz 
head-dresses (elecheck) and, respectively, women in hijabs and fully veiled with black niqabs, 
above the caption: ‘My poor people, where are we going?’ [Kairan elim, kaida baratabyz?]. 
Despite their potentially provocative if not offensive message vis-à-vis the pious Muslim 
community, the billboards were greeted by large parts of the population and public actors, with 
president Atambaev even subsidising the campaign (Nazritdinov and Esenamanova 2016).40 
This shows how foreign religion and orthodox Islam were being framed as invasive and 
potentially dangerous (Louw 2012: 151), leading to a securitisation of dressing styles and faith 
(Tromble 2014). Beyond this adversarial discourse on religion in Kyrgyzstan’s public 
discourse, it is necessary to mention that the practice and teachings of Islam are also a source 
of social harmony, peacefulness, patience and obedience resonating with the coping and 
perseverance strategies discussed in IV.2.4 (Bennett 2016: 19, Beyer 2013, Louw 2013, 
Satybaldieva 2017 and 2015b) and have even been conceptualised as entry point for 
institutionalised peacebuilding practices (Alisheva 2015).   
 
IV.4.2 Traditional institutions and concepts of social order 
The second crucial discourse is one emphasising the substance and importance of traditional 
institutions and concepts of social order and governance. It can be traced through the ongoing 
                                                
orthodox Islam adopt new dressing styles, dietary requirements and mannerisms (ibid.: 91 ff.), 
provoking disdain and ridicule among supporters of ‘traditional Islam’. 
40 After a counter-campaign parodying the initial bill boards decried the spreading of miniskirts 
as the hyper-modern opposite to more traditional clothing, Atambaev was also reported to 
defend mini-skirts, saying that mini-skirts had been worn in Kyrgyzstan since the 1950s and 
that at least people wearing them ‘do not blow up anyone’. KirTAG, Пусть лучше ходят в 
мини-юбках, но никого не взрывают – Атамбаев [They better walk around in mini-skirts as 
long as they do not blow up anyone – Atambaev’], 01 August 2016, accessed 17 April 2017, 
http://kyrtag.kg/society/pust-luchshe-khodyat-v-mini-yubkakh-no-nikogo-ne-vzryvayut-
atambaev-  
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significance of two traditional institutions, the kurultai and askakal courts and key concepts of 
order, harmony and peace which I briefly discuss here. 
The kurultai – an assembly of community representatives – goes back several centuries 
in the history of the Kyrgyz nomadic tribes. Throughout history, it has been a significant vehicle 
for the establishment, consolidation and extension of administration, and rule of law, as well as 
military command.41 Re-introduced and institutionalised in the post-independence era42, 
kurultais are still held today, for instance by political parties as a substitute for party congresses 
demonstrating proximity to the people and traditions of Kyrgyzstan (Gezitter.org 2015; 
Bedelbek kyzy 2015), and they have been called to protest different issues such as recent 
government plans to hold a referendum on changes to the constitution.43 Such popular 
democracy creates accountability, but is also vulnerable to capture, populism, manipulation and 
deadlocks as, according to different commentators, ‘people yield themselves [for participation] 
because they are relatives or because they are promised money or offices’.44   
                                                41	In his anthology of Kyrgyz statehood, Borubashov traces the role of kurultais in the different 
epochs during which the Kyrgyz had lived under Turkic, Mongol, Kokand and Russian rule 
(2015).	42	The 2001 Presidential Decree on ‘Increasing the role of Kurultais in the management of local 
affairs’ institutionalised kurultais as village assemblies which would review and approve 
municipal social and economic development plans and track their implementation (Alymkulov 
and Kulatov 2001: 533). The concept fit well into Akaev’s idea of a multicultural nationalist 
ideology and led him to create a People’s Assembly uniting representatives from all ethnic and 
religious groups of the country, which mirrored the intercommunal idea underling the kurultai 
(Marat 2008: 14; Borubashov 2013: 18). Omelicheva (2015: 83-84) has shown how 
Kyrgyzstan’s second president Bakiev, in light of the fatigue with the promotion of Western 
electoral democracy (a ‘marathon of money-bags’; quoted in Nikolaev 2010), invoked the 
kurultai as an example of ‘consultative democracy’ where people raise their everyday concerns 
and needs to shape policy, rather than leave it to elected officials and technocrats.	
43 Zanoza.kg: Народный курултай: референдум и изменение Конституции нелегитимны 
[People’s kurultai: The referendum and changes tot he Constitution are not legitimate], 20 
October 2016, accessed 17 April 2017, http://zanoza.kg/doc/345642_ 
narodnyy_kyryltay:_referendym_i_izmenenie_konstitycii_nelegitimny.html  
44 Ganyeva, N. (2016) Курултай новый - проблемы старые [New kurultai, old problems], 12 
March 2016, accessed 17 April 2017, http://24.kg/perekrestok/28996_kurultay_novyiy_-
_problemyi_staryie/  
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  Aksakal (Kg. elder, lit. white beard) courts are an institution in the legal realm has 
enjoyed yet more popularity. Aksakals are seen as authoritative based not only based on their 
age, experience and connectedness within the community, but also as elders of a respective 
lineage or uruu (clan or tribe) (Beyer 2006: 160, fn. 8). Even in Soviet days, when the courts 
had not been formally existent, aksakals or lineage elders would meet regularly and discuss 
issues pertaining to life and the community. This social structure was an ideal basis for 
institutionalisation into lay or alternative dispute settlement mechanism, which could even 
solve cases that went beyond a particular community. Aksakals were institutionalised in 1995 
as alternative dispute resolution mechanism to unburden the increasingly unfit ex-Soviet legal 
system. According to the 2002 law ‘On the aksakal courts’, they are constituted of individuals 
who enjoy respect within the community and are supposed to judge disputes between people 
‘according to moral norms that reflect the customs and traditions of the Kyrgyz’.45 Since then, 
this institution has been set up in almost every municipality of the country and has become the 
first point of contact for people in cases of domestic conflicts. Because all ‘minor’ cases are 
first reviewed by askakals before being handed on to the police and judiciary, it could be said 
that people are ‘forced to interact with this institution if they want to have their cases considered 
by officials’ (Beyer 2006: 147). In light of this lack of alternatives and other limitations of the 
institution of aksakals,46 it has been argued that they often serve to reproduce a rather 
                                                
45 Art. 1, I, 2, ‘Law on the aksakal Courts’, accessed 13 November 2017, 
http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/1070  
46 Most importantly, Kyrgyz traditions are seen to favour certain constellations, for instance, 
maintaining marriages rather than encouraging divorces in case of conflicts between spouses, 
or not engaging into all too quarrelsome splitting of property for harmony’s sake, but potentially 
at the expense of one party (Beyer 2006: 152). Further, aksakals’ knowledge of legislation and 
procedural regulations is faint if existent at all, which means that decisions are often enforced 
with almost exclusive reference to salt (Kyrgyz traditional law), while statutory law and 
affiliation with law enforcement are invoked by aksakals to reinforce their decisions and build 
up a status of state officials (Beyer 2014: 106).	
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conservative and potentially repressive social order while failing to address and normative 
conflict within society (Beyer 2016, Beyer and Girke 2015).  
 Askakals are seen as the bearers of the century-old traditions, norms and values which 
are implicit in customary law or adat utuk, which, according to Botokanova, espouses the ‘most 
archaic conceptions of law – with primordial popular understandings of “justice”, “reciprocity”, 
“truth”, “restraint”, “order”’(2015: 171); uiat bolot (shame anxiety); el emne deit (‘what will 
people say?’); or narmys (pride), ‘which were … crucial regulating devices for the traditional 
Kyrgyz society’ (ibid: 152; Beyer 2013: 436). These moralistic understandings were 
‘determined by the socio-economic factors, the nomadic way of life, the domination of the 
communal psychology over the individual, and the de facto absence of gender equality’ 
(Botokanova 2015: 171). This disposition of traditional law exhibits some level of injustice and 
bias to the favour of well-endowed elites (ibid.: 171), but, as Botokanova argues, it also ensured 
the functioning of society in rural areas and secured a sense of belonging to a meaningful social 
collective under the harsh conditions of social transformation that the Kyrgyz people underwent 
throughout the 20th century (ibid.: 113 ff., Féaux de la Croix and Ismailbekova 2014). 
         Traditional law and norms stemming from the Kyrgyz nomad culture informed multiple 
initiatives of making and securing social order especially in rural communities. Ideas of ‘unity’ 
(birimdik) and ‘harmony’ (yntymak) are at the forefront of these projects, which are carried out 
by aksakals, imams and local civil society (Beyer 2013, 2016). Different authors have shown 
how they are mobilised for conflict prevention in inter-ethnic and cross border communities in 
the Fergana valley in the southern Kyrgyzstan.47 There appears ample scope, though, for 
                                                
47 Analysing the work of the NGO Yntymak saiasaty (‘Politics of harmony’), Bichsel finds that 
the promotion of harmony and tolerance vis-à-vis intra- and inter-communal division leads to 
a depoliticisation of the problems at the root of cross-border conflicts and strengthening of the 
position of local elites who benefit from support for infrastructure rehabilitation (2005: 63). 
Similarly, Reeves finds that yntymak is largely secured by older men and their rituals of cross 
border visiting and feasting, which throws up the question as to how more fundamental 
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investigating such practices of ‘harmony ideology’ (Lewis 2016: 389, Nader 1990) as to how 
much they present an instantiation of a repressive system where, in Laura Nader’s words, 
‘harmony coerced is freedom denied’ (Nader 2001; Beyer and Girke 2015). This completes the 
outline of a field of tension surrounding the role of traditional institutions and concepts of order 
which, on the one hand, link the Kyrgyz with their ancient traditions and experience of their 
ancestors – making them stand above and beyond politics, which become cast in an amoral light 
– and, on the other, as an instrument for the consolidation of social order on the local level and, 
hence, of hegemony of the political players of the day. 
  
IV.4.3 Traditional knowledge for a better life and better society  
Beyond pragmatic arrangements of governance, organisation and administration, the 
application of ‘traditional knowledge’ from the nomadic forebears inspires more sustainable 
ways of doing policies and organising society. On a more mundane level, nomadic traditions 
foreground a strong political agenda in regard to agriculture, resources management and 
environmental protection, which resonate with discourses of ‘sustainable development’, 
environmental protection, climate change and ‘agrobiocultural diversity’ (Botokanova 2015: 
18). In the output of a 2010 a research initiative on ‘traditional knowledge’ (traditsionnye 
znania, plural), it is argued that ‘[t]echnogenic society’, in contrast to its ‘traditional’ 
counterpart, is understood to see nature as a ‘deposit’ on which it draws for the realisation of 
production, industrialisation and economic growth (ibid.: 110). The technogenic approach has 
wrought significant damage and the destruction of livelihoods through in form of flooded 
valleys in Kyrgyzstan’s Tian Shan mountains or the salinisation and drying out of the Aral Sea 
(Féaux de la Croix 2011, Sievers 2013). The more traditional activities such as animal 
                                                
questions and discontents may be addressed within this traditional framework of conflict 
containment (2015b).	
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husbandry and cash cropping in agro-, horti- and silvicultural sectors present livelihood 
strategies (see Schmidt 2013), on the other hand, were similarly elevated to prime importance 
during the Soviet period while being much more sustainable (Schoch et al. 2010, Shigaeva et 
al. 2007). Analyses of the decline of cash cropping and animal husbandry since the end of the 
Soviet Union (Steimann 2011, Isakov and Schoeberlein 2014) show how the sustenance of 
traditional, pastoral livelihoods depends on the scale of production and integration into the 
global market or, alternatively, on the embracing of a very basic way of life, which is 
increasingly marginalised in a society flattered by the comforts of modern-day consumption. 
Furthermore, with its emphasis on the collective – the family, kinship and community – 
renders individual life meaningful in relation to its belonging to this collective. This social and 
genealogical relationality is expressed in the principle of zhety ata – literally ‘six fathers’, 
denoting the rule that people should know their family tree into the seventh ancestral generation 
–  or greetings like Kaisy uruktan, uurudan bolosun? – ‘Which tribe or kin do you belong to?’ 
(Botokanova 2015: 115 ff.). Besides a more material component of mutual obligations in case 
of need (ibid.: 120), this points to the importance of belonging in an emotional or psychological 
sense. On the other hand, this emphasis on the absolute value of traditional knowledge, ways 
of life and identity also exhibits tendencies of ethno-nationalist thinking, both in academic 
discourse and in its political usage48. Botokanova, for instance, opens her volume with the 
following statement, among others: ‘In today’s multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-
confessional space, the problem of renewal, preservation and dissemination of traditional 
knowledge with the aim of preserving ethnic identity and securing continuity of cultural 
                                                
48 In his opening address on the Second World Nomad Games (a world event for nomadic 
traditional sports with a wide audience) at lake Issyk-Kul, president Atambaev remarked: ‘In 
today’s world, humankind is forgetting its roots. There is a threat of the disappearance of unique 
cultures and peoples; state borders are changing.’ Speech accessed 13 November 2017, 
available at: http://www.gezitter.org/culture/53170_a_atambaev_vsemirnyie_ 
igryi_kochevnikov_-_eto_prazdnik_vozvrascheniya_k_svoim_istokam_/   
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development acquires special importance.’ (Botokanova 2015: 4) This statement positions 
traditional knowledge in the familiar opposition with the challenges and changes brought about 
by globalisation and defines its main purpose as preserving ‘unique traditional cultures’ and 
‘ethnic identity’, thus invoking a scenario of threat of vanishing or extinction of ethnic identity 
and culture under conditions of globalisation and, specifically in the Central Asian case, labour 
migration and multi-local livelihoods. The next and final discourse on ‘tradition and culture’ 
points to a more fundamentally peaceful and ‘decolonial’ modality of being.  
 
IV.4.4 Tradition as link between human, natural and spiritual domain 
As a final item in the imaginary of ‘tradition and culture’, it is necessary to discuss in more 
depth the importance of discourses in the spiritual domain and how they foreground the three 
discourses examined above. . It can be said that a distinct sense of spirituality lies beneath the 
discourses and practices of ‘traditional Islam’, traditional forms of social order and ways of life 
discussed above. This is captured in the traditional ‘ecosophic’ worldview which, based on the 
nomadic way of life, ‘keep[s] in step with the development of nature’ and posits as core 
principle the ‘harmony of nature and humans’ (Umanbetova and Abdrasulova 2009: 92). 
According to this worldview, writes Botokanova, ‘social welfare, [and] the spiritual 
foundations of society’s and humans’ existence are not only depending on the observation of 
ethico-moral norms … but also on [people’s] relationship with nature, the source of life in all 
its diversity and phenomenality’ (2015: 74). Such a relationship or unity between humans and 
natures is present in in pre-Islamic religions such as tengrism and principals such as ubal – 
responsibility for damage or suffering brought about by affecting nature – and pir – the idea 
that all objects and creatures of the natural world have a patron, a ‘supernatural’ being, who 
protects them and to whom one can pray for protection and blessings, both of which indicate 
how a good standing in the spiritual domain may be seen as crucial for economic activities and 
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‘worldly conduct’ more generally (Botokanova 2015: 63).  Traditional beliefs and spirituality 
have continuously shaped social and domestic life of the Kyrgyz and other peoples in 
Kyrgyzstan throughout the Soviet and into the post-Soviet period.49   
This implicit critique of and search for alternatives vis-à-vis the exigencies of modern 
statehood and neo-liberal transformation that Kyrgyz people experienced during the last ca. 100 
years is reminiscent of the decolonial approach of ‘deep relation’, put forward by Robbie 
Shilliam (2015). Deep relation, according to him, seeks 
… to repair colonial wounds, binding back together peoples, lands, pasts, ancestors and 
spirits ... to bring back the manifest and spiritual domains. For in the latter domain exist 
the hinterlands that were never colonized … and therein lie the supports of a global 
infrastructure of anti-colonial connectivity (2015: 13). 
This idea reaches beyond the purpose of this analysis and beyond the intentions and interests 
of traditional ways of life in Kyrgyzstan. Developing anti-colonial or more generally anti-
oppressive/exploitative agency would necessitate a critical awareness and desire for social 
change. Rather than such ambition, the most significant thread underlying traditional and 
culturally endowed ways of living is a passive acceptance or evasion of the imperatives of 
modern, urban life, which appear significant in their own right, even if they are unattractive for 
many people especially among the urban population in Kyrgyzstan. Other than the first three 
discourses under the ‘tradition and culture’ imaginary, this fourth discourse on ‘spirituality and 
nature’ reflects the modality of decoloniality, understood as counter-pole of governmentality 
                                                49	O’Neill Borbieva (2013), for instance, has shown how the handling of bread and other 
foodstuffs is acrimoniously regulated in her hosts’ household. Adherence to these rules pays 
tribute to the holy status of bread in Muslim tradition; secures a person’s standing according to 
conceptions of doing good (soop) and having enough to live (rizq/yrysky); and expresses 
valorisation of the social bonds (with neighbours, guests or family members) that bread 
symbolises (ibid.: 504). Conversely, failure to stick to the rules may cause a disequilibrium in 
the spiritual sphere and incur threats, curses and unhappiness.	
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(III.2). The decolonial ways of thinking, acting and knowing I examine have a potential to 
inform practices of peace- and statebuilding; but as I will show, they ultimately stand in an 
uncomfortable relation to them. 
 
IV.5 Post-liberal statebuilding between governmentality and decoloniality 
As already indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the imaginaries and discourses that I 
have defined based on literature, media material and my own research are ideal-types that rest 
on certain dimensions and underlying concepts. Given this stylisation into a workable 
framework, there are many overlaps, synergies and oppositions between the different elements. 
This synthetic potential foregrounds the combination of different discourses into hybrid 
practices and discourses of statebuilding; and, conversely, a deconstruction of statebuilding – 
more specifically community security and peacebuilding practices and discourses – into their 
composite parts, or, respectively, situating these discourses and practices vis-à-vis the three 
imaginaries of statebuilding. This helps to show how specific actors, actions and speech acts 
cannot be seen to belong or refer exclusively to categories such as ‘liberal peace’ or ‘local’, or 
‘authoritarian’, ‘traditional’ or ‘culturally authentic’. Rather, as my analysis shows, actors and 
modalities in statebuilding have to be seen in terms of how they situate themselves vis-à-vis 
and within different imaginaries of statebuilding by drawing on particular discourses and 
engaging in certain practices and relations.  
The use of the interpretive framework for the analysis of the multiple relationalities and 
heteroglossia underlying peace- and statebuilding discourse and practice is particularly well 
captured in the intentional choice to name the ‘politics of sovereignty’ (IV.3) such and not 
otherwise. This denotation emphasises that resistance by national or sub-national actors can 
rarely, if ever, be understood to be expressed against ‘the West’ or the ‘liberal peace’ in their 
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very essence, and exclusively directed at them.50 Indeed, external interference and 
conditionality are often rejected and resisted by invoking concepts of international law (most 
notably ‘sovereignty’ or ‘territorial integrity’) which are equally associated with the Western 
‘liberal peace’ imaginary and the idea of statehood it implies. While much of the literature on 
international politics in the post-Soviet space uses a continuum of authoritarianism to label 
Central Asian states’ forms of governance and politics, this framework enables an analysis of 
how governments, organisations and people use and re-appropriate concepts like sovereignty 
or ‘democracy’ to negotiate their relations with international actors. Thus, rather than being 
opposed to one another, notions and concepts situated within the ‘liberal peace’ may be 
combined with discourses from both of the other two imaginaries in the crafting of post-liberal 
forms of statebuilding, domestic and foreign policy. 
Besides this pragmatic, discourse-analytical perspective on the combination and 
hybridisation of discourses into post-liberal statebuilding, the framework offers a normative 
perspective on these processes. The different imaginaries and discourses of statebuilding are 
situated in a space between the ‘governmentality’ and ‘decoloniality’ modalities of governance 
and social ordering (see III.2). Figure 4.2 indicates how this normative aspect can be illustrated 
in a third dimension in which the plane of the imaginaries of statebuilding is located.  
 
                                                
50 Although such a somewhat purer resistance is discussed in the ‘bad West’ discourse (IV.3.1).  
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Figure 4.2: Situating the framework between governmentality and decoloniality 
 
In the foregoing sections, I have indicated the tendencies towards governmentality and 
decoloniality of some of the discourses and imaginaries on their own.51 The full scale of 
ambiguity becomes clear in the hypothetical example of a ‘liberal peace’ style peacebuilding 
project that uses traditional concepts and institutions of social order: it might appear 
emancipatory given the valorisation of people, their lifeworlds and cultural backgrounds. 
However, in the absence of a holistic consideration and critique of the embeddedness of the 
context in precarious economic and political conditions, such a project is liable to produce a 
                                                
51 For instance, it can be argued that the discourse of spirituality, ‘ecosophy’ and the 
corresponding concept of ‘deep relation’ – a connection with the pasts, places and ancestors 
that imperial/colonial interference has disrupted – can be understood as a potential for 
decoloniality in light of its focus on wellbeing, wholesomeness and harmony. On the other 
hand, the embracing of this discourse can also imply that people seek refuge in their own homes 
or communities while society at large continues to suffer from unregulated market forces and 
declining social support. Similarly, traditional institutions and concepts of social order are 
portrayed as important and meaningful because of their potential to create harmony (yntymak) 
and to give people a sense of belonging, while their functionality for dealing with conflicts 
arising from the longings and problems sparked by modernisation, urban life and neo-liberal 
reforms appears to be limited. 
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form of governmentality and mere conflict management with possible neo-authoritarian 
features, instead of transforming conflict and tackling its root causes (see Reeves 2015b, 
Lottholz 2018).  
 Finally, it should be emphasised that the discussion of the implications of post-liberal 
forms of statebuilding is primarily of reflective character and not aimed at generating 
suggestions as to what could be ‘done better’ to ‘decolonise’ the modalities of social order 
under analysis. Such ideas may emerge from the examination of the different initiatives and 
actions but are of minor concern here. More importantly, in contextualising the empirical 
analyses, I aim to show how trajectories of neo-authoritarian governmentality are 
preconditioned by the Soviet and post-Soviet modes of governance and how these largely 
preclude decoloniality, although they appear to enable it on individual and group levels in 
certain instances. I will show how different instances of intervention, engagement, resistance 
and creativity make contributions to community security and peacebuilding that help to shape 
a more representative, just and empathetic social order. However, by demonstrating how these 
instances are most often only exceptions confirming the overarching logics of security 
governance, politics of sovereignty and governmentality, this research aims to offer a critical 
and reflective perspective on post-liberal statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan.  
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Chapter V	 Statebuilding in Central Asia: The case of community security and 
peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan 
 
In this first empirical chapter, I give an introduction into the realities of life in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan, and especially its specifics in semi-urban and rural areas where privatisation and 
liberal reform have effected a fundamental reconfiguration of public life, social order and 
economic activity. While the main analytical focus of the chapter is on community security 
practices in rural and semi-urban localities in Kyrgyzstan, the reason why and ways in which 
community security ‘is done’ cannot be sufficiently understood without looking at the 
livelihoods and struggle for a decent life, if not survival, that people in Kyrgyzstan became 
caught up in after the country’s independence and subsequent privatisation and liberalisation 
programmes. In chapter IV, I have already shown how the Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary 
and its discourses on liberalisation and reform after the Washington Consensus model have 
dominated debates policies pertaining to Kyrgyzstan’s ‘transition’ after the end of the Soviet 
Union. To outline the ‘post-Soviet condition of uncertainty’ (Pelkmans 2017: 5) and its 
implications for security, peace and conflict, I give an insight into the poverty, precarity, and 
dependence on newly emergent institutions, mechanisms and access regimes people were 
having to grapple with, and new ways of securing existence through labour migration to former 
Soviet states and beyond. On this basis, I show how different structures of municipal/rural 
administration and civil society – i.e. voluntary bodies engaged in social ordering and 
mobilisation – evolved during the post-Soviet period, first sharply declining in their activity 
and meaning but soon revived as part of the central government’s efforts to decentralise and 
delegate responsibility to local self-governance bodies. Against this background, I analyse so-
called Local Crime Prevention Centres (LCPCs, Ru. Obshestvenno-profilakticheskie tsentry or 
OPTs) and an initiative of international NGOs to strengthen, or re-vive, their role in maintaining 
order, preventing crime and building peace in communities across the country.    
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 In the subsequent section V.1, I show how the large scale industrial collapse and 
concurring downsizing and disabling of state institutional structures led to such degrees of 
reorganisation of social life and economic activity according to informal principles and 
mechanisms that a new moral economy of survival came into being. In this new configuration, 
certain policies and reform measures produced the impression that Kyrgyzstan was slowly 
transitioning to a market economy with modern, accountable state institutions, while de facto 
access patterns, social hierarchies and social stratification in many ways defied the idea of a 
modern and fairly equal society. I also show how the emerging transnational economy of labour 
migration put increasing strain on families and social networks, which, together with the other 
challenges, led to many people, especially youth, being increasingly prone to aggression and 
crime, which in turn had negative implications for peace and security.  
In section V.2, I outline the infrastructure of local administration and civil society during 
and after the Soviet Union and situate Local Crime Prevention Centres within this network. I 
analyse how they were set up to become nodes for cooperation between state and society while 
also acting as conduits for international aid funding streams. In section V.3, I present analyses 
of a sample of LCPCs based on a cooperative project in which I profiled these entities in select 
localities and observed how they practice and produce security. Besides discussing the overall 
pattern of security issues and their embeddedness in domains such as infrastructure and the 
economy, I show how LCPCs draw on their symbolic and social capital as well as donor funding 
to mobilise communities to work together on solutions for infrastructural challenges; to 
promote moral strength and cohesion of young families to cope with multi-local livelihoods; 
and to call divided communities to practice tolerance, harmony and ‘people’s friendship’. In 
the concluding discussion, I extrapolate these activities of LCPCs into the framework of the 
imaginaries of statebuilding and show how, while drawing on the Western ‘liberal peace’ and 
‘tradition and culture’ imaginaries, LCPCs and their actions reproduce, or at least do not 
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fundamentally challenge a ‘politics of sovereignty’ with ambiguous implications for social 
justice and representation.  
 
V.1 Between Soviet legacy and ‘new market realities’: Life in semi-urban and rural 
Kyrgyzstan 
As already discussed in the previous chapter (section IV.2) the Kyrgyzstani population at large 
has accepted the necessity and inevitability of a transition from planned to market economy, 
and all institutional and political changes this would imply, in a way that suggests teleological 
thinking ingrained through Marxist-Leninist ideology whose telos – the idea of a fully 
industrially developed Communist society – was replaced with the same image glossed in a free 
market and individualist version. In this light, I use the term ‘new market realities’ in inverted 
commas to suggest that, even though markets may not have become real or at least did not 
operate as they are supposed to, people perceived their constitution and necessity as real, and 
therefore were soon confronted with the challenge to find ways to make a living and navigate 
these realities. In the first part of this section, I show how industrial collapse and the subsequent 
weakening and partial vanishing of institutional presence of the state gave rise to a 
reorganisation of life along informal principals and mechanisms of social organisation, resource 
allocation and inclusion/exclusion, thus creating a moral economy of survival. I further discuss 
the transnational economy of migrant labour emerging out of this shift and the strain it puts on 
families and social networks, which in turn feeds into the security and stability risks that local 
community security practitioners are grappling with.     
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Industrial and institutional collapse: Privatisation, informalisation and moral economy of 
survival  
Life in post-independence Kyrgyzstan has, for the larger part of the population, been 
determined by the rapid collapse of the industrial sector and a general slump of the country’s 
GDP and a slow but steady decline of institutional capacities and services. The country’s first 
democratically elected president Askar Akaev, who had already been elected president of the 
Kyrgyz SSR by its Supreme Soviet in 1990, embraced the ‘shock therapy’ reforms proposed to 
former Soviet and Socialist countries across the board – with devastating effects for the 
population. As Igamberdiev reports in his analysis of the first ‘transition years’, the country’s 
GDP was diminished by half of the 1990 level within 4 years and thus back to the republic’s 
1970s level (2016: 150). Mass bankruptcies in the industrial sector led to a plunge to 35 per 
cent of the 1990 level in 1995. More than privatisation, this collapse had been effected by the 
stop of financial flows from Moscow and the implosion of distribution channels for Kyrgyz-
produced goods throughout the (former) Soviet Union (Gullette 2010: 28). As in other former 
Soviet republics, the process of setting up channels and infrastructures for market trading took 
some time, during which barter trading and the informal and black-market economy, as well as 
organised crime, where the main channels of economic exchange and accumulation.  
 This had significant ramifications for people’s lives. According to statistical data, the 
real wage dropped to a level of around a fifth of the 1989 level and, given hyper-inflations in 
the early 1990s and a five-fold rise in food prices made it impossible to live let alone sustain a 
family if one had employment at all (Igamberdiev 2016: 152). In the absence of employment, 
and given wage arrears and lack of orders, people had to find ways to secure and their families’ 
wellbeing, and often survival, in the informal economy and through subsistence agriculture 
(Pelkmans 2017: ch.1). As Muratbek, my driver on trips in southern Kyrgyzstan told me:    
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In the Soviet times [pri soiuzu] I used to work in a cement-asphalt factory, then they 
closed it. I first sold samogon [spirit distilled at home] in the villages, from my car or 
with the motorcycle. With that money, I would get animal skins for tanning, sometimes 
also colouring it, and then I would sell it to [people in] Russia. I had clients there. … 
My wife was at home with the [three] kids, I was the only one working.1   
This illustrates the inventive spirit and self-initiative people had to develop to find ways to 
make a living. However, many people lacked such industriousness and entrepreneurial thinking 
and where thus rendered much more vulnerable. Most people, especially in rural areas, came to 
rely on a combination of wage labour and subsistence agriculture, which they pursued on newly 
allotted land plots they were allocated as part of the new land reform that saw the 576 state or 
collective farms – through which agricultural production was organised on an industrial or large 
scale – split up into units of up to one hectare’s size (Botoeva 2015: 534, Steimann 2011: ch. 
4). As much as the privatisation of industrial enterprises, the liquidation of collective farms was 
a largely uneven process in which former bosses and managers were advantages and managed 
to acquire the machinery and equipment necessary to cultivate larger plots of land (Steimann 
2011: 58). As Botoeva sums up the dynamics in the agricultural sector:   
Only a tiny minority of well-off families, who owned large fields (30–50 hectares), full 
machinery and large herds of livestock (around 300 sheep, 30–40 cows and 20 horses), 
were able to produce a surplus and generate cash. Although also a minority in the 
community, the poorer members could not cultivate most of their land and so rented it 
out (or lost ownership completely), or did not own much livestock (no livestock or one 
cow and a few sheep) and had to find other ways to generate income. (Botoeva 2015: 
535)  
                                                
1 Trip to Jalal-Abad province, 31 Octover 2015. 
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This creeping stratification of the rural population slowly produced a sizeable population of 
rural poor who have increasingly moved into the urban centres in the different provinces 
– mostly in the capital Bishkek and Osh in the South – in the hope to find jobs in the service 
and construction sectors (Satybaldieva 2015a: 373; 2015b: 103). This increased the pressures 
on urban infrastructures and social climate extraordinarily as it added to the strain experienced 
by the already mentioned industrial collapse experienced across the country.  
Today, over 25 years since Kyrgyzstan’s constitution as independent country, former 
factories and production sites lie in ruins and produce feeling of trepidation, abandonment and 
betrayal among their former workers (Tucker 2011, Satybaldieva 2015b). In Osh, for instance, 
factories for textile production, pump manufacturing and meat processing once employed up to 
45,000 people, with multiplier effects in other sectors and creating livelihoods for a large part 
of the city’s residents (ibid.; Harrowell 2015). Mass lay-offs and suspension of housebuilding 
and provision has given rise to fierce distribution battles within the labour market and sectors 
of social housing and land registry. Other middle-sized, once well-constituted towns, especially 
so-called ‘frontier towns’, with mineral and raw material deposits of strategic significance for 
the Soviet Union as a whole, saw an even more marked exodus of inhabitants, leaving behind 
only a few hundred or dozens of people. The ‘complete disappearance of industry’ (Pelkmans 
2017: 47, see Reeves 2014: ch. 3) and of the social and infrastructural advantages the ‘frontier 
town’ status had brought with it evoked feelings of hopelessness and overwhelmedness up to 
traumatic dimensions (Tucker 2011). ‘When they described their city to outsiders, key words 
included “war zone”, “devastation” and “death”. ... was a “dying city”, a postindustrial 
wasteland, a ruin of Soviet modernity’, finds Pelkmans (2017: 48) in his description of a former 
mining town in Jalal-Abad province in western Kyrgyzstan.2  
                                                
2 For illustrations see Razul-zade, Tilav, Журавли улетели, забыв о родных гнездах и городе 
Шураб, превратившемся в бесхозные руины [The cranes flew away, forgetting about their 
nests back home and about the city of Shurab, which turns into ownerless ruins], 23 June 2010, 
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The collapse of the economy and especially the industrial sector of the Kyrgyz ex-Soviet 
Republic also affected a fundamental reconfiguration of the ways in which life was ordered and 
governed. In this regard, it makes sense to differentiate between downsizing and withdrawal of 
state institutions on the one hand, and the changes of societal practices, attitudes and approaches 
to dealing with the challenges and questions of life, most of which lie in an informal realm. 
While informal institutions and parallel markets and structures had already existed during 
Soviet times, the massive underfunding of state institutions and often complete disconnect 
between their budgets and equipment on the one hand and societal demands for services on the 
other brought to the fore the importance of informal mechanisms in maintaining the ability of 
public services to operate at all, and secondly, to allow public employees to ensure their own 
ability to survive and feed their families, but not too rarely to enrich themselves through bribes 
beyond appropriate levels.  
In this sense, informal structures and economic mechanisms can be seen, as suggested 
by Morris and Polese (2015: 19) ‘as response to botched political/economic reform' and 
‘working solution’ among street level bureaucrats’ which it would actually make sense to 
formalise in order to create a working system in the first place (ibid.: 11). In Kyrgyzstan, this 
compensatory function of informal payments is most apparent in the education and health 
sectors. According to Reeves, the complete disconnect between de facto and reported levels of 
educational attainment leads to corruption being ‘interpreted not as the deviant action of 
particular immoral individuals, but the symptom of a much broader, systemic dis-integration’ 
(2015a: 22, her emphasis). She shows how academics on every level are systematically 
                                                
accessed 23 May 2017, http://www.fergananews.com/articles/6626 and Sputnik news, 
Кыргызский город-призрак — кадры из горного Иныльчека [The Kyrgyz ghost town 
– people from the mountainous Inylchek, 25 August 2016, accessed 23 May 2017,  
https://ru.sputnik.kg/photo/20160825/1028764675.html . 
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incentivised to over-report learning achievements and coverage of courses Reeves concludes 
that ‘the constant – indeed institutionalized – lack of correspondence between what is claimed 
and what is delivered (and what can, in fact, be delivered), between the actual and the 
“certified,” blurs the boundary between ethical and unethical’ (ibid.: 23, emphasis added). For 
instance, with university teachers’ average salary of 40 USD not covering average living costs 
of 100 USD for a family (60 USD in rural areas), it is not surprising that, apart from working 
on several jobs, a culture of bribery is rife in Kyrgyzstani academia, where students can buy 
themselves good grades or get away with not attending lectures (Sanghera and Satybaldieva 
2009: 31). One extreme example of underfunding and operation thanks to workers’ ingenuity 
and readiness to put up with inacceptable conditions is the Kyrgyzstani state morgue in Bishkek, 
which became renown after a media outlet had reported how drain pipes leak into the 
examination rooms, most forensic machines date back from the 1970s, staff have to provide 
‘their own gloves and soap’ and ‘kitchen knives and saws are used for autopsies’.3  
Informal activity is thus an important way to mobilise and enable the operation of state 
institutions in the first place, as in the case of morgue staff bringing their own hygienic 
equipment, or in Staybaldieva’s finding of kindergarten and school staff trying to run their 
entities on their own, without state support and with the help of parents’ payments (Satybaldieva 
2015a: 380). This decentralisation or often complete state withdrawal and transfer of 
responsibility to institutional staff and citizens also relocates the delivery of public service and 
support into a grey zone that is open to social hierarchies and forms of exclusion. These can be 
purely economically motivated but also intersect with differentials in educational and cultural 
capital as well as belonging to certain localities or identity groups. Most shocking in this regard 
                                                
3 The video was released after the crash of a Turkish cargo plane near Bishkek’s Manas airport, 
which took 39 lives in the settlement Dacha Suu and attracted widespread media attention. 
RFE/RL, ‘Disturbing tales from a Kyrgyz morgue’, 31 January 2017, 
https://www.facebook.com/rferl/videos/10155084038894575/  
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is Sanghera and Satybaldieva’s finding that medical staff could go as far as to withhold basic 
services like medical treatment and care from those who are not able to make extra payments, 
or that police officers release criminals upon payments of bribes (2009: 929, 932). They raise 
awareness, however, ‘that it is not easy to make straightforward moral judgements of practices 
and to condemn corruption because people possess a multiplicity of ultimate concerns, and 
often prioritise the family over professional ethics’ (ibid.: 933, see also Sanghera and Ilyasov 
2008: 460-461). Rather, the standard response that ‘[people] have their own families that they 
need to feed. That’s why they take bribes. Maybe, if their salary were bigger, they would be 
taking fewer bribes.’ makes the authors conclude that: ‘public sector workers and professionals 
justify corruption as necessary for household survival. Their sense of living and being, their 
modus vivendi, rests upon family commitments, rather than upon a fragile professional ethos’ 
(ibid.: 930). This resonates with Veena Das’ (2015) argument that rather than morally repulsive, 
corruption should be seen as bringing about the ‘possibility of life’ for many people in the 
precarious economy of post-Socialist collapse that is still gripping Kyrgyzstan as many other 
post-Soviet countries.  
It can thus be argued that the rife informality and corruption should be seen as an attempt 
of people to navigate the precarious life after industrial and gradual institutional collapse. While 
this moral economy approach to corruption and informality (see Olivier de Sardan 1999) adds 
important nuance to the often ethnocentric and imposing analyses of mainly Western scholars, 
it is equally important to also point out the grey zone created by the moral amnesty suggested 
by this approach. Nearly all authors writing about dynamics of informality and social inequality 
note that people of higher status, i.e. clerks (Ru. chinovniki), teachers and other office holders, 
use their position to extract bribes from people, and this up to a level that goes way beyond the 
mere survival and reproduction of their families (Satybaldieva 2015a: 376 ff.; 2015b: 101 ff.; 
Engvall 2011). This tendency to take more than one is entitled to appears to be effected by a 
		155 
general perception that above oneself within the hierarchy there will always be someone more 
corrupt and immoral, making one’s own misconduct relatively acceptable. In light of the large-
scale siphoning of state revenues and privatisation revenues to offshore accounts, which 
governments and elites practiced throughout the 1990s until today (Heathershaw and Cooley, 
Marat 2015, Engvall 2011), a complete rejection of this illicit world of unlimited opportunities 
would seem to be simply belittling and boring to people of average ambition and with social 
and symbolic capital at their disposal.4  
A final factor encouraging people to accumulate beyond their needs is an emerging 
consumerist economy of traditional celebrations and life cycle events. Different systems for 
collecting money among relatives to finance life cycle event celebrations have existed 
throughout centuries and had, up to the late Soviet period, the primary function of mutual 
support and solidarity with those experiencing especial hardship (Botokanova 2015: 123, Féaux 
de la Croix and Ismailbekova 2014: 7). Most important in this regard are yrazha (Kg., literally 
law, mutual agreement) or yntymak (order, harmony) payments which are collected among kin 
for occasions of weddings or deaths and serve to cover expenses related to the organisations of 
feasts and gatherings (Kapalova 2015: 252-253). With the increasing affluence enjoyed in the 
late Soviet period, however, these schemes became more important and the average level of 
contributions began to inflate. In the post-Soviet period, the increasing social stratification and 
earning differentials were mirrored in these schemes (Kapalova 2015: 255).5 This led to the 
                                                
4 Sanghera (2010, n.p.) illustrates what attitude the widespread corruption and elite excesses 
give rise to in the population, arguing that: ‘Bishkek slum dwellers argue that if the then 
President Bakiyev’s family and elites were looting and grabbing national assets, and improperly 
acquired the wealth to finance their lavish and wasteful lifestyles, then it is reasonable for the 
slum dwellers to grab plots of land to make ends meet’. She cites the example of disabled people 
and NGOs seizing the property of the son of ex-president Bakiev to create a sanctuary: Bennet, 
D. (2010) Kyrgyzstan: In Wake of Looting, Disabled Seize an Opportunity, 22 April 2010, 
accessed 23 May 2017, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/60916  
5 Especially in the koshumcha and korumduk ones, where contributions are not fixed and depend 
on income and reciprocity patterns. 
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gradual exclusion of poor people from kin and social networks (Kühnast and Dudwick 2002) 
and an entrenchment of poverty and inequality as poor people, in order to stay part of networks 
and not be embarrassed for not being able to pay their contributions, took loans with significant 
interest or engaged in petty crimes such as growing and selling hashish (Kapalova 2015: 258-
259; Botoeva 2015: 542). Thus, it has been argued that informal support networks often merely 
create the ‘illusion of support’ (Kapalova 2015: 260) while increasing social pressure on people 
who lack financial means and social capital. Together with the precarisation of life effected by 
industrial and institutional collapse, these social circumstances make it understandable why 
labour migration has become a prevalent way among Kyrgyzstanis to ensure their livelihoods.    
 
Translocal livelihoods and their implications for community security 
Alongside its neighbour Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is the country whose inhabitants are most 
dependent on labour migration for their survival. During the 1990s migration took place 
primarily within the country, from rural, underdeveloped localities to urban, administrative and 
trading centres. The early 2000s saw a deepening trend of labour migration to Russia, 
Kazakhstan, other CIS countries, and beyond (Schröder and Stephan-Emmerich 2016: 426). 
Nowadays almost a quarter of the country’s overall population – ca. 1.5 million people (IRIN 
2015) is working abroad. Given its significance for livelihoods and wellbeing and its 
widespread practice, Schröder and Stephan-Emmerich have argued that mobility as the constant 
state of labour migrants has acquired institutional status and become a vehicle through which 
people negotiate and navigate their own life courses, career choices and relations with relatives 
(2016: 421). They further argue that conceiving of these livelihoods as translocal rather than 
inter- or transnational (concepts which have dominated migration scholarship until recently) 
helps to better take into account the often blurred and unclear effects of being in another place: 
the social pressure and economic hardship in the sending community may be evaded but also 
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reproduced through networks and moral regimes that reach beyond borders (ibid.: 537).6 
Somewhat regardless of whether migration has positive effects at home or abroad, it is clear 
that the institutions, urban infrastructures in Kyrgyzstan are in many ways insufficiently 
equipped to absorb the pressures and challenges caused by large scale migration.  
 As far as domestic migration is concerned, its effects on urban life and security questions 
in communities targeted by migration flows are perhaps the most profound. As already 
mentioned in IV.3.3, migration from rural areas to urban centres already put pressure on social 
systems and institutions in the 1980s, and continued to do so throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
The population of the capital Bishkek, for instance, increased by up to 35 per cent to circa 1.1 
million in the year 2001, while its administrative institutions and infrastructure were not 
enlarged accordingly (Fryer et al. 2014: 177). While putting additional strain on urban centres 
like Bishkek and Osh, an additional issue with in-migration of rural poor was that many of them 
did not have a residence permit (propiska) that entitled them to education, health care and social 
benefits (Hatcher 2011, Azimov and Azimov 2009). Correspondingly, large amounts of people 
started accumulating in so-called novostroika settlements in the outskirts of cities, where land 
plots were squatted and utilities like water electricity, sewerage and administrative entitlements 
were only acquired in the course of years if not decades and subject to considerable political 
struggle, lobbying and mobilisation (ibid., Fryer et al. 2014: 185 ff.; Nazritdinov et al. 2015).7 
Domestic migrants living in novostroikas are usually not registered and live in precarious 
conditions, which puts pressure on them to resort to livelihood strategies beyond legal 
                                                
6 Schröder and Stephan-Emmerich (2016: 537), alongside other authors (Thieme 2008, 
Conradson and Mckay 2007, Reeves 2012), show how migrants’ dependence on networks also 
limits their ability to escape the moral imperatives and obligations of their home community. 
7 For an illustration see Leonard, Peter, Life in limbo: inside Bishkek's illegal 'new-builds', The 
Guardian, 17 Octover 2017, accessed 30 October 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/oct/17/life-limbo-inside-bishkek-illegal-new-builds-
kyrgyzstan  
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boundaries. Especially in more rural settings like Osh and Jalal-Abad such poor groups have 
been shown to be liable to mobilisation for political purposes if not conflict and violence 
(Megoran et al. 2014, Radnitz 2012, Sanghera 2010). Although this trajectory is not 
straightforward, the potential risks emanating from large populations without legal status, care 
entitlements and opportunities to take part of their society is not deniable and poses a problem 
in and of itself.  
 Less visible for outside observers, but more strongly felt and experienced by those 
affected is labour migration beyond the national borders and its social and psychological 
effects. To understand the effects of large scale migration in the sending communities in 
Kyrgyzstan, it is necessary to briefly outline the overall experiences of Kyrgyzstani migrants 
abroad. Overall, given that few people manage to attain all documents necessary to fully 
legalise their status – a 2014 report estimated that 60 per cent of Kyrgyzstani migrants manage 
to do so (MLMY 2014) – and in light of the exposure to rights violations by authorities in 
Russian cities (FIDH 2016: II.2), most migrants embark on journeys abroad for several years, 
during which their status is unclear and contact with the family back home sparse. Given the 
xenophobia and racism prevalent in Russia, Kyrgyzstanis and people from other Central Asian 
states became reconstituted as subaltern migrant communities across the former Soviet Union, 
that is, primarily Russia (Zanca 2013). Other than during Soviet times when the Soviet passport 
enabled free movement across borders (Reeves 2014: 136), now most labour migrants find 
themselves in a trajectory of systematic reproduction of their semi- or illegal status, as the 
Russian authorities and government have no interest in legalising large numbers of immigrants 
(which would add pressure on already struggling administration and welfare state institutions) 
(ibid.: 130, Reeves 2013). Fryer et al. describe the situation of migrant labourers as follows 
(2014: 172, see also Reeves 2014: 129 ff.):  
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Though most migration is voluntary, the conditions for migrants are often difficult, if 
not outright inhumane. Central Asians have found themselves tricked and trafficked into 
conditions of near-slavery, abused and deceived by employers, robbed, and victimized 
by a Russian public that has been increasingly xenophobic and violent against migrants 
from the former Soviet “South”. 
Apart from the dire psychological effects of this reconstitution of Central Asians as inferior 
citizens in the community of former Soviet states, migration has put a high burden on families 
and has led to the general deterioration of the nuclear family as an institution within Kyrgyzstani 
society. Researchers agree that it particularly affects children and adolescents who are left with 
grandparents, other relatives and even neighbours. Empirical studies (Ablezova et al. 2008, 
Nazritdinov and Schenkkan 2012) have shown that these relatives are often not able or ready 
to impart the attention, devotion and build the relationships that could substitute the absence of 
parents, which has a negative bearing on the emotional wellbeing and psychological health of 
migrants’ children. This is most obvious in cases of physical and psychological ill-treatment by 
surrogate parents (FIDH 2016: 49 ff.), and when looking at the appalling conditions in which 
foster sometimes children live.8 Sanghera et al. demonstrate the long-term effects of distress 
caused by separation from parents and its ‘adverse consequences on children’s personal 
development ... and later adult relationships’ (2012: 393) which can range from to insecurity 
complexes and emotional dependence to depression, anxiety and aggression. Another issue is 
the extensive labour that children are made to carry out in the households of their surrogate 
parents, which leads to them missing school (Fryer et al. 2014: 182). In this way, and given the 
general dire economic situation in the country, secondary education and high-skilled jobs are 
                                                
8 See the documentary short film ‘Lost in their childhood’ (Poteriannye v detstve) on this topic, 
produced by the NGO network Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ (Grazhdanskii Soiuz ‘Za 
reformy i rezultat’), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rfSWcPXxX2M  
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by many not seen as realistic means for reaching a good life, while labour migration within or 
beyond Kyrgyzstan provides the best chances to earn money, found a family and live up to the 
mutual obligations in one’s kin and social networks. Instead of receiving the appropriate 
emotional protection and economic support, most children and adolescents in Kyrgyzstan are 
exposed to the hardships of supporting or entirely running a household early on in their lives.  
 As indicated in section IV.2.3, the omnipresent economic precarity and the struggle for 
a good life renders dreams about becoming a successful entrepreneur and making money 
especially attractive, but also foregrounds feelings of exclusion, injustice and anger among 
people who lack the basic conditions to access such a career trajectory. Seen from the moral 
economy perspective outlined above, it becomes obvious how inequality and social 
stratification in Kyrgyzstan and the mental burden people carry in trying to cope with life can 
foreground leniency towards the spectrum of informal, illicit, illegal and outright criminal 
practices and actions (Kirmse 2010: 394, Sanghera and Satybaldieva 2009, Sanghera and 
Ilyasov 2008). Given the downsizing, withdrawal and often virtual absence of the state in 
sectors of health, education and welfare especially in rural and semi-urban areas of Kyrgyzstan, 
no significant level of compliance towards state laws and decrees or support for government 
strategies and appeals can be expected. In the analysis of Local Crime Prevention Centres in 
section V.3, I show that the precarious living conditions and blurred boundaries and overlaps 
between legality, licit-ness and the morally acceptable give rise to different security and legal 
issues in rural communities in southern Kyrgyzstan, and how local administration staff and 
activists try to address the latter. In the next section, I introduce the structures of local self-
governance and civil society that are employed by the Kyrgyzstani state in the effort to maintain 
order, security and peace.   
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V.2 Community security and crime prevention: The role of local self-governance and 
post-Soviet civil society  
 
In this section, I first provide an overview of the local self-governance and social institutions 
that existed during Soviet times and were (partly) carried forward into the post-independence 
period, to then analyse the legal set-up of Local Crime Prevention Centres.  
 
Local self-governance and social institutions during and after the Soviet Union 
In order to provide enough context for understanding the process of community security 
provision that will be analysed in the next section, this sub-section focuses on the current 
structure of local self-governance in the Kyrgyz Republic and draw on historical facts and 
developments only inasmuch as it appears relevant for understanding this context.9 A new 
standard of local self-governance was a major goal in newly independent Kyrgyzstan. Until 
1991, the republic’s Supreme Soviet, at the top of a vertically integrated pyramid of state 
institutions, had formally directed and regulated matters of local life, with local councils on 
various levels merely implementing policies programmed from the top down (Alymkulov and 
Kulatov 2001: 526). Thus, even though new bodies and competencies were introduced on 
different levels in different legislative acts throughout the 1990s, no consistent set of normative 
and legal acts had been created to ensure efficiently functioning local self-governance by the 
year 2000. Thus, conclude Alymkulov and Kulatov, ‘there [was] no such understanding of the 
essence or limits of delegated state powers, leading to the permanent intrusion of the state into 
local self-government affairs’ (2001: 564). This legislative patchwork provided ample room for 
local elites, such as former kolkhoz heads, managers and people high up in the Soviet hierarchy, 
                                                
9 See Alymkulov and Kulatov’s (2001) or Abraliev et al.’s (2011) for more detailed analyses 
of local self-governance reform in the last 20 years.  
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to privatise and divide up key assets and farmland among themselves before legal regulations 
and accountability provisions were put in place (Steimann 2011: 72). It is important to note that 
the informal and self-initiative splitting up of collective farms (kolkhozy) and state farms 
(sovkhozy) also enabled the continuation of agricultural production, food provision and the 
maintenance of food security in the dire times of post-Socialist transition and crises (ibid.: 63, 
134, Beyer 2016: 55). However, as Steimann and other authors show, the redistribution of 
equipment, buildings and land once owned by the Soviet state involved a lot of embezzlement, 
ransacking and insider deals which were at the expense of people who lacked the connections 
and social capital to secure a good position (Steimann 2011: 59 ff., Satybaldieva 2015a).   
Nowadays, local governance structures and competencies are better differentiated and 
defined and it is mostly the mismatch between the challenges that local self-governance bodies 
have to put up with and, on the other hand, their insufficient competencies, that requires 
addressing. The structure of local administration as confirmed in the 2008 Law on Local Self-
Governance and Local Self-Administration is sketched in table 5.1 below.  
 
Table 5.1: Structure of local self-governance in Kyrgyzstan, Author illustration  
Level Territorial 
units 
Governmental 
administration 
(Executive body) 
Local self-governance 
(Representative body) 
National Republican 
cities (Bishkek, 
Osh) 
Mayor’s office (meriia) and 
administration  
City council (gorodskii kenesh) 
 Provinces 
(oblast) 
Provincial administration 
w/ head and staff 
 
Regional  Oblast level city City administration City council (gorodskii kenesh) 
 District (raion) State administration w/ 
akim (head) and staff 
District council (raionnyi 
kenesh) 
Local Towns, district 
(raion) cities  
City executive committee  City council (gorodskii kenesh) 
 Rural district 
(aiylnyi aimak)   
Aiyl okmotu (Rural 
executive committee)  
Aiylnyi kenesh or mestnyi 
kenesh (Rural council) 
 
The current set up of local self-governance structure (the local or municipal level) presents a 
balance between executive bodies (middle column) and representative bodies (right column) 
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comprising up to 10 councillors (depending on the size of the population; more than 10 in large 
cities) elected by the population of the respective village, town or city. Over the years, there 
have been different divisions of labour between local self-administrations and representative 
bodies on the one hand, and the different line ministries (e.g. Health, Education, Internal 
Affairs) on the other. This means that local administrations were partly made responsible to 
maintain infrastructure and basic operations while administering resources and dispensation of 
e.g. welfare and pensions. With the gradual disconnection of state support and funding levels 
and from life circumstances in Kyrgyzstan, local administrations and councils have seen 
themselves in a more and more dilemmic situation. While local economic and social 
development plans are to be discussed and implemented on the local level, the central problem 
with public finances in Kyrgyzstan is that there is little that local administrations can do to 
increase the money they get allotted by the central governmental budget (Alymkulov and 
Kulatov 2001: 520; Kenzheeva 2016).10 Allocation of extra-budgetary projects and investments 
depends on political influence of local politicians in the national parliament. Furthermore, it is 
normally easier to attract funding from international development agencies.11 Given the gaping 
underfunding of city and rural executive committees (aiyl okmotu) they often only carry out the 
bare minimum of their tasks, thus compounding a cycle of despair and destitution (Steimann 
2011: 62, Grävingholt et al. 2006).  
 Given this inability of state bodies to address the entrenched pauperisation of the 
population, especially older generations without sufficient support from relatives, the 
                                                
10 Steimann notes that taxes on land and pasture lease fees are the main potential source of 
communal revenue but that in reality ‘the collection of local taxes is hardly ever worthwhile for 
municipal administrations as revenue is often insignificant compared to the considerable 
organizational effort needed to calculate and collect them’ (2011: 62)  
11 Although their support is usually one-off or limited to the short run and can thus not replace 
the institutional and budgetary arrangement needed to adequately equip local self-governance 
(Babajanian 2015, Grävingholt et al. 2006) 
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international development sector has given rise to a significant sector of local NGOs that apply 
for grants from international funders and help to deliver projects and repair infrastructure 
(Féaux de la Croix 2013, Satybaldieva 2015a, Pétric 2005). Especially during a food crisis in 
the years 2008 and 2009, help from international aid organisations including the World Food 
Programme was desperately needed to cover the needs of the most vulnerable and food insecure 
parts of the population (Steimann 2011: 64, Gullette 2010: 94 ff.). This kind of provision and 
the aid support received by local communities (Babajanian 2015, Grävingholt 2006) in parallel 
to the state budget indicate a shift in responsibilities and, consequently, accountability of state 
and government bodies vis-à-vis local communities, with international organisations forming a 
third, substituting actor in the triangle.  
It has been shown that intellectual elites and volunteers who run the myriad of 
Kyrgyzstani NGOs invest tremendous efforts into the maintenance of a minimal level of 
provision of social services and support for the poor and elderly (Satybaldieva 2015a, Féaux de 
la Croix 2013). This relief and charity also, however, serves to brush over the fact that the 
increasing stratification and destitution within Kyrgyzstani society was affected by uneven 
process of privatisation and land distribution in the 1990s, and that the beneficiaries of these 
processes – former farm and state enterprise heads, managers, nomenklatura and regime 
insiders – are often still in key positions both in the private economy and in local 
administrations, which affects grievances and indignation among rural and urban poor who feel 
like they have lost out and been betrayed in the course the post-Socialist transition 
(Satybaldieva 2015b, Tucker 2011). The fact that province governors and district heads (akims) 
are appointed rather than elected, also means that ‘state representatives often feel more 
accountable to their superiors than to the inhabitants of their rayon or oblast’, which in turn 
feeds into clientelistic and informal dealings replacing democratic and accountable patterns 
(Steimann 2011: 63). 
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In a similar way to questions of administration, welfare and service provision, a 
networked and decentralised approach is apparent in the way in which the maintenance of 
community security and public order are organised. There were already numerous public and 
semi-public organisations integrated with processes of local self-governance and social 
ordering at the end of the 1990s (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001: 534-535) and their number 
increased further thereafter. The organisations relevant for security provision and other issues 
of community governance, are listed in the table below.  
Table 5.2: Social institutions and (semi-) public community structures, Author illustration 
Organisation Description 
Voluntary squads for the maintenance 
of public order, usually ‘voluntary 
people’s squads’ (Dobrovolnaia 
Narodnaia Druzhina)  
Groups of citizens who complement police and 
other law enforcement organs in sustaining social 
order; protecting state-owned corporate property or 
territorial borders during Soviet times 
Aksakal (elders’, literally ‘white 
beard’) courts  
 
Voluntary courts which mediate and arbitrate in 
minor disputes usually in the domestic household of 
family and neighbour context; activity inscribed into 
law in 2002 (see Beyer 2014, IV.4.2) 
Women’s councils (zhenskii sovet or 
zhensovet) 
 
А structure to gather women and represent their 
interests both in public life and in the production 
process, as well as oversee compliance with Soviet 
legislation on women’s entitlements  
Neighbourhood committee (ru. 
kvartalnyi komitet), also mahalla 
committee in Uzbek-style 
neighbourhood 
Voluntary group of inhabitants of one bloc or 
borough who deal with their affairs and coordinate 
action between domkoms and higher levels  
House committees (ru. domovoi 
komitet or domkom)  
 
Group of inhabitants of multi-storey houses 
regulating social affairs and solving problems  
Residential associations 
 
Evolved as response to the privatisation of multi-
storey blocs and the corresponding transfer of 
responsibility from local administration to 
proprietors/proprietor associations 
 
All of the organisations listed in the table were part of communal life in the Soviet Union, with 
the exception of aksakal courts who appear to have ‘escaped’ Soviet reform as they were seen 
neither influential nor very detrimental in comparison to religious practices or clan-based 
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economic activity (Beyer 2016: 28).12 Conversely, other social institutions have experienced a 
relative decline in importance and activity and have operated in places where they were most 
demanded by people. For instance, in large cities like Bishkek or Osh, residential area or 
mahalla committees or hosing associations were sometimes relatively active in representing 
their inhabitants needs, while in some rural areas women’s councils (zhensovets) would try to 
foster solidarity and mutual help between women.  
 Overall, this institutional architecture and the ideational regimes they foreground are 
geared towards sustaining social order, harmony and peacefulness, even in the face of 
increasing strain and social upheaval. This is most obvious in regard to the Soviet times, when 
voluntary squads and different institutions were intentionally established run and extended not 
only to keep the population under control but also collect intelligence and information that 
would help to maintain the authorities’ effective governing (Alymkulov and Kulatov 2001: 
548). Established technologies and mechanisms of social ordering13 were equally useful for the 
new governing and economic elites of post-independence Kyrgyzstan, especially given the 
hardship, poverty and inequality that many privatisation, decentralisation the repealing of social 
welfare programmes. In this sense, it is no coincidence that Kyrgyzstan’s first president Askar 
Akaev first legalised aksakals and then promoted their transformation into a country-wide 
institution of alternative dispute settling. The pragmatic purpose they fulfilled – the 
maintenance of peace, harmony, solidarity and mutual help among the dispossessed and 
precarious population across the country – was in perfect sync with the development 
                                                
12 As already discussed in IV.4.2, aksakal courts were set up in nearly every municipality of 
Kyrgyzstan and, given the incapacitation of state law enforcement and justice organs, became 
the first point of contact for cititzens in case of conflict, which de facto forced them to interact 
with aksakals to seek justice (Beyer 2006: 147). 
13 This would usually involve the settlement of people’s discontents in meetings of the 
respective committee or arbitration in visits of relevant residents and institutions.  
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community’s trends of the day, namely decentralisation and devolution of responsibility to the 
local level and grass roots governance (Beyer 2016: 33, Ibraeva 2008: 11).  
However, given the specific orientation and traditional heritage of this institution, its 
potential biases and omissions were equally apparent, e.g. in favour of a traditional family 
model (at the expense of divorces or late marriages) or dispute resolution in line with traditional 
law (adat utuk) while knowledge of the Kyrgyz legal code was faint if existent at all (see 
IV.4.2). Furthermore, in light of the appointment of aksakals by local leaders such as the aiyl 
okmotu head and given the fact that women and poor people are de facto excluded from the 
institution, Ibraeva concluded that ‘no voluntary or civic initiative is to be found in such a 
‘public organisation’’ and that ‘regional nomenklatura elites are reproducing themselves as 
aksakal institutions’ (2008: 4, 6). Thus, while they may be effective for maintaining social 
order, harmony and for building peace and facilitating inter-communal conciliation aksakals 
and other social institutions in Kyrgyzstan are prone to be only partially effective in their 
activities by virtue of their semi-public and informal nature. Some of these shortcomings were 
supposed to be mitigated by newly-created Local Crime Prevention Centres, which I will 
discuss in turn.  
 
Local Crime Prevention Centres: Executive authority and societal concerns 
After the web of Soviet and newly initiated institutions was more or less active in an overall 
piecemeal approach to social order and community security, the 2005 Law on Crime Prevention 
(Zakon o profilaktike pravonarushenii)14 was intended to regulate community security and 
crime prevention in an overarching framework and on all administrative levels from central 
                                                
14 The law was signed by the then newly inaugurated president Kurmanbek Bakiev on 25 June 
2005, available in Russian and Kyrgyz language at: http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-
ru/1679  
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government down to the village unit. Article 12-1 of the law defines the status and the 
competencies of Local Crime Prevention Centres:  
The LCPC is a non-commercial organisation founded on the territory of local self-
administration for the purpose of the mutual participation of the organs of local self-
administration and citizens in the prevention of crime … LCPCs, within the framework 
of the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic, have the right to:  
- constitute themselves as juridical persons, open bank accounts, have the corresponding 
equipment, stamps and letter heads; 
- to create associations and bodies for the attainment of their common goals; to attract 
domestic and foreign investments;  
- to design different projects and programmes on questions of crime prevention in order 
to receive grants and other transfers, including from international organisations and 
actors.   
- The activity of LCPCs can be funded out of the following sources: the local budget in 
agreement with the local self-administration; voluntary contributions of juridical or 
physical persons; grants and other gratuitous and non-refundable support […].   
As the final sentence in this excerpt makes clear, LCPCs are not only a platform where citizens 
and the local self-administration can combine their efforts to prevent crime, but also serve as 
vehicles to attract and use international funding. Thus, rather than further seeking direct 
budgetary support from donors on a bilateral level, the attraction of support is devolved to the 
municipal level, which enables the mobilisation of local residents in the effort to attract funding 
and conforms to the trend among aid organisations to focus on very specific localities and issue 
areas in their funding programmes. While the efforts of local activists and civil society in jointly 
conducting crime prevention is obviously welcomed, the decision to inaugurate an LCPC and 
transfer competencies and budgetary decisions to it rests with local administrations alone (12-
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1). Article 14 details the ample competencies of local administrations apart from this right of 
initiation, which range from the leadership, coordination, scrutiny, initiation of measures and 
confirmation of action plans.15 
While local self-administrations are also given some tasks in terms of establishing and 
facilitating the development and activities of LCPCs, the law has no binding character and in 
this sense establishes a unilateral mechanism: local administrations have rights to the initiation 
and coordination of LCPCs’ work (alongside some obligations within the measure of their 
capacities) while LCPCs or their constituent bodies are largely bound to carrying out their tasks 
but lack scrutiny or feedback competencies vis-à-vis local administrations. Thus, LCPCs are 
largely dependent on local administrations when it comes to carrying out their work effectively.  
This prioritisation of the executive is also apparent in prime role of law enforcement 
organs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the organisation of LCPC activities. According 
to article 7, ‘crime prevention activities … are organised and coordinated through 
consultations of the law enforcement organs ... on the provincial, city, district and (local) self-
administrations’ (emphasis added). In such consultations (soveshania, also meeting, briefing), 
the involved parties are supposed to ‘execute the preparation and carrying out of criminological 
research and, on the basis of its results - the design of complex and other programmes of crime 
prevention, as well as control over their implementation.’ Thus, the participation of law 
enforcement organs (and thus the Ministry of Internal Affairs overseeing their conduct) is the 
                                                
15 According to the exact formulation, local state administration and local self-administration 
bodies: carry out the general leadership/coordination on crime prevention and its subjects; 
facilitate the development of LCPCs and coordinate their activities; hear the reports of the 
leaders of LCPCs on the state of preventative work on their territories; consider the 
development of crime prevention measures in the socio-economic development plans; confirm 
complex and other programmes on crime prevention; consider the possibility of allocating 
budgetary means for material and other support to aksakal courts, women’s committees and 
other social bodies under the LCPCs for their organisation of prophylactic events.   
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baseline for crime prevention work. Hence, besides the local executive administrations (aiyl 
okmotu, city administrations or meriia/mayor’s offices), law enforcement organs are the actors 
determining the overall process of crime prevention as far as the law is concerned.  
State bodies and agencies working on issues inter-relating with crime are called upon to 
do their share in fighting the conditions conducive for crime, and to help internal affairs and 
law enforcement organs in their investigatory actions. According to article 11, social protection 
and employment agencies should deal with the socio-economic and labour market problems at 
the root of crime trends, for instance by setting up respective social welfare funds and 
programmes. The different organs and institutions of the educational system, are supposed to 
‘fully cooperate in the process by delivering all information necessary for identification and 
study of individuals and groups especially exposed to/likely to commit unlawful behaviour, on 
which basis the design and implementation of preventative action are possible and to be 
supported by the same institutions’ (article 7).16  
Overall, the 2005 Law on Crime Prevention constitutes a clear prioritisation of 
governmental and executive authority in the conceptualisation of crime prevention as the prime 
mechanism for community security. This is not to say that the understanding of crime is not 
holistic enough. Rather, the approach at solving the issues at the heart of crime and deviant 
behaviour appears to be limited if not problematic in its prioritising of executive action, while 
public initiative and the role of sectoral bodies are subordinate and limited. The latter are merely 
foreseen in the secondary aspects of design and implementation of crime prevention measures 
or in the data and intelligence gathering through which health and education institutions are to 
assist law enforcement and executive organs’ operations. The idea to combat and prevent crime 
                                                
16 Similar to this collaboration and delivery of intelligence and data on crime, the health sector’s 
task is defined as not only helping to rehabilitate and support people recovering from alcohol 
or drug addiction, but also the ‘identification, registration and record keeping’ of such 
individuals; alongside ‘softer measures’ of educating citizens and offering consultations (article 
10). 
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through data and information gathering, analysis and subsequent devising of measures and 
policies is convincing with its rational logics of evidence-based policy-making. It also has 
limitations, however, as essentialism and exclusionary methodologies used in the analysis can 
lead to alienation and other adverse effects in the population (see III.4). This is best exemplified 
by the definition of crime prevention in article 1 of the law:  
Crime prevention is defined as actions (deitelnost) … directed towards the 
identification, study, remedy and neutralisation of the reasons for any unlawful actions 
being carried out (soversheniu protivopravnykh deistvii) and any conditions enabling 
this; as well as towards ensuring favourable living conditions and the individual 
upbringing of certain categories of persons, whose behaviour reveals anti-social 
tendencies (kategorii lic, v deistviakh kotorykh imeetsa antiobshestvennaia 
napravlennost); the activation of factors that stimulate the law-abiding behaviour of 
citizens; and the design and implementation of systems of legal, socio-economic, 
organisational, educational (vospitatelnykh), special and other measures for the 
prevention of unlawful actions. (emphasis added)  
Although this definition demonstrates some holistic and nuanced thinking, the underlined 
passage exemplifies the above-mentioned tendencies of essentialist thinking in the form of a 
belief that it will be ‘certain’, i.e. identifiable, ‘categories of persons’ who are most likely to 
require measures for upbringing, education and other things in order to make them refrain from 
anti-social or criminal behaviour. While it might indeed be the belonging to a certain group that 
renders people more likely to (have to) engage in certain types of behaviour, this formulation 
risks a confusion social belonging with the effects of identitarian policies and behaviours in 
practice. The statistical likelihood of a person from a group engaging in deviant behaviour is 
not the same as ascribing certain behaviours as part of the habitus or general characteristics of 
that group. Basing analysis and policy on group categories might thus create a self-fulfilling 
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prophecy and the usual scapegoating and pathologisation of groups on the basis of stereotypes, 
which is all but conducive to solving issues of crime and conflict. Thus, the pathologisation and 
‘othering’ already identified as issue in community safety debates in the UK in the 1990s (see 
III.4) appears to also potentially limit the Law on Crime Prevention in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Furthermore, it is the emphasis on dealing with crime and delinquency, i.e. crime prevention 
and addressing of ‘anti-social behaviour’, which super-ordinates the creation and maintenance 
of order and security over the idea of creating secure communities and sustainable livelihoods. 
The analyses in the next section will show how these apprehensions play out empirically.  
 
International actors’ security and peacebuilding programming 
Different international organisations including inter-governmental ones like the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) or the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in 
Europe (OSCE) have invested considerable efforts and resources into community security-
related programming in Kyrgyzstan. Especially after the inter-communal clashed in June 2010, 
projects for peacebuilding and the prevention of a re-emergence of conflict increased in 
number, making Kyrgyzstan another internationally renowned ‘Peaceland’ (Autesserre 2014) 
and laboratory for the development, testing and showcasing of peacebuilding and security 
approaches. The UK-based international NGO Saferworld is one of the many organisations 
working in Kyrgyzstan and is involved with local partners across communities in southern 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In their ‘community security approach’ the organisation aims at 
‘supporting communities and security actors jointly to identify and implement locally 
appropriate ways of responding to causes of insecurity’ (Saferworld 2015b: 3). The overarching 
aim of the organisation is to foster cooperation between the local population and, on the other 
hand, local self-governance and law enforcement and security organs (ibid.:4). This is a crucial 
undertaking given the fact that in many communities, people have lost trust in these organs 
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given their perceived corruption, inability to protect people, and, worse so, individual police 
and other law enforcement staff’s complicity with and active perpetration of violence, abuse 
and extortion (ibid.: 3). In trying to foster cooperative relations between these parties 
Saferworld also tries to promote an evidence- and analysis-based approach to local actions, in 
which a ‘process of identifying => analysing => prioritising conflict and security concerns’ is 
followed by the ‘planning => implementing => [and] evaluating [of] responses’ (ibid.: 5-6). 
Much emphasis is put on the idea of ‘hear[ing] different perspectives and concerns’ and 
activating and providing a ‘safe place’ for potentially excluded and vulnerable groups within 
of community populations throughout the process, which also means that law enforcement and 
local administration members are involved ‘wherever possible’ but necessarily in every step of 
the process (ibid.: 5, 8, 10). In this sense, Saferworld and its Kyrgyzstani partner, the 
Foundation for Tolerance International, are trying to nurture potential and build capacity among 
local civil society and activist elements within communities who are supposed to defend the 
interest of the population in the cooperative arrangements for community security provision. 
Saferworld put a high emphasis on working with already existing structures, such as 
LCPCs and their constituent institutions as discussed above, to enhance their capacity 
(Saferworld 2015a), not least because LCPCs specifically often turned out to be ‘dysfunctional, 
non-funded and composed of community representatives without the will or ability to undertake 
the centres’ work’ (Saferworld 2015b: 12). The organisation usually approaches the members 
of LCPCs and increases their motivation and skill set by providing trainings in conflict 
prevention and community security planning, as well as by initiating dialogue between the 
different stakeholders of LCPCs, i.e. local government, law enforcement bodies, civil society 
organisations and active citizens. In cases where LCPCs were not existent or had ceased to 
work, the organisation gathered interested people and helped them found so-called Community 
Security Working Groups (CSWGs), which would make plans and implement measures on 
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crime and conflict prevention and aim at creating or joining an LCPC in the middle to long run 
(Saferworld 2015a). Presently, Saferworld has enhanced the capacity of 17 LCPCs throughout 
Kyrgyzstan and helped to create 8 independent CSWGs, out of which 4 new LCPCs were 
founded (correspondence October 2017). It is important to mention that LCPCs are effectively, 
as discussed above, under the oversight of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (via the primacy of 
law enforcement agencies as well as local executive organs), which retains the right to veto or 
align to its own principles and agendas the activities carried out by the Saferworld community 
security programme.   
 The idea to work with structures that already exist in given localities or which are 
endorsed by Kyrgyzstan’s legislation has also been taken up by other organisations active in 
community security and peacebuilding. Most notable in this respect is the ‘Community Security 
Initiative’ (Initsiativa po Obshestvennoi Bezopasnosti or InOBez) of the OSCE, which was 
devised to support and help to restructure and adjust the work of the police across Kyrgyzstan, 
but especially in localities that had been affected by the 2010 events. The goal to ‘increase the 
respect for and protection of human rights by the police and to build confidence between law 
enforcement agencies and communities’ was tackled by allocating civilian police advisors in 
district police stations across the South of the country, where they would ‘follow developments 
and daily challenges that the local communities and police face’ and facilitated ‘monthly 
community-police discussion forums, the Community Safety Working Groups, where police, 
local authorities and civil society representatives talk about their concerns’.17 This approach is 
strikingly similar to that of Saferworld, but markedly more oriented towards reforming law 
enforcement organs themselves rather than strengthening their civil society and other counter-
                                                
17 Thus, while official sources such as then vice prime minister Oleg Pankratov have lauded the 
exemplary character and crucial contribution of the initiative to the improvement of police-
community relations, some inadequacies and residual distrust towards the police often remain 
to be addressed. OSCE, ‘The Community Security Initiative’, 12 April 2012, accessed 29 May 
2017, http://www.osce.org/bishkek/106312  
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parts in the given localities.18 The UN Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has, among its 
other institution-focused activities such as penitentiary reform, countering organised crime or 
drug and HIV prevention, facilitated the of crime prevention plans in two communities and 
supported cooperative community security and police reform activities in through grant giving 
to civil society organisations (see chapter VII). Similar to the OSCE, it has provided 
infrastructural help by co-funding the refurbishment of local police stations in two districts in 
the country.19  
 The projects of these three organisations only present a small share of the initiatives of 
NGOs and donors in Kyrgyzstan, but possibly the ones tackling the issues most decisive for 
impact in the long run. As several analyses of peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
programmes in southern Kyrgyzstan have pointed out, these activities are often focused on 
more short term and measurable/presentable approaches and practices, which are likely to be 
limited in terms of their structural and substantive effects (e.g. Megoran et al. 2014). In section 
IV.4.2, I have shown how the promotion of harmony (Kg. yntymak) and tolerance (Ru./Kg. 
tolerantnost) between communities and ethnicities often leads to the organisation of sport or 
cultural events among young people or visits between elders of different communities (Bichsel 
2005, Beyer and Girke 2015). As Reeves (2015b) has shown, these rituals are often well known 
to their participants and take on a performative character that distracts form the persistence of 
underlying tensions and conflicts in the respective community. The idea of changing the 
behaviour of law enforcement organs though accompanying them and working on improved 
operations directly with them, or by building skills and capacities among local administrations 
                                                
18 Kabar, 'Проект «Инициатива общественной безопасности» оказал ощутимую 
поддержку территориальным подразделениям милиции – О.Панкратов [O. Pankratov: The 
‘Community Security Initiative' has substantive support to police units]’ 12 December 2015, 
http://old.kabar.kg/index.php/society/full/99975  
19 UNODC, Criminal justice, crime prevention and integrity, accessed 29 May 2017, 
https://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/criminal-justice-crime-prevention-and-integrity.html  
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and civil society to stand up for people’s interests, bears testimony to an attempt to create more 
fundamental and long-term change – an argument I will revisit in chapter VII. In the following 
section, I show in which areas community security practitioners were particularly struggling to 
deal with challenges and which solutions they devised.   
 
V.3 Local Crime Prevention Centres (LCPCs) as state-society nodes and recipients of 
international capacity-building support  
Background note 
The present analysis is based on a cooperative research with the UK-based organisation 
Saferworld, which is involved in peacebuilding and community security projects in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan, but also in Africa and South-East Asia. I was invited to accompany a contracted 
consultant in visiting a number of Local Crime Prevention Centres (LCPCs) in the South of 
Kyrgyzstan to make interviews and write them up into profiles which, combined with other 
material, were compiled in a brochure to be presented to different partners including the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. The LCPC profiling tour was an ideal entry point for my fieldwork, 
as it gave the opportunity to visit and get insight into the work of nine LCPCs across the South 
of the country, as well as establish contacts for possible follow-up research. The profiling visits 
were scheduled to last up to two hours each, during which questions from a standard 
questionnaire would be answered, followed by exchange of photographs and other material and 
a swift departure necessitated by a schedule of two to three LCPC visits per day with 
considerable geographical distance between some of the locations. While this limited the scope 
for additional networking and research work that I was interested in, it was agreed that I could 
use the material gathered for my PhD research. The consensus on my official role was that I 
should introduce myself as a volunteering assistant of the main consultant carrying out the 
research, while mentioning my position as a PhD researcher and Visiting Fellow with the 
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American University in Central Asia (AUCA) was left as optional information to be provided 
depending on the situation. In terms of my positionality as scholar, the profiling tour was 
somewhat peculiar as the mission and purpose of it was to produce a brochure on ‘Success 
Stories’ of LCPCs ‘by order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA)’, as it was stated in the 
brochure later on (Saferworld 2016: 1). Given my earlier experience of interviewing civil 
society actors in the aftermath of the 2010 events in Osh, I was aware that this might incur 
certain biases and pressures to be selective in the writing up of actual ‘success stories’ (see 
below).  
In the following, I present the overall results from the LCPC profiling work, indicating 
the main areas of concern for community security and crime prevention in the surveyed 
communities in southern Kyrgyzstan. Thereafter, I discuss the main aspects emanating from 
this initial analysis, which I analysed in more depth and context, including follow-up visits to 
two LCPCs.20 This analysis of the ‘role of community mobilisation’, ‘moral support and 
strength’ and ‘people’s friendship’ as the three main items promoted by LCPCs will help to 
show how the activity of these bodies is embedded in the imaginaries of statebuilding identified 
in chapter IV (see discussion in V.4). 
 
LCPC ‘success stories’: Overall results and implications 
The fact that the brochure for which the contracted consultant and I had gathered profiling data 
from nine LCPCs was titled ‘Success Stories’ may raise the concern about bias and partiality 
in our approach. In fact, however, the presented stories are in most cases only one of many 
aspects of the LCPC’s work and it took my colleague and myself repetitive questioning and 
tedious inquiry into details to gather enough data to back up the respective success narrative 
                                                
20 As indicated in appendix 1, the profiling visits in cooperation with Saferworld were 
conducted between 11 and 15 July 2015, while the follow-up visits that I carried out on my own 
were carried out in late October.  
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that we would finally extract from the overall data on a given LCPC. This was because LCPC 
representatives often found it hard to navigate the multiple expectations and pressures (and 
often indifference) they were facing from different local administration bodies and the 
population. Hence, they were struggling to present or even remember positive results of their 
work. This lack of positive memories and experiences was compounded by the fact that, during 
our interviews, LCPC activists did not feel able to frame results of their work as a particular 
success to be presented to their principals from the MIA, Saferworld and its partnering NGO, 
the Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI or Fond za Mezhdunarodnuiu Tolerantnost). 
This was partly due to their unfamiliarity with Russian – the language in which interviews were 
conducted, but also with the manifold terms and concepts used in community security and crime 
prevention, which are not part of everyday language in Kyrgyzstan (and elsewhere). The 
brochure has to be seen in this light, i.e. with attention to the fact that most of the success stories 
are – if not ‘constructed’ – distilled out of the sometimes diffuse array of stories, facts and 
memories that LCPC representatives recounted. While the brochure itself devotes more 
attention to the successes of the LCPCs than to challenges (although these are also listed in 
brief for every locality), I provide deeper insight into the issues faced by LCPCs and the way 
in which they try to effectively promote security in their communities.   
In his ‘auto-ethnography of programme evaluation’ in Tajikistan, Heathershaw (2011) 
has provided a critical account of how the success of local development projects as it is 
presented in Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) practices might far surpass the actual effects 
on the livelihoods of local populations. This, according to him, is possible because of the 
remoteness of donors from on-the-ground implementation, allowing local elites to co-opt and 
redeploy international peacebuilding resources (ibid.: 162). Contrary to Heathershaw’s case, 
the construction and exaggeration of ‘success’ is less of an issue here, because the brochure 
was much less of an M&E document than an additional communication tool in Saferworld’s 
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efforts to strengthen stakeholder awareness on community security in south Kyrgyzstan. To this 
end, it raised awareness about the obstacles faced by the respective LCPCs and their future 
plans and developments. For everyone aware about the realities in rural communities in this 
context, it is clear that the ‘success stories’ presented in the LCPC profiles are not the entire 
stories of these entities, and that only hard work and the overcoming of existing obstacles leads 
to such success stories.  
To give a brief overview of the overall results of the LCPC profiling, table 5.3 presents 
the different issues LCPCs were reportedly working on, with their respective number of times 
mentioned across the nine LCPCs (column ‘General’), as well as the issue areas of the success 
stories (column ‘‘Success’’; only one item per ‘Success story’). The results from this profiling 
study present only a small number of communities throughout the vast territory of southern 
Kyrgyzstan, but comparing them with the results from a report discussed in chapter VII (CURR 
2015) and other community security initiatives (OSCE and El-Pikir 2013) shows that the thrust 
of the issues presented is of relevance for community security in localities throughout the 
country.  
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Table 5.3: Issues that LCPCs are working on21; Source: Saferworld (2016); author’s 
illustration & analysis 
R
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e Issue  
General ‘Success’ 
Land disputes  6  
New arrivals and squatted territories (ru. novostroiki) 1  
Border issues (crossings etc.) 2  
Water conflicts (inter-communal; drinking and industrial; usage 
rota violation) 
6 2 
Street traffic danger 2 1 
So
ci
al
, c
om
m
un
al
, i
ns
tit
ut
io
na
l 
Interethnic tension/conflict 6 1 
Inter-communal youth conflict  1  
Racketeering (youth, school)  3  
Religious radicalism (incl. rel. pluralism; one ‘extremism’ only)  7 2 
Lack of trust tow/ law enforcement organs (incl. corruption in 
law enforcement, electricity usage, detentions)  
4 2 
Lack of trust tow/ local self-governance organs 1  
Juvenile delinquency (incl. hooliganism) 4  
Cattle theft  1  
Fa
m
ily
, i
nd
iv
id
ua
l 
Migration (incl. consequence of infantile precarity)  2  
Family conflicts (incl. divorce; domestic confl./bytovoi konflikt)  6  
Early marriage & divorce (incl. unregistered marriage) 4  
Young female precarity (single mothers, impoverished)  1 1 
Excessive expenses for lifecycle ceremonies 1  
Alcohol/drug abuse 2  
 Uncategorised 3  
 
To further facilitate the overview given by the table, I have clustered the different issues into 
three groups, which are ‘Resources and infrastructure’; ‘Social, communal and institutional’; 
and ‘Family and individual’ issues. It becomes obvious that LCPCs deal with a wide range of 
issues, which have varying implications for politics on the national level. The following 
                                                
21 Note: Specific (sub-) issues are listed in brackets if they have been mentioned but can be 
reasonably included in a given issue count (e.g. ‘incl. religious pluralism’); additions in brackets 
without ‘incl.’ provide detail on the respective issue, e.g. ‘Family conflicts (domestic conflict)’.  
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analysis is structured along the division of these three fields and will focus on specific items 
and cases within them in order to illustrate the logic of operation, mobilisation and networked 
approach to community security of LCPCs.  
 
 
Mobilisation in the community and beyond 
Issues in the first cluster of community security issues – Infrastructure and resources – appear 
somewhat more straightforward as they are conceivable through the (neo-) liberal modern 
episteme of science and technology. Thus, a problem can relatively clearly be defined through 
certain parameters and subsequently be solved through coordination, negotiation, which in turn 
often require the mobilisation of social and political pressure – especially in cases where 
regional and national authorities are needed to solve issues, such as in border regions – or of 
social support and contribution to municipal level-projects such as the building of canals, roads 
and other infrastructure. The logic of mobilisation sets focus on communities and their own 
capacities to address problems and conflicts, while the latter are only effectively lobbied at 
higher levels when they flare up into conflicts between communities and across borders (Reeves 
2014: ch. 6). This is reflective of the decentralisation and responsibilisation of local self-
governance and administrative structures (see above section V.2), which can be especially 
problematic when these structures are incapacitated or inactive while tensions among and 
between communities are mounting.  
Disputes over land and water usage, often on an inter-communal level – not rarely 
between communities belonging to two different states, e.g. to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – are 
clear examples of the Soviet historical legacy and its infrastructural aspect. As Reeves observes, 
the creation of newly independent nations has affected the penetration of former areas of free 
movement across Soviet republican borders by new borders of sovereign states, which are 
guarded by military posts and barbed wire (Reeves 2014). Given the fact that during Soviet 
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times infrastructure had been built with little regard to republican borders but according to the 
most practicable and resource-saving plans, many water canals and pipes provide Tajik, Uzbek 
and Kyrgyz villages in their course through the borderlands in Batken and Jalal-Abad 
provinces, and there are points where streets from different territories meet or traverse the 
administrative border. The legal uncertainty and arbitrary behaviour of border guards has given 
rise to tense ways of handling disputes, with car accidents at crossings resulting in ‘fights and 
violent incidents’ and disputes over water and border crossings leading confrontations of large 
groups of men (Saferworld 2015b: 9-10; Reeves 2014: 218 ff.) In such situations, LCPCs and 
local self-governance bodies are often confined to a rather helpless role of intermediaries who 
must quickly react to inter-communal confrontations and even violence and convey the urgency 
of concerns to superiors in the national hierarchy. They also have to resolve quarrels over the 
rearrangements of water usage rotas and infrastructural adjustment, which not too rarely 
requires the mobilisation of regional and national political actors (as in the case of LCPCs in 
Batken and Jalal-Abad provinces, see Saferworld 2016: 22-24 & 28-30).  
In the village of Tash-Bulak, a rural community located at the outskirts of Jalal-Abad at 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, a major road leading through the area proved to be a major security 
issue.22 An increase in traffic volume was noted years on end, with the number of road accidents 
and casualties – even fatalities – increasing as well. Although LCPC members understood that 
something had to be done, especially to protect schoolchildren who crossed the street at 
dangerous and unmarked spots, the local administration did not seem to pay attention to the 
issues nor demonstrated any responsibility for solving it. After the constitution as Community 
Security Working Group and prioritisation of the problem, the following measures were 
adopted to deal with it:  
                                                
22 The following three paragraphs are based on the case study as presented in the Saferworld 
brochure (2016: 6-10) and the profiling visit on 13 July 2015.   
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- Installation of street signs prescribing a tempo limit on a specific section;  
- Consultations with the traffic police (GAI) on the possibility of making the street 
section safer;  
- Building of a sidewalk in the street section by of LCPC members with the support of 
the rural executive committee, local administration parents of affected children and 
some other community members;  
- Organisation of school lessons by traffic police (GAI) staff on traffic rules and safety;  
- Exchange on successful solution of traffic safety problems with other rural districts.   
The measurable changes, such as 19 new street signs and speed bumps on the road, as well as 
the establishment of traffic safety lessons in school given by specialised groups of so-called 
‘Young police inspectors’, yielded immediate results, as no accidents involving pedestrians 
were recorded in the implementation period. According to the working group members, the 
main reason why this initiative can be called a success is because people in the community 
started caring about and supporting this cause when they saw that the LCPC members started 
to tackle the problem on their own, voluntary initiative (Ru. na obshestvennykh nachalakh), 
without any reward given. The support and mobilisation in their own community helped in turn 
to lobby the local administration and traffic police departments to help solve the issue.  
 Among the twelve profiling visits throughout the South of Kyrgyzstan the Tash-Bulak 
working group stuck out as a positive example as it demonstrated decisiveness and a boost that 
it had received through the successful solution of this infrastructural issue. On a follow-up visit, 
I tried to find out more about the motivation and mobilisation principles of the group. The 
youngest member, an undergrad student at Jalal-Abad university her motivation as follows: 
‘One would like to see people who are content with life (dovolny zhizniu), and when they have 
problems this is not possible. When you can help solve their problems or lead them in the right 
direction out of this you can receive some spiritual wealth or tranquillity (spokoistvie)’. After 
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my questions on the reasons for other members to invest considerable free time in keeping the 
LCPC and its constituent institutions running, the head of the group put forward a statement 
outlining his own motivation:  
So what, patriotism might play a role [in motivating us to work for the LCPC] ... but 
whether there is work or no work, a wage or no wage ... this town is ours, these people 
are ours, all these children are my future I am not indifferent ... I am working here for 
the state, whether it’s real work or not [mne zdes vot na gosudarstvennuiu rabotu, 
rabotau ne rabotau]. I am a human. You shall do good things, because something you 
have to do [dolzhen delat chelovek]. And from us something good shall be remaining, a 
good future. And in the future, there should also be good people. Their security matters 
to me [ix ne bezopasnost bezrazlichno mne ne byvaet] ... I am working, I should be a 
pensioner but so what? I come here to work anyways and will spend my energy on this; 
and then Allah gives me the power, right? I should invest this energy on good things, 
that’s my understanding. Because if you don't do anything then you’re not a person ... 
If I only work for myself [radi svoego interesa], what would this be, then I’m an animal 
or what? An animal, as people say, eats and eats and that’s it. But we are people and we 
have a conscience that tells us to do good. That’s my human duty, that’s how I 
understand it.  
Thus, the head of the working group and the members who tacitly agreed with him, declared 
the voluntary work as LCPC a matter of fulfilling the duty that one’s human nature and 
conscious created. In this sense, the motivation to work for the maintenance of community 
security was attributed to an underlying, universal essence of human life, where people able to 
contribute to the collective good are morally obliged to do so and risk being identified as merely 
self-interested, even ‘animalistic’ creatures if they refuse to contribute their share. On the other 
hand, ideas of patriotism or Soviet heritage as a unifying framework were more or less explicitly 
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rejected by the group. The fundamental motivation reasons of the group could not hide the fact, 
however, that not all people would be able to engage in and support LCPC activities to the same 
extent as this group, who were partly employed by the local administration (as in the case of 
the social worker and the group head who was also deputy head of the rural executive 
committee) or were able to devote time to this cause because their family and economic 
situation allowed them to. The group agreed that there might be limits to the participation of 
the poor rural population and that more would have to be done to include destitute and in 
community building and rights education to prevent the reproduction of poverty through issues 
such as lack of registration or early marriage, which is the focus of the following part.   
 
Legalisation of marriages  
The area of family and individual level issues was of equal relevance on average, as almost as 
many items were mentioned here as in the Resource/infrastructure category (16 vs. 17). But, 
other than in the latter category with its straightforwardly identifiable issues and relatively clear 
division of institutional competencies (even if they were neglected), this area presented issues 
that LCPCs are on average less equipped or able to deal with. This is, on the one hand, because 
upbringing, moral and practical education, and the shaping of family relations and values are 
habitually seen as the area curated by social and educational institutions and, after the 
downsizing and incapacitation the latter, of family and kin networks (see section V.2). On the 
other hand, LCPCs, and their relevant constituent institutions such as aksakal (elderly) courts, 
women committees or social workers would usually only step in when tensions and conflicts 
within families would erupt into an open form or when people affected by family issues and 
domestic violence would approach them. In this sense, LCPCs were struggling to address the 
social effects of the transformation and increasing strain put on families in light of the 
translocal-local livelihood model chosen by an increasing part of the population (compare 
V.2.2). These effects included, apart from child labour and exploitation by surrogate parents 
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(see V.2.2), an increasing number of early marriages, subsequent divorces and the 
consequential social stigmatisation and material destitution of young divorced women and 
single mothers. With the country-wide rate of underage married girls at 13 per cent in 2015, 
these issues and the vulnerability and domestic violence they give rise to present a significant 
challenge.23 
The LCPC in the Mirmakhmudov district of the small town of Nookat in western Osh 
province, for instance, recognised an increasing number of young women who were vulnerable 
and required material support to nurture their children.24 They had been left alone by their 
husbands who had migrated abroad, often marrying other women. Young mothers were not 
only lacking support but also the basis to claim alimony or child benefits as their marriages had 
not been registered with the local marriage committee (ZAGS) but only married through the 
traditional Islamic nike ceremony. According to the representative of the local committee, their 
social stigma and exclusion made many women ‘suffer from anxiety, depression and, in 
particular cases, made them suicide as the last way out of such a situation’ (ibid.). According 
to statistical data, the local district of Mirmakhmudov was the one with the most divorces of 
young marriages in the entire country. The following measures were taken to tackle the 
situation:  
- Organisation of a seminar with participation of LCPC members, district committee, 
coordinators from the NGO FTI and imams on the topic of early marriage, marriage 
registration and marriage in traditional Islam;  
                                                
23 Radio Azattyk, ‘В Кыргызстане количество ранних браков не уменьшается [‘The number 
of early marriages in Kyrgyzstan is not decreasing’], 9 December 2015, accessed 30 May 2017,  
http://rus.azattyk.org/a/27424930.html  
24 This case is based on the profile in the Saferworld brochure (2016: 2-5) and the LCPC 
profiling visits on 11 and 12 July 2015 if not indicated otherwise.  
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- Organisation of seminar for the population on the topics of religious extremism, early 
marriage, divorces and the role of the LCPC;  
- Dissemination of brochures on the importance of the official registration of marriages, 
also in specific villages of the rural district; staff of the State Registration Service (GRS) 
were allocated to the local marriage registration office;  
- Organisation of events to strengthen relationships of young couples, e.g. contests 
between brides or mothers-in-law;  
- Aksakal courts and other LCPC representatives provided support and consultation to 
young couples in cases of quarrels;  
- On the rural district level, it was decided that imams would only perform nike 
ceremonies for couples who have obtained official marriage registrations.  
These efforts had immediate effect: The level of early marriages dropped from 30 in 2015 to 
only two in 2016 (Mamatjalil uluu 2017: 33); imams complied to the above-mentioned code of 
conduct and raised more awareness among the religious population; and the population at large, 
especially parents, became more aware about the negative effects that early marriages can have. 
The level of awareness on the rights and obligations that the entering of a marriage incurs – and 
the importance of officially registering one’s marriage – were raised by simple means of 
information events and seminars but also a brochure titled ‘What is an official marriage? [Chto 
takoe ofitsialnyi brak?]’ handed out to the population. While the effect of this well-coordinated 
initiative is quite obvious, it should not be forgotten that the basic living conditions of people 
in the town are likely not to have changed. Thus, even if girls are not forced to get married as 
early as 17, it is not unlikely that practices like arranged marriages still persist, especially in 
light of the strong role of religious beliefs in rural areas, according to which girls should be 
married or at least have a future husband determined for them at the age 13 (Mamatjalil uluu 
2017: 30).  
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Thus, while the LCPC in Mirmakhmudov (as in other places) is right to point out the 
success it managed to achieve in certain numbers, the underlying reasons for early marriages 
and stigmatisation and destitution of young brides and mothers should be borne in mind. Events 
organised by the LCPC and local self-governance intuitions, such as the competition titled ‘We 
are an exemplary [primernaia] family’ under participation of brides and mothers-in-law or a 
meeting titled ‘The contribution of women-entrepreneurs into families’ (Saferworld 2016: 2) 
are useful in that they present people with role models and introduce the topic to the community 
in a playful and not all too serious manner. This might help some people to change their mind, 
but will not be enough to yield this effect among people who justify and normalise early and 
arranged marriages with reference to their (self-perceived) cultural dispositions and traditions 
– as in the case of Uzbek communities in Southern Kyrgyzstan, finds Mamatjalil uluu (2017: 
29) – or with the lack of alternative ways of taking care of their children – as in the case of rural 
poor (ibid.: 30). Overall, then, it seems that LCPCs can address and change some of the 
mechanisms that effect community security negatively but that, given their limited scope, 
mission statement and resources, a more fundamental transformation of the living conditions 
and livelihoods that produce precarious living conditions in rural and semi-urban Kyrgyzstan 
lies beyond the realm of these institutions. This is similarly apparent in the case of inter-
communal/inter-group peacebuilding and reconciliation projects administered by LCPCs, 
which I analyse in turn.  
  
 
Peoples’ friendship 
Like in the area of ‘Family and individual’ issues, security challenges in the ‘Social, communal 
and institutional’ domain are often complex, contested and hard to come by.25 Within this 
                                                
25 This analysis is partly adapted from Lottholz (2018).  
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domain, the items of ‘Interethnic conflict/tension’ and ‘Religious radicalism’ are of 
predominant concern and mentioned more often than all other issues together (13 vs. 11 times, 
respectively). These issues of collective or public security (obshestvennaia bezopasnost) are at 
the heart of community security work throughout the country, especially in multi-ethnic and 
border communities in the South. Consequently, most LCPCs were busy devising and 
implementing measures to prevent and reduce the seclusion of people within sub-groups and 
separate communities, as well as people’s joining and supporting of radical religious groups. 
This part will focus on LCPCs’ efforts in the prevention of group-/community-based conflict, 
which was often reported to form along inter-ethnic lines (violent extremism is discussed in 
VII.4). As I show in the following analysis, the promotion of peace, harmony and ‘peoples’ 
friendship’ were the predominant approach but proved a difficult undertaking.  
As I have discussed in section IV.3 in the previous chapter, contradictions between 
infrastructural and institutional policies and arrangements on the one hand and the official 
discourse of ‘people’s friendship’ and ‘Kyrgyzstan is our common home’ on the other appear 
to be an inherent feature of Soviet and post-Soviet policies. The dual principle of using ethnicity 
to structure and organise production and life as such along ethno-territorial lines while 
downplaying the importance of ethnic belonging and its gradual fading away with the reaching 
of Communism (Egdar 2007, Simon 1991) has foregrounded not only the Soviet national 
territorial division (NTD, 1924-1936), but also subsequent efforts to organise social welfare, 
state provision and education into the period of Kyrgyzstan’s independence (Reeves 2014: 
123). Not surprisingly, then, the idea that people’s peaceful coexistence is a matter of educating 
them about the benefits of diversity and peace, and about the irrelevance and irrationality of 
making one’s belonging and identity the primary grounds for action has lived on and informs 
efforts to build peace and promote security in communities throughout Kyrgyzstan. ‘People’s 
friendship’ (druzhba narodov) has become the core idea behind numerous peacebuilding events 
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and programmes, which try to call people and communities to unity, harmony and peaceful 
relations in the face of the violence in June 2010 and the continued impunity of perpetrators 
and the persisting tensions and everyday forms of violence and marginalisation (Lottholz 2018, 
Ismailbekova 2013, Ismailbekova and Karimova 2018). As already pointed out, apart from the 
general structural and institutional arrangements that rather exacerbate competition and 
conflict, the involvement and complicity of state bodies, specifically law enforcement and 
judiciary organs, often exacerbated the communal tensions and increased the distrust, feelings 
of vulnerability and other obstacles to be overcome by peacebuilding and security practitioners.  
This situation is well exemplified by the town of Bazar-Korgon, west of Jalal-Abad and 
about 20 kilometres north of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border and gravely affected by the violent 
clashes in June 2010 (McBrien 2013). As the two representatives of the local LCPC told during 
the profiling interview26, relations between the population and the police had already been 
strained in the months and years leading up to the 2010 ‘events’. The death of an Uzbek 
inhabitant of the town as a consequence of beatings received while taken in custody and the 
increasing number of unjustified detentions and interrogations – some of which were ended on 
the next day, others only after payment of substantial sums of money – made people try to avoid 
the police at all costs and, especially after the June 2010 violence, produced feeling of grave 
insecurity. During the ‘June events’, the destruction of over 2000 properties and killing of 15 
people had borne testimony to the ‘deep interethnic hostility and the inaction of the law 
enforcement organs’, but also to the involvement of Uzbek people in violent action, as in the 
case of an armed resistance group who attacked people on a mountain pass, killing one Kyrgyz 
police man on 13 June. The post-violence period was characterised by continued tensions and 
confusion in law enforcement and judicial procedures, as detention of especially young people 
                                                
26 Profiling visit on 13 July 2015; the following analysis is based on the LCPC profile in 
Saferworld 2016: 18-21.  
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without other reasons than to extort payments, and the targeting of families of the fled 
perpetrators of crimes during the conflict. The insecurity and vulnerability people felt after the 
conflict was so grave that many would send their kids to relatives or to work in Russia and in 
some cases entire families were leaving their homes behind. Although it was hard to give voice 
to the issues underlying this exodus and suffering of the town’s inhabitants, it was clear that 
these things would need to be addressed when Saferworld and its partner FTI initiated 
conversations and the foundation of a Community Security Working Group in 2011.  
On the first event organised by the local group, a roundtable for the rapprochement and 
trust-building between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Bazar-Korgon, it was primarily women who 
joined the discussion and voiced some of the grievances and worries held by people. This 
helped to identify and address issues in a series of meetings with representatives of law 
enforcement organs, prosecution, the local administration and the international partners, where 
a common approach towards discussing problems and solutions was found and different 
measures were to improve police performance and inspire trust from the population were 
agreed. As a result of the measures taken, including the setting up of a help line (telefon 
doveriia), compulsory police badges and accountability mechanisms,27 the population’s 
perception of the police improved and it was able to develop trust into the institution. If earlier 
the majority of policemen carried out searches without identification and even without wearing 
their uniforms, since January 2012 they would always wear their uniforms and badges showing 
                                                
27 The measures included, more exactly, the introduction of an annual report of the Regional 
Administration for Internal Affairs [ROVD] in front of the population on the ‘town gatherings’ 
[‘selskii skhod’];  procurement of mobile telephones for neighbourhood inspectors to improve 
the communication within the police and between police and population; procurement of 
service vehicles for the police with the help of the local administration [aiyl okmotu] and private 
entrepreneurs, which increased the capacity of the police and helps it to react quickly to 
challenges; opening of neighbourhood posts and observation posts outside the town 
[uchastkovye punkty i opornye punkty vozle aiyl okmotu] to be closer to the population and 
enable policemen to quickly react to violations of the law; and incorporation of representatives 
of the police into several events, in order to create connections and positive relations between 
the police and population. 
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the respective policeman's family name. Furthermore, law enforcement organs started to 
incorporate aksakal courts who solved specific cases matching their job description (see V.3.1), 
which limited people’s exposure to the police and helped foster a more people-focused 
approach in settling disputes, rather than prioritising law enforcement and security concerns.  
The measures taken by the LCPC to mitigate ethnic tension and encourage a spirit of 
reconciliation and peaceful coexistence reflect, as indicated above, the Soviet idea of ‘people’s 
friendship’. A look at peacebuilding events reported by the LCPCs reveals a consistent attempt 
to promote friendship and peaceful gathering, for instance in the context of a ‘Festival of 
friendship’ (Festival druzhby) with music and dance performances, a sport events series titles 
‘Sport – a messenger of peace’ (Sport – Poslannik mira), dialogue events titled ‘Park of 
friendship’ (Park druzhby) and ‘Avenue of friendship’ (Aleia druzhby), and the setting up of a 
new seating area (besedka) on the school courtyard (see fig. 5.1 below). As the two LCPC 
representatives explained during the profiling interview, these events and the construction of 
the new seating area, financed by Saferworld, FTI and USAID, were intended to create open 
spaces where people would be able to get to know and spend time with each other. Furthermore, 
selected as the best way to illustrate peace out of other competitors, a painting symbolising a 
peaceful Kyrgyzstan with space for messages of the pupils of the local school (illustration 5.1) 
presented a viable way of letting young people express their own ideas, hopes and wishes and 
find a common ground.28 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
28 Interview with LCPC representative during follow-up visit, 30 October 2015.   
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Illustration 5.1: Peacebuilding based on the ‘peoples’ friendship’ discourse, Bazar-
Korgon, author photography 
                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
These measures appear more compatible with people’s preferences than workshops, 
training, or ‘peace propaganda’. Having grown up with this maxim, for most adults in 
Kyrgyzstan, ‘peoples’ friendship’ is the frame of reference determining the appropriate 
positioning on the issue of inter-ethnic relations: As good former Soviet  
Top left: ‘Avenue of friendship’;  
Top right: ‘Friendship square’ with 
seating area (besedka); a sign is indicating 
the funding by Saferworld, FTI and the 
US embassy.  
Bottom: A map of Kyrgyzstan held by 
hands in which local pupils wrote 
messages; the hand on the right reads ‘We 
wish Kyrgyzstan peace, unity, harmony, 
welfare, justice and friendship!’ [Kyrgyz: 
Kyrgyzstanga kaaloorubuz tynchtyk, 
birimdik, yntymak, beypildik, adilettik, 
dostuk!]  
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and now Kyrgyzstani citizens, a multi-ethnic and peaceful Kyrgyzstan is the goal; conflicts and 
divisions either undesired or even outright denied.29 The ‘friendship of peoples’ also 
foregrounded a host of culturally inflected peacebuilding events across the rest of the country, 
such as feasts, sport events, and cultural food and costume exhibitions and performances, often 
themed under the banner of friendship (e.g. ‘festival of friendship’ or ‘garden of friendship’) 
and focused on specific neighbourhoods or uniting people from the entire cities on holidays 
such as Nooruz or anniversaries (Ismailbekova 2013: 115; Isakova 2013: 24). The arts 
installation based on a competition among pupils from the local school also shows how such 
discourses of peace, harmony and unity are carried forward to and internalised by young people. 
When taken literally, the message written by one young person resonates almost exactly with 
the discourses of peacebuilding proffered in peacebuilding events: ‘We wish Kyrgyzstan peace, 
unity, harmony, welfare, justice and friendship!’ 
When thinking about the effects of these peacebuilding initiatives, the most obvious 
question concerns the audience of these events and new infrastructures of shared space: Who 
attends and makes use these spaces? It appears likely, that they are utilised by those who already 
have a basic readiness to interact with people beyond their own immediate social circle (and 
possibly from other ethnicities). However, whether people from economically and culturally 
marginalised parts of the communities would also seize these opportunities to reach out and 
build new bridges appears more than doubtful. This problematique was confirmed by one LCPC 
representative, who pointed to the history of inter-ethnic conflict during Soviet times, with 
clashes having happened in the 50s, 60s, in and 1990s and explained how the systematic 
                                                
29 This crucial role of the ‘friendship of peoples’ in structuring the interpretation, downplaying 
and denial of the Osh events and problem of ethnic nationalism is only casually mentioned in 
the literature (e.g. Laruelle 2012: 45; Khamidov and Marat 2011: 7) but much more apparent 
on the ground. Middle-aged interviewees laid out their visions of society after this 
multiculturalist idea and their wish that ‘everything was as it used to be’ (27 June, Bishkek; 9 
November, Bishkek).  
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division of the ethnic groups in the education system after the fall of the Soviet Union gave rise 
to a new separation along ethnic lines and to a degree of fear of the two communities from each 
other:  
The problem is this: In the past, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz were going together to school. 
Class ‘a’, that was Kyrgyz, the ‘b’ classes were Uzbeks, and the ‘v’ classes [the third 
letter of the Cyrillic alphabet] were Russians. Here in our school they learnt three 
languages, more than 40 years ago and they would always live and work together in a 
friendly way. Just when the Union broke up, they divided up schools, divided up the 
territorial administrative units [uchastki], told the Uzbeks to go there and the Kyrgyz to 
go here, even though they had lived together. So they created Kyrgyz and Uzbek mono-
ethnic communities [naselennye punkty].  
This re-ordering of urban space after Kyrgyzstan’s independence presents a significant ‘re-
materialization’ of ethno-territorial thinking, which was closely associated with the 
materialization and, in 1999, closing of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border after incursions of Islamist 
fighters into Uzbekistan (Megoran 2017, 19 ff.). While such compartmentalization is to the 
benefit of few, if any, the adverse effects have been most painfully felt during the ‘2010 events’ 
and their aftermath. The LCPC representative concluded:   
… people wouldn’t be the way they are now if they worked together, went to school 
together, played together on sports events and if they knew each other. But now they do 
not want to be involved in such events, they are scared [oni boiatsa]. And the authorities 
are also afraid and do not let us go to them, we’re not invited into the other school, ‘it’s 
not necessary’, they say, ‘don’t do it’. But let them mix with each other whether it’s a 
sports event, a festival or something else! Whether it’s at work or in a holiday camp [v 
lagere], that’s it, you have to mix them and they will live, they will develop a positive 
view [u nikh poiavliautsa khoroshie positivy].  
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This makes the challenges of peacebuilding and inter-ethnic reconciliation and trust-building 
abundantly clear: With ethnicised territorial, labour market and welfare policies and 
provisioning already nurturing tensions during the Soviet period, authorities knew no better 
than creating mono-lingual schools and mono-ethnic communities (naselennye punkty) to 
strengthen national languages, cultures and traditions (Brubakers 2011: 1802 ff.). As new 
generations grew up in separation from one another, hardening stereotypes and deepening 
distrust were compounded by the perceptions of different wellbeing. Most importantly, the 
relative wealth of Uzbeks, some of whom sported an affluent lifestyle thanks to their bazar 
businesses and networks with close-by Uzbekistan, stood in contrast to the dwindling livelihood 
opportunities of rural and urban poor Kyrgyz, who increasingly depended on connections with 
the local administration or labour migration to the CIS and had accumulated frustration and 
envy by 2010 (McBrien 2013: 261).  
The means of the LCPC are very limited to reach the larger part of the vast population 
of 36,000 – the less well-off and struggling poor living in the different communities around 
Bazar-Korgon. The average events usually attract between 20 and maximum 200 people, which, 
in the representative’s words can be regarded a ‘drop in the ocean [kapli v more]’. He also stated 
that, given that the people who come to community security, tolerance promotion and 
peacebuilding events, will usually be the ones with a rather wide horizon anyways, it is the 
‘housewives, those who do not work, idlers (bezdelniki) and, how do you say, all layers of 
society … you basically should invite them to all events … then it will get better in our 
community, that’s what I think, that’s how it seems to me.’ This shows how reaching out to 
those groups within the community who are likely to have been complicit with or affected by 
the inter-communal violence during the 2010 events poses a significant challenge. The latter 
should be even more obvious when taking into account the grievances and feelings of injustice 
in light of the still unaddressed justice issues relating the detentions, trials and money extortion 
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in which law enforcement agencies had been complicit. Tackling this challenge appears to lie 
beyond the LCPC’s scope, as it is primarily interested in forging a dialogue with law 
enforcement and security organs in order to secure the cooperation to improve police 
performance and accountability in the future. Retrospective investigation of (post-) June 2010 
crimes would have to be initiated at the provincial or national level and can be seen as a 
precondition to involve the entire population in peace- and trust-building activities. But given 
that provincial and central authorities have little interest in solving these cases, and that LCPC 
workers are depending on the cooperation of law enforcement and security organs in the first 
place, this precondition is unlikely to be met, which limits the peace and harmony that are built 
in this and other communities, and will make them appear superficial and wrong in the eyes of 
the 2010 events’ victims.   
 
 
V.4 Discussion  
The examples of peacebuilding and community security initiatives after the ‘people’s 
friendship’ discourse, and in the case of early marriages and traffic infrastructure issues 
illustrate the larger issues of livelihoods, local administration and decentralisation in post-
Soviet Kyrgyzstan. In section V.1, I have shown how the industrial collapse of the Soviet 
Kyrgyz community and the withdrawal and downsizing of state institutions and provisioning 
have given rise to a moral economy, in which people’s survival was dependent on their amounts 
of social and cultural capital given the entrenched informalisation and personalisation of once 
well-endowed and less biased institutions; most importantly the new institutions of the market 
which brought about a precarious and thoroughly uncertain living conditions for the larger part 
of the population. In V.2, I have discussed the main effects of recent and current migration 
trends and the commodification of social and family networks. Most significant for community 
security and societal conditions is the increasing number of ‘social orphans’ and entrenching 
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trends in early marriages and domestic violence mirroring increasing psychological strain by a 
large part of the population that is in ‘trans-local livelihoods’ with few people around them to 
trust. After outlining these challenges, I turned to the institutional architecture of Soviet social 
institutions and their afterlives in the post-Soviet period, that saw the institutionalisation and 
incorporation into law enforcement and crime prevention efforts of, most notably, the 
‘traditional’ aksakal courts and the newly founded Local Crime Prevention Centres (LCPCs), 
which came in the focus of international peacebuilding and community programmes after the 
2010 events in Osh, Jalal-Abad and their environs.  
These societal, economic and institutional dynamics are part of a few key trends in the 
re-configuration of social policy, state(building) and law enforcement. In other words, while 
they were changes seen by people in the context of their respective community, they constituted 
a shift of the role or the state in their overall scale. This shift proceeded from a paternalist 
welfare state to, at least in some sectors and aspects, a neo-liberal state with decreased levels 
of provision but a still palpable capacity to regulate and interfere, to a situation where the state 
vanishes and withdraws altogether, leaving people behind to organise their lives and economic 
activities largely on their own. This ‘post-liberal’ configuration is most apparent in the 
decentralisation of administrative and law enforcement functions and the corresponding 
responsibilisation of the community level, as well as the family and individual. Thus, what 
Akaev initiated with his Law on the aksakal courts in 2002 was continued by the Law on crime 
prevention in 2005 by his successor Bakiev and constituted a process of outsourcing of judicial 
and social ordering competencies that would otherwise have been carried out by the police and 
judiciary, or by local administrations which were often incapable of doing so. With the founding 
of LCPCs as coordinating body for municipal and rural institutions and voluntary organs of 
public order, community level crime prevention and public order and security provision were 
consolidated as a competency of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), with bodies from the 
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education and health sector tasked to provide the necessary intelligence and support in the 
analysis of security challenges and implementation of measures.    
The result of this decentralisation trajectory, which resonates with Western public 
management and ‘good governance’ ideas and adapts them to the local reality – with aksakals  
and other LCPC entities figuring as the locally acknowledged organs of public security and 
order provision (e.g. Ibraeva 2008: 11) – is the responsibilisation of the communal level for the 
prevention of and dealing with crime, while reciprocal mechanisms for changing policies and 
strengthening accountability of provincial and national ministries and the government appear 
not to match the former. It can thus be said that community security programming is strong on 
the security side – with structures integrated under the MIA and geared towards effectively 
ensuring crime prevention – while no equivalent provisions are made to deal with challenges 
in the economic, employment, family, health and other sectors. This ‘security-first’ approach 
has been challenged in some communities where international donors have initiated systematic 
approach in the LCPCs or Community Security Working Groups, as shown in the first example 
of an LCPC solving traffic infrastructure issues, but overall a securitisation tendency in 
institutional design and implementation can be observed.    
One feature that makes the work of LCPCs unreliable – in fact many LCPCs across the 
country are by now, 12 years after the law institutionalising them, inactive30 – and thus 
potentially malleable, manipulable, is the de-facto voluntary basis, on which its members are 
expected to work. The group in Tash-Bulak, for instance, suggested that LCPC members should 
be given ‘the maximal salary, so they can be most effective’ in doing their work, while another 
LCPC head emphasised how ‘miserable’ the allowances were.31 It is understandable that there 
                                                
30 They often consist of ‘two old men [dedushki]’ and thus exist mostly on paper. Conversation 
with community security activist, community 2, 11 November 2015, see chapter VII. 
31 Conversation with head of LCPC and territorial council, south Kyrgyztsan, 19 October 2015.  
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are other sufficient reasons for people to get involved in the work of LCPC and CSWGs, as 
expressed by the head of the Tash-Bulak LCPC who alluded to his religious belief, a general 
spiritual need to work for society and even framed the issue as a matter of civic honour and 
even a part of human existence. These motives are honourable and, as the successful solution 
of a road traffic issue in that community showed, effective in mobilising communal support and 
overcome the ignorance and deadlock among municipal, regional, and provincial authorities 
under certain conditions. The same motives are also susceptible to fatigue and exhaustion when 
issues prove too complex and ‘wicked’ to be solved, or the ignorance and resistance from local 
and higher-level administration too stubborn. The representative of the Bazar-Korgon LCPC, 
reported that in addition to the deep-seated alienation and distrust between ethnicities, the 
groups’ work was also complicated by resistance from the local administration (aiyl okmotu) 
and the rift within the group it affected. To still work and organise events in the face of such 
adversity he admitted one required a good amount of fanaticism.32 Although such zeal and 
voluntary activism are necessary to keep society together, it is equally necessary to note how 
such initiatives and the LCPCs as such divert attention from questions as to how economic 
activities and livelihoods are organised and insufficiently provided by public actors and their 
policies. In the following chapter, I further deepen the perspective on how people’s autonomy, 
resilience and self-reliance is promoted by peacebuilding and community security initiatives in 
the youth sector.  
  The trajectory of group and individual responsibilisation, and the use of moral 
discourses to give weight to calls for perseverance under conditions of economic hardship and 
strain on family and communal relations, is already apparent in the two initiatives on 
                                                
32 About the new members of the team, he commented: ‘They are such fanatics as we are, we 
are cast in the same mould [oni tozhe takie fanaty kak my, s odnogo testa]’, Bazar-Korgon, 30 
October 2015.  
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legalisation of marriages and people’s friendship. First of all, the consultation with responsible 
bodies and actors and measures implemented to reduce child marriages were effective in 
reducing the number of the latter, which depicts a success in collective action against a social 
problem co-produced by local and regional level institutions. Still, this initiative did not 
perceive as its scope the key problems underlying the phenomenon, such as the high number of 
social orphans and the destitute conditions in the local labour market that make people prefer 
to marry off their kids as soon as possible, which in turn feeds into the growth of young 
parenthood via the psychological suffering experienced by young brides. In this light, events 
for the promotion of family and marriage values (‘We are an exemplary (primernaia) family’) 
is useful in that it brings to attention these issues and may inspire people in their attempt to 
navigate the conditions of the post-Soviet labour market. But it can be expected that they also 
put social and moral pressure on people who due to their family history or economic situation 
are not able to live up to such ‘examples’ neither in the present nor in future generations.   
Events for the promotion of virtuous values within the family and the community, 
whether they are about ‘exemplary families’, ‘women entrepreneurs’ or diversity, tolerance and 
‘people’s friendship’, thus exhibit a performative and potentially elitist character insofar that 
they present an ideal towards which people should ideally strive rather than being focused on 
the current state of affairs in a given community and ways to improve it. This function is partly 
taken by the roundtables and other consultation formats organised by LCPCs for exchange with 
the population. But again, it cannot be expected that these formats yield insights and results that 
represent the entire population of a community. This is not to argue that peacebuilding and 
community security practices of LCPCs or other bodies are insufficient. It is merely to point 
out that with their capacities and scope they will be able to tackle issues of security, peace and 
conflict and will most likely be able to identify and tackle the most important aspects pertaining 
to the latter. These initiatives are unlikely to solve more fundamental issues of material and 
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psychological wellbeing, however, but are likely to instate – depending on their reach and 
effectiveness – certain regimes of social and moral desirability which will make people refrain 
from voicing their discontent and grievances stemming from such issues. This analysis has 
focussed less on this effect of a peace or ‘tolerance governmentality’ but more on the 
institutional and actor side that is likely to produce such effects, which will be further explored 
in the following chapter. It has become clear, however, that the ways in which peace and 
security are produced and maintained by LCPCs and their constituent bodies are post-liberal in 
that they transcend the ‘classic’ relationship between the state and society and mobilise and 
responsibilise the latter to take over functions and competencies of the former, partly replacing 
and rendering it obsolete in the process.  
Finally, the dynamics of present-day community security and peacebuilding, and the 
overarching trajectory of local administration reform and decentralisation can be clearly 
situated within the three imaginaries of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan (ch. IV). As already 
indicated, the local administration reform of the 1990s and 2000s was pursued after the 
templates offered by international financial institutions and local governance consultants. As I 
have shown, given that privatisation and the distribution of valuable assets and land had 
proceeded significantly before rural executive committees (aiyl okmotu) and other local bodies 
were ready to take on and regulate such processes, large parts of the population were already 
facing dire economic circumstances reducing them to perseverance and coping strategies 
(IV.2.4) which included labour migration within the country, and by the 2000s, to the CIS and 
beyond. With Western-style reforms not yielding positive results, Akaev started to embrace 
Kyrgyz traditions to nurture his own popularity among the population invoke the Kyrgyz 
people’s inherent ability to persevere in the most adverse conditions. He also institutionalised 
the aksakal courts as alternative dispute resolution body especially in rural areas, and held up 
their exemplary status for the inherently democratic nature and institutions of the Kyrgyz 
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nomadic tribes, which should help to maintain unity and harmony in the current period of 
economic and increasing political instability (IV.4.2).  
The Law on crime prevention and institutionalisation of LCPCs can be seen as a 
combination of Western-style local governance imaginary with traditional discourses on social 
order and institutions into a set of institutions and practices conforming to the ‘politics of 
sovereignty’ imaginary (IV.3). While the content of internationally supported projects and 
practices thus largely draws on Western notions of participatory techniques and local 
democracy and emphasises their compatibility with Kyrgyzstani local institutions such as 
LCPCs, asksakal courts or district/mahalla committees, the overarching priorities and agenda 
are always agreed with and thus subsumed under the priorities of the MIA. Thereby, domestic 
authorities’ sovereignty is maintained vis-à-vis international actors’ criticism or interference in 
domestic affairs but also vis-à-vis local and municipal actors’ challenges and attempts to 
influence the provincial and national policy making or legislation. Community security 
initiatives are primarily free to address the symptoms of economic, social and political problems 
by deriving initiatives that help people reflect on their situation and seek help in coping with 
them, but a feedback loop that would create additional responsibility and accountability from 
the top levels vis-à-vis communities appears to be generally lacking in this area. The state is 
thus re-configured and re-built of the state in to a post-liberal one, where the classic relationship 
between state and society, which is supposed to be determined and shaped by collective 
decision making among society, is transcended into one where the state is only active in certain 
aspects and situations while societal actors and elements, but also private actors or international 
ones, like donors or peacebuilding and security NGOs, take over functions and responsibilities 
that state agencies cannot cover. In chapter VII, I will examine attempts to challenge this post-
liberal reconfiguration by creating more accountability of state intuitions, specifically the 
police, vis-à-vis society. There, I will indicate that the trend appears irreversible to the extent 
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that fiscal arrangements and thus livelihoods of people working within the institution are 
significantly disconnected from the realities of life in Kyrgyzstan and produce parallel 
structures and markets undermining accountability and professionalism.  
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Chapter VI	 Shaping peace, social order and resilience: Territorial Youth Councils 
as problem-solvers and voice of youth  
 
The previous chapter has given a first insight into community security and peacebuilding 
practices against the background of the post-Socialist transition and its effects on livelihoods 
in rural and semi-urban Kyrgyzstan. As I have shown, forms of insecurity and crime appear 
inextricably linked to the results of privatisation, liberalisation and market deregulation; either 
directly, as people try to fight dispossession and poverty through squatting, petty crime and 
cattle theft; or indirectly, via the social and psychological effects of mass labour migration and 
incapacitation of education and health and social care institutions who fail to address the 
hardships and needs of people. In this situation of rolling back, downsizing and sometimes de 
facto collapse of state institutions and services, I have shown how the web of social institutions 
and civil society from the Soviet Union has – albeit selectively – lived on and was partly revived 
by the creation Local Crime Prevention Centres as a coordinating body for them. I have 
demonstrated LCPCs’ high potential to address conflict and related issues, but have also shown 
that their functioning and operations are highly dependent on the readiness and ability of local 
activists to invest time and effort into this institution. LCPCs are thus the first example of post-
liberal forms of community security provision and foreground two more in-depth cases which 
will be examined in this and the following chapter.   
In this chapter, I present an analysis of the peacebuilding, social ordering and 
mobilisation practices of the Territorial Youth Councils (Territorialnye Molodezhnye Sovety, 
TYCs), an institution officially created in the year 2011 following the initiatives of young 
people in the southern Kyrgyzstani city of Osh to promote peace, tolerance and non-violence 
in the aftermath of the 2010 ‘Osh’ or ‘June events’ (see IV.1). The TYCs have become firmly 
integrated into the institutional architecture of local governance and social policy, which 
presents a success given that their establishment and consolidation was continuously supported 
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by the Organisation for Co-Operation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the NGO Iret1 based 
in Osh. The important status of TYCs and similar structures across Kyrgyzstan as a promoter 
of tolerance, inter-ethnic and inter-regional exchange and but also self-help and solidarity 
among young people make them a pertinent case for post-liberal peace and statebuilding in 
Kyrgyzstan. Like the LCPCs analysed earlier, they mobilise comprehensive efforts among 
young people but also national NGOs to implement goals which are also in the interest of local 
government actors such as the Mayor’s Administration (meriia) of the city of Osh. In this sense, 
as this chapter will show, the practices and discourses of peacebuilding and social ordering 
undertaken by this institution can often be situated within the ‘politics of sovereignty’ and 
‘Western liberal peace’ imaginary at the same time, while their content invoked ‘tradition and 
culture’ as a source of peacefulness and harmony in diversity. I analyse this hybrid constitution 
of this institution between the different imaginaries and the implications for the trajectory of 
post-liberal statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan. 
 The data used in this analysis was gathered in participatory observation during national 
conferences and community events, and interviews conducted with TYC representatives 
between September and December 2015.2 Access to the conferences was given by the 
coordinator of the project working for OSCE and agreed with the staff of Iret. In order to 
interview TYC representatives themselves, I first requested and obtained permission to contact 
TYC representatives from the head of the Committee for Youth Affairs (CYA) in Osh and, 
subsequently, contacted individual TYC representatives to ask for their participation; a process 
further facilitated by staff of the Committee. I interviewed current or recent heads or active 
                                                
1 The Russian acronym for Initsiativa razvitiia edinstva i tolerantnosti, or ‘Initiative for the 
development of equality and tolerance’.  
2 See list of attended events and interviews in Appendix 1. The Committee for Youth Affairs 
helped to arrange some of the interviews, but all interviewees and conversations were 
conducted on separate occasions.    
		207 
members from five out of twelve TYCs in the city of Osh, some of whom were currently 
working as staff in the CYA or in Iret. The analysis draws on only one interview with ‘ordinary’ 
members because time and resources to negotiate trust and access to the TYCs of the different 
communities were limited. Thus, the analyses, views and results discussed in this chapter are 
largely based on the views shared by people working in the Committee for Youth Affairs of the 
mayor’s administration, and the OSCE and Iret. A first draft of the chapter was shared with the 
latter in order to confirm the correct representation of the institution.  
 The chapter is structured as follows. In section VI.21, I discuss the original mission and 
functions of the TYCs to outline the logics of mobilisation, scope and functions and, on that 
basis the importance of youth work for territorial governance and peacebuilding. The section 
sets the analytical frame for the chapter, which is focused on how TYCs are made to work 
effectively in some areas while their powers are limited in others. Section VI.2 presents the 
actual content of the activities and initiatives of TYCs. I first focus on the original mission of 
promoting peace, tolerance and exchange between groups and different urban and rural locales 
(VI.2.1) to then show how this peacebuilding mission is embedded in discourses and symbolic 
interactions pertaining to national ideology in Kyrgyzstan, which have ample resonance with 
some of the imaginaries and discourses of statebuilding (VI.2.2). The next section (VI.2.3) 
gives examples of how TYCs approached concrete issues of conflict and insecurity and focuses 
on violent extremism, racketeering and poverty. I further examine the TYCs’ positioning vis-
à-vis the latter problem, i.e. poverty and socio-economic hardship, which appears to be 
underlying more visible issues of conflict and crime. I show how TYCs and other youth actors 
attempt to tackle these more fundamental problems by, on the one hand, promoting solutions 
of self-help and entrepreneurial subjecthood resonating with free market discourses and, on 
other hand, also work on providing help through charity and solidarity work (VI.2.4). The 
tension between the promotion of resilience and more critical and demanding attitude in regard 
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to living conditions and social policy leads to a more systematic discussion of the opportunities 
and limits of youth politics and policy in section VI.3. I first examine the different attempts to 
give youth a voice to raise the issues identified in previous sections in local and national 
political debates. I turn then discuss Kyrgyzstani state youth policy to show you much of the 
work of TYCs and other youth policy actors and institutions tackles issues that could more 
effectively be addressed by a more systematic state youth policy.  
The fact that such a policy is only in the process of formulation and that the challenges 
and problems in the youth sphere are still mainly left to be dealt with by project-based and 
donor-funded initiatives makes the youth sphere in Kyrgyzstan in a post-liberal trajectory, 
where state responsibilities and provision are internationalised and outsourced while the content 
and shape of initiatives are subject to national ideological and sovereignty discourses. I discuss 
the autonomisation and internationalisation of youth work and its situatedness in and between 
imaginaries of statebuilding in section VI.4 
  
 
VI.1 TYCs’ mission, functions and the logics of territorial youth work  
Although the TYCs are, much like the LCPCs analysed in the previous chapter, aiming to 
prevent conflict and to promote tolerance, harmony and good citizenship among young people, 
their establishment and institutionalisation is a special case insofar as they received support 
from the OSCE and the NGO Iret. This rendered the institutionalisation of TYCs in Territorial 
Councils of the city of Osh – and the corresponding access to financial means from the city’s 
budget – subject to long negotiation. After discussing the institutionalisation and expansion of 
the TYCs into other cities in Kyrgyzstan (VI.2.1), I will thus present insights into the roles, 
scope and logics of mobilisation of TYCs to explain their integration into local government 
structures (VI.2.2).  
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Establishment, institutionalisation and expansion of TYCs 
The process of establishing TYCs in the city of Osh in the South of the country goes back to 
the year 2010. One of the more short-term responses to the June 2010 events, which had brought 
massive damage to large parts of the city and other towns in southern Kyrgyzstan, was to 
establish eleven working groups across the territory of the city (Info booklet: 7).3 The young 
volunteers in these groups attempted to call their peers to peacefulness and dispel the multiple 
conflict-related rumours circulating in the aftermath of the June event and aimed to build trust, 
reconciliation and new friendships. This initial activity, often in the form of seminars or 
trainings, was conducted under the slogan ‘I am a Kyrgyzstani’ (Ya – Kyrgyzstanets!).4 This 
expresses the goal of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence among the population regardless 
of people’s identities and under the civic nationalist banner discussed in IV.2.2.  
In 2011, the youth groups were institutionalised as Territorial Youth Councils as part of 
a project implemented by the NGO Iret and realised in cooperation with the Committee for 
Youth Affairs under the mayor’s office (meriia) of the city of Osh. The institutional status was 
documented in a decree by the mayor’s office (Polozhenie o territoralnykh sovetakh), which 
also established a Coordination Council (koordinatsionnyi sovet) consisting of representatives 
of the Committee for Youth Affairs, Iret and the OSCE, and one representative from each of 
the twelve TYCs. In this body, all operative and strategic questions pertaining to TYCs’ work 
were discussed, including the allocation of ‘mini-grants’ to young people’s projects on a 
competitive basis. The general structure of each TYC includes one head (predsedatel), a deputy 
                                                
3 Most of the information presented in this section can be found in the Information booklet on 
the Territorial Youth Council of the city of Osh (Informatsionnyi sbornik o Territorialnykh 
Molodezhnykh Sovetakh goroda Osh), Osh, 2015; cited as ‘Booklet’ hereafter.    
4 Conversation with youth council head, who had been part of the efforts in the aftermath of the 
Osh events; Osh, 13 November.  
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head (zampredsedateli) and a group of ten active members (zolotaia desiatka or ‘golden ten’) 
who were supposed to mobilise two active helpers or participants each for any of the events 
organised in a TYC. 
A major factor of motivation and important source for knowledge transfer were select 
activists’ funded trips to Northern Ireland and Vienna, where experiences and perspectives on 
post-conflict trust building among young people, were exchanged (Info booklet: 8). Further 
projects on capacity-building and skills training implemented by Iret with the support and 
advice from the OSCE helped to recruit new people who would gradually partake in the 
activities of the TYCs, take on responsibility and become second and third generation youth 
council representatives themselves. The trainings, exchange visits and – once youth initiatives 
had been started across the country – national conferences for problem analysis, brainstorming 
and project planning, which were organised in different places across Kyrgyzstan, were 
regarded as prestigious and attracted many supporters for the TYCs. They could not, however, 
mitigate the high fluctuation rate in executing and leadership positions in these bodies, and thus 
also their functions and scope (see below).  
The institutionalisation of TYCs did not only have the function of approving of the work 
done by the young volunteers and granting the authority to continue their operations; it also 
answered the question about the ownership of the TYC structure. While much of the capacity 
building and recruitment of volunteers had been supported or actively carried out by Iret and 
the OSCE, neither of these organisations were realistic candidates to become the TYCs’ patrons 
in the long term. The Committee for Youth Affairs under the office of the mayor of Osh was 
practically also the only viable partner to institutionalise TYCs and integrate them into its 
structure. Until the cycle of capacity building projects finished in October 2016, the CYA and 
Iret were coordinating the work of the TYCs, while the OSCE took on an advisor role and 
provides mostly project-based support.   
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An important step in the further institutionalisation of the TYCs was the integration of 
the twelve TYC heads (predsedateli) into the ordinary staff of the office of the mayor of Osh 
in 2013 (Info booklet: 9). This step, alongside with granting all members of TYCs official status 
and their specific ID cards (ibid.), increased the visibility and legitimacy of the work of the 
volunteers. In the words of one representative from Iret:  
We are trying to make the project sustainable, the participants in the youth councils are 
supposed to have a [consolidated] position. Even if the authorities rotate, our people 
will already be there and will not be touched by them [ikh ne trogaiut].5 
This statement points especially to the potential problem of rotation in the leadership in the 
CYA or in the higher levels of the mayor’s office. Such fluctuation does now not pose the same 
problem as it used to in times when the status of TYCs had not been determined by concrete 
local legislative acts. The institutionalisation of TYCs can thus be seen as a concrete activity of 
statebuilding, through which state structures, in this case local administrative structures such as 
Territorial Councils – the sub-division of the mayor’s office in the city’s districts (see table 
V.3) – and Local Crime Prevention centres which work in close cooperation or personal unison 
with them, are supported and in fact extended in order to better reach young people.  
The city of Osh has served as a model case for the reinvigoration of youth sector 
structures in Kyrgyzstan. The establishment and institutionalisation of TYCs was regarded as 
a success both in Kyrgyzstan and in the OSCE. Through conversations of the responsible 
ministry and involved international organisation, this concept was also applied and 
implemented in other localities, foremost the southern provincial capitals of Batken and Jalal-
Abad. Another prime example is the city of Tokmok in Chui province, about 70 kilometres east 
of Bishkek. After the establishment of a youth working group as part of a joint capacity building 
                                                
5 Youth forum in Batken, 11 September 2015. 
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project of the OSCE and the local mayor’s office in 2012, a Youth Coordination Council 
(Koordinatsionnyi Sovet Molodezhy, KSM) was founded in 2013. However, the mayor’s office 
could not support the institutionalisation as in the case of TYCs in Osh, which was explained 
by the fact that it did not have the competencies as the city of Osh, which is the only republican 
city apart from the capital Bishkek and thus has significant self-administrative competencies.6 
With Tokmok being downgraded to an ordinary town because of the deindustrialisation and 
depopulation after 1991, the mayor’s administration argued that they could not obtain approval 
from the provincial administration to officially constitute the Youth Coordination Council 
(KSM) under its auspices. The local initiative group thus had to lobby their case on a higher 
level and negotiated the possibility of being constituted as official body directly under the 
Ministry of Youth, Labour and Migration. This agreement was ready to be signed when the 
2015 parliamentary elections and subsequent reshuffles in the Ministry and its sub-divisions 
brought new people, who were not ready to take over the agreements and arrangements of their 
predecessors. This status of the Youth Coordination Council in Tokmok has not been changed 
since 2015.7  
This case and similar difficulties of legally constituting youth structures in Jalal-Abad 
and Batken8 indicate the limits and reservations to the official incorporation of youth councils 
into local administrative structures. It also underlines the accomplishment that the legalisation 
of the TYCs’ activity in Osh represents. As the following sub-section and section VI.4 will 
show, the responsibilities and commitments in terms of budgeting and claims for shaping local 
                                                
6 Interview with youth representative, Tokmok, 10 December 2015; correspondence, August 
2017. 
7 Interview with youth representative, Tokmok, 10 December 2015.  
8 Although with similar difficulties, Committees for Youth Affairs were eventually instated 
under the mayor’s offices of these provincial capitals and are serving to plan, coordinate and 
oversee the implementation of youth sphere activities by young activists and NGOs. 
Participants on youth forum, Batken, 11 September 2015.   
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policies incurred by the constitution of youth councils or equivalent institutions are not little. It 
is thus more practical for mayor’s administrations and rural executive committees (aiyl okmotu) 
to allow youth initiatives to organise events, educate and entertain young people without 
creating the structures and liabilities that would make this kind of work more sustainable. It is 
also important to acknowledge that this mode of spontaneous self-organisation, which is 
significantly supported by local NGOs working in the youth and peacebuilding sectors, can be 
regarded equally effective from the perspective of event beneficiaries – young people living in 
the place where events are organised. If youth affairs are taken care of by voluntary youth 
activists and NGOs successfully raising and using donor money9, local administrations do not 
see a real need to create structures like Territorial Youth Councils.10 Furthermore, rural 
administrations are more focused on providing basic services like language and computer 
literacy courses, which do not require the of administrative and governance capacity of TYCs.11 
In the next sub-section, I will discuss the logic of mobilisation and spontaneity at play in youth 
work and peacebuilding in more detail, which will substantiate the reasons for why local 
administrations have little preference to institutionalise youth structures.    
 
TYCs’ role, scope and logics of mobilisation  
To give a more concrete insight in how TYCs operate and what their implications for 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention are, I will discuss their external working environment 
                                                
9 The substituting effect of international donor and local NGOs’ activities in the youth sphere 
was noted by a senior specialist from the Tokmok Mayor’s Office Social Department, Tokmok, 
10 December 2015.  
10 Conversation, TYC project consultant, Osh, 3 December 2015. The expert in Tokmok (see 
note 8 above) noted how the creation of an official youth work structure was apparently more 
a matter of political will than of available resources or approval from higher level structures. 
11 Interview, TYC head, Osh, 4 December. Interview with LCPC representatives, Smarkandek 
(Batken province), 12 July 2015 (see chapter V). 
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and conditions and internal logics of working and mobilising young people. This discussion is 
divided into the aspects of visibility, territorial coverage and cooperation with local 
government, administration and civil society bodies; cadre recruitment, fluctuation and 
turnover; and the internal working logics and mechanisms.  
 
Territorial vs social outreach and cooperation with existing bodies and institutions 
To understand the way TYCs work it is best to differentiate two kinds of activities: First, 
activities organised in direct cooperation with and usually on the premises of education 
institutions such as schools, universities, technical and professional colleges and other 
educational or administrative institutions. For these events TYC volunteers can utilise existing 
infrastructure for communicating events, recruiting participants and new volunteers for their 
work. On the other hand, TYCs also organise street-level activities, usually in the form of sport 
events or small yard festivals or concerts with the title Rebiata s nashego dvora (‘Kids from 
our courtyard’). While both kinds of events have important effects and impacts, I was 
particularly interested in the social outreach that TYCs could generate given the large 
population of the twelve city districts they are operating in. With up to 50,000 inhabitants in 
one district, it is important to consider appropriateness and effectivity of measures taken to 
build trust and peace and prevent tensions, conflict and crime both by TYCs and other bodies. 
Accordingly, it is important to assess the degree of TYCs’ social outreach, and to what extent 
their activity fulfils the goal of demonstrating presence and a general offer of activities and 
events across the territory. It became clear that TYCs’ cooperation with the existing social and 
administrative infrastructure is very likely to generate significant social outreach, but that it is 
still possible that pockets of young people not knowing about TYCs are still existent across the 
city. As several TYC representatives explained, their activities are structured across the 
different schools in a given district, with pupils in each school actively engaged in the their 
		215 
TYC.12 The coverage of schools is not always the same, however, as the following quote 
illustrates:  
In general, many TYC folks [TMSniki] work with pupils, yes. Look, we had a Russian 
school in [our district], and only in this school there was no information about TYCs. In 
the school of Manas in Kerme-Too, they had information and they participated [in TYC 
events]. TYC members themselves are pupils. We did not have this [situation] because 
our school director […] did not admit such youth organisations. She did not want people 
to undertake such activity but wanted them to only study.13    
Similar to the dependence on individuals when it comes to incorporating schools or other 
institutions in the TYC activities, getting to know about TYCs outside of school or any other 
social infrastructure is yet more dependent on coincidence, but possible thanks to the ‘Kids 
from our courtyard’ and similar events. The same ex youth council activist reported:  
In our courtyard, it is possible that people knew [about TYCs]; only I didn’t because I 
didn’t go out on the street [to play]. My district is [covered by] the TYC Kerme-Too 
and it turns out that there, people knew well about it and that monthly events with graffiti 
and other things were held on the street. I knew that such events are being organised in 
our district … but I just didn’t know that it was TYC people doing them.  
This shows how TYCs manage to be present in children’s lives through street-level events, 
even if somewhat subconsciously. At the same time, this social outreach depends on 
individuals’ interaction with their own district and can vary across different districts. Youth 
activists from another TYC, for instance, reported that their activities were focused on working 
with higher education institutions as no agreements for doing events with pupils from the 
                                                
12 For instance, interviews with youth council head, Osh, 13 November; youth council head, 
Osh, 4 December 2015.  
13 Interview with former ‘golden ten’ member, Osh, 3 December 2015.  
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district’s schools had been reached.14 Furthermore, even if some events are advertised through 
posters or leaflets, it seems that people’s participation in them is more effectively brought about 
by friends, school teachers or pedagogues strongly encouraging them to join.15 Given her 
limited interaction with kids in her courtyard, the interviewee quoted in length above was, like 
many other activists, recruited into her TYC during the first year of her studies at the Faculty 
of Business and Management of Osh State University. Therefore, it is important to notice that 
the coverage and ‘social outreach’ of TYCs varies depending on their own capacity and 
cooperativeness of different institutions.  
This was confirmed and explained in further detail by a current TYC head, who pointed 
out how it was challenging to cover the needs and requirements of young people at the three 
universities and eight schools in his district, as well as of the ‘city youth’ (gorodskaia 
molodezh): only in order to have one event per school, it meant that already one event per month 
had to be prepared and implemented.16 TYCs therefore have responsible persons or sviaznye 
(‘communicators’) in each institution, especially colleges, universities and higher education 
institutions, to communicate event plans and coordinate their implementation.17 Thus the high 
number of events is organised in cooperation with the different institutional partners who also 
draw on the experience of organising events before the founding of TYCs. As senior voices in 
the initiative have pointed out, the TYCs have managed to establish a cooperation between 
‘local administrative organs’ (mestnye organy vlasti)18 and, specifically in Osh, ‘interact 
                                                
14 Interview with two youth council activists, Osh, 4 December.  
15 Interview with activists (previous note) & TYC head, Osh, 4 December. The youth 
representative in Tokmok (interview, 10 December) pointed out the ironic fact that people 
usually had to be pushed to partake in trainings and events and were keen once they had 
participated and understood what it was all about.   
16 Conversation, youth council head, Osh, 13 November.  
17 Interview with activists, Osh, 4 December; youth representative, Tokmok, 10 December.  
18 OSCE representative, national youth forum, Janaat resort, 28 October 2015.  
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closely’ with law enforcement organs, territorial councils (the district level sub-division of the 
mayor’s office) and their composite institutions such as aksakal courts and women’s councils 
(zhensovets).19 ‘As regards the role of TYCs for these institutions’, the head of the Committee 
for Youth Affairs further explained, ‘[they] are in need of human resources… they need people 
[…] who will realise this, discuss, promote and advertise the events and so on ca call then talk 
to young people and so on.’20 The best demonstration of this close cooperation between TYCs 
and other administrative and civil society bodies are big festivals held on the occasions of 
Nooruz21, 1st of May or the Anniversary of the city of Osh (see VI.2.2), where TYC activists 
help by organising dance and theatrical performances and culinary or arts fairs. Perhaps even 
more important are smaller projects funded by ‘mini-grants’ in which young people can realise 
their ideas on the level of their respective district and in cooperation with young people from 
different places from Osh province. 
 
Recruitment and fluctuation 
To further understand the logics and effects of TYCs, it is important to take into account the 
yearly turnover of people in each district and the factors of people’s engagement in TYCs. The 
events implemented in schools, colleges, universities also serve as occasions for recruitment, 
as the ex-golden ten member from a central district TYC explained: ‘in BiM [Faculty of 
Business and Management], we have the Youth Business Club […]. Every year, many first-
year students join, young students who do not know at all what TYCs are. … [In the] Youth 
Business Club … they know us and can spread the information about us to everyone, like, what 
                                                
19 Interview, Head of the Committee for Youth Affairs, Osh, 19 November 2015.  
20 Interview, Head of the Committee for Youth Affairs, Osh, 19 November 2015.  
21 A holiday celebrating the commencement of spring or, in Persian and Zoroastrian tradition, 
the new year.  
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are TYCs, and you can join them and so on.’22 Another current activist describes how he was 
recruited by his friend, who had by the time of the interview become head of his TYC:  
When I was studying in the first year ... [the TYC head] told me how they work in TYCs 
and what events they have there, what they are aiming at and trying to build there. He 
told me all of this and I became interested. ... So in the beginning I became an active 
participant in all events in the college, and then I already became a member of the TYC 
team.23 
In this sense, the TYCs’ different events and trainings serve as places where ‘active youth are 
gathering’, can ‘present themselves’24, voice their ambition and be selected to become members 
of TYCs and their core team called ‘golden ten’ (zolotaia desiatka).25  
 This recruitment practice is limited to the core team, each of whose member is 
responsible to recruit two more active members for the TYC, so that the overall number of 
people per TYC is thirty, plus the head of the TYC. With the heads working as regular staff in 
the CYA and acting as bridge between the latter and their TYC, the golden ten takes on the 
principal responsibility for the operative work in the district. As one TYC head from a more 
rural district in Western Osh explained:  
In the morning, I go to my [home district] office, I have a district head there, members, 
leaders of neighbourhood committees [with whom they cooperate] and youth 
representatives, youth leaders are doing the whole work there.26  
                                                
22 Interview, Osh, 3 December 2015. 
23 Interview with activists, Osh, 4 December 2015; similar stories were told in interviews by 
two TYC heads, Osh, 13 November and 4 December. 
24 ‘Ty sebia pokazyvaesh.’ Ex-golden ten member, interview, Osh, 3 December.  
25 As explained in an interview by a TYC head of a suburban district, where recruitment was 
primarily done on festivals organised by the supporting NGO, Osh 13 November.  
26 Interview, TYC head, Osh, 13 November.  
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Thus, TYC heads depend on their ‘golden ten’ and have to keep up the mood and performance 
of their team to keep the activities of TYCs running. The TYC head facing eight schools in his 
district remarked succinctly that, ‘as regards the regularity [of people’s contribution], that varies 
[eto po raznomu]’ and, worse, within a short period of time, ‘the golden ten completely fell 
apart. They finished the 11th grade and entered university in Bishkek or left for other reasons.’ 
Maintaining operations under such conditions can be hard and presents a core issue faced by 
TYCs. The head from the rural district explained her situation concerning the challenge of 
recruiting people and managing fluctuation as follows:  
We had about fourteen leaders, but four already left for their relatives to Moscow to 
work and only ten were left. The following year, of these ten, another four or five 
became students or also left to work.27  
She confirmed that this fluctuation meant that within one year the positions within her golden 
ten team could change one or more times, as people would join the core team for an average of 
seven to eight months. This demonstrates that, while working in TYCs may be interesting and 
atractive for young people for various reasons28, their life courses, personal plans and 
obligations vis-à-vis family and relatives may not allow them to be active in TYCs for a long 
time. This dilemma was particulalry related to the recruitment of pupils from higher grades of 
high schools, who are all likely to leave Osh to study or work in Bishkek and abroad. Given 
that the work in TYCs is fully voluntary and any benefits in terms of acquired skills and 
networking contacts hard to measure and quickly saturated, it appears fairly logical that young 
people are not able to stay in Osh and work in their TYC when they need to go and work abroad 
to earn a living and support tehir family or, alternatively, when they have the possibility to 
                                                
27 Interview, TYC head, Osh, 13 November.  
28 Reasons other than simply being active and working with friends are discussed in the next 
section.  
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further their career through studies or jobs in Bishkek. This situation frustrated TYC 
representatives and was seen as a major issues preventing a more sustainable impact of TYCs.29 
It appears, though, as if replacing the constant stream of leavers with new young activists, thus 
working as a conduit for constantly fluctuating cadres, is a guiding principle of TYC whose 
success depends on the few paid heads and staff in the CYA.  
 
Internal communication, hierarchy, division of labour 
The high degree of fluctuation combined with high output performance requires effective 
internal communication, hierarchies and a clear division of labour and leads to questions about 
benefits, reward and recognition. As already indicated above, communication and 
implementation of project plans is organised in a decentral manner and based on the principle 
of delegation. The golden ten team is divided across the different schools, professional higher 
education and other institutions – or, in more rural areas, different villages or settlements – and 
tasked with coordinating the efforts of other TYC members and active youth in these respective 
entities. Meetings of the entire golden ten itself take place once a month or become redundant 
altogether depending on the communication undertaken by the TYC head. While TYC members 
are free to propose events and activities suitable for their communities and different target 
groups, the event plans, budgetary planning and the annual event calendar of the city of Osh 
with its traditional holidays creates some degree of rigidity in the work of TYCs, which puts 
expectation and some pressure on TYCs and especially their leaders to deliver their programme. 
The salary of 2,100 soms30 that TYC heads received from the CYA until 2016 creates additional 
expectations and moral pressure on TYC heads to deliver.  
                                                
29 Presentation at national closing conference, 27 October, Janaat resort, near Bishkek. 
30 Which equals about 22 GBP as of December 2017. 
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 Relatedly, the atmosphere within teams and attractiveness of their programmes and 
benefits should also be considered in terms of its role in convincing young people to stay, be 
active and take responsibility in a TYC or excuse oneself and try working in another 
organisation. One example is a TYC in Osh, which was not content with the appointment of its 
deputy: ‘The members did not want him to be a deputy, at all.’, told one TYC head. ’So they 
set up a meeting [miting stroili; laughs], saying ‘the guy doesn’t do work’, ‘he is such and such’ 
and they even called for new elections and elected a new deputy. … So that’s the kind of internal 
politics going on.’ In another case, the deputy of the head of a local youth activist group decided, 
as the head told me in an interview, to abandon his activity because he did not agree with the 
way things were done in the local group. She further told:  
And when I asked him, why did you leave, why do you not want to work, he said 
[clearing throat], ‘these are my principles, I want it like this, that’s it.’ And I just wanted 
to kill myself [ubivalas] and said, gosh, what’s this, what am I supposed to do now, I 
have to explain this to the boss, what to say in front of [the implementing NGO] and the 
OSCE. How am I supposed to step up and say that … [this is] the person for whom I 
did everything to be included into the project.  It was my full responsibility that he would 
work …31    
This illustrates the stakes involved in the work of TYCs and the trust implicated in decisions 
on recruiting people and investing into them by sending them to national conferences and 
trainings. These often significant investments and corresponding responsibility make the people 
in leading positions vulnerable to the disagreement, resistance or inability of ordinary members 
to carry out their work. The same activist group leader laid out her own understanding of this 
feature of youth work as follows: 
                                                
31 Interview, youth council representative, Tokmok, 10 December 2015.  
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Anyways, one has to conform to some rules, to some pillars and to move in such a way 
that it’s not only comfortable for yourself but also for others. There were days when I 
missed classes for three or four days in order to work in some project, to go on a trip. 
Because this is a responsibility, after all. Because you chose this life [podkluchilsa v etu 
zhizn], after all. You’re not supposed to reject this responsibility because they invest 
money and work into you. And you’re supposed to give some feedback [if you don’t 
like something]. 
As this statement shows, precarious situations and competitive relations can emerge among the 
activists. These are often mitigated and transformed into constructive and creative cooperation 
thanks to the year-long friendships and open and honest relationships between people.32 Still, 
the entirely voluntary status of TYC work throws up questions as to how people are supposed 
to carry on in life once they graduate from school or university, and what TYCs have to offer 
apart from ID cards, participation diplomas and their official status and symbolic prestige.   
  The answer are the skills, knowledge and experience that can be gained during work in 
TYCs. I will discuss these in more depth in the next section, as they are to a significant degree 
linked to the symbolic meaning and goal of the overall project (e.g. development and 
improvement of one’s city of the country at large). Another aspect in relation to young people’s 
own (self-) development is the progression from ordinary member to leader to professional in 
the sphere of youth activism and policy. It is clear that not everyone can become a leader or 
professional and that the progression of youth activists into these stages will have a selective 
logic that requires compensation through friendly relations and more general motivation 
factors. In this sense, the position of TYC heads and leaders of youth groups in other youth 
structures in Kyrgyzstan is rendered somewhat precarious in two respects. First, they are having 
                                                
32 For instance, the same youth leader told how she would regularly have disagreements or even 
fights with her colleague but would always find a common denominator in the end.  
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to justify their positioning by juggling different interests from above and below in the hierarchy, 
and from the spectrum of different preferences across actors. Second, given the absence or 
insufficiency of monetary compensation in these positions, youth leaders are having to sustain 
their existence through wage labour or grant writing and project implementation in the youth 
and wider civil society sector. Given donors’ increasing involvement in Kyrgyzstan since 2010 
and the intensifying focus on youth as a vulnerable group, this has become an increasingly 
viable option, as different ‘success stories’ of (former) youth leaders show.33  
However, these favourable business cycle conditions cannot betray the fact that existing 
structures and human resources in youth work and policy – especially those with adequate 
salaries –  are barely sufficient to tackle the challenges of youth work in Kyrgyzstan. TYCs can 
in this sense be seen as the ideal solution from the point of view of the state and exchequer, as 
they serve to channel international donor money and large-scale efforts of young people into 
conducting projects and activities to build trust, tolerance and peace and prevent crime, conflict 
and delinquent behaviour. The working mode and logic of TYCs is in this sense a post-liberal 
one, as it mobilises scarce resources, foremost the time and dedication of young activists with 
precariously sustained livelihoods, with an appeal to a collective effort to build a peaceful and 
tolerant social order. In the following section, I will analyse how the embedding of this project 
in a discourse of nation- and peacebuilding served as the key factor of mobilisation and social 
ordering in accordance with the three imaginaries of social orders identified in chapter IV.    
 
 
                                                
33 Different interviewees have pointed out how ex-youth council/group leaders have become 
successful workers in the donor-funded civil society sector. Interview, youth work expert, 
Tokmok, 10 December 2015; conversation, TYC project consultant, 6 July 2017.  
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VI.2 Tolerance, the right path, self-help and solidarity: Discourses and practices of 
youth-led (peace) initiatives 
VI.2.1 Peace, tolerance and exchange between groups and locales 
The original function and mission of TYCs was to build peace and trust between different ethnic 
groups within and across the districts of Osh city and beyond. Although this initial goal has 
largely been realised and was shifted into the background by the year 2015, the importance of 
this mission was still very present, especially in the districts affected by the ‘2010 events’. One 
TYC head describes the importance of this aspect as follows:  
You see in 2010 we head an interethnic war34 … in Amir Temur35 the population is 99 
per cent Uzbek and in our district, there are 90 per cent Kyrgyz. Together with the 
[TYC] head of Amir Temur, we wrote a project for a training on interethnic conflict. 
After this conflict, my ‘golden ten’ and I went to Amir Temur for three days, I think. 
We looked at everything, made friends, and we saw with our own eyes that Uzbeks are 
also good people and that there are no bad nations [natsii], but only bad people. And 
they also came to our district and stayed over there. They saw the Kyrgyz, they saw 
what kind of cuisine we have, what kind of schools, what kind of things pupils learn in 
schools. … After this war, this event was very important.  
This statement demonstrates how the inter-communal conflict of 2010 and the factors leading 
up to it – such as perceived substantive differences between ethnic groups and cultures, which 
may easily lead to stereotypes and prejudice – are still vividly present in the memories of young 
people in Osh. The corresponding significance of exchanges, ‘friendship camps’ (lagery 
druzhby) and mutual visits of people from different districts of the city and beyond was 
                                                
34 The term war is not rarely used in referring to the conflict in June 2010; see for instance 
Ismailbekova (2013: 114) and Megoran et al. (2014: 13-14).  
35 An Uzbek majority neighbourhood in the On Adyr district in the south east of the city 
territory.   
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emphasised by several interviewees. One acting TYC head from a central district from Osh, 
which had been gravely affected by the ‘2010 events’, told how, as a reaction to the conflict 
and the apparent involvement of people from the distant regions of Osh province, they started 
organising mutual visits with villages in Chong Alai region.36 Such exchange between mono-
ethnic communities from different ends of the city, for instance Turan and Kerme-Too, and 
with remote areas beyond such as the Alai or Chong Alai regions, was, as argued by leading 
project consultants, be one of the biggest successes of the TYCs.37  
With the years, this component of building peace, tolerance and trust and fighting 
stereotypes between ethnic communities was increasingly combined with activities that 
are of general interest for young people, with the latter gradually replacing the former as 
main event themes. Different so-called mini-projects for peace- and tolerance building 
have been combined the transfer of skills or performances or sports competition with the 
promotion of interaction of youth from diverse backgrounds. Ordinary TYC members 
from one central district reported an event on Origami paper folding, which included 
visitors from Aravan, a town south of Osh, and the Alai region yet further south, as their 
most significant achievement of the current year.38 Other examples include projects like 
‘Let’s debate with one another’ (‘Davaite obsudim vmeste’), where debating and public 
speech skills training was combined with debating current issues; or ‘The world through 
art’ (‘Mir cherez iskusstvo’), where participants from both Osh city and province, who 
had special artisan and handicraft talents, created works on specific themes which were 
exhibited in all represented locales.39 Another important and more regular event theme is 
                                                
36 Interview, Osh, 13 November 2015. Chong Alai is one of the regions whose almost 
exclusively Kyrgyz population is well known for harbouring stereotypes about Osh and its 
Uzbek population. This was confirmed in an interview with a project consultant on 3 December.  
37 Conversation, Osh, 6 July 2017.  
38 Interview, Osh, 4 December 2017.  
39 Presentations on national forum in Batken, 11 September 2015; Info booklet: 29.   
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the above-mentioned Rebiata s nashego dvora (‘Kids from our courtyard’), which offers 
a stage for young people to present any performances they like to contribute. Attending 
such an event on the occasion of the International Youth Day, I witnessed a wide spectrum 
of acts including contemporary pop culture (breakdance, singer-songwriter and rock acts 
performing Russian and English language songs) and sketches and love songs performed 
in Kyrgyz language (see Illustration 6.1 below).  
 
Illustration 6.1: Performances during Rebiata s nashego dvora event, author 
photography  
 
 
 
 
These events, which make up the large share of TYC activities, place a central emphasis 
on the idea of practicing and living the tolerance and openness to the diversity of interests, 
orientations and identities among young people. The promotion of peace and tolerance 
may be the main goal of these activities, but it is not as explicitly propagated as in the 
Top left: Photograph from the 
‘Kids from our courtyard’ event; 
Top right: Kyrgyz language 
sketch performance during the 
same event.  
Bottom: Breakdance performance.  
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events organised in the immediate post-conflict period and specifically in communities affected 
by or assumed to have been involved in the conflict. This recently established focus on more 
implicit peace and tolerance-building is reflecting the need to ‘move forward’ from the initial 
focus of the TYC project,40 which has already been successful in creating friendship and is in 
need of ‘new directions’.41 A youth activist from Tokmok, after initially emphasising that 
peacebuilding was not the only pillar of the work of TYCs, explained the balance as follows: 
Well of course one of the main tasks of our work is, well, our premise is to create a 
friendly atmosphere among youth because we understand that in five years they will 
become parents. And if they will be friendly now then they will be friendly in the future 
and it will be calmer here. … Everything we are doing right now is peacebuilding, only 
that we are not doing it in a banal way, right? This does not work, at all, right. Trainings 
[telling] ‘You should all live in peace and not fight’, right, this for sure does not work. 
Now, we have to work in new ways [po novym tekhnologiiam].42  
As she further explained, this meant that all rules for promoting tolerance and diversity were 
still adhered to in projects, such as trying let young people work only in mixed groups, or make 
them overcome reservations and stereotypes when they surface in interaction. This 
peacebuilding in ‘imperceptible ways’43 and through an ‘indirect model’ emphasising 
cooperation (sotrudnichestvo)44 and simply practicing diversity and tolerance in action, rather 
than explicitly propagating and educating about it as an end in itself, has emerged in reaction 
to the above-mentioned need to ‘move forward’ and to acknowledge that most young people 
                                                
40 As expressed by the head of the Committee for Youth Affairs, interview, Osh, 19 November 
2015.  
41 Conversation, TYC head, Osh, 13 November.  
42 Interview, Tokmok, 10 December 2015.  
43 Interview, youth representative, Tokmok, 10 December 2015..  
44 Conversation, project consultant, Osh, 6 July 2017.  
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with whom projects are conducted may not have memories from the 2010 conflict or may not 
feel like they are in particular need to get trained on peace. Megoran et al. (2014: 14 ff.) have 
noted the feelings widespread especially among urban residents of Osh and Jalal-Abad, that 
peacebuilding projects conducted and/or funded by international actors were super-imposing, 
often in patronising ways, ideas of peace and harmony on people who did not feel like they 
needed any peacebuilding measures, at all. The peace- and tolerance-building of the TYCs has 
moved on from this problematic and limited approach not only in its more implicit emphasis 
on this goal, but also by persistently incorporating youth from the regions of Osh province. 
Stories of friendship and cooperation, like the setting up of a joint coal trading business between 
people in the Alai region and the Turan district of Osh45, and the exceptional diversity of people 
working in TYC themselves46, help to overcome stereotypes on the part of some people and 
foreground stories of personal transformation in other peacebuilding projects.47 These stories, 
in turn, indicate that the original mission of the TYCs is still of significance and should be kept 
in sight. This is all the more important in light of the importance that the TYC project is given 
in relation to the perceived need to strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s national ideology, which I will 
discuss in turn.    
 
 
                                                
45 As told by project consultants, conversation, Osh, 6 July 2017; 4 December 2015.  
46 The booklet lists all TYCs’ golden ten members whose backgrounds range from sports 
(boxer, sportsman, fighter, karate champion) and artistic ones (artist, poet, musician, singer, 
dancer, komus [Kyrgyz string instrument] player) to political and student activist ones (school 
president, school parliament member, political party youth wing member, NGO chairwoman/-
man), and of course including pupils and students.  
47 A story of how a young man from Chong Alai overcame his stereotypes is published by 
Saferworld under the title, ‘From bias to cooperation – A personal transformation in 
Kyrgyzstan’, n.d., accessed 04 September 2017, https://www.saferworld.org.uk/en-stories-of-
change/from-bias-to-cooperation-a-a-personal-transformation-in-kyrgyzstan  
		229 
VI.2.2 National ideology and the ‘right path’  
 
On different occasions, the TYC project was positioned vis-à-vis questions of national ideology 
and the idea of a ‘right path’ for individual and collective life courses and the development of 
Kyrgyzstan as a country. As responsible individuals with good outreach in their respective 
communities, TYC leaders and youth activists from across the country are very aware of the 
issues that Kyrgyzstan is facing in the areas of economic development (see V.2) and, 
correspondingly, the challenges that society needs to face up to in the social and educational 
sector. The repeated pronouncement of event organisers and funders that the young leaders can 
make a significant impact on the future of the country, or are the embodiment of the country’s 
future itself serve as a good illustration of how TYC and other youth structure members are 
encouraged to think in national terms.48 In this context, youth activists on the forum in Batken 
drew direct links between the social and political problems of the country and the insufficiently 
developed ideology and moral orientation of Kyrgyzstani society. One participant stated:  
We need make changes; now women drink and smoke, earlier there weren’t such things 
[ranshe togo ne bylo]. Why are men not protecting their women and their country? We 
have to create jobs in Kyrgyzstan, so that women don’t go in the wrong direction; we 
are doing dirty work on the streets; suicides are growing in number, there is a problem 
with upbringing [vospitanie]. … We need to preserve our national ideology [sokhranit 
                                                
48 On the forum in Batken, for instance, an OSCE representatives mentioned that the TYC 
project was a good possibility to lay a good foundation for the future of Kyrgyzstan’ and, in the 
closing remarks, that ‘you are the future of this country’. 11 and 13 September 2015. In a theme 
movie on the TYC project another OSCE staff mentions the possibility that TYC activists may 
become politicians or presidents, an imagination also shared by one girl interviewed in the same 
movie.   
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svoiu natsionalnuiu ideologiu] and not forget our history. We have to help the people 
who are not on the right path… 49 
This statement, which initiated a wider discussion problems faced by youth in Kyrgyzstan, 
touches upon a number of problems, such as deteriorating social relations and role models and 
behaviours – such as men not living up to their alleged role of protecting women, drug 
consumption, and suicides –  and indicates the possibility of solving these problems by helping 
those who are not on the ‘right path’ and by preserving national ideology and historical 
memory. Although the subsequent plenary discussion was not specifically in resolving this 
question, participants agreed that there was a problem with people ‘embarking on the wrong 
path’ (nastaiut na nepravilnyi put) that it was increasingly ‘difficult to mobilise people’ (ochen 
slozhno sobirat ludei) as spiritual values were apparently changing (nashi dukhovnye tsennosti 
izmenilis).50 In further determining the signs of the general loss of ideology, people especially 
emphasised the rise of new Islamic practices: ‘People forget their [culture], they wear a hijab, 
but this is Arabic clothing, why don’t they wear some Kyrgyz clothing like the kalpak?’. 
Besides this recasting of the search for national ideology as an issues of ‘traditional vs. non-
traditional Islam’ (see below), one participant from Jalal-Abad also argued that: ‘The Kyrgyz 
language is part of our ideology, …, we should be proud of it; in Bishkek when someone speaks 
with a Southern dialogue, they relate to him like to a [sart], a word usually used for Uzbeks.’ 
This ethno-nationalist framing (see IV.3.3), according to which maintaining national ideology 
is a matter of preserving Kyrgyz language, with other languages having a secondary role, was 
not widely disagreed with but corrected by the moderator of the discussion who stated that: 	
                                                
49 Plenary session during youth forum in Batken, 11 September 2013.  
50 Plenary session during youth forum in Batken, 11 September 2013. 
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Our national ideology is neither our language nor our clothing – it is justice 
[spravedlivost]! No matter what language we speak or what ethnicity we are of, justice 
is our national ideology, don’t forget this!	
Later on, another participant contradicted the opinion that Kyrgyz should be upheld as a 
language at the expense of non-Kyrgyz speakers, saying that ‘… nationalism is not good, so as 
regards the Kyrgyz language, already Aitmatov said, for me the Russian language is a mother 
tongue just as Kyrgyz’. 
This outlines the general tension between the opinion that a stronger national ideology 
would be needed to improve the situation of people in Kyrgyzstan and that, on the other hand, 
emphasising Kyrgyz culture and language too much and at the expense of other cultures, 
ethnicities and ways of life, the overall goal of peace and tolerance among people may be 
jeopardised. Both the forum in Batken and other TYC events I attended and heard about 
demonstrated that harmonic conviviality is possible under the banner of Kyrgyzstan’s national 
symbols. The participants of the Batken forum, for instance, collected money to drive to the 
local Manas Ata (Father Manas) monument and take photos for their memories. They also set 
up an entertainment event the same evening, where participants recited the Epic of Manas and 
other traditional Kyrgyz poetry, alongside contemporary sketches and performances.  
Similarly, but on a greater scale, the programme of official celebrations in the city of 
Osh includes anniversaries which are of major importance for Kyrgyzstan as a nation and, in 
their celebrations, emphasise the history of the Kyrgyz very specifically. For instance, on the 
ceremony for the Anniversary of the city of Osh in late October 2015 (see illustration below), 
dozens of young people were mobilised to present different performances, with the core of the 
programme being the story of Kurmanjan Datka and the murder of her son, the historical 
sacrifice made to ensure decades of peace (see IV.3.4). This performance of the historically 
significant legend did not preclude, however, the action-laden shows of hip hop and breakdance 
		232 
groups, which presented their moves to the beats of western RnB and Drum-n-Bass stars. While 
this event brought together Kyrgyz legends and dreams of modern life and self-expression on 
the Lenin square in front of the mayor’s office, the adjacent Lenin street and the square in front 
of the theatre (dramteatr) hosted a farmer’s market, an arts exhibition and borsok51 festival. 
With the market hosting stalls representing most towns of Osh province and the borsok 
competition including all districts of the city of Osh, the events gave a genuine display of the 
diversity of people, traditions and culture living in and around Osh, but also of the things uniting 
them such as specific products, in which the towns in the periphery have specialised or the 
borsok, which has been baked by all groups inhabiting Osh and its environs for centuries. The 
TYCs’ participation in the Osh Anniversary celebration and other ‘festivals of friendship’ and 
similar events52, thus attest to the fact that Kyrgyzstani national symbolism and the implicit 
reinvigoration of Kyrgyz traditions are commensurable with both displays of modern hip hop 
and youth culture and the diversity of ethnicities and cultures of Osh and its environs.  
 
  
                                                
51 Central Asian fried dough specialty. 
52 A city-wide ‘festival of friendship’ has been held practically every year since 2010, as the 
following headlines indicate (all accessed 5 September 2017): Aimak: В городе Ош прошел 
Фестиваль Дружбы [Festival of Friendship held in Osh], 20 March 2015, 
http://aimak.kg/ru/fotoreportazh/3134-v-gorode-osh-proshel-festival-druzhby.html; Turmush: 
В Оше в микрорайоне «Амир-Тимур» пройдет фестиваль дружбы [A festival of friendship 
is held in the Osh microdistrict ‘Amir Temur’], 25 March 2014, 
http://ik.turmush.kg/ru/news:52259; idem: Фестиваль дружбы молодежи различных 
национальностей прошел в Оше [Festival of friendship among youth of different nationalities 
held in Osh], 17 June 2013, http://jalal-abad.turmush.kg/ru/news:43123. 
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Illustration 6.2: Peacebuilding and national symbols, author photography & 
facebook 
                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Different interviewees from TYCs stated very explicitly their and their peers’ motivation 
based on patriotic feelings and corresponding desires to develop the country of their town 
and community. One TYC head, when I asked him how come people were ready to 
organise all the different events in their free time, explained that:  
Well, there are some patriots among them [smiles]. After school, they all come on 
their own initiative, we do stuff, they are already like patriots. Of course, we need 
[to cover a wider] range of interest [nado v krugozornom].53  
                                                
53 Interview, Osh, 4 December 2015.  
Top left: Traditional dance performance, Lenin square, Day of the city of Osh celebration  
Bottom left: Group photo of the national youth forum at Manas Ata monument, Batken  
Right: Picture from the borsok festival in front of the Kyrgyz drama theatre, Osh  
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Another ordinary member explained that he was joining the TYC activities because he 
personally wanted to ‘change my country’ and ‘make a contribution [dat polzu]’.54 The ex-
golden ten member from a western district described the important contribution of TYCs for 
the development of the city of Osh as follows:    
Our goal was to unite the city and to develop it … and I personally did not see such 
[ethnic] disagreements because I was not only in TYCs but was also active in other 
organisations … [enumerates organisations] … and I knew that TYCs develop the city 
by strengthening it and creating interethnic accord. In the team of the business club, for 
instance, we did not have such an agenda …55  
In this sense, participation in TYC work and its building of peace and tolerance is seen as an 
act of patriotism and contribution to building the Kyrgyzstani nation by youth activists in Osh 
and beyond. In these practices and activities, discourses emphasising Kyrgyz tradition and 
defence against external influence, which can be situated in the ‘political of sovereignty’ 
imaginary, can co-exist with ideas of multi-cultural, civic nationalism and displays of pop 
culture and youth sub-culture akin to the creativity and self-expression in the Western liberal 
peace imaginary. Any incompatibilities between these discourses is suspended and temporarily 
overcome because performance, interaction and expression are the prime focus of Territorial 
Youth Councils.56 While this makes a key contribution to educating and socialising tolerant and 
diversity-oriented people, the approach is not exempt from questions regarding its suitability 
and sufficiency for helping youth overcome challenges arising from the wider socio-semiotic 
                                                
54 Interview, Osh, 4 December 2015.   
55 Interview, Osh, 3 December 2015. 
56 Another incompatibility was brought up by a TYC who added his personal opinion during 
an conversation saying that ‘see, our people does not like this LGBT and similar people. Here, 
no one is forcing their opinion upon you’, which hints at the perceived intrusiveness of LGBT 
discourse in Kyrgyzstan. Interestingly, the topic was not brought up during any other interview 
with TYCs. Osh, 13 November 2015.  
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environment. When attending a meeting of a TYC in the southern outskirts of the Osh, during 
which the upcoming Festival of Friendship (Festival druzhby) was planned, a good deal of the 
conversation revolved around the question what, apart from the festival, could really aide the 
development of local youth.57 The concrete issues and problems faced by youth and TYCs’ and 
youth activists’ ideas and attempts to tackle them will be discussed in turn.  
 
VI.2.3 Tackling concrete problems: Racketeering and poverty   
Events and activities situated in or close to the official discourses on nation-building, interethnic 
friendship and tolerance are the easiest and most straightforward way for TYCs to promote their 
goals. However, given their close focus on communities and task of ‘identifying problems 
[vyiavlenia problem] and contributing to their solutions’58, TYCs also work to tackle the issues 
faced by youth in their respective districts and in the country at large. In the following, I focus 
on the problems racketeering and poverty, in relation to which youth have appeared to be 
vulnerable and gravely affected, but were also constructed as concrete source of problems by 
law enforcement organs and other state bodies. The various degrees to which TYCs have proved 
to be able and successful in dealing with the problems indicate the challenges posed by these 
and similar issues.  
	 Some progress had been reached in analysing and devising measures against 
racketeering in schools and youth milieus of different communities. Already in 2014, TYCs in 
Osh had realised events to tackle such issues together with the local administration, schools and 
Inspectors for Youth Affairs (Inspektor po delam nesovershennoletnykh or IDN) in the police. 
In a project on the problem of ‘Inter-group clashes among youth and racketeering in schools’, 
a ‘Dialogue centre’ for discussion of the reasons for these phenomena had been established, 
                                                
57 Participatory observation at TYC meeting, Osh, 13 November 2015.  
58 Interview, head of CYA, Osh, 19 November 2015. 
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meetings with law enforcement agencies organised, and even an excursion was arranged for 
‘pupils who [potentially] connected to of informal leaders [imeiushikh vliiania neformalnykh 
liderov]’ (Info booklet: 22-23). The TYC head from a central district in Osh reported that 
racketeering was the number one problem (pervaia problema) in his district’s schools and how, 
thanks to his group’s efforts to promote moderation, ‘some pupils who are racket leaders […] 
already listen and it’s already interesting for them.’59 He explained that especially sport events 
were useful in his team’s attempts to make racketeers refrain from their practices. By now many 
of the racketeers had become members of the TYC, because knowing what kind of events were 
being organised by this entity they started ‘considering different things in life’ (soobrazhenie 
drugogo). A similar, and more detailed, story of a conversion of racketeers and youth gang 
leaders was told by the TYC head from the rural district of Osh:  
In my TYC we have thirteen villages [sel] and all the time there are fights between youth 
of different villages. So, together with neighbourhood inspectors and IDNs, we set up 
seminars for the informal leaders … and we went to [a town] in Jalal-Abad province, 
where they had a good time [otdykhali], became friends and learnt new things. So, when 
they came back home they had already become friends.60 
Asked what exactly they told the racket group leaders to convince them to come to such a 
summer camp, the youth council head further explained that they approached them as ‘very 
active young people’ whom they sought to recruit for a camp for active people and for the 
development of new ideas for youth. As the different leaders and the people ‘managing different 
schools’ (smotriashie shkoly, lit. ‘looking after schools’) became friends, the number of 
                                                
59 Interview, Osh, 4 December 2015. A project consultant confirmed that former racketeers and 
‘gangsters’ [bandity] had indeed written quite interesting project proposals; conversation, Osh, 
6 July 2017.  
60 Interview, TYC head, Osh, 13 November 2015. 
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physical fights significantly decreased or, if they happened at all, fights were not that grave (ne 
tak slozhno), as the activist told.  
 While these success cases benefited from good cooperation on the part of law 
enforcement agencies and financial and organisational support of donors and NGOs, this 
situation can vary considerably with time and geographical location, even from district to 
district. One indication of this is the experience of the ‘Youth and Security’ group on the forum 
in Batken, who, when trying to further work on their solution to racketeering, were being told 
by the participating major of the local police that there were no registered facts of racketeering 
in the area. When discussing the oft-observed issue that police can apply psychological pressure 
against racket gang members and have abused their powers in the past, the major again replied 
that ‘in Batken province such facts were not being recorded [takie fakty ne registrirovalis] … 
it might be that such things happen on rare occasions when police want to find perpetrators 
[vinovnogo] … but if people have well educated lawyers they can easily find their way out of 
custody.’ This reference to official statistics served to slow down the discussion but, given the 
likelihood that people abused by the police might simply not file complaints for lack of 
competent bodies or fear or reprise, the young participants of the group ended up agreeing, 
although more implicitly, that the abuse of powers by police officers was a problem both in 
relation to racketeering and other cases of violence and crime.   
 А reluctant position of law enforcement and other state organs is also important to 
consider in the final issue which appears to be underlying the two above and other problems 
TYCs are struggling against. While I have glossed the issue as ‘poverty’, this must be 
understood in its different nuances and aspects which can loosely be group into:  
- First, the general effects and social ills emanating from poverty and socio-economic 
hardship; 
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- second, the social and psychological effects of migration and other attempts of 
coping with the situation; and,  
- third, further entrenchment of this situation through the destitution and deprivation 
of rights and basic services affecting young people.  
Especially the first two aspects are very present in the social sphere across the country as well 
as in TYCs. The TYC head from the rural district of Osh, for instance, told that her TYC team 
demanded for a ‘crisis centre’ to be set up, which would offer psychological help, especially to 
women who were in dire need of support given the rising percentage of suicides.61 Similarly, 
the police major from Batken reported that suicides, especially among children from badly-off 
families (maloimushikhsia semei), were a big problem, alongside children being left by parents 
who go to work abroad.62 The social work expert from Tokmok shared similar experiences 
about the trend in the deterioration of the family as an institution:  
The institution of the family as such does not exist anymore … Now, where you look, 
you see lone mothers bringing up children, or lone fathers, or the parents went 
somewhere the child stays behind alone and becomes a social orphan, right? Or the 
parents leave the child altogether. What’s this? To tell the truth, this kind of thing is 
very developed here now. … in the [municipal] Commission for Children Affairs we 
had nine cases, and all these nine cases were from disadvantages families 
[neblagopoluchnye semi], all of them! The children don’t go to school because the 
family is badly off [nuzhdaetsa], because there is no birth certificate or because the 
father and mother do not have passports.  … And then mothers and fathers, they don’t 
have any upbringing [vospitania], no education [obrazovania], parents give their child 
to someone random, it doesn’t matter at all what’s with their son, he’s being brought up 
                                                
61 TYC head, Osh, 13 November 2015.  
62 Youth forum, Batken, 12 September 2015.  
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by some strangers or a grandmother who is eighty years old, we had all of these cases. 
So [in these cases] we can say that as such the institution of the family does not exist.63   
This shows how the deterioration of families is associated, on the one hand, with parents’ 
attempts to cope with economic hardship through labour migration and delegation of 
upbringing and provision roles, but is increasingly conditioned by social destitution and 
individuals’ and entire families’ vanishing from the registers of welfare institutions and the 
state altogether. Under the theme ‘The violation of rights of young brides and the break-up of 
young families’, TYCs set up a theatre play to raise awareness about the way in which negative 
family relations and factors like alcoholism or unemployment can lead to broken homes, while 
also discussing, in a roundtable, the possibilities of mitigating this trend (Booklet: 29). 
Analytically, participants on the forum in Batken framed this issue especially as one of children 
and youth not knowing their rights and ways to (re-) claim their dignity. This point was raised 
especially in regard to ‘social orphans’ left behind by their parents and relatives and living in 
state boarding homes (internaty) with only 500 soms per month allocated for their needs – a 
sum barely sufficient to cover a week’s costs. This situation is exacerbated by informal 
payments requested during hospital visits, even though they were entitled to free medical 
treatment. The participants thus suggested rights education (pravovedenie) in the form of a 
school subject as a way to counter the entrenchment of the precarity of socially vulnerable 
children through the withholding of their basic rights. Poverty and destitution as fundamental 
challenges faced by youth and the Kyrgyzstani population at large both directly affect the TYCs 
and indirectly condition the problems they deal with, such as family and upbringing problems, 
domestic violence and conflicts among youth.  
                                                
63 Interview, Tokmok, 10 December 2015.  
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The instruments and capacities of TYCs to address these issues were, as this survey 
shows, often limited to reacting to situations of neediness or conflicts and criminal practices 
like racketeering, which are deeply intertwined with these socioeconomic dynamics. 
Furthermore, as became clear in regard to the issue of religious extremism, young people are 
prone to endorse and reproduce the actions taken by law enforcement and state security organs 
while insufficiently considering the root causes of such issues.64 On the other hand, discussions 
on the youth forum in Batken also brought up some important nuances and facts regarding 
radicalisation and non-traditional religion among youth.65 The TYCs’ way of dealing with the 
socio-economic issues in their challenging environment is discussed in the subsequent part.  
 
                                                
64 The degree to which youth are affected by non-traditional religion and specifically radical 
tendencies within Islamic thought, has become a major concern for state and security actors in 
recent years (Dyner et al. 2015: 5-6), especially in Kyrgyzstan. The importance of the issue was 
not only identified by participants on the forum in Batken, but also emphasised in the speech 
of the local aksakal court chairman who outlined the issue of religious freedom and radicalism. 
His juxtaposition of disorientation and lack of education, due to which people join different 
non-traditional religious sects, with a ‘good path [khoroshiy put]’64 shows how the discourse 
on the ‘right path’, identified in the above section on national ideology, also runs through 
discussions on religion in Kyrgyzstan, and specifically the confrontation between traditional 
Islam, the historically established Hanafi Maskhab which is often constructed as ‘good’, and, 
on the other hand, non-traditional Islam adhering to more orthodox, textual interpretations of 
the Quran and situated in Salafi and Shiia sects (while Hanafi Maskhab is Sunni) (see IV.3, 
Louw 2013). 
65 The following important points were raised: First, there is no religious education 
(religovedenie) (and theology) subject in schools, which points to the need to create such a 
subject for both schools and universities. Second, the wearing of the hijab is not allowed in 
schools, but a law to regulate this is missing. Participants suggested creating a common uniform 
for girls who want to wear a hijab and face the problem of the ban. Other participants pointed 
out that increased control, oversight and regulation would be largely ineffective given the fact 
that it was often parents who made (or forced, zastavliaiut) their kids wear religious clothing 
and failed to tell them how to correctly practice and relate to religious matters. Another 
participant pointed out that this problem is linked to the issue of early marriages discussed 
above (V.5.3), where parents often had a prime role in arranging. 
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VI.2.4 Self-help and solidarity  
There are two discernible strands of thinking among TYC activists as to how poverty and socio-
economic hardship in Kyrgyzstan can be dealt with. The first strand espouses the idea that these 
challenges can be overcome and dealt with through working on and improving oneself to be 
better equipped to make it in life. Although this stance does not deny the possibility of help and 
support being offered to those in need, it, emphasises the necessity of basic education, 
knowledge, skills and initiative. This idea of self-help and self-improvement has remarkable 
significance and resonance among young people working in the TYCs (but also in Kyrgyzstan 
more generally). One example is the statement of one participant of the youth forum in Batken 
when reasoning on how to overcome problems in the work of the TYCs: ‘One needs start with 
oneself and to change oneself [Nado nachninat s sebia, nado sebia meniat].’66 This approach 
is also encouraged by the perception that, while state provision of resources and services may 
be insufficient, people are simply lacking the right education to fill in the employment positions 
that actually are available.67 In light of this ‘human resources problem’ (kadrovaia problema), 
other forum participants put forward the well-known quote ‘We should not only ask what the 
state does, rather, what can we do for the state?’. On the closing conference, two of the more 
successful TYC (ex-) heads put forward this self-initiative, entrepreneurial ethos as a key to 
escape the problems faced by youth. Making references to the ‘people who built today’s 
America’ such as Steve Jobs, they argue that becoming a successful leader and entrepreneur 
was mainly a question of will, as the opportunities available for young people nowadays had 
been unprecedented [ranshe ne byli takie vozmozhnosti].68  
                                                
66 Batken, 11 September 2015.  
67 Youth forum, Batken, 11 September 2015.  
68 National closing conference, Jannat Resort, Chuy province, 28 October.  
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This and other presentations promoted what could be called an entrepreneurial model 
of personhood, which has gained popularity among youth in Kyrgyzstan. The increasing 
popularity of studies at the Faculty of Business and Management, numerous programmes and 
events facilitate young people’s self-development, and the annually organised Jashtar Kemp 
(‘Youth camp’) showcasing successful business(wo)men and their personal development paths 
are testimony to this new trend.69 This thinking is very attractive for its focus on empowerment 
and the possibility to realise one’s own ideas and projects, and to become successful in life 
without being dependent on others. On the other hand, this ‘liberal’ and entrepreneurial 
approach runs the risk of homogenising people’s experiences in life and their unequal socio-
economic backgrounds, recent family histories and other factors that make their attempts to 
self-improve and realise their potential less successful than those of other people. Under certain 
circumstances, people who are affected in the described way may not be aware of this situation 
(or may deny this fact outright), which could render them susceptible to interpret failure or 
relatively lesser success in their endeavours as being caused by personal insufficiencies, thus 
causing disappointment or worse. The same individuals who had presented the idea of taking 
Steve Jobs and other entrepreneurs as role models admitted in later group work that people in 
their neighbourhood were still forced to go to work in Russia, even if they were very talented. 
So, while self-improvement and entrepreneurialism were seen as ways to make the best out of 
the situation, the overwhelming feelings about the socio-economic issues face by youth in 
Kyrgyzstan and the massive fluctuation they created in the TYCs in Osh and other youth bodies, 
was one of frustration and desperation.    
Here the second, complementary narrative comes into play: solidarity and empathy 
among young people, and initiative to help those in need were another strong agenda of TYCs 
                                                
69 For more on the Jashtar Kemp, see http://youthofosh.kg/kg/2015/12/24/zhashtar-kemp-
2012/.   
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and the individuals working in them. Most relevant in this regard are TYCs’ involvement in 
solving problems with water access or the regular cleaning of different parts of Osh; as well as 
the setting up of ‘social taxis’ [socialnye taksi] in an eastern district of the town.70 The expert 
from the social department from Tokmok affirmed that youth nowadays are ‘aware that it is 
necessary to help each other, and the poor, and the old.’ She enumerated countless examples of 
organisations and initiatives helping elderly, homeless, poor families, and school children 
collecting money for their needy classmates. Similarly, the Tokmok youth delegation on the 
forum in Batken demonstrated how for them, ‘everything starts from solidarity and tolerance’ 
as they and their partners in the regions of Chui province worked to support children’s houses 
and had even opened a canteen (stolovuiu), whose profits were spent on charity purposes.71 The 
head and deputy head of a central district TYC were giving their interview in the headquarters 
of the organisation they worked for as professionals, which specialised in supporting disabled 
people for whom state support was insufficient if available, at all.72 This solidarity and charity 
aspect of the work of TYCs and their members is a critical complement to the self-help and 
entrepreneurial narrative examined above. Some interviewees put forward explicit criticism 
vis-à-vis the latter, remarking that ‘there are some people who join [TYCs] only to develop 
themselves, right? … Just to develop themselves and one’s thinking somehow, and when you’re 
done you try to get a job, right.’73, or indicating that some people were working ‘only into their 
own pocket [na svoiu karmanu]’ to develop their own business and their profession for 
enhancing their own life.74 Another critical voice on the forum in Batken remarked that: 
                                                
70 Interview with TYC head, Osh, 13 November 2015.  
71 Group presentation, Batken, 11 September 2015.  
72 Interview with TYC head, Osh, 13 November 2015 
73 Interview, ex-golden ten member, Osh, 4 December 2015.  
74 Presentation during the national closing conference, Jannat resort, 28 October 2015.  
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… usually you have egoistic people who think about themselves, maybe even one day 
we will be corrupted [mozhet byt my i budem korrupcionerami], we need to pay attention 
to people around us, in our community [nado obratit vnimanie cheloveku vokrug, v 
svoem soobshestve]. 
This is not to discredit the idea of self-help and –development altogether, however. Rather, 
given the specific junction that the different people at their lives were at – the end of their school 
years and entering studies or professional lives – the idea of developing their own skill sets, 
abilities to lead teams and projects and to gather and enhance their experience and knowledge 
is an indispensable part of the project. The combination of this idea of personal growth and 
experience with empathy about the challenges and hardships faced by peers and society at large, 
strongly bound many of the young people in TYCs and other youth institutions to put all their 
time and effort into the improvement of youth policy and politics in Kyrgyzstan and their 
respective community. Although this dedication was rewarded with a good standing with 
teachers and professors or follow-up jobs in the NGO sector75, it also put the youth leaders in 
precarious positions when it came to finishing implementation and reporting, finding successors 
or lobbying sustainable changes in the structures and practices of local government and other 
institutions. These problems were extensively stressed during the closing conference and taken 
up in the work of the TYCs in the year 2016, which was put under the theme of institutional 
development and sustainability.76 In the final section of this chapter, I will discuss the question 
of whether and how TYCs and related actors are able to bring about substantive change to the 
situation faced by young people in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
                                                
75 As indicated by the same individuals cited in the two previous notes.  
76 Conversation, consultant, Osh, 6 July 2017.  
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VI.3 A voice of or vis-à-vis youth? Opportunities and limitations of youth politics in 
Kyrgyzstan  
While the previous section has focused on the concrete practices undertaken by TYCs and 
discourses forming in this milieu, I now re-focus back on national level to critically discuss the 
question whether and how the problems that youth policy actors encounter can and have to be 
tackled in more systematic ways, which are possible to initiate only on the national level. After 
first considering attempts and developments towards the institutionalisation of the TYCs and 
complementary bodies in order to develop such a more systematic approach (VI.4.1), I will 
show how the logics of youth policy in Kyrgyzstan appear to be captured in a post-liberal 
trajectory, where decisions and agendas are not decided by recipients and experts, but more so 
by a combination of mobilisations of the latter and business cycle of international donor funding 
more generally.  
 
Further developments and limits of TYCs and related initiatives  
As already indicated in the previous section, the problems faced by the TYCs and their fellow 
activists across the country often appeared to be too entrenched and omnipresent to solve them 
through the local initiatives, which could merely attempt to alleviate present trends in poverty 
and social destitution and related issues of racketeering and gang violence and other forms of 
conflict. In the final days of my research on the TYCs in Osh, more and more reference was 
made to the upcoming inauguration of a youth parliament for the city of Osh which, according 
to one TYC head, would perhaps be more effective in solving problems on the city level as it 
would enter into direct dialogue with the city’s parliament (gorodskii kenesh).77 This was 
affirmed by the CYA head who said that, even though the parliament would not have an official 
status or any ways to enforce its influence, it was helpful to have this group of active youth who 
                                                
77 Conversation, TYC head, Osh, 13 November 2015.  
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could bring to attention issues affecting specific communities or the city as a whole and who 
could, based on research and analyses, make recommendations for legislation and normative 
acts to the city parliament and mayor’s office.78 However, besides the opening of the youth 
parliament, little is known about the results it has reached and recommendations made.  
 The limited impact of the Osh youth parliament may also be linked to the fact that the 
city’s administration was involved in multiple projects to improve the performance of 
municipal services and security of inhabitants, which created a positive impression and a feeling 
that there is not much more to do for a youth parliament. The best example is the OshCity App 
project supported by USAID and DFID, which offers a mobile phone app through which people 
can file any concerns or complaints online for everyone to see.79 One year after the 
inauguration, the city’s mayor Kadyrbaev summarised that: ‘[With this app] you have all 
problems of the city and the reactions of the mayor’s office and municipal services at one sight. 
It is very practical in helping us to keep track of the issues that concern our citizens and to 
efficiently react to them.’80 The map was introduced as part of the project «8х13», which is 
aimed at improving eight key municipal services in the areas of transport and infrastructure, 
energy and utilities and health and cleaning in the by now thirteen territorial councils or districts 
of the city. With the NGO ‘Youth of Osh’ as main implementing partner, this initiative presents 
a significant success and impact of local youth. While the project and its visibility can thus be 
seen as an indirect success of TYCs’ initiatives to build a peaceful, tolerant and more 
                                                
78 Interview, Osh, 19 November 2015; the same mission was stated during the inauguration of 
the youth parliament in late December 2015. See Vechernyi Bishkek, В Оше состоялось 
открытие молодежного парламента [The opening of the youth parliament has been held in 
Osh], 21 December 2015, accessed 24 August 2017, http://www.vb.kg/doc/331338  
79 See http://www.map.oshcity.kg/  
80 Youth of Osh, В Оше запустили мобильное приложение для приема онлайн обращений 
[In Osh, a mobile app has been released for filing online requests], 28 May 2017, accessed 24 
August 2017, http://youthofosh.kg/2017/05/28/v-oshe-zapustili-mobilnoe-prilozhenie-dlya-
priema-onlajn-obrashhenij/  
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cooperative environment, it also needs to be acknowledged that it absorbs airtime, public 
attention and thus also capacity and willingness on part of the mayor’s office or national 
institutions, to listen to youth-specific problems and challenges. With the local administration 
demonstrating genuine interest in hearing about and solving in people’s concerns, can it be 
argued that there are fundamental issues that the city administration of republican level 
institutions should have to address?  
In this light, rather than scaling up the initiatives from the TYCs into other bodies, the 
recent trajectory of the initiative was more one aiming at further consolidation or maintenance 
of the established status. The TYCs’ support by Iret and the OSCE officially ended in autumn 
2016, which also marked the point at which TYCs were ‘solely’ – i.e. also in terms of funding 
and capacity-building support – ‘in the hand of the mayor’s office’.81 One measure still taken 
in 2016 was to halve the number of TYC heads who work as ordinary staff members in the 
CYA: instead of one staff per TYC, the CYA now employs 6 staff for the by now 13 TYCs, 
each of whom manage the work of two TYCs. Accordingly, the salary for each TYC manager 
was doubled and can more realistically support their livelihoods than the 2,100 soms previously 
received by each TYC head. This new arrangement also significantly centralises the procedures 
and communication channels, however, and puts yet more pressure on the TYC managers and 
their deputies to recruit, train and coordinate TYC members for the organisation of events and 
activities. Overall, it appears as if the establishment and institutionalisation of TYCs in Osh 
marks an achievement that cannot be surpassed by further institutional changes in the local 
administration or youth-led influence on the city’s policies. Youth NGOs mobilising donor 
support and focusing on issues of common and more pragmatic interest – like Youth of Osh did 
with the OshCity project – appears the more viable pathway at this point.  
                                                
81 Conversation, project consultant, 6 July 2017.  
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This leads to a final glance beyond the ‘success case’ of Osh. As already mentioned 
above, activists in the other provincial capitals of Batken and Jalal-Abad had successfully 
lobbied the establishment of Committees for Youth Affairs under their mayor’s administrations. 
Besides the establishment of TYCs in these major cities, one question of special interest 
concerns the building of youth institution in regional centres and the country side. In this regard, 
the project consultants pointed out that youth centres were created in Uzgen, Kara-Kuldja and 
other larger towns of Osh province. Especially Uzgen, about 30 kilometres north of Osh, was 
seen as example of success, as its activists had benefited from internships in NGOs (Info 
booklet: 27) and subsequently, with the help of Iret, Youth of Osh and different individuals, 
successfully lobbied the creation of a Committee for Youth Affairs.82 These institutional 
developments did not automatically mitigate the challenges and hardships faced by youth in 
Kyrgyzstan, however.  
On the national level, a project titled ‘Youth parliament’ is run on an annual basis and 
aims to involve young leaders into the ‘activities of the state through interaction … with the 
Jogorku Kenesh [Parliament] and other state organs’.83 Apart from a few press releases on the 
project itself, the parliament is not making a contribution to public debate and is largely focused 
on the ‘formation of an active civic position’ among youth and their ‘activation for active 
participation’84; processes which are confined to the non-public sessions of the project. Another 
recent project titled ‘Generation of Democracy’ (Ru. Pokolenie demokratii, Kg. Demokratiia 
                                                
82 Interview, project consultant, 4 December 2015.  
83 Nazgul Joldosheva, director of the NGO, which implemented the project. Kabar: В Бишкеке 
стартовал проект «Молодежный Парламент 2016» [The project ‘Youth Parliament 2016’ 
started in Bishkek], 29 Spetember 2016, accessed 24 August 2017, 
http://old.kabar.kg/rus/society/full/111772   
84 AKI Press, Фонд Поддержки Демократии» сообщает о начале проекта «Молодежный 
Парламент [Foundation for the Support of Democracy informs on the opening of the “Youth 
Parliament”]; 21 June 2016; accessed 24 August 2017; 
http://pressrelease.akipress.org/unews/un_post:7794  
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munuu) organised televised competitive debates between the youth wings of established 
political parties.85 This format aimed at ‘improving the culture of constructive dialogue and 
open societal discussion of different issues and draft laws’ and at a more concise outlining of 
the ideological positionings of the political parties by their young representatives, tomorrow’s 
professional politicians and thus, similar to the ‘Youth Parliament’, appears more as a model 
project for youth participation in politics rather than a concrete mouthpiece. This largely 
rhetorical self-positioning of youth vis-à-vis state actors and society at large leads to the 
question as to which actors should represent progressive interests among young people in an 
effective manner. The discussion of the post-liberal constitution of youth policy and politics in 
Kyrgyzstan in the next sub-section shows how such a policy is still in the process of formation, 
which projects ideas about a systematic representation of youth interests into the distant future.  
 
The state, the NGO sector and Kyrgyzstan’s post-liberal youth policy 
A systematic state policy in the youth sector appears to be lacking, as initiatives as initiatives 
have been conceived in piecemeal and ineffective fashion. In late December 2016, a network 
of NGOs working in the youth sphere uniting under the banner ‘Youth politics in action’86 filed 
a declaration (obrashenie) towards the president, government and parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, asking them to initiate the drafting of a ‘Conception for Youth 
Development 2025’, the formation of a youth policy working group and the creation of a 
                                                
85 Kloop.kg, Публичная дискуссия и конструктивный спор. Зачем нужны молодежные 
политические дебаты? [Public discussion and constructive arguing. Why do we need young 
politicians’ debates?], 06 July 2017, accessed 04 September 2017, 
https://kloop.kg/blog/2017/07/06/publichnaya-diskussiya-konstruktivnyj-spor-i-podderzhka-
molodyh-politikov-zachem-nuzhny-molodezhnye-politicheskie-debaty/ The project is 
organised by the Central Asia section of the International Debate Education Association 
(IDEA), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the media platform Kloop with the 
support of USAID.  
86 Set molodezhnykh organizatsii ‘Molodezhnaia politika v deistvii’. 
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Council for Youth Affairs under the government.87 The declaration pointed out that the 
realisation of youth policy has remained ‘on a low level of effectiveness [effektivnost ee 
realizatsii ostaetsia na ochen nizkom urovne]’ and that a ‘tendency of extreme disinterest on 
the part of authorities’ had led to the relegation of urgent concerns to the margins of internal 
affairs.88 Given this neglect, the organisations demanded a ‘targeted and consistent process of 
structuring youth policy’ including the drafting of the above Conception and the development 
of a ‘systematic approach in realising youth policy’. Experts from youth organisations and local 
government I spoke to explained this situation in more detail.  
According to the senior specialist on education, culture, sports and youth policy in 
Tokmok, a more systematic approach and competent institutions had existed during the reign 
of the first post-independence president Askar Akaev, but were dismantled in the course of the 
two revolutions in 2005 and 2010.89 While she had worked in the Committee for Youth Affairs 
on the level of Chui Province and overseen such committees in each of the regions of the 
province, this separate structure with its staff and resources was gradually dissolved and 
integrated with other educational, social and sports committees. ‘The programme that is 
working today on the state level’, she compared, ‘is not really a programme. It does not work 
as such. That I can tell you openly. It is only a nominal programme.’ The only ordinary staff 
besides herself competent on youth policy, she, added, did not have any further workers or 
structures that he could command. This left the work with youth to be done by Non-
Governmental Organisations and the Youth Coordination Council mentioned earlier (VI.2.1). 
The mayor’s office regularly helped the youth council and the different cooperating 
organisations with intermittent financial support, but this provided a much more frail basis than 
                                                
87 Institute for Youth Development, ‘Declaration from youth to the president of the Kyrgyz 
Republic’, 25 December 2016, accessed 24 August 2017, http://dr.kg/ru/news/view/id/62  
88 See note 86 above.; citing the White Book on Education in the Kyrgyz Republic.  
89 Interview, Tokmok, 10 December 2015.  
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the programme-based funding available in earlier years. ‘So, do you know how they get their 
funding?’ the expert asked. ‘They write projects for the OSCE and UNDP. I sometimes think 
that the OSCE and UNDP understand our youth better than we ourselves. I already raised this 
concern on the ministry level, that’s what I can say.’ Therefore, although some symbolic 
support was given by the local administration, youth policy in this town and the country as such 
is financially largely dependent on international donors and, in terms of the design and 
implementation of projects, on local NGOs and the activists who retain a precarious, non-
official status and corresponding dependence on the goodwill of their partners. The sentiment 
that international organisations appear to ‘know better’ and care more about Kyrgyzstani youth 
than the state itself was voiced on several occasions.90 
A similar situation of state expertise and capacity being exceeded by a tandem of 
national NGOs and international donors support appeared to be the case on the national level. 
The then head of the Institute for Youth Development stated that, even if youth was a cross-
cutting theme that required addressing in a range of spheres such as health, education or 
defence, and was thus a complex matter, state youth policy was insufficient.91 He elaborated 
that nor the State Agency for Youth Affairs, Physical Culture and Sport (State Agency or 
GAMFKS hereafter)92 nor its predecessors were able to provide a clear line for youth policy 
that coordinated the different relevant ministries and did not manage to provide the vertical 
connection from the national to the municipal level, where an appropriate framework and 
conditions for conducting youth work were largely lacking, as well. The third aspect of this 
                                                
90 On the youth forum in Batken, an inspector for youth affairs remarked that many youth 
problems ‘are not solved on the state level’, while one of the forum organisers and TYC project 
consultants added the following to her concluding words: ‘Thank you that you support our 
youth more than our state; this is from my heart (eto ot dushy).’ 
91 Interview, Bishkek, 9 December 2015.  
92 Gosudarstvennoe agenstvo po delam mkolodezhi, fisicheskoi kultury i sporta pri pravitelstve 
Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki (GMFKS). 
		252 
insufficiency, according to him, was a strategic basis which would ‘outline clear indicators 
according to which we are supposed to reach [goals], … so that we can move, within the next 
years, towards a goal we are supposed to reach and can allocate all our resources’. Instead of 
taking over this coordinating and dialogical role, however, the State Agency focused more on 
concrete projects and thus duplicated the efforts of numerous civil society organisations, 
making the interviewee wonder: ‘Why do we conduct trainings, and then they conduct 
trainings? We do a forum, they do a forum. It’s not clear who is responsible for what. And all 
the while, they do not finance others, they finance themselves and realise their own events. We 
don’t understand this.’  
Apart from this critical stance, however, positive changes were effected in the months 
after the interview. In a decree from 12 December 201693 handed the competency for youth 
policy to the above-mentioned State Agency, enabling a more coordinated and holistic youth 
policy.94 This transfer of competencies also brought the inclusion of the Institute for Youth 
Development (IYD) and other youth NGOs into an in an expert group to co-determine the 
conceptualisation and measures in the design of national youth policy.95 At the same time, the 
IYD continued to mobilise support and dialogue among youth organisations in a National 
Forum of Youth Centres and Youth Houses which served as a ‘new communication platform 
for the uniting of all stakeholders in the spheres of youth policy and youth work’96 and, 
                                                
93 ‘On the optimisation of the structure of the State Agency on Youth Affairs, Physical Culture 
and Sport under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic’, accessed 4 September 2017, 
http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/98710  
94 Institute for Youth Development, Для совершенствования нормативно-правовой базы 
образована экспертная рабочая группа по делам молодежи [Expert group on youth affairs 
formed for the improvement of a legal-normative basis], 17 February 2017, accessed 04 
September 2017, http://www.for.kg/news-410136-ru.html  
95 See previous note and IYD new about the first expert group meeting on 14 February 2017: 
http://dr.kg/ru/news/po-iniciative-instituta-razvitiya-molodezhi-byla-sozdana-ekspertnaya-
rabochaya-gruppa-po-delam  
96 Idem, Сегодня в Бишкеке стартовал республиканский форум молодежных центров и 
домов молодежи [Today an all-republican forum of youth centres and houses of youth 
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furthermore, in public hearings on a draft law ‘On the basics of state youth policy’ across the 
entire country.97 The Institute has also demonstrated its expertise in training youth work 
experts: As part of a project funded by the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), 
its experts are running courses for young leaders to get state certificates enabling them to work 
as specialist for youth affairs (spetsialist po delam molodezhy) and, furthermore, additional 
qualification courses for civil servants working in the youth sphere at the Academy of State 
Administration under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic (AGUPKR).98  
The efforts of the network ‘Youth policy in action’ appear to have borne fruits, perhaps 
benefitting from the political business cycle which foresees presidential elections in autumn. In 
August 2017, Prime Minister Jeenbekov signed the ‘Programme for the development of youth 
policy for the years 2017-2020’, which, as demanded by the youth NGO representatives, gives 
the central role for coordinating the design and implementation of this programme to the 
GAMFKS and prescribes a ‘systematic approach of state administration organs and their 
partners’.99 This appears to be a deserved victory for the youth NGO initiative and a good basis 
for the development of a more holistic approach in the youth sphere. On the other hand, the fact 
that NGOs appeared better equipped in terms of know-how and drew on the backing of donors 
                                                
commenced in Bishkek], 21 September 2016, accessed 04 September 2017,  
http://dr.kg/ru/news/view/id/466  
97 Idem, Законопроект «Об основах государственной молодежной политики» доработают 
с активным вовлечением молодежи Кыргызстана [The draft law ‘On the basics of the state 
youth policy’ is finalised with the active involvement of the youth of Kyrgyzstan], 25 December 
2016, accessed 04 September 2017,  http://dr.kg/ru/news/view/id/434  
98 Idem, В Бишкеке начились курсы по повышению квалификации молодых лидеров и 
специалистов по делам молодежи [Courses for additional qualification of young leaders and 
spcecialists on youth affairs commenced in Bishkek], 15 August 2017, accessed 04 September 
2017, http://dr.kg/ru/news/v-bishkeke-nachalis-kursy-po-povysheniyu-kvalifikacii-molodyh-
liderov-i-specialistov-po-delam  
99 State Agency for Youth Affairs, Physical Culture and Sport under the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Подписана программа Развития молодежной политики на 2017-2020 
годы [Programme for development of youth policy for the years 2017 – 2020 signed], 27 
August 2017, accessed 04 Spetember 2017, http://sport.gov.kg/news/view/idnews/2530  
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in lobbying the support of the government and GAMFKS for their initiatives, the prospects for 
realising a more holistic youth policy and receiving state budget support in doing so appear 
limited and dependent on the continuation of these mobilisation practices. The fact that the 
small successes discussed above were reached with significant societal mobilisation but also 
against the background of donor support for youth sector projects adds to the perspective of a 
post-liberal trajectory of politics. Thus, decisions about policy are not made in accordance with 
voters’ and interest groups’ initiatives alone but also depend on the political-economic climate 
and whether and how it favours initiatives in certain sectors with investments.   
 
VI.4 Discussion  
This chapter has analysed the Territorial Youth Councils and other actors in the youth sphere 
as a case study of post-liberal community security and statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan. As I have 
shown, the different practices of building peace, tolerance and trust and preventing tensions, 
violence and conflict are embedded in wider societal dynamics, institutional structures and 
discourses of state- and nation-building. In drawing further links between TYCs and their 
practices on the one hand and imaginaries and discourses of statebuilding on the other, I will 
put additional focus on the actors, institutions and structures in the youth sphere to show how 
it is evolving in a post-liberal trajectory. This means, to reiterate the initial argument (see ch. 
3), that the nexus from knowledge to policy and institutional design is not linear but is mediated 
by the influence of different institutions and actors, as well as by the conditions and trends in 
the specific sector.  
 To invoke an alternative scenario, it could be imagined that, taking into account the 
issues faced by youth – some of which are more specific to youth and some being faced by 
society at large – new action programmes, policies and institutions can be created to address 
them. As this would cost considerably more money and political capital, it is understandable 
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that this approach has not been taken. On the contrary, I have shown that structures for youth 
work and representation were, and partly still are, absent in wide patches of Kyrgyzstan and 
thus, together with the incapacitation of state institutions, especially in the education sector, 
leave young people very much to their own devices. As different analyses have shown, this 
rendered youth vulnerable to recruitment by business entrepreneurs with links to underground 
networks and organised crime, often via sports clubs or gangs (e.g. Kirmse 2010). Given the 
high number of youth – about 40 per cent of the overall population, i.e. 2.4 million people, are 
under 30 years old – and the precarious political economy of young people’s under- or 
unemployment, it is no wonder that young people get inspired by discourses of self-made 
success and survival in a market economy, which I have shown to be part of the ‘Western liberal 
peace’ imaginary, although rather its downside (IV.2.3 and IV.2.4). These images of success 
also make young people susceptible to engaging in illicit, criminal and violent actions and 
practices to achieve the wellbeing and success which may appear unattainable for them in 
today’s Kyrgyzstan (Kirmse 2010) and cast youth as a high-risk group in relation to conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding (Roche 2014).  
 As in many other sectors, the year 2010 and the shocking ‘June events’ marked a turning 
point in the way youth and the necessity of youth work were regarded in Kyrgyzstan. Youth 
gangs and large crowds of youth had a clear role in the emergence of the conflict in Osh itself 
and for the way it evolved throughout several days (Khamidov et al. 2017: 3, Matveeva et al. 
2012). As the TYC activists and project consultants and supporters told, youth were especially 
receptive to the untrue information circulating during the few days in June and in their 
aftermath, which made concrete efforts to disperse rumours and prevent further conflict the 
initial main priority of conflict prevention initiatives. The TYCs have since promoted trust, 
tolerance and peaceful interaction among youth from different communities, ethnic groups and 
personal backgrounds. Through their mobilisation for large scale festivals, smaller scale events 
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in courtyards, schools and universities and exchange events with communities in the regions of 
Osh province and across provinces, the TYCs have established a culture of open-ness and 
cooperation. They have thus managed to significantly decrease the conflict and violence 
potential, both in regard to ethnic and cultural difference and in relation to specific problems 
like racketeering and gang rivalries between different villages or settlements. In this sense, 
TYCs are a key actor of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, which is acknowledged in the 
decision of the Osh mayor’s office to institutionalise this structure under the Committee of 
Youth Affairs.  
 In section VI.1, I have shown how the establishment and institutionalisation of TYCs 
has been carried out in a way that limits the expenses of the mayor’s administration to the salary 
of the twelve TYC heads, reduced to six since 2016, plus financial support for projects. 
Financial demands were not extensive up to 2016, when the OSCE still supported the annual 
capacity-building projects. On the other hand, with TYC heads working directly under the 
Committee for Youth Affairs, all work and contents of the TYC projects could be shaped and 
controlled by the mayor’s administration and the TYCs practically became an arm of the latter 
or, as suggested by one interviewee, a mediator between the administration and local youth. 
TYCs at least partly offered youth the entertainment, attention and care which the heavily 
strained, downsized and incapacitated state institutions in the educational and social sector 
could not impart anymore. In this sense, TYCs present the local administration and thus the 
state by promoting behaviours and attitudes conducive to peaceful and resilient social order. 
On the other hand, the structure is almost exclusively sustained by the voluntary action of young 
people and, additionally, by donor money. Therefore, the intensity, outreach and effect of a 
given project or initiative depended on how these different factors coalesced in a given locality 
at a certain time. I have shown how most of the activities of the TYCs and youth institutions in 
other towns had a significant impact. This, and the fact that conflictual or intolerant behaviour 
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were thus prevented in these places, should not be equated, however, to a situation where the 
root caused for conflict and inter-communal or inter-ethnic tension are fundamentally tackled 
or mitigated, let alone overcome. Rather than systematically dealing with material or socio-
cultural root causes of conflict, TYCs appear mostly as an institution of conflict management, 
which successfully promotes non-violence but does not have the mandate or capacity to tackle 
more fundamental problems.  
  Thus, although TYCs also tackled the more fundamental problems faced by youth and 
compounding their conflict potential, their more significant was in uniting young people in a 
collective effort to build peace and make the best of their situation. This idea had multiple 
nuances and in this sense reflects Bakhtin’s notion of heteroglossia which I have proposed as a 
way to interpret the discursive hybridity of processes of social ordering and statebuilding (see 
chapter III). As I have shown, engagement in TYCs or single projects was understood by young 
people in ways as different as developing their community, their city or country, but also 
developing and improving themselves by organising events, working with municipal structures 
and being part of a team. While the latter understandings resonate more with discourses of self-
making and personal development resonate under the Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary 
(IV.2.2), the former present combinations of ‘Western liberal peace’ discourses – especially 
capitalist development’– with discourses from the other two imaginaries.  
The ‘politics of sovereignty’ imaginary was most obvious in the discussions of national 
ideology and the need for its strengthening in light of the problems faced by youth and the 
population at large (VI.2.1). While it may be true that a ‘right path’ needs to be defined for 
people to walk on in their attempts to navigate the hardships and challenges of post-Socialist 
neoliberalism, it is questionable to what extent such a path can be defined in reference to 
national ideology and specifically the cultural and historical heritage of the Kyrgyz alone. In 
this sense, the undertones and symbolisms of exclusively Kyrgyz (ethno-) national heritage 
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stand in a tension with the civic nationalist discourse carried forward from the Soviet period 
(IV.2.2) into present day peacebuilding events and practices which emphasise the diversity and 
commonalities of different ethnicities and cultural legacies in and around Osh (VI.2.2). I have 
also shown how these and the traditional values and stories of the Kyrgyz co-exist in a 
momentary harmony with self-expressions through genres of Western popular culture, as in the 
hip hop and breakdance performances on large festivals and ‘Kids from our courtyard’ events, 
even though they may be perceived as incompatible. These activities demonstrate how TYCs 
build peace through practiced and lived tolerance and coexistence of diverse interests, values 
and identities. At the same time, my analysis of the high fluctuation and the fact that interaction 
with or in TYCs is in many cases a mere stopover in young people’s life trajectories, as well as 
the selective social rather than merely territorial outreach, shows that this positive impact of 
TYCs can be limited and highly contingent, which in turn points to the importance of addressing 
conflict factors in a more systematic manner.  
After outlining TYCs’ attempts and capabilities to tackle the specific issues of religious 
radicalism and racketeering, I have discussed how youth are affected by the more fundamental 
issue of poverty and precarity in Kyrgyzstan’s neoliberal economy and how they have 
attempted to tackled the latter. Their impact onto a post-liberal trajectory of statebuilding and 
state-society relations is perhaps most significant in this area, because they substitute or support 
formerly state functions and initiative in different ways. I have divided these into the promotion 
of self-help, -improvement and resilience on the part of young people on the one hand and 
collective charity and social support initiatives on the other. The former variant is a clear 
example of the popularity of an entrepreneurial model of personhood in post-Socialist countries 
(Makovicky 2014) and should be acknowledged, as I have argued, for the empowerment and 
pride in one’s own achievement that it promised to those who will fully adopt a philosophy of 
self-made success. I have also warranted caution that beyond the motivating young people to 
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be disciplined, polite and make the best out of their situation, this approach can serve to silence 
and normalise the general absence of good opportunities and viable livelihoods in Kyrgyzstan. 
In a more critical vein, it recasts state-society relations into a post-liberal modality, where 
political subjecthood – which is the basis for shaping and negotiating the way social life is 
organised and reproduced and the of state institutions and actors therein – is replaced by an 
entrepreneurial subjecthood, whose purpose it is to optimally use the available resources 
without contesting the overall framework. While young people’s solidarity and charity 
initiatives mitigate this autonomisation and responsibilisation, they have a similar effect of 
transferring collective responsibility from the state to society and other actors like donors. In 
this light, rather than only mobilising young people to help themselves and help each other, I 
have argued that there also appears to be a need for youth actors to create platforms that lobby 
a more systematic policy in the youth sector and more effective ways of addressing problems 
affecting young people.    
 I have outlined existing initiatives in this direction (VI.3) but concluded that none of 
them seem to have led to the establishment of such platforms or formulation of a clear and 
united voice. As further discussed in that section, a programme to discuss and design youth 
policy on the national level in more systematic ways has been signed into action very recently 
and upon significant lobbying efforts of the youth NGO network ‘Youth policy in action’. This 
new future perspective appears like a promising success of putting youth matters higher on the 
political agenda. On the other hand, the implementation of this cooperative approach and 
realisation of any policies and measures designed in this dialogue remain to be seen. In the 
following chapter, I will show how the NGO network called Civic Union ‘For Reforms and 
Result’ have, in a very similar way, managed to get their ‘alternative conception’ of police 
reform acknowledged by law-makers and informed several governmental decrees on police 
reform. By and large, no further progress was reached when it came to the practical adoption 
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and implementation of these decrees. Therefore, as I will show in the next chapter, even 
lobbying and influence on policy making and legislation are tools of potentially limited effect 
in a post-liberal polity like Kyrgyzstan, where collective, centralised and politicised action is 
largely replaced by decentral processes of management and autonomisation.  
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Chapter VII	 	Community security as a step towards fundamental change? 
The Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ 
 
This chapter presents the work of the NGO network Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ 
(Grazhdanskii Soiuz ‘Za reformy i resultat’) in the area of police reform. Based on the initiative 
for a petition for an ‘Alternative conception for the reform of Internal affairs organs’, the 
network has constituted itself in 2012 and since advocated for the adoption of a complex and 
human-security focused approach to reforming the Kyrgyzstani police forces. Drawing on ideas 
about community policing and of public scrutiny and accountability that can broadly be situated 
in the ‘liberal peace’ imaginary’ the Civic Union activists developed their CoSecurity 
(SoBezopasnost) approach, which advocates the mutual cooperation of local administration, 
law enforcement and civil society in the provision of public order and crime prevention. In this 
sense, the ‘Civic Union’ presents a graduation of the bodies and initiative examined in the two 
previous chapters: On the one hand, it unites many individuals who work in local 
administrations, Local Crime Prevention Centres (LCPCs), current and former staff form law 
enforcement and higher level internal affairs organs and are interested in bringing out a more 
sustainable and target-oriented reform. On the other hand, the network is also positioned in 
theoretical and analytical terms as it produces its own research and conceptualisations of 
methodologies and approaches that can help to reform the police and assess the progress in this 
reform. Besides fulfilling technocratic criteria of expertise and experience, the network also 
created potential for a form of social ordering and peacebuilding, which is more sustainable and 
meaningful in that it takes into account the specific needs, preferences and rights of individuals 
and groups within the population of a specific community.  
 As this chapter shows, however, reforming the police and bringing about a holistic 
approach to policing, crime prevention and social ordering in local communities is not a 
straightforward process. On the contrary, it is a contingent, slowly progressing and often 
negotiated and precarious endeavour that absorbs considerable efforts and resources. On the 
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national level, the Civic Union activists soon met the resistance of policy makers and governing 
elites, both in obvious, confrontational ways and as materialised in slow progress of legislative 
reform or insufficient implementation of legislation in practice. As I further show on the basis 
of participatory observation data from project implementation events in piloting communities, 
the implementation of the Co-Security approach was not always straightforward and easy, 
either. Rather, it depended on a multiplicity of factors pertaining to the geographical and 
political context of the respective municipality, and the actor-constellations and potential to 
mobilise resources emanating therefrom. I also show how, despite the experience gathered and 
despite the fact that the appropriateness of the Co-Security approach was proved through the 
implementation of a community security project in piloting municipalities, reform progress was 
still sluggish in the years since the end of my fieldwork. This points to the trajectory of post-
liberal statebuilding – both in politico-economic, institutional and epistemic terms as I have 
outlined it in chapter III.  
The Civic Union’s combination of a widespread movement with the creation of a 
conceptual approach towards reforming social ordering practices in a specific domain – police 
reform in this case – presents an extension of the case of Territorial Youth Councils, other youth 
organisations and Local Crime Prevention Centres (LCPCs) discussed in the previous two 
chapters. While these entities were effective and, within their own parameters, successful in 
building peace and tolerance among youth and other groups within their communities, their 
work was limited by certain issues whose solution was outside of their sphere of influence, e.g. 
the deterioration and roll-back of the education system, and withdrawal of state support in the 
social and pedagogical sphere. I have also shown how an initiative to create a more systematic 
youth policy, which would more effectively design and implement measures for combatting 
these specific challenges, was in the process of formatting, but that the outcomes of these 
initiatives by national level NGOs remain to be assessed (VI.3). As extension of this 
		263 
perspective, the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ presents a movement with concrete 
demands, broad backing in the form of composite NGOs and signatures gathered in support of 
their petition for an alternative conception towards police reform. The way in which their efforts 
evolve throughout time and in interaction with state and international actors thus provides a key 
insight for the possibility of effecting institutional and policy change towards more sustainable 
forms of social ordering, which can foreground lasting peace in the post-conflict areas and the 
country as a whole.  
The link between the Civic Union’s initiative and the idea of post-liberal forms of peace 
is the community- and in fact human-focussed approach of the network. As I show especially 
in the part on the network’s implementation of their cooperative approach towards security 
provision in pilot communities (VII.4), the super-ordination of security concerns of 
communities and their inhabitants over those of state actors on the local and higher levels is 
reflective of a human security approach. In line with the critical understanding on community 
security and its governmentality tendencies (see III.4) and the critical and pessimistic stance 
regarding the practical possibility of human security, the chapter analyses how state-centric 
security conceptions and practices may be challenged by attempts to create alternative 
mechanisms of security provision in more or less substantial ways. 
Section VII.1 provides both an empirical and conceptual entry into the chapter, as the 
creation and establishment of the Civic Union as actor in police reform processes is discussed 
on the basis of content analysis of material and interviews and, subsequently, discussed in 
conceptual terms that lay out the field of tension between state and non-state actors in the law 
enforcement and broader security sectors. In section VII.2 I show how this tension and the 
different socialisations and professional backgrounds of stakeholders played out in the 
interaction of the Civic Union activists and policy makers in Bishkek, who blocked the reform 
efforts in different more and less obvious ways.  Section VII.3 presents an analysis of the 
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implications of community level implementation of the Co-Security approach in the framework 
of a donor funded project. Finally, section VII.4 shows how, despite the generally successful 
proof that cooperative approach to provision of public security can bring about meaningful and 
sustainable change to people’s security perceptions, the piecemeal and often too superficial 
reform practices of political elites continued and confined the Civic Union to the role of a 
constant observer, commentator and expert entity. In section VII.5, I show how this role was 
maintained and strengthened as the organisation managed to reconcile, combine and hybridise 
the ‘liberal peace’ imaginary foregrounding its radical approach with sentiments that can be 
located in the politics of sovereignty and ‘tradition and culture’ imaginaries.   
 
VII.1 From national to human security? The establishment of the ‘Civic Union’  
Reforms of the police, law enforcement organs and the security sector more generally are seen 
to be a vital part of ‘liberal peace’ style transition after Socialism or colonial governance (Lewis 
2011a, Jackson 2011). Yet, given the diverging levels of cooperation and alignment with 
democratisation and transition agendas, police reform has become a field in which different 
Central Asian states have asserted their sovereignty and control over domestic matters by 
choosing not to cooperate or limit their degree or speed of harmonisation with institutional 
blueprints proposed by international actors. In a similar way, Kyrgyzstan’s police forces can be 
seen as a domain in which successive governments have shown limited readiness to cooperate, 
or, at least, to let actions follow their announcements and stated intentions. This reluctance 
appears somewhat understandable in light of the two recent revolutions in the country: There 
seems to be a fear that a too open discussion of police reform could be hijacked by domestic or 
international actors, leading to a re-configuring of the internal affairs architecture that would 
limit governmental actors’ access and control and make implementation and execution of 
policies less effective. Principles such as the strict hierarchy of command, internal 
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accountability and confidentiality of internal data and structures have seemed too valuable for 
Bishkek’s policy makers to just give them up and reform has been focused almost solely on 
capacity building and modernising equipment of the police forces since the first efforts in 1998.  
The efforts of civil society actors, especially numerous human rights defending 
organizations (pravozashitniki), have been comprehensive in trying to affect more bold steps 
towards police reform, law enforcement and judiciary reform. The main desire among both 
activists but also ordinary people is for the police to become a more trustworthy and 
conscientious in fulfilling its mandate and complying to laws and regulations itself. The 
everyday experience of Kyrgyz citizens stands in contrast to this ideal picture. Petty corruption, 
e.g. in the form of bribe extortion by traffic police, and negligence of duty of officers in 
recording and investigating crimes have for some people become a normality rather than an 
exception (see O’Shea 2015). The harsh criticism vis-à-vis the police, especially in regard to 
human rights abuses as for instance in the aftermath of the Osh events where impunity or the 
disproportionate persecution of Uzbeks have been admonished, is generally dismissed by 
Ministry of Interior Affairs or government officials. While civil society has mostly focused on 
identifying procedural irregularities and human rights abuses and tried to effect their correction 
through the moral pressure or public campaigns (Tiulegenov 2017), there is little to suggest that 
non-state actors have substantively tried to propose concrete institutional changes in order to 
improve the performance of the Kyrgyz police.    
In this context, the work of the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ (Grazhdanskii 
Soiuz ‘Za reformy i rezultat’, hereafter CU) is unique, as the organization has managed to 
become actively involved in the discussion, design and implementation of police reform. De 
jure a network of 28 NGOs with a central office in Bishkek and member organizations spread 
across the country, the organisation was first admitted to consultations with top level policy 
makers in early 2013 and has subsequently both continued to lobby change on the national level 
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and applied its participatory community security approach in selected localities throughout 
Kyrgyzstan. Among 28 NGOs united in the CU, main actors in the constitution of the CU are 
the Liberal Youth Alliance, a student organisation that had been working on police reform 
already and whose almost entire membership body transferred into the CU’s structures. The 
founding and strategic positioning of the organisation in the years 2011 and 2012 was supported 
by the UK-based international NGO Saferworld, which continued to play a role in advising and 
supporting the CU until 2016, both on the basis of concrete project cooperation and funding but 
also aside from concrete programmes. Thanks to this support, the CU has evolved as a self-
sufficient entity with a significant number of projects that generate enough paid work for a 
small office in the centre of Bishkek.    
The Civic Union’s formation began in the time of the initiative on the ‘Alternative 
conception of the reform for the law enforcement agencies’, explained Timur Shaikhutdinov, 
programme manager in the Bishkek head office.1 Back in 2011, he and fellow activists in the 
Liberal Youth Alliance felt that they did not have enough expertise and a high enough number 
of activists to continue their work effectively enough. In order to gauge the potential that their 
agenda had across the country, they made 32 public hearings in different localities all over 
Kyrgyzstan, during which they became convinced that further steps had to be taken in order to 
scale up the countrywide efforts.2 Following a gathering of representatives of the participating 
NGOs in July 2012, the first crucial step was the collection of signatures in favour of the 
Alternative conception for the reform of the law enforcement agencies.3 The 10,950 signatures 
                                                
1 Conversation, 26 June 2015, Bishkek.  
2 Conversation, 26 June 2015, Bishkek. 
3 Альтернативная концепция реформы МВД (проект Программы реформирования 
государственной системы обеспечения общественной безопасности) [Alternative 
conception for the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (draft Programme for the reform 
of the state system for public security provision)], Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result”, 
October 2012,  http://www.reforma.kg/sites/default/files/alternative_concept_oct12.pdf. All 
links in this chapter accessed 20 October 2017.   
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they managed to collect and hand over to parliament were a first landmark indicating the force 
behind the newly established network. In 2013, the then prime minister Jantoro Satybaldiev’s 
invitation to present their ‘Alternative conception of the police reform’ and suggest ideas how 
to improve current polices was another sign that the CU might be able to influence the way in 
which the reforms are planned and carried out.  
As will be shown below, the CU’s impact on the reforms was still limited given inherent 
structural constraints in the sphere of regulation and reform of law enforcement in Kyrgyzstan. 
Rather than straightforwardly enforcing their agenda on the national level, the organisation was 
forced to refocus efforts and work in communities to recruit new supporters, and to actually 
conceptualise and develop an approach to community security that would pose an alternative 
to the understanding of questions of policing and security among many state actors but also 
international organisations. 
In the course of this activism, the CU coined an approach named ‘SoBezopasnost’, 
which emphasises cooperation between the population, municipal authorities and civil society 
and law enforcement organs. This approach is part of a broader trend towards community based 
security approaches that emphasise local level cooperation and scope over central, national 
level reform and policy implementation. More importantly, however, ‘SoBezopasnost’ is an 
approach that helps the CU illustrate what the implementation of police reforms could look like 
on the local level and how it would help to make communities secure and resilient. As one of 
their reports states, Co-Security:	
… denote[s] [a] philosophy, set of norms and practices directed at promotion of 
interaction among citizens, law enforcement bodies and other structures for better 
provision of security with focus on citizens’ interests.4 
                                                
4 ‘Role of local self-governance (LSG) in security provision in Kyrgyzstan’, Civic Union ‘For 
reforms and result’, Bishkek, Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’, 17 March 2015, 
http://www.reforma.kg/sites/default/files/brief-en_1.pdf , p. 3  
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The fact that ‘Co-Security’ or SoBezopasnost5 is used interchangeable with the internationally 
widespread idea of community policing, ‘where all relevant stakeholders take part in protection 
of public order’6 indicates the tension underlying community security work: While the ultimate 
goal of this work is security of the individual or society as a whole, the practices performed to 
provide security are, in this vision of society, of an observing if not restraining or disciplining 
character. This illustrates the important difference between community policing, an approach 
and idea that focuses primarily on practices of policing and, on the other hand, community 
security, where the result, a secure social environment, is of prime importance (see III.4). A 
point could thus be made that Co-Security or community security are not interchangeable with 
community policing, as both ideas have different primary foci that are not interchangeable.  
In practice, law enforcement organs, above all neighbourhood inspectors of the police 
(Uchastkovye inspektory militsii, UIM) and juvenile inspectors (Inspektory po delam 
nesovershennoletnykh, IDN), are usually the representatives of the state apparatus and represent 
law and order vis-à-vis communities. Still, as indicated in chapter V, different institutions and 
actors support and cooperate with law enforcement organs, such as aksakal (elder) courts; 
women’s councils; neighbourhood committees (kvartalnye komitety); and the Local Crime 
Prevention Centres (LCPCs) under which the latter bodies are united and managed by the head 
(or deputy head) of the territorial council (in cities) or aiyl okmotu (village administration). 
These structures do not have any law enforcement mandate, but they play an important role in 
dispute settlements in cooperation with the police (esp. aksakal courts) and focus on crime 
prevention by raising awareness and educating the population. The Civic Union started 
cooperating with these actors in different local contexts to implement their Co-Security 
approach after the institutionalisation of community security approaches from the top down 
                                                
5 The English term will be used hereafter.  
6 ‘Role of local self-governance’, see note 4, p. 5.  
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turned out to be impossible given the resistance within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the law 
enforcement apparatus and the government.  
Apart from creating and strengthening this practical knowledge and experience in 
community-based projects, the Civic Union also attained an expert status when it came to doing 
analyses in the area of law enforcement and justice. Using methods and analytical skills of the 
activists and partners of the network, the Civic Union thus became a knowledge producer and 
managed to justify the necessity for the advocated ‘Co-Security’ approach, thus creating a 
demand for its own activities. With its quarterly report on community security and of 
monitoring reports on the progress of the police reform, which are based on empirical data 
gathered by the activists themselves and augmented by other data and sources, the CU also 
establishes itself as an independent and substantive voice in debates about community security 
in Kyrgyzstan.7 The different areas in which the Civic Union published reports, commentary 
and analysis are tracked in appendix 5.  
The overweight of evidence in favour of the Civic Union’s approach to police reform 
did not, however, help to dominate the reform agenda in final consequence. The re-
politicisation and democratisation of the national fields of security and law enforcement policy 
and legislation as brought about by the Civic Union is, quite straightforwardly, subject to 
negotiation and resistance on the part of political powerholders, experts and established elites 
in these sectors. Especially in a context of increasing inter- and transnational influence on 
policy-making in post-Soviet countries, contestations as to the intentions of Western or other 
donor-supported actors would not be surprising, given the high potential that the utilisation of 
foreign funding and expertise for developing better conceptualised approaches and more 
effectively executed ways to bring them about. Analysing an analogous case of non-state actors’ 
efforts to bring about people-centred reform in Mexico City, Markus-Michael Müller (2014, 
                                                
7 These analyses are available under: http://www.reforma.kg/document/materialy-po-reforme    
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see also 2016) shows how marginalised intellectual elites deployed ‘internationalisation 
strategies’, i.e. dialogue with foundations, experts and civil society actors, to contest the 
authority of the city administration, the police and Attorney General’s Office, to ‘define urban 
security’ and the best ways to bring it about (2014: 56 ff.). The bureaucratic apparatus and elites 
were initially disadvantaged vis-à-vis the ‘increasing inflow of external scientific expertise and 
“best practices”’ and the increasing dominance of the ‘new security heretics and their vision of 
legitimate policing practices’ (48). Subsequently, however, Müller shows how administrative 
actors also ‘went international’ to receive expertise and advice, started to acknowledge the 
efforts of the local domestic and civil society community, and made changes to policing and 
law enforcement practices. These, as he demonstrates, rarely went beyond a symbolic and 
superficial level and eventually served to shield the majority of policy areas, as well as ‘the 
illegal, violent, and corrupt practices of the penal apparatus’ from external influence (2014: 50). 
This research into the attempt to ‘demonopolise the bureaucratic field’ (2014: 37) illustrates 
well the limits and pitfalls of attempts to reform state-centric security approaches.  
In their article on the role of non-state actors in police reform, Albrecht and Buur (2009) 
show how both national policy makers and international advisors, despite their awareness of 
the ‘importance to engage communities and develop context-specific programmes, [but] fall 
back on state-centric approaches’ (2009: 390). They point to the ambiguous status of such and 
other non-state actors, given that ‘[a]t the core of their authority lies access to political power 
and resources (ibid.: 397) and explain the constant reverting back to state-centric approaches in 
police reform with the ‘unease within the executive around clearly defining the roles and 
limitations of an organisation, while also formally establishing its political independence’ 
(400). ‘[H]ow security at the national and more localised levels are provided is often presented 
as painstakingly political and context specific’, they further argue and predict that ‘[i]t can 
therefore safely be assumed as a matter of course that reform efforts will be obstructed, as they 
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threaten individuals who stand to lose or fear losing access to political or economic resources’ 
(402). While many of these difficulties apply to the case analysed in the following, it is also 
shown how Kyrgyzstan has moved towards a situation where a ‘language for discussing non-
state actor inclusion in police reforms on par with state institutions’ was being formed, thus 
presenting an improvement vis-à-vis the West African countries examined (Albrecht and Buur 
2009: 401). The next section shows the obstacles met by the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and 
Result’ in its efforts to bring about a more fundamental approach to police reform.  
 
VII.2 ‘Young folks’ and ‘military people’: The Civic Union’s role in police reform 
legislation and policy-making 
An alternative approach to police reform: Legislative demands, successes and hold-ups 
Influencing national level policy making was initially the main goal and focus of most of the 
activists of the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ and thus put at the top of the agenda 
when the network was officially founded in July 2012. Together with the 10,950 signatures and 
the over 32 public hearings held across the whole country, the network signified a strong and 
determined stance in its petition for a new approach to police reform, announcing: ‘We, the 
citizens of Kyrgyzstan, demand from the leadership [ot rukovodstva] of Kyrgyzstan to set into 
motion major [kardinalnykh] reforms of the police without any delay!’8 In order to push the 
demand for a proper reform, the activist did not spare their addressees vocal criticism of the 
hitherto progress of the police reform: ‘Matters didn't develop beyond words. Enough with the 
cheating! [Khvatit falshi!] We ask the authorities to hold their promise and immediately start 
to transform the old police into a modern police [nachat preobrazovanie staroi militsii v 
sovremennuiu politsiiu]’9 (emphasis in original, in bold). The desired reform is laid out in detail 
                                                
8 See here for the whole petition: http://reforma.kg/sites/default/files/petition_20.02.12.pdf    
9 The terms militsiia and politsiia are used synonymously for ‘police’ in Russian, although 
militsiia is clearly associated with Soviet structures and policing practices.  
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in the ‘Alternative conception for the reform of the Ministry of Interior Affairs’, which was 
submitted to the government, the Jogorku Kenesh (parliament) and MIA, alongside the 10, 950 
signatures10. The conception puts forward the following core aspects:  
1) Creation of a normative-legal basis which regulates the activities of Internal Affairs 
organs in line with the constitution, international human rights standards and the 
Programme for the reform of the state system of maintenance of security within society 
and the rule of law in the Kyrgyz Republic; 
2) Optimisation of the structure and improvement of the administrative system of the 
MIA, including redefinition of tasks carried out by the ministerial secretariat and the 
‘Department for interaction of the law enforcement system’; 
3) Improvement of the recruitment policy including the unconditional replacement of 
part of the current staff, while observing principles of depoliticisation and partial 
demilitarisation; 
4) Development and application of new methods and instruments to secure the effective 
operation, openness and accountability of law enforcement agencies vis-à-vis society; 
5) Monitoring and assessment of the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies.11  
The Civic Union’s efforts appear to have been successful in the government’s and MIA’s 
approach to the reform in the months and years after the submission of the petition. A major 
step was the consultation with then prime minister Satybaldiev on 13 February 2012, as result 
of which the latter promised to take into account the following points suggested by CU 
members:     
                                                
10 Alternative conception, see n. 3.  
11 Adapted from the ‘Alternative conception’; see n. 3.  
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- Creation of a Coordination Council under the government of the Kyrgyz Republic to 
implement the coordination, control and monitoring and assessment of the conducted 
reforms;  
- Strengthening of the role of neighbourhood inspectors and youth affair inspectors under 
the internal affairs organs; 
- New directions in the recruitment policies for law enforcement organs, especially 
drawing applicants from civil backgrounds and juridical higher education institutions 
(rather than recruiting primarily graduates of the country’s three years long military 
service); 
- Developing new criteria for the assessment of different services and departments or law 
enforcement organs.12  
Further steps by the government followed suit, especially in the form of a series of 
governmental decrees (postanovlenie), which can be seen to satisfy to some extent the CU’s 
demand for a normative legal basis for the regulation and reform of law enforcement organs. 
Of course, this has to be seen in the context that other international and intergovernmental 
organisations were lobbying the government as much as did the CU, and the decrees serve as 
tools in the realisation of the ‘National sustainable development strategy of the Kyrgyz 
Republic for the years 2013-2017’13. The main contribution of the Civic Union can thus be seen 
in lobbying these changes from a pragmatic point of view that expressed the will of Kyrgyzstani 
citizens; as well as in the concrete ideas and concepts it proposed to introduce into the reform 
process.  
                                                
12 See protocol from the meeting (in Russian): 
http://reforma.kg/sites/default/files/minutes_of_meeting_with_pm_13.2.2013.pdf    
13 ‘Национальная стратегия устойчивого развития Кыргызской Республики на период 
2013-2017 годы’, http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/61542. Security and law 
enforcement reform are addresses in section 2.9 of the Strategy, which is titled ‘Reform of law 
enforcement organs, ensuring legal compliance of their operations’. 
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While not all changes proposed by the CU were taken on by the government, PM 
Satybaldiev signed decree No 220 on 30 April 201214, which tasked the MIA with ‘working 
out an Action plan for the realisation of measures reforming internal affairs organs of the 
Kyrgyz Republic.’ Besides detailing these measures and the different areas of change, the 
decree announces the aforementioned Council as main mechanism for the implementation of 
the reform. A good deal of subsequent interaction between the Civic Union and other selected 
civil society representatives took place mostly in this Council for the Reform and Development 
of the System of Law and Order in the Kyrgyz Republic15, which was officially formed in 
September 2013 and included representatives from the government and its administration both 
on the national and local levels, as well as advisors from intergovernmental organisations such 
as the OSCE.  
It soon became clear, however, that the Reform Council did not affect the design and 
implementation of concrete reform measures and, worse, seemed to help the government and 
MIA delay such processes. CU activists thus admonished this status of a ‘dialogue platform 
without actual administrative tasks’ or a mandate to make decisions binding for the MIA and 
law enforcement organs more generally.16 The Council had been side-lined and kept out of the 
public attention, leading to its marginalisation and constitution as a forum where civil society 
actors could state their opinion and air grievances, but were unlikely to prompt official 
authorities to act upon them.17 It also took another one and a half years for the Civic Union to 
effect an instructive legislative act, again based on a consultation with the prime minister (in 
                                                
14 Available at: http://mvd.kg/index.php/rus/program-gov/reform   
15 Sovet po reformirovaniiu i razvitiiu sistemy pravoporiadka v Kyrgyzskoi Respbublike.  
16 Monitoring reformy OVD Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki – Navigator reform [Monitoring of the 
reform of law enforcement organs of the Kyrgyz Republic – Navigating the reforms]; Civic 
Union ‘For Reforms and Result’, October 2014 
http://reforma.kg/sites/default/files/final_report_0.pdf, p. 7  
17 Conversation with Timur Shaikhutdinov, Bishkek, 14 August 2015.  
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this case Otorbaev), who once again vowed to integrate their suggestions as much as possible.18 
The resulting governmental decree No 81 from 24 February 2015 presents a progressive change 
as it introduces ‘Guidelines on the foundations of the complex assessment of the activity of law 
enforcement organs of the Kyrgyz Republic’, including a component of external assessment 
with a participatory and transparent approach. The Civic Union, however, criticised the 
configuration of the external assessment component for excluding them and other civil society 
actors from the development of a methodology and general approach to external assessment.19 
Rather than being able to influence the way in which the MIA goes about assessing the police’s 
performance across the country, the Civic Union was thus relegated to do work in this area on 
their own.   
Another normative legal act worth mentioning is a governmental decree from 30 July 
2015 signed by prime minister Temir Sariev and introducing ‘Provision on the mechanisms of 
cooperation of the law enforcement organs of the Kyrgyz Republic with civil society 
institutions’20. Most remarkable about the provision is the creation of (yet another) council that 
can be translated as ‘Public Council of the MIA’. Its functions are mainly communication with 
civil society actors and consideration of their suggestions and proposals, alongside keeping the 
general public informed on the Ministry’s activities and creating new working groups and 
                                                
18 Quote from the protocol of the meeting on 20 September 2014; Obzor No 3 khoda reform 
OVD KR [Review No 3 on the progress of the law enforcement organ reforms in the Kyrgyz 
Republic]; Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’, October 2014, 
http://reforma.kg/sites/default/files/rev_3_10.14_0.pdf, p. 4 
19 Reforma militsii v Kyrgyzstane: na puti k bolshеи otkrytosti? [Police reform in Kyrgyzstan: 
On the path to more openness?], Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’, 22 March 2015, 
http://reforma.kg/sites/default/files/rev_5.pdf, p. 13 
20 Polozhenie o mekhanizmakh vzaimodeistviia organov vnutrennykh del Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki 
s institutami grazhdanskogo obshestva [Decree of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic ‘On 
the mechanisms of interaction of internal affairs organs of the Kyrgyz Republic with civil 
society instiutions], Bishkek, 30 July 2015, No 547 
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committees that if they are deemed necessary.21 The text further details the role of 
neighbourhood inspectors and local crime prevention centres (LCPCs) as main actors and 
platforms in the interaction between society and law enforcement organs. These legal 
provisions and their criticism outline the field of contestation between the Civic Union and the 
MIA, government and law enforcement officials. As indicated and analysed in more detail 
below, the negotiations with the authorities on the concrete steps of reform and the assessment 
of the law enforcement organs’ activities produced too little results to be pursued on their own. 
The next sub-section shows how this legislative change was not followed by substantial, 
‘behavioural change’ as ministerial, governmental and law enforcement staff resisted the 
reform initiative more and more decisively.  
 
‘Not the hard way’: Friction, resistance and insufficient implementation     
Although the above-discussed legislation signifies substantial success of the Civic Union’s 
activism, the time required to achieve the different steps and their insufficient addressing of 
demands or implementation of solutions indicate clear limits to the Civic Union’s effectiveness 
in bringing about an alternative approach to police reform. It is also reflective of frictions in the 
interaction between the activists and ministerial and governmental officials. Given the 
acrimonious rhetoric and explicit criticism put forward by the Civic Union, it is perhaps not 
entirely surprising that accounts of the reactions of top policy makers and law enforcement staff 
emphasise how those were surprised and overwhelmed by the demands of the mostly young 
activists who did not have anything to do with internal affairs and security issues at first sight. 
This astonishment is best understood in the context of the 2010 revolution and violent clashes 
                                                
21 This institutional enlargement appears to duplicate the abovementioned Coordination 
Council’s mandate, which already comprised these activities and merely did not carry them out 
in actual fact. It could still be argued, though, that the newly created body increased prospects 
for a more level and open playing field as concrete proposals from civil society can be given 
more consideration and reasons for their rejection can be discussed.   
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in the South of the country, after which law enforcement and internal affairs organs had tried 
to consolidate for themselves the role of a guarantor of security and stability despite apparent 
irregularities. The Civic Union was the first actor daring to tackle the topic of police reform 
since the Osh 2010 events in such an outspoken manner and with such concrete ambitions for 
reform.22 
Another reason for lack of understanding and engagement with the Civic Union can be 
seen in the generational and professional remoteness of the young activists from the policy-
makers and interior affairs staff. The latter are usually civil servants who had started their career 
and received education during Soviet times and have thus internalised principles such as 
hierarchy of command, military discipline, and loyalty to the nodes of power within the state 
system. Their counterparts from the Civic Union were mostly part of a younger generation, who 
have adopted ideas about liberal democratic reforms and accountable state institutions. This is 
not to essentialise these different markers or to say that they are completely incompatible – in 
fact, their combination and hybridisation into cooperative and dialogue-based community 
security processes has yielded productive practices and actions (see below). It is rather to reflect 
on the general ramifications of a determined, while not always apparent, resistance that the 
Civic Union met in realising its agenda. Ravshan Abdukarimov, ex-MIA officer and advisor to 
the CU stylised the reactions the organisation usually received: ‘Don’t rush, don’t mess things 
up! Who are you, in the first place? Do you want an office or what [Vam dolzhnost?]?’ These 
comments bear testimony of the unrealistic number and scope of the proposed reforms. 
Furthermore, open hostilities were also part of the initial interactions between state 
representatives and the CU activists. One illustrative example is a meeting of activists with law 
                                                
22 This situation is well expressed in Timur Shaikhutdinov’s statement: ‘Reforma privezet 
nestabilnost, poetomu ne sdelali posle 2010. Posle Osh pugalis trogat militsiiu’ – ‘Reform 
brings instability, that’s why they didn’t implement it after 2010. After Osh [the Osh events] 
people were affairs to touch the police [and reform it]’. Conversation, Bishkek, 26 June 2015.    
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enforcement officials, including the then head of the Bishkek branch Internal Affairs 
Administration (GUVD) who addressed Timur in Kyrgyz and took advantage of his limited 
command of the language. ‘It turned out later’, Timur explained vividly, ‘that he had told me 
to burn [in hell] [Russian: zhech], while I was nodding and acting as if I understood and 
appreciated what he was saying.’23  
 
 
 
Illustration 7.1: Civic Union activists and national decision-makers  
Explanation: Meeting of representatives of the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Results’ with 
(from left to right) prime minister Otorbaev, p.p. Minister for Interior Affairs Turganbaev and 
vice prime minister Mamataliev, 20 September 2014; Source: Civic Union ‘For Reforms and 
Results’, permission obtained.  
 
Such and other animosities were not rare, and while they were never more than verbally 
expressed, they indicate the divide between the Civic Union and their partners in the 
government, ministerial and internal affairs organs. The body language of the two activists on 
the right and PM Otorbaev, p.p. Minister of Interior Affairs Turganbaev on the left captures 
these attempts at finding a common language quite well.24 This division is further traceable in 
                                                
23 Conversation at CU office, Bishkek, 19 August 2015.  
24 For the complete line-up and details of the meeting see: Премьер-министр Кыргызстана 
Джоомарт Оторбаев поддерживает сотрудничество Правительства с гражданским 
обществом для продвижения реформы милиции [PM of Kyrgyzstan Joomart Otorbaev 
supports cooperation of the government with civil society for the promotion of police reform], 
East-West Management Institute (EWMI) 2 October 2014, http://ewmi-
cgp.org/ru/novosti/tekushchie-novosti/118-premer-ministr-kyrgyzstana-dzhoomart-otorbaev-
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a discourse on different professional or vocational spheres, which was reproduced by different 
former security sector employees. Mr Abdukarimov’s remarks on how the ‘young folks’25 from 
the Civic Union were leaving many authority representatives baffled was echoed in many 
conversations with supporters and activists of the network. One of them explained26: ‘People 
were laughing: Why did these young folks want to reform the police? … the higher echelons 
(leadership; rukovodstvo) began to understand step by step [postepenno] [what they wanted].’ 
He further described the difference between the vocational spheres of the protagonists: ‘Civil 
society, this is a rather soft [bolee miakhkoe] part of society … the police, they just work 
through orders, they have completely different blood (u nikh sovsem drugie krovi).’ This gap 
was partly bridged as the Civic Union incorporated ex police and law enforcement staff into its 
own network and consultation processes, but it did not entirely mitigate the tensions between 
the Civic Unions ambitions for reform and the realities in the Kyrgyz police forces on the 
ground.  
Convincing top-level policy makers about the CU’s agenda proved hard especially as 
the bifurcation between a security/law enforcement sphere and the ‘civic sphere’ seem to 
underlie a broader claim about expertise and understanding of what is possible and desirable 
when it comes to reforming the police. Rather than engaging with the content of the Civic 
Union’s reform proposals, some actors thus stressed the fact that the group’s expertise was 
insufficient and the nature and scale of their demands lied beyond what was realistically 
possible. This is best captured in the quote of an OSCE officer working on police reform:  
                                                
podderzhivaet-sotrudnichestvo-pravitelstva-s-grazhdanskim-obshchestvom-dlya-
prodvizheniya-reformy-militsii.html  
25 The Russian term is rebiata or molodye [young] rebiata; it was often used by interview 
partners when referring to Timur and other activists from the central office in Bishkek.  
26 Conversation with territorial council head, Osh, 14 October 2015.  
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I ask the question, what do you want from the Police? Civil society watches and argues 
without agreeing with each other ... We are former police officers, we understand the 
best practices. (quoted in Mangham 2015: 33) 
As Ravshan Abdukarimov stated in his recollection of the early days of the CU’s negotiations 
with MIA officials, the deputy minister for Internal Affairs remarked towards the activists that 
they should not try to enforce reforms ‘the hard way’ (‘ne po plokhomu!’).27 International actors 
seemed to broadly agree with the government’s and MIA’s approach to reform. With its 
dominating position in the Reform Council, especially the OSCE is thus part of the barrier that 
the CU activists understand themselves to be confronted with. The more conservative approach 
to police reform advocated by former police and military personnel in the government, ministry 
and international organisations emphasises capacity building in the form of providing new cars 
and radios28 as well as money for renovation of police premises and a less transformative 
measures concerning modes of operation and institutional culture. Shaikhutdinov and other CU 
members deny that such capacity-building and infrastructural support present a reform in and 
of themselves: The way things are done, the institutional culture has to change, new cars, radios 
and buildings are merely a change in the façade.29   
With time, it became increasingly obvious that actions towards such systematic change 
were not taken, even if the aforementioned governmental decrees would have necessitated 
them. The ‘Reform Council’ had also proved largely ineffective, as it served mainly as a 
dialogue platform but did not have any concrete mandate to order implementation measures on 
the ground (see above). Given this blockage on concrete reform policies on the national level, 
the Civic Union was forced to re-orient to the local level in order to, firstly, recruit more active 
                                                
27 Conversation, Bishkek, 20 August 2015. 
28 Conversations with Timur Shaikhutdinov and Galina Davletbaeva, 17 and 24 August; 9 
December 2016, Bishkek. 
29 Conversations, Bishkek, 9 December 2015.  
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members and build organizational capital, and secondly, to practically test out the participatory 
community security approaches advocated on the national level.     
 
VII.3 Community security project implementation in piloting localities  
On the community level, the Civic Union worked on a better provision of security through the 
promotion of interaction between the population and law enforcement organs. The activists had 
already gathered experience during the public hearings that fed into the drafting of the 
‘Alternative conception’ for the police reform in 2011 (see above), which had also served as 
the basis for constituting the network. One of the many proves of the network’s grounded 
approach and adaptation to the needs and habits of the semi-urban and rural population is its 
use of a quarterly newspaper, in which the most recent achievements and important items on 
the organisation’s agenda are presented in both Russian and Kyrgyz language (see appendix 6 
for the title page of an issue from 2012). In 2015, the Civic Union won a tender announced as 
part of the criminal justice programme of the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC). The project, titled, ‘Developing mechanisms of social partnership on questions of 
the provision of public security and crime prevention’, identified twelve piloting communities 
in which the following steps were implemented (CU 2016: 8):  
1) assessment of main community security issues and factors;  
2) creation of working groups, including representatives from law enforcement, local 
administration, civil society and population;  
3) discussion of possible measures to be taken to prevent security threats and tackle the 
identified issues, drawing up of a local community security action plan;  
4) integration of the community security action plan into the budget of the local 
council’s (mestnyi/aiylnyi kenesh) budget and execution of action plan by local self-
governance bodies.  
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The implementation of these steps was not a straightforward process and involved a lot of prior 
research, consultations with community representatives and especially persuading local self-
governance representatives to welcome the initiative and the recommendations and actions it 
would propose at the end of the project. It is thus understandable that the degree of project 
implementation and success varied between communities, and that localities with a support 
base of the CU network and its new Co-Security approach were more effective in realising the 
project. 
While the overall impression from the project’s analysis on the basis of participatory 
fieldwork is positive, the following analysis presents the CU’s work in two localities with 
varying performance.30 The first two participated in the UNODC-financed project and serve as 
the examples of the most successful and effective implementation of the project (community 2) 
and the community where the participation appeared to be valued the least (community 1). 
While doing the research in these two places I was officially acting as a volunteer to support 
and facilitate the running of the respective training events and group meetings. This legitimated 
my presence and the inclusion of the witnessed conversations into my research. The comparison 
of impressions collected in these two communities to the experience of doing research in one 
territorial council in the city of Osh (community 3, analysed in appendix 7) illustrates the risk 
of being rejected and receiving incomplete or potentially biased data, which is especially faced 
by that foreign researchers (Lottholz and Meyer 2016). Based on these reflections, I point out 
how, even if newly established cooperation between police and local community workers is 
presented as a success of the Civic Union’s work, it is not always clear to what baseline such a 
‘success’ is compared and how acute community security issues may be despite improved 
cooperation between the population and the police. 
                                                
30 Part of this analysis is presented in Lottholz (2017b).  
		283 
Three key dimensions of the community security working groups’ impact on the local 
security situation guide the analysis. First, I discuss the ‘status of the working group’ in the 
local context, which concerns both the relevance and importance conferred to it by its members 
and stakeholders and its complementarity with other administrative and security bodies and 
institutions. The second dimension regards the way security problems and solution measures 
are being understood and constructed. In this respect, the working groups exhibited different 
degrees of rather simplistic understandings and lack of visible consultation with the population 
groups affected by issues in question. When it came to economic problems and poverty, the 
security working groups proved a useful platform for discussing the issue and raising them vis-
à-vis other local or regional actors; which stands in some contract to the normalisation of 
economic precarity and its role as a factor of crime and conflict analysed in V.4. As I show in 
a third step, analytical practices and epistemic positionings – i.e. individual members’ or entire 
group’s stances on what exactly constitutes a problem and why it is hard to solve it – point to 
the different constellations post-liberal social ordering indicated in chapter III and can be 
situated within the imaginaries and discourses of statebuilding. 
 
 
 
Community 1    
 
Status of working group 
In this community, north of Bishkek and bordering Kazakhstan, I attended working group 
meetings between August and November 2015, during which I accompanied a CU activist 
Galina – a Bishkek woman in her fifties – and assisted in arranging presentations, taking photos 
and documenting the conversations. The overall impression from the work in this community 
was that the significance and potential of the Civic Union’s project was either not sufficiently 
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appreciated, limiting the prospect of implementing a sustainable cooperation between police 
and the population; or that other bodies such as the Local Crime Prevention Centre (LCPC) and 
local council (mestnyi kenesh) were already working on the issues, making more work on 
community security seem less important than the mobilisation of support for dealing with 
socioeconomic issues, for instance. Correspondingly, the analysis of problems and devising 
concrete of action steps to tackle them was difficult, as it was often not clear what was already 
being done, or what could be done given the entrenched nature of issues. These difficulties were 
compounded by the patchy attendance of group members – two of the meetings began with 
only a handful of group members, which necessitated scheduling new meetings – and reluctance 
to contribute to discussions on the part of those who did attend.31  
This difficulty in assembling the group in full number and getting it to produce the 
concrete results demanded within the project framework seemed to be an issue with both 
insufficient leadership of the group and the lack of a clear mandate of the group and/or 
awareness among participants and other shareholders about it. While the focus groups for the 
initial assessment of local security issues had been conducted with ease, the follow-up meeting 
to discuss and consolidate the identified priority issues was initially attended by not more than 
five people. A large part of the group could be called in to start the meeting one hour later, but 
the lack of organisation and preparation was obvious. The latter seemed to be linked to the 
extreme busy-ness of the head of the aiyl okmotu (local administration), who obviously had 
difficulty managing her daily work schedule and discharging her role as community security 
working group leader32, while her deputy appeared to be insufficiently authorised and resourced 
to effectively mobilise and lead the group.  
                                                
31 The best illustration of this is the fact that some older women attending a meeting on 17 
August 2015 were reading newspapers and only contributed to discussions when they deemed 
it appropriate.  
32 This became obvious when the CU’s coordinator for this piloting community and I met the 
head after the working group meeting on 17 August 2015 and talked her through the main 
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 This situation was exacerbated when the aiyl okmotu head became re-appointed as head 
of the Alamedin regional administration, leaving the deputy head to lead the group during the 
remainder of the project. The lack of leadership and awareness about the purpose and possible 
value of the community’s participation in the project became especially obvious in a training 
session in November that was attended by representatives of UNODC, the project funder, who 
did not hesitate to state their concern with the group’s low turnout and lack of participation and 
enthusiasm in discussing ways to tackle local security issues. Towards the end of the meeting, 
the Kyrgyz programme manager addressed the remaining handful of group members to explain 
the purpose of the project and the general context of UNODC’s work in the community: 
‘What’s the whole point with this [local security] plan?’, she rhetorically asked; ‘It will be your 
tool … but how can you make a plan with only three people?’. She further encouraged the 
attendees to more actively approach the police and ask police staff to participate in light of 
UNODC’s investment of 30,000 USD into building a new local police station (Poselkovyi otdel 
militsii or POM): ‘Look, we invest 30,000 dollars to improve things here … get in touch with 
the police so that they attend all of the meetings!’ 
 The less than mediocre performance led the deputy head of the aiyl okmotu to endeavour 
more firmly to invite all group members, including the neighbourhood inspector and local 
council members. The latter attended the next meeting three weeks later and contributed to a 
constructive and well-informed discussion on the prioritised security issues and possible 
actions. This meeting illustrated the situation already indicated in an initial report33, namely 
                                                
impressions and results of the day. When trying to schedule a date to assemble the group again 
for finishing the work left over from this session, she said that she would simply not be able to 
find the time to participate in the gathering herself. 
33 ‘Public security. Analysis of the situation and prioritiy problem. Preliminary report 
[Общественная безопасность. Анализ ситуации и приоритетные проблемы Сводный 
отчет по исследованиям в пилотных территориях]’, Civic Union ‘For reforms and result’, 
Bishkek, October 2015, unpublished document.  
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that the local crime prevention centre (LCPC), women’s council and aksakal court were 
actively working on preventing crimes and social tensions. With these efforts already being 
made – and some of them helping to solve the identified issues in the process, as for instance 
in the case of insufficient provision of transport between the different villages of the 
community, it was understandable that the working group was not keen to tackle security issues 
or unwilling to do so in the framework of the CU’s project. Given the absence of financial 
benefits, the community security project was also much less attractive than infrastructural and 
other development projects proposed by development agencies from nearby Bishkek (see 
below). Priority issues and an action plan to tackle them were nevertheless agreed after long 
and windy discussions.     
 
Understanding of security problems and solutions 
In preliminary research and initial group meetings, the following priority issues were 
determined: 1) traffic security; 2) drug consumption and dealing; 3) vulnerability of children; 
4) tensions between different groups and individual dwellers; and 5) grazing of cattle and 
damage to communal areas and harvest. However, during the meetings I attended the group 
appeared split in their opinion on different issues and ways to tackle them.  
Disagreement was most consistent (although somewhat silent) on the issue of drug trade 
and consumption in the community. This had initially been identified as prescient by the focus 
group during the initial community security assessment. However, during subsequent meetings 
with the security working group different attendees explicitly voiced their doubts that this was 
an issue significantly pertaining to the community’s security, or even was a problem in the first 
place. ‘We don’t have such a problem right now’, said an elderly Kyrgyz wearing a kalpak 
during the follow-up meeting in August, although he admitted, ‘Yes, that’s possible’, when the 
CU moderating CU activist said it had been raised during initial focus groups. ‘If it is possible 
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to uncover incidents, then there is a problem’, said the local school’s head teacher, suggesting 
that the problem was only of priority if a concrete exposure or evidence could be adduced. 
Thus, the group eventually removed the item from agenda, and a loose agreement was found 
that preventive work should be done in schools. This demonstrates how the power of the 
working group to set the agenda and decide how urgent or even existent a security issue is. 
Although there was little disagreement within the group as to the minor importance of drug 
consumption and trading, a more holistic understanding of this would only have been possible 
by juxtaposing this point of view with the perspectives put forward during the initial focus 
groups.  
In a similar way, ‘tensions between different groups, especially between inhabitants and 
migrants from other regions of the country and [ethnic Kyrgyz] from Tajikistan’ was a topic 
whose relevance for the community security action plan was contested. A mode of living where 
everyone was for themselves seemed to have been established in the community long ago, and 
actual tensions and conflicts seemed to be a rare occasion. Thus, the problem seemed to lie 
more in the disinterest and single-mindedness of the different groups towards each other, which, 
as some group members suggested on the second meeting for planning concrete action steps, 
might be overcome by reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and patriotism. The post-Soviet 
multicultural slogan ‘We are all Kyrgyzstanis!’ was invoked by several group members 
alongside the idea that ‘people should be taught to love their nation’.34 The group agreed that 
educational and prophylactic work, including gatherings between groups, had to be done to 
                                                
34 The neighbourhood inspector further made clear that, contrary to the dominant ‘mentality’ 
among the Kyrgyz, it would be inappropriate to invoke the ‘ethnic’ category when talking about 
the different groups. The divide between ‘native’ dwellers and ‘new arrivals’ was congruent 
with an ethnic divide, as the former were quite diverse, with Kurds, Lezgins (a Caucasian 
ethnicity emanating from southern Dagestan and northern Azerbaijan) and Russians 
cohabitating with Kyrgyz, while the latter were predominantly Kyrgyz (or Kyrgyz-Kairylmany, 
i.e. ’re-settlers’ mostly from Kyrgyz territories in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). The sentiments and 
stereotypes put forward in this discussion seemed to primarily be directed at the sense of 
entitlements and duties (perceived or real) given the respective groups’ biographies. 
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further strengthen the sources of unity within the village and resolve the paradox that, in the 
words of a local council member ‘On Friday [at the Islamic Namaz prayer] all great each other 
but then go their way and don’t care about each other anymore’.  
The problem with the overgrazing of communal areas and destruction of arable land and 
harvest was particularly associated by the group with the ‘new arrivals’, many of whom had 
their livestock grazing all over the central village’s green, which was technically prohibited and 
led to the deterioration of the central village area into a plane of soil and decrepit trees. In the 
early November meeting group members had remarked how this was rooted in the ‘new 
arrivals’’ attitude towards the state and social order more generally. ‘For the natives, it is a 
shame to see that for the new arrivals the law doesn’t count’, one dweller summed up the 
common sentiment.35 While this picture went unchallenged in that meeting, in the working 
group meeting later that month was also attended by an elderly man who listened to the 
discussions and wanted to add his view on the problem – but seemed to go unnoticed by the 
rest of the group. While the group was hotly discussing the topic, he got from his seat in one of 
the last rows, remote from the rest of the group, inhaled hastily to raise his voice, extended his 
hand to be called to speech and quietly – but audibly for those who paid attention – remarked 
‘I am a new arrival for instance’. Neither the moderating CU activist nor any group member 
noticed him, thus missing out on hearing the point of view from the people concerned in this 
debate.   
This clearly indicated the limits to the participation of representatives of all different 
groups and categories of village dwellers in the working group, as well as the potential of 
missing out on certain points of view during discussions, especially when they are heated and 
emotional. What somewhat inevitably resulted from this limited inclusiveness of the group and 
                                                
35 ‘Dla korennykh obidno, chto dlia novykh zakon ne deistvuet’. The person put forward the 
example of people cutting trees in the village area. Participatory observation, 6 November 2015.  
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its bold way of trusting their own opinion and knowledge about the problems in their 
community is a certain degree of objectification and patronizing vis-à-vis other groups. Rather 
than a critique, this is to be understood in the context of the generally benevolent intents of the 
group’s members and the logics of provision and care according to which they apparently saw 
it as their responsibility to provide ‘the others’ with security or create a secure and peaceful 
environment.  
Another example for the limited inclusivity of the group is the role of youth committee, 
which seemed to be non-existent beyond a list of members presented on a sheet next to the 
other local institutions and their staff.  One young man who had attended all of the meetings 
had not made any contribution any of the discussions whatsoever, although they revolved 
around juvenile delinquency, car races organised by local youth and the problem of drug trade 
and consumption. When I dared to make one of my very few interventions and asked why the 
group was not consulting their youngest member when discussing possibilities of keeping 
young people busy and entertained to distract them from delinquent activities and 
‘hooliganism’, the answer was unbelievable for me but perhaps descriptive of the situation: 
‘He’s sits quite far away [daleko sidit],’, remarked one attendee in response to the suggestion; 
another just dismissed my initiative: ‘The old people will sort it out for him [Dla nego pozhilye 
reshaiut]’ – and on went the discussion. While the working group might generally be 
representative of the population and have active and competent members, this reluctance to 
engage with specific groups that play a crucial part in or are affected by the community’s 
security issues and their solution limits the scope of both the analysis of the situation in this 
community and the potential to effectively tackle them. This partially exclusionary, 
paternalistic, patronising and sometimes objectifying logic, however, makes sense when its 
representativeness of the way things are done in Kyrgyzstan is seen through a post-liberal lens.  
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Community security practice seen through a post-liberal lens 
The above-discussed situations serve as suitable examples to understand post-liberal forms of 
social ordering against their historical background and in the context of the combination and 
hybridisation of globally dominant and contextually specific ways of doing things; i.e., 
participatory analysis and planning mechanisms on the one hand and paternalist logics of care 
and traditional notions of hierarchy, on the other.  
What seemed to make these instances of failed dialogue somewhat acceptable to both 
the ones excluded and those (unwittingly) excluding is a logic of provision of security and 
caring for someone else or a group. This seems to reflect the Soviet legacy of a paternalistic 
state and local administration structures whose activists and experts can be trusted to consider 
the community’s and its different groups’ needs and problems in enough detail to make 
informed decisions and take appropriate measures in social organisation and resource 
allocation.36 A further explanation for the lack of explicit exchange and inclusion of youth and 
‘new arrivals’ would highlight a cultural reading of the fact that people do not necessarily voice 
their opinion unless directly asked for it. Age and professional hierarchies might be seen to play 
a role here in the sense that representatives from groups concerned are more likely to approach 
personal acquaintances or friends in the local self-governance to suggest their own views, rather 
than contesting people above their own age or hierarchy level in a public meeting.  
This indicates an important mechanism of post-liberal forms of social order: order needs 
to be understood in terms of the role of the individual and its input into the construction and 
maintenance of order. That is, rather than assigning each individual a role of its own and 
assuming that they utter their opinions to inform the decision-making process, a different set of 
                                                
36 This mode of social organisation is clearly rooted in the Soviet Union’s scientific-
technological model of social organisation, where social policy and provision were based on 
group belonging like nationality, ethnicity or professional association and the entitlements 
derived therefrom. See Reeves (2014: 148), Hirsch (2005) and the discussion in IV.2.2.  
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social relations needs to be taken into account that transcends this methodological individualism 
of ‘liberal peace’ approaches.37 A first implication for community security seen from a post-
liberal vantage point is thus that participation and articulation by every individual and the whole 
range of actors might not be a desired or viable ingredient of social ordering, contra the liberal 
orthodoxy.  
The complementary to this logic of decreased participation and articulation is a logic of 
representation, provision and care, according to which certain actors within a community can 
be tasked with identifying and dealing with issues on behalf of others. As I have shown, this 
can have the effect of reproducing past forms of social order and cultural production at the 
expense of designing community engagement activities along the lines of the groups for whom 
they are made. This is especially apparent in the example of the problem with young people’s 
susceptibility to delinquency and vulnerability to school racketeering – a point that was initially 
glossed ‘vulnerability of kids [uiazvimost detei]’ but reduced to ‘school racketeering’ for the 
final report. When discussing leisure activities that should be organised to offer children 
attractive alternatives, the most discussed topic (besides sports pitches and tournaments) was 
the need to re-establish – or at least to offer an equivalent to – the cultural institutions of the 
past such as a house of culture (dom kultury), a youth club, dances and other items that would 
enable the reinvigoration of the civilisational spirit that characterised the village during Soviet 
times.38 This demonstrates how the way that the group members had experienced their own 
youth now came to be considered as the best way to bring up  the current young generation.  
                                                
37 This is not a statement on whether such a post-liberal condition is desirable or not. At 
minimum, the empirical significance of these paternalistic and otherwise hierarchical 
mechanisms of arbitration suggests that it might be worth to search for other ways of securing 
inclusion than trying to impose liberal methodological individualism on societies; or that a mix 
between the two may be more viable in practice. 
38 One older teacher underlined this demand with the exclamation: ‘We had a civilisation (‘u 
nas byla tsivilizatsiia’)!’, which clearly alludes to the achievements of Soviet modernism. 
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This desire to restore past dignity and glory was associated to a broader logic of not only 
regulating matters of security, but of attempting to attain a basic level of infrastructure and 
service provision in the community. The discussions on road security, for instance, extended 
towards the problem that streetlights were not working and the question of how to make them 
work again.39 Other discussions revolved around how the new local police station could be 
provided with living space, the current state and rebuilding plans for the school and 
kindergarten. Another example is the negotiation of an agreement between marshrutka 
(minibus) drivers and the population to ensure a consistently running transport system for 
school children. Community security was thus understood in broader terms, as relating to the 
provision, maintenance or (re-) establishment of services and infrastructure, as a way of 
securing an environment in which security issues and crime are less likely to occur.  
This more contextual and material understanding of security sometimes morphed into a 
clear, almost cynical preference for infrastructure development and concrete financial 
investments into the community over wise words on crime prevention and security 
arrangements. In the planning meeting on 6th of November, instead of proceeding to discuss 
actions to tackle the identified security issues, some group members exclaimed, in reference to 
the porous half-dirt-half-asphalt-remnants road leading to the village: ‘We need to fix our roads, 
it is horrible, didn’t you see it when you came here?!’ ‘Why don’t you fund some road building 
or so?’, remarked one participant laughingly, though barely noticed by the group and 
moderator. This behaviour indicated a strategic and wary attitude that some of the village 
dwellers seem to have developed towards security and development projects. It was most 
starkly demonstrated when the first security working group meeting that I attended in mid-
August was re-located to the local school because the big hall of the aiyl okmotu (local 
                                                
39 This was yet another new issue brought up and discussed broadly with the newly-joining 
local council member during the working group on 27 November.  
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administration) was reserved for a project seminar by the infrastructural development agency 
Aris40, whose help appeared much more attractive and necessary in the village than the less 
countable outcomes and additional efforts required by the Civic Union’s community security 
project. This shows how the group and its stakeholders in the community were well aware about 
the different ways to еffect change and acquire help from development agencies in Bishkek and 
higher-level institutions.41 It also points, however, to an unlevel playing field, where people 
with good contacts to such institutions and agencies enjoy higher authority, while those lacking 
such a status can end up in a meaning- and helpless position, such as the co-head of the aiyl 
okmotu whose promotion to the leading position was pending throughout interaction with the 
Civic Union and put her in an helpless position.  
  
 
Community 2  
 
Status of working group 
In contrast to the somewhat mixed performance of the working group in community 1, 
community 2 was something like the poster child of the Civic Union’s community security 
project. This was because the local crime prevention centre (LCPC) had received a lot of 
capacity building support in the form of trainings and the formation of a community security 
                                                
40 Агентство развития и инвестирования сообществ Кыргызской Республики, 
http://www.aris.kg/  
41 This also became clear in the case of the topic of road security (bezopasnost na dorogakh), 
the group decided to bring the problem with car races conducted by young people to the 
attention of the regional road patrol unit. In another case, the relocation of a bus stop was 
discussed to protect people from possible accidents with the bypassing traffic, which shows 
how the group held the urban planning and design accountable and fed back into such processes 
in order to make them take into account the community’s inhabitants’ security concerns.  
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working group with the support of Saferworld and the Foundation for Tolerance International.42 
The existence of this working group and the familiarity with and openness to community 
security work on the part of the local authorities gave the project a decisively positive starting 
position in this community. A further reason as to why the overall process went along much 
more smoothly was the town’s location along the border with Uzbekistan, because of which it 
had already been in the focus of attention of the previous security work.43 The local authorities 
and especially the LCPC were thus trained and had already proved their ability to inform the 
population about security issues and conduct preventative work.  
Another reason for increased attention both from without the community and on part of 
the local authorities and community security actors were the significant movements of goods 
and people in the region as part of the wider transfer routes of the Fergana valley and between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, in particular. The corresponding transnational networks seem to 
have spurred the rise of what is called ‘non-traditional’ Islamic practices and denominations, 
who apparently became more and more popular among the population and even led to a 
significant number of inhabitants going to Syria. Given this frontier status of the community, 
local administrators and activists had already gathered experience in cooperating with national 
level bodies such as the Tenth main administration under the MIA for countering radicalism 
and extremism44, or in short ‘tenth department’ (desiatyi otdel); and the State Committee for 
National Security (Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti or GKNB). The latter 
had participated in different events held by the LCPC and consulted local policy makers in their 
                                                
42 The biggest Kyrgyz national NGO in the area of peacebuilding and community security, see 
V.4 
43 Conflicts with Kyrgyz border troops over electric energy usage had unsettled the local 
population; as well as a number of unbeknownst border crossings of Kyrgyz citizens which put 
them in conflict with Uzbek border guards. Interview with LCPC representatives, 11 July 2015, 
Saferworld 2016: 25.  
44 Desiatoe Glavnoe Upravlenie pri MVD po protivodeistviu radikalizma i ekstremizma. 
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efforts to implement measures to reduce and prevent the increased recruitment of the population 
by so-called ‘non-traditional’ religious groups.45 This embeddedness of the local working 
group’s efforts in the wider national project of countering radicalisation and religious 
extremism was as a factor to motivate the group members and make them aware of the 
importance of their work, but it also increased the pressure onto them to identify root causes, 
mechanisms of radicalisation and extremism, as well as ways to counter them.  
This prior activity and experience made for a mood among the group members and 
friendships that had apparently developed between some of them, as was palpable in the 
minutes of preparation before the start of the training session in the local administration 
building.46 The female leader of the group, who was also the deputy head of the aiyl okmotu, 
was among the core group of friends who had been running the work in this community for 
years and had a very positive and encouraging way of talking to people while not lacking the 
courage and resoluteness to tell them if they were wrong. Another significant observation is the 
attendance of three members of the police – one youth affairs inspector or IDN, one senior and 
one ordinary neighbourhood inspector – and their active participation in the discussion. The 
working group further included a range of local council (mestnyi kenesh) members, 
representatives from the different institutions subsumed under the LCPC (i.e. youth committee, 
elderly or aksakal court), the deputy head of local imams, head teachers from the local schools, 
among others.  
Besides the composition of the group, its links to the other institutions seemed very well 
developed, also thanks to the Civic Union’s further efforts, whose activists visited the aiyl 
okmotu head after the event to discuss the result of the training, planned action steps and the 
                                                
45 Interview with LCPC representatives, 11 July 2015 (see V.4, Saferworld 2016).  
46 The following analysis is based on participatory during a working group training and 
planning session on 11 November 2015.  
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necessity to include the group’s action plan into the local parliament’s annual budget plan. The 
same relationship-building and maintenance appeared to have been practiced with the head of 
the local police station (POM), which was being renovated with the financial help of the 
UNODC (as in community 1). In contrast to community 1, the police representatives showed 
more than just formal presence and commitment vis-à-vis local administration and community 
security workers in this community, as the POM head gave the whole Civic Union team 
(including myself) a lift to the police station and to the restaurant where the whole group was 
to have lunch after the training. Working with the Civic Union and receiving their input on how 
to deal with security issues was thus seen as part and parcel of the wider capacity building 
process that involved significant investment into the police infrastructure.47 
The entire working group gathered for lunch after the session and shared different stories 
and impressions with the Civic Union activists. New plans and perspectives were discussed 
regarding the work of the community working group and the Civic Union as a whole. This is 
reflective of the high awareness among the group about their mission and its meaning and 
purpose. Rather than taking this for granted, Timur, one of two CU activists, made sure at the 
beginning of the day to re-state both the Civic Union’s founding idea and the role that the group 
in this community played in this mission: ‘The main idea of our work is to maintain law and 
order on the local level … people here can decide themselves who is supposed to decide, 
whether it is the local leaders, the Regional Internal Affairs Administration, or others.’ A further 
encouraging aspect was the recognition that the CU activists expressed vis-à-vis the local group 
members, as they mentioned that this group was one of the strongest in the whole project and 
through the invitation to the forum on the current state in the police reform in the end of 
                                                
47 By contrast, the group activities in community 1 sometimes appeared like a tick box exercise 
to discharge the moral duty and expectations raised by the reception of financial and other 
material benefits such as the building of the new police station with the help of UNODC.   
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November where the youth affairs inspector received the Co-Security prize award for ‘IDN of 
the year’.  
 
Understanding of security problems and solutions 
The increased radicalisation and alignment with ‘non-traditional’ sects among the population 
was one of two core issues presenting a particular challenge to the working group. A major 
factor of the occurring shift in believes and practices of Islam was the activity of missionaries 
who visited the town from outside, either from elsewhere in Kyrgyzstan or from neighbouring 
Uzbekistan. Correspondingly, one major concern for some group members was how to block 
the access of such missionaries or prohibit their apparently illegal practices all along. ‘They 
should be completely prohibited to enter [the town]’, posited one NGO activist during the group 
meeting and visibly captured the group’s general fatigue with the issue. The head of the group 
and deputy aiyl okmotu head agreed but urged the members for more modesty: ‘Our main goal 
to maintain public control. I agree [the foreign missionaries need to be controlled] but it has to 
be according to some rules [na baze kakikh-to pravil]’. After a long discussion, the group found 
that prohibiting missionaries’ access appeared unfeasible and that they needed to focus on 
getting more information and a clearer view on the visitor’s movements and activities. 
Furthermore, the deputy head of the local imams argued against the earlier proposition on the 
ground that that recruitment of supporters for radical Islamic sects and their inciting to join the 
fighting in Syria was mostly done via internet. Therefore, tackling the foreign missionaries 
might not even be the most effective way of reducing radicalisation and extremism in the town, 
he argued.   
Another core problem was the desperate situation among local youth and the wide 
spread of hooliganism, school racketeering and violence among youth. The discussion on ways 
of overcoming this situation was in some ways very similar to the one in community 1, as all 
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group members seemed to see the problem more or less in comparison with their own 
upbringing and the pride and dignity that had been part of their everyday during the late days 
of the Soviet Union. The strongest proponent of a re-establishment of long-vanished virtues 
was the senior neighbourhood inspector of the police, who emphasised his view that a more 
serious consideration of conscribing a higher number of youth for military service could 
enhance their ‘discipline’. This was met with exclamations across the meeting room and 
followed by a controversial discussion. The head teacher of a local school adamantly raised her 
concern with such a reinvigoration of youth’s attitude through a military-based national culture, 
especially given the connotations this had in terms of excluding different national minorities 
who would not subscribe to such a national spirit or would simply not qualify for conscription 
for lack of Kyrgyzstani citizenship. ‘Excuse me’, she concluded, ‘but if Kyrgyzstan is only for 
the Kyrgyz, then all others will already be afraid [to drugie uzhe boiatsa] … if it’s only about 
‘us’, ‘ours’, ‘this is for us’ … [esli eto tolko ‘my’, ‘nash’, ‘eto nam’ …]’.  
While there was general agreement that patriotic education and military-based 
disciplining of young people might be too divisive, the group leader expressed her own 
observation of the gendered nature of the lack of discipline and esteem among people: ‘You 
know what the problem is all about?’, she addressed the Civic Union activists including myself. 
‘We don’t have any men, there are only women in the schools … The racketeering is spreading 
without any male authorities counteracting it … in any case, a man is a man [vse ravno, 
muzhchina – eto muzhchina.].’ While this suggestion that women lack the authority and 
competence to effectively deal with issues of racketeering and authority might sound patriarchal 
and misogynistic, it is suggestive of the wider gender implications of the marketisation and 
political economy of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, as well as the incapacitation of the education 
system (DeYoung 2007). The fact that average wages do not enable people to secure a family’s 
livelihood entrenches a situation in which male teachers are by far outnumbered by their female 
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counterparts. Male breadwinners often depart to work in Russia or other post-Soviet countries 
to leave their children to be raised by the female partner, grandparents, or more remote kin and 
even neighbours, with significant implications for emotional and psychological wellbeing (see 
V.2).48 While largely clueless which measures might be helpful in tackling the problem without 
marginalising anyone’s interests or needs, the group agreed that organising sports tournaments 
and ‘cultural mass events’ – e.g. in the style of KVN49 – might be useful to further facilitate 
young people’s creative and organisational talents, and planned to devise more specific 
measures at a later point. Rather than tackling the root causes of violence and raising them with 
responsible state institutions and higher-level bodies, the working group thus focused on doing 
all it could to manage the situation on the ground.50  
 
 
 
Community security practice seen through a post-liberal lens 
This way of managing security issues while deferring their more fundamental tackling 
exemplifies once again the post-liberal problematique of community security, i.e. that that the 
problems encountered by community security and state-/peacebuilding actors have 
ramifications that go well beyond the latter’s analytical scope and action repertoire. Non-
                                                
48 See also the Civic Union’s documentary short film ‘Lost in their childhood’ [Poteriannye v 
detsvte] on this topic, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rfSWcPXxX2M   
49 Literally Klub veselykh i nakhodchivykh or ‘Club of the merry and ingenuous’, a format 
initially pioneering in Soviet state television which combines the genre of quiz shows with 
comedy, as participants are expected to answer questions and fulfil improvisation tasks in the 
most possibly humorous and entertaining way. This genre has become entrenched both in 
Soviet culture and in the entertainment world of post-Soviet states and is practiced by numerous 
student or youth KVN associations.  
50 Further planned measures of ‘meeting with parents’ and ‘joint raids conducted by police and 
activists from villages in the evening time to prevent criminal behaviour’ confirm this pre-
emptive logic and focus on behavioural change, rather than on root causes of behaviour.   
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traditional religious radicalisation and extremism appear to be rooted in the lack of education 
and knowledge about Islam, which made people susceptible to being recruited to specific sects 
advertising membership as an especially pure or authentic way of practising faith. Another 
reason were the financial incentives given by sects with considerable financial means at their 
disposal, who were thus able to offer help to were struggling to make a living. As community 
1 is situated in a structurally weak and poor district, the challenges that the local authorities 
face when trying to reverse the trend of growing numbers of radicalised inhabitants and 
extremist Islamists thus seem abundant. As the discussion on the necessity to bar foreign 
missionaries from accessing the city shows, the tense situation in relation to non-traditional 
religion in Kyrgyzstan (see IV.4.1) and the need to curb radical and violent extremism appear 
to generate pressures on community security practitioners and civic and social activists to take 
draconian measures which can limit different people’s and groups’ freedom of expression and 
religion. As with the discussion on preventing violent extremism among youth activists in the 
previous chapter (VI.2), there appears to be a danger that participatory and bottom-up 
approaches can be abused for gathering intelligence and justifying overly hard and possibly 
misguided – as the remarks on online recruitment by the deputy imam indicated – measures.51 
As indicated in section IV.3, this pressure is compounded and moralised by the allusion of a 
‘politics of sovereignty’ perspective to the traditional Kyrgyz Islam, which has to be upheld 
and defended against foreign influences on an un-level playing field.   
Another issue that was easier to solve is the problem of road safety which was prioritised 
by the local security working group given the high numbers of accidents happening on the 
                                                
51 Pelkmans (2017: ch. 5) provides an inner perspective of one more modern and pious Islamic 
movement which is prohibited which is prohibited in Kyrgyzstan. While it is understandable 
that the movement’s practice of visiting other communities and calling people to visit mosques 
during prayer times may look suspicious, his analysis makes it equally clear that the intentions 
of the movement are not associated with radical ideas, at all.  
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national road leading trough the community.52 The group agreed that more measures had to be 
taken to ensure the safety especially of school students moving across and alongside the road 
every day in the danger of high speed traffic. One major point the group brought up and vowed 
to address with the Regional administration of internal affairs (ROVD) was the fact that the 
whole town was officially appointed only a single traffic police officer53, which was obviously 
much too little to deal with the challenge of keeping an eye on the highly frequented road’s 
traffic. Asking for a strengthening of the traffic police’s presence in the town was much more 
viable and effective a measure, a pure measure of distribution and allocation of administrative 
and personal resources, while attempts to curb radicalisation among the population were a more 
immediate matter given the ongoing recruitment of Kyrgyz as foreign fighters and the 
emergence of a discourse of threats to the country’s sovereignty and integrity.  
 
Implications and potentials of community level projects   
The observations from the implementation of the so far largest community security project of 
the Civic Union in twelve piloting communities allow some conclusions about the post-liberal 
condition of this domain and the ways the latter needs to be navigated by the Civic Union and 
other actors. The project generally presents a great success, given the development and official 
confirmation by administration and internal affairs organs of the twelve action plans and the 
allocation of budgetary resources for the realisation of the latter. Still, as the participatory 
observation from two project communities show, the change brought about by the cooperative 
‘CoSecurity’ approach promoted by the Civic Union is not always fundamental and 
straightforward. Rather, it is inherently contingent, negotiated and in need of being presented 
                                                
52 This road connects Osh province and the South-East of the country with the whole of the 
Fergana valley 
53 Russian GAIshnik, derived from the official short name State traffic inspection of the MIA 
or Gosavtoinspekciia MVD or GAI. 
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through engagement between different actors and with reference to better statistics, e.g. of a 
lower rate of crimes of a certain kind. In community 3 (see appendix 7, Lottholz and Meyer 
2016), interaction between community security workers and police men was presented as a first 
visible result of the Civic Union’s work, for instance, while substantial engagement with the 
researchers, through which this success could have been empirically substantiated, was politely 
but consistently rejected by members of the Local Crime Prevention Centre. Thus, as Graef 
(2015: ch. 8) has pointed out in relation to legal empowerment interventions in Liberia, the 
relevance, impact and success of the project needed to be constantly negotiated and maintained 
by the Civic Union while critical reflection on side effects and encountered problems and 
limitations guided their efforts to make the project as successful as possible.    
 As the research on the above communities and reporting from other ones has shown, the 
project had the irrevocable impact of initiating a dialogue between local administrations, law 
enforcement and populations. It was clear that this dialogue can effect a meaningful 
consideration of the needs of different population groups and measures to take into account and 
address such needs. This presents the realisation of a central tenets of the post-liberal approach 
to peace- and statebuilding, which emphasises empathy and needs and preferences of people, 
in defiance of the preoccupation with standard templates, formulae and practices of the ‘liberal 
peace’ approach (see III.2, Richmond 2011a).  
On the other hand, it also became clear how the security working groups tended to 
occupy a moral and epistemic high ground in analysing issues and making decisions, while 
often failing to (visibly) engage and consult with groups or people affected by or associated 
with security or crime issues. This was most ostensible in the case of community 1, whose 
working group even failed to consult representatives from their community’s youth and ‘new 
arrivals’ who were present on the group meeting. Similarly, community 2 appeared to be more 
preoccupied with curbing the activity of missionaries than with understanding the reasons for 
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missionary activity and whether and how it was actually associated with the reported 
recruitment of violent extremists in town. These ways in which the working groups related to 
their communities are reflective of paternalistic understandings of governance and social 
ordering which, as I have argued, are rooted in the mode of social organisation practiced during 
Soviet times. They also have clear associations with Kyrgyz traditional conceptions of order 
and harmony in the community, the maintenance of which is the task of elders in the aksakal 
courts or in women’s councils (zhensovet) which were institutionalised during the Soviet 
period. Conceiving of these and the other actors in the working groups as straightforward 
guardians of order, morality and peace would be an essentialist move, however. A more critical 
approach is necessary by which the needs and feelings of young people or poor groups within 
the community are inquired in more depth and explicitness, even if this means to partially 
challenge the knowledge and competence of the former actors.  
This critical point about working groups’ representativeness and competence to decide 
for the rest of the community leads to broader argument about the epistemic dimension of the 
shift towards post-liberal community security and peace-/statebuilding. As I have shown, the 
working group and LCPC members had almost a monopoly on deciding which issues in their 
community were of priority and should thus be worked on, and which were of minor importance 
or not problematic, at all. In community 1, this meant that drug consumption and trading was 
eventually taken off the priority list. In community 3, it had the effect of sanitising the 
conversation vis-à-vis the police and me as foreign researcher from any mentioning of 
significant problems in the community, even if reporting such ones would have seemed logical 
given the large-scale violence that had struck the community back in 2010 and the widely-
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reported continuation of harassment and marginalization of people in the aftermath of the 
conflict (Ismailbekova and Karimova 2018, Bennett 2016, Ismailbekova 2013).54  
It thus seems that that denying the existence or importance of certain issues, including 
shortcomings in the actions of city administration and law enforcement is perceived as a matter 
of professionalism and good citizenship. In stating that everything is going well, even if things 
are not easy to deal with, neighbourhood committee leaders and working group or LCPC 
members appear to hope to shield the community from scandalising reports and to build a 
constructive relationship with people in charge. Conversely, explicit criticism was largely 
absent in community 2, which was perceived as a largely successful case, but would require 
more scrutiny as to whether there are disagreements between the different actors involved in 
securing the community. Acts of social ordering and community cooperative security provision 
are dependent on a suspension of such epistemic ambiguities – e.g. as to where and how 
recruitment of foreign fighters really takes place, or what would really the best way to keep 
youth from getting into conflict with one another and the law – in a post-liberal modality 
characterised by uncertainty instead of fully explicit exchange of opinions and criticisms.  
Relatedly, I have indicated how the working groups’ activities were geared towards a 
post-liberal politics of conflict management and peace performance, similar to the LCPCs in 
V.4 and TYCs in VI.3. On the one hand, this is understandable given the limited scope of the 
groups and their individual members in terms of resources, time and skills/knowledge. On the 
other, it is also important to acknowledge how a focus on empirically observable results, e.g. 
the reduction of fighting or racketeering among youth or number of recruitment of foreign 
fighters, might make community security practitioners susceptible to disregard possibilities of 
                                                
54 The scope of my research in this community was not sufficient to further analyse why exactly 
criticisms were silenced, but it was nevertheless interesting to see how the discussion of daily 
issues on the planning meeting with police officers and reporting about problem solving 
activities to me seemed to give the community security workers in this territorial council a sense 
of normality and being on the right path towards building a more secure environment. 
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addressing root causes of such issues and extending and strengthening state approaches at crime 
reduction and conflict management. As indicated in community 2, this would not be a surprise 
given the history of cooperation with state bodies and the perceived necessity to crack down 
upon religious radicalism. It thus seems that in this area, the current internationally dominant 
agenda on counter-terrorism and violent extremism generate resources and a sense of urgency 
that cannot be matched by knowledge gathering and dialogue on the communal level, thus 
feeding further pressure into the social system to be absorbed and materialised in social 
deviance.  
 Despite these internal ambiguities, the success and effectiveness of the project and its 
cooperative approach is fairly straightforward, especially when compared to the situation in 
community 1. Perhaps most important is the signalling effect of the interaction between law 
enforcement agencies and the population, or local administration and civil society acting on 
behalf of it. This indicated a rare and in many cases unprecedented, level of interest, 
accountability and empathy on part of the former. Furthermore, the project created a small 
audience (the funding organisation, higher level administrative bodies) vis-à-vis whom 
irregularities or misconduct could potentially be reported, which increased the accountability 
of local administrations and law enforcement in an informal way.  
It can thus be argued that, while reforms on the top level are still slow and cannot be 
expected to create accountable and accurately operating police force all the way through to the 
practical level, it is the Civic Union’s community work that delivers the results locally which 
insufficient policies are not able to produce. That is, the creation of community security 
working groups can be seen to have had a much more immediate effect on the communities 
themselves, as it signalled a re-configuration of the relations between the population and police, 
and law enforcement organs more generally. In this sense, the implementation of participatory 
approaches by the CU has provided the respective communities with a higher potential for 
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providing community security, if not security from a human perspective. The challenge 
following from this partial, modest success, was to scale up the experience, knowledge and 
potential of activist organisation in order to effect a more substantial implementation of reform 
measures on the national level.   
 
VI.4 Shifting the tide? Further mobilisation and limited results 
The Civic Union continued its efforts to bring about a more systematic and people-centred 
approach to police reform through the two-pronged approach of working with people in the 
regions and policy makers in the capital. On a forum titled ‘Police reform in Kyrgyzstan – 
Reloaded’55, the activists presented preliminary results from the above another project for 
external assessment of the police reform, funded by USAID56, invited speakers from 
representing the government and Ministry of Interior Affairs to discuss their reform strategy, 
and awarded several prizes as part of the ‘Co-Security 2015’ award to acknowledge the efforts 
of state employees from different bodies and levels in bringing about social partnership and 
cooperation to reform law enforcement organs. This effort at positive and constructive 
interaction – see illustration 7.2 below with the 2015 Co-Security prize winners and a photo 
from a national level conference in 2016 –   with state actors further materialised in a 
‘Memorandum on cooperation in the advancement of internal affairs organs in the Kyrgyz 
Republic’, which was concluded with the representative of the Public Council of the MIA.57  
                                                
55 «Реформа милиции в Кыргызстане: перезагрузка», 20 November, Bishkek. See 
http://www.reforma.kg/news/predstaviteli-0         
56 Пресс-релиз: В Кыргызстане приступили к разработке инструментов внешней оценки 
работы милиции [Press release: In Kyrgyzstan instruments for external assessment of the 
police entered into force], Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’, 20 December 2015, 
http://reforma.kg/news/press-reliz-v-kyrgyzstane   
57 Общественный совет МВД и Гражданский союз «За реформы и результат» планируют 
сотрудничество по продвижении реформы милиции [The public council of the MIA and 
Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ are planning to cooperate on the promotion of police 
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Although merely declaratory in character, this signified a more positive and cooperative 
relation with policy makers in the capital, even if the Public Council is merely a civic 
control organ itself.  
 
Illustration 7.2: The Civic Union’s approach to dialogue on the national level  
                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
reform, Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’, 28 November 2015, 
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A decisive step in the internal consolidation and development of a systematic approach in the 
Civic Union’s activities was a conference under the title ‘Developing Co-Security on the local 
level’, to which the most activists and community security workers from across the country 
were invited, alongside a select number of MIA representatives showing sympathy for the 
alternative approach to police reform promoted by the CU.58 The work during the conference 
mainly focused on discussing the establishment of a steady and more official structure for the 
network that would make its efforts more effective. There was general agreement that a central 
entity like a secretariat would be useful, while local working groups in different communities 
should be delivering data and analysis results and thus keep enriching the knowledge and 
understanding of the organisation as a whole. It was not clear, however, to what extent to make 
the working groups official, i.e. establish them as officially registered subsidiaries of the CU 
or, as was also suggested, have local crime prevention centres work as working groups more in 
terms of a side activity. The discussion on the central body – secretariat or otherwise – revolved 
around such points as recruitment of members of the secretariat and the possibility of local 
community workers to become members of the secretariat given their limited ability to 
personally attend meetings in Bishkek.59  
Like the deliberations in local community working groups, the discussion was long, 
windy and not always fully targeted. But this was understandable given the long way the Civic 
Union had already come towards such an open and participatory discussion of the network’s 
                                                
58 Participatory observation during event, 5 December 2015.  
59 Another frontier of the debate was opened up in regard to the question which sort of expertise 
and control should be established in relation to the secretariat. An experts council with 
representatives of the MIA and other former and current security sector staff was suggested as 
a useful advisory body while another ‘Coordination council’ was proposed to direct and 
sanction the secretariat’s activities. This discussion was still at an early stage and more of a 
brainstorming but indicated fruitful avenues for the further development of the network.  
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future strategy. As the programme manager of Saferworld60 explained to me in a conversation 
after the second day of the event, most of the participants of the seminar had already undergone 
an impressive development and their ability to engage in the discussion that I witnessed, as they 
needed to work their way in to such questions from their initial expertise that was only 
concerned with local level administration and community policing. The thing goes for the 
participants from the side of the MIA and law enforcement organs. As the chair for the 
department of youth affairs, who had only recently been recruited by the CU to participate in 
the event, stated during the discussion: ‘You need to teach [people], they don’t know, they were 
training me for five years on seminars of international organizations. At some point, I started 
to understand.’ In this case ‘understanding’ implied that this senior law enforcement official 
realised that cooperating and engaging in dialogue with civil society organisations was 
inevitable in attempts to make law enforcement organs’ work more accountable to Kyrgyz 
citizens. While perhaps not representative for the whole security sector, the many years that 
this person had taken to become convinced of the necessity to cooperate with non-security 
structures actors indicate how remote many key actors and decision makers might still be from 
cooperating with the Civic Union. By holding regular forums – such as the one depicted in 
illustration 7.2 – to gather the network members, stakeholders and national and international 
experts on police reform, community security and related issues, the Civic Union managed to 
further fortify its position as a key actor in these domains in Kyrgyzstan.   
The end of 2015 appeared to be a time when things seemed to generally work out for 
the Civic Union. The network managed to forge with an alliance a group of female Jogorku 
Kenesh deputies, who invited the activists to different briefings of their informal parliamentary 
initiative. When I entered the CU’s office for my last interview with Timur Shaikhutdinov and 
                                                
60 Saferworld supported the event as part of their continuous capacity building and conceptual 
advice provided to the CU. Conversation, Bishkek, 5 December 2015.   
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the other activists, they were just in the process of drafting their recommendations on the police 
reform to send them this group of deputies. On the same day, they received an invitation from 
this same women deputy group to attend one of its sessions in the city parliament (gorodskii 
kenesh) in the city of Osh. ‘There is a reason to hope [Est osnova nadeiatsa],’ agreed Timur 
when I asked him about the apparent upswing in the attention that the CU’s efforts had been 
given the last days and weeks. The stated commitment of the then new prime minister Temir 
Sariev to work on the police reform and the place of this topic on the agenda of the MIA were 
further reasons to believe that real progress in the law enforcement reform could be made. The 
fact that the network had been waiting for political actors in the capital to respond to their 
demands for several months in the run-up to the parliamentary in October 2015, as well as 
during the post-election coalition negotiations showed, however, that matters were not in the 
hands of the activists and decisively dependent on the political business cycle in Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Re-monopolisation of the reform process  
The following months and years did not bring much progress in national level reform efforts, 
however and, after a phase of intensification of common efforts between the Civic Union and 
its partners in Parliament, led to a gradual re-monopolisation of the reform process by the 
government and MIA.61 After presenting the Jogorku Kenesh with a new petition62 to encourage 
systematic and publicly calling for a reform with concrete results, the Civic Union activists saw 
the scope for their input into the process with the discussion and final execution of an initiative 
to liquidate the Council for Reform and Development of the System of Law and Order. 
                                                
61 A systematic overview of the research and commentary publications and other press coverage 
can be found in appendix 5.  
62 Activists in Zhogorku Kenesh handed over petition with appeal for a police reform, 29 
January 2016, Azattyk. For sake of brevity, only English titles, dates and sources (with 
hyperlinks) will be given hereafter.   
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Although the Council was also criticised for the little competence it was given, the CU 
admonished that its liquidation amounted to ‘stripping civil society from its right to have a stake 
in the reform process’, a problematique that was not solved by transferring the competencies of 
this organ to the ‘Council for security and public order’, which did not include any civil society 
representatives.63 Further efforts of the Civic Union included a report presented in parliament64, 
another forum in cooperation with MPs under the title ‘Co-Security and Crime Prevention 
policy in the Kyrgyz Republic’65 on which a new set of recommendations reiterating earlier 
demands were made, this time affirmed by participating MPs themselves.66 This led the MIA 
to pass a set of laws aimed to restructure law enforcement, which the then secretary of the 
Defence Council qualified as ‘fundamental reform’.67 Given the superficial character of these 
changes, the Civic Union concluded that no real reform had taken place yet68 and that, in order 
to deliver real results, more new legislation would have to be generated.69 
 For this purpose and to ensure the contribution of civil society actors, a working group 
including many civil society representatives – including the Civic Union’s Timur 
Shaikhutdinov – was created by decree of PM Jeenbekov in September 201670 and tasked to 
write draft laws that help to further advance a more fundamental police reform agenda. Two of 
                                                
63 Society could be deprived of the right to take part in the police reform, 5 April 2016, 
reforma.kg 
64 Civic union presented a report on the progress of the police reform in the parliament, 12 April 
2016, Azattyk  
65 Civic activists handed over dozens of proposals for police reform in Kyrgyzstan, 24 June 
2016, KNews 
66 Djanybek Bakchiev MP: Security should be a key element of modern society, 11 June 
2016, KNews 
67 Law enforcement agencies in Kyrgyzstan will be cardinally reformed, 4 June 2016, 24.kg 
68 The police reform and results that society wants are not there, 29 December 2016, Golos.kg 
69 Activists call for speeding up the development of the new legislation on law enforcement 
agencies, 31 January 2017, Akipress 
70 http://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/215383   
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the draft laws concerned the key reform areas of competitive recruitment and the information 
and transparency provisions on law enforcement bodies and their operative activities.71 The 
draft laws were not introduced into Parliament before its break during the presidential elections 
and the campaigning period. Although their first reading is to be schedules in the next months, 
it remains to be seen to what extent they were changed since the submission by the working 
group.72 Given this deferral of the more thoroughgoing legislative changes until after the 
presidential elections, and despite continued calls for better cooperation on the realisation of 
this legislative and other reform initiatives73, the MIA’s and government’s reform efforts were 
largely limited to the carrying out of the renaming and restructuring of the into six separate 
services.74  
The Civic Union admonished that such a ‘renaming is not yet a reform’ and that the 
creation of the six new services75 did not solve the issue that the central leadership of the MIA 
still had de facto control over these services, and that it consisted of mostly personnel with a 
military background and was not separated from the political leadership on the ministerial 
level.76 ‘The experience and history of previous reform attempts’, the official announcement 
argued, ‘that there can be no talk of reform’.77 As already indicated, the limited renaming and 
                                                
71 See note 66. 
72 Further redactions to the draft laws had been made within the MIA and government apparatus 
since the draft submission from the working group. Timur Shaikhutdinov, personal interview, 
Bishkek/Plovdiv, 25 October 2017.  
73 Civic union calls for a dialogue of political forces, 28 March 2017, Kaktus; Timur 
Shaikhutdinov: There is a huge social potential for maintaining law and order, 20 April 2017, 
KNews  
74 Six new services have been created in the MIA, Azattyk 
75 Criminal police service, Service for combatting illegal drug trading, Internal investigation 
service, investigative service, Service for prevention of extremism and illegal migration, service 
for public security. See previous note.  
76 Renaming does not mean reform, 10 August 2017, reforma.kg 
77 See previous note.  
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restructuring measures were the last actions of the MIA before the presidential elections in 
October 2017. At the time of writing, it is not quite clear yet, which role the police reform will 
play on the agenda of the new president Jeenbekov, his apparatus and the already partly 
reshuffled Jogorku Kenesh. The fact that Jeenbekov had already led the previous government 
as prime minister and was a leader in the Social Democratic Party associated with president 
Atambaev, and that he thus oversaw the recent reform policies and described re-monopolisation 
of the process by the MIA, points to a consolidation of the previous agenda.  
While developments on the national level remain largely contingent and progress in a 
very selective manner, the Civic Union managed to consolidate its role as practice-oriented and 
knowledge-generating experts in the law enforcement and crime prevention. The achievements 
of the UNODC-financed project on cooperative security provision in twelve piloting 
communities was well advertised in preliminary press coverage78 and the final report.79 The 
work in these and other communities was perpetuated through the allocation of small grants on 
a competitive basis80 and the Civic Union stayed in touch with most municipalities that 
participated in the initial project and collected their new action plans.81 The community-based 
approach of the project was further applied in one cooperation with authorities82 in the Sverdlov 
district of Bishkek, where local residents were given the chance to tell their opinion on the 
                                                
78 For instance, An active fight against violence and extremism is started in all parts of the 
country, 29 April 2016, Knews; Police joins forces with the public and the authorities in 12 
regions in Kyrgyzstan, 29 April 2016, Azattyk; The Police and the LSG organs developed a 
plan for crime reduction, 29 April 2016, Akipress 
79 A joint plan allows for the mobilisation of civic efforts and state authorities for crime 
prevention (final report), 24 August 2016, reforma.kg 
80 12 projects on security and crime reduction start in Kyrgyzstan, 14 July 2017, Azattyk 
81 Conversation, Timur Shaikhutdinov, Bishkek/Plovdiv, 25 October 2017.  
82 In particular, members from the Bishkek city council, the local administration, the police and 
civil society representatives.  
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security situation and any concrete issues in the district via an online survey83, whose results 
were subsequently analysed and used to identify priority issues and devise measures to work 
on them.84 The experience and routine gathered in the community projects was used as a clear 
asset to promote the Co-Security approach for piloting and potential future application in all of 
Bishkek: ‘After all, this worked in the countryside, where we have worked. There, the number 
of cattle theft, car accidents, domestic violence and school racketeering cases in fact 
decreased.’85  
These and the well-established role of the Civic Union as commentator reform aspects 
such as the patrol service86 restructuring and their production of research on crime victim 
statistics87 or school racketeering88 make this NGO network a key actor in the area of police 
reform and cooperative community security promotion. The limited success this actor achieved 
in terms of legislative, institutional and practical success in reforming law enforcement organs, 
despite the firm positioning in a number of fields pertaining to this domain, illustrate clearly 
                                                
83 Bishkek citizens are asked to take part in internet voting on law and order issues, 27 March 
2017, Golos.kg, see KNews, Kaktus 
84 Joint plan: Bishkekians define the priorities for crime prevention, 2 August 2017, Kaktus  
85 How the neighbour can ensure your safety, 15 August 2017, Azattyk 
86 For instance, Activists: the union between RPS and PPS will not resolve the questions related 
to the fight against corruption, 2 March 2016, Knews; NGO: The new road authority will stop 
cars without a reason, 11 March 2016, KNews; The foot patrol will be separated from the patrol 
police, 25 April 2017, Akipress 
87 Research: teens at school are divided into ‘observers’ and ‘crowd’, Zanoza; Report release; 
Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’: School racketeering adapts to external conditions, 20 
July 2016, Azattyk; In Kyrgyzstan, the problem with violence in the school environment 
remains extremely worrying, 24.kg; Activists: A new form of school racket has emerged - 
exploitation, KNews, all 20 July 2016.  
88 ‘More than 60% of the crime victims do not report to the police’, 24 February 2016, Azattyk; 
Only 30 per cent of the thefts and attacks’ victims report crimes in the police, in the case of 
bribes - only 2-3 percent, 05 March 2016, 24.kg; ‘Crime victims’: Is the Kyrgyz police 
managing their job well?, 03 July 2016, KNews; Crime victim documentary, 03 July 2017, 
Youtube release; Victims of sexual violence are afraid to contact the police in Kyrgyzstan, 08 
May 2017, Zanoza 
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the path-dependent nature of institutional development and the correspondingly limited 
prospects for sustainable forms of peace in post-liberal Central Asia.   
 
 
VII.5 Police reform and imaginaries of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan  
As already indicated in the analysis of community level implementation of the Co-Security 
approach, the police reform and community security agenda of the Civic Union is situated 
within the imaginaries of social ordering and statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan. The decisive 
conclusion from viewing the network’s actions from this perspective is that, rather than getting 
caught up in the antagonism between a Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary that usually 
foregrounds democratic reform and criticisms of human rights violations in Kyrgyzstan (see 
IV.3), the Civic Union managed to reconcile ambitions and benchmarks in this area with ideas 
social ordering and moral integrity which are situated in the ‘politics of sovereignty’ and 
‘culture and tradition’ imaginaries.  
The high ambition that the activists’ demands for transparency and data access to the 
MIA and law enforcement bodies present can more or less straightforwardly be situated in the 
Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary. The consistent and not rarely biting criticism put forward 
vis-à-vis ministerial, governmental and law enforcement staff is not rarely reminiscent of the   
human rights-based criticisms raised by many NGOs which have earned themselves the 
reputation of so-called human rights defenders or pravozashitniki. Criticism vis-à-vis such 
NGOs is widespread in Kyrgyzstan and usually does not engage with the actual issues they 
raise but simply dismisses them on the base of their Western funding. Statements like 
Imanaliev’s – that ‘in order to justify the money they receive from donors, NGOs have to 
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‘shout’ just like that (obiazany vot tak krichat)’89 – present a distorted portrayal of 
pravozashitniki as part of the ‘bad West’ discourse that I have examined above (IV.3.1).90  
Apart from the outright and consistent criticism vis-à-vis authorities, the Civic Union 
and its composite NGOs portray themselves in references and symbolisms that can clearly be 
situated in the Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary. The mission and symbolic representation of 
some of the NGOs under the roof of the Civic Union speak a very clear language in favour of 
liberal values, human rights and other concepts that underlie the transformation and 
democratisation agendas that were introduced in Kyrgyzstan throughout the 1990s.91 The 
network is also the legal successor of the ‘Liberal Youth Alliance’ (Alians liberalnoi 
molodezhi), a political youth organisation founded in 2006 to lobby the interests of young 
people in constitutional reform and politics more generally.92  The obvious question is thus as 
to whether the Civic Union is not seen as a main actor among other ‘liberal’ forces that are seen 
to promote democratic political and economic reforms beyond the extent that the country can 
accommodate and successfully implement them. This puzzle is further compounded by the fact 
that a lot of support the CU receives comes from the USAID, or as declared in the multiple 
reports and summaries of the CU, from ‘the American people’.    
                                                
89 Imanaliev, Aman, Поющие песни Запада не откажутся оптом продать Кыргызстан? [Do 
those singing the songs of the West turn out to sell out Kyrgyzstan wholesale?], translation 
from newspaper ‘De facto’ No 39, 23 October 2015, p. 2, 
http://www.gezitter.org/politic/44646_poyuschie_pesni_zapada_ne_otkajutsya_optom__prod
at_kyirgyizstan/   
90 This sentiment is more popularly held than actually expressed in commentators’ opinions, 
but one exemplary publication is a dossier titled ‘So whose rights are Kyrgyzstani (human) 
rights defenders defending?’, Delo Nomer, 10 October 2014, http://delo.kg/index.php/2011-08-
04-18-06-33/7741. A comprehensive overview of human rights defender’s criticism is provided 
in a summary of statement of the Kyrgyz Human Rights Defenders Council: 
http://www.paruskg.info/2014/07/18/102712 
91 See organisational goals under: http://www.reforma.kg/content/grazhdanskiy-soyuz.   
92 В Киргизии возник Альянс Либеральной Молодежи "Свободное Поколение" [In 
Kyrgyztsan, the Liberal Youth Alliance ‘Free Generation’ was created], Centrasia, 20 May 
2006, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1148957400		
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When I asked him about this, Timur explained that the Civic Union had not faced any 
criticism in this regard.93 Yes, their high demands and vocal criticism vis-à-vis the security 
sector’s intransparency and remote positioning vis-à-vis society would regularly meet the 
resistance of officials, but neither on the national nor on the local levels had CU activists faced 
charges of being ‘foreign agents’ or acting in the interest of foreign donors at the expense of 
their fellow countrymen and –women. The fault lines, as Timur further explained, were rather 
different ones, as many international, particularly intergovernmental organisations such as the 
UN and its different agencies, as well as the OSCE, were agreeing on most things with the 
national policy making elites. The mandate of these international organisations was mostly 
focused on capacity building and did much less to hold policy makers to account when it came 
to reforming the police and security sector, as well as in other cases of reform efforts. National 
elites would have grown accustomed to this lenient position, he further explained. The network 
between ministries and, on other hand, UN and other big donor and development agencies thus 
appears more to fortify the current institutional set up and state-society relations in Kyrgyzstan 
rather than challenging the status quo and work on changing it.  
This demonstrates how the Kyrgyz state and its primary political actors are interpellated 
in a web of responsibilities, treaties and standards limiting its own room for negotiation and 
transformative action, very much like set out in Chandler’s conception of post-liberalism 
(2010b). It is equally clear, however, how the networks established within this web of 
governance structures also serve to stabilise and entrench certain institutional structures and 
practices that require fundamental overhaul. The different international actors active in law 
enforcement reform and security thus support a more conservative approach and do not endorse 
the more fundamental and rapid reform advocated by the Civic Union and more resonant with 
the ‘liberal peace’. Even if such consolidation and maintenance may be done in the name of 
                                                
93 Interview, Bishkek, 11 December 2015.  
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stability and maintaining the Kyrgyz state’s sovereignty, the necessity of doing so is contested 
on the ground, especially when taking into account citizens’ access to security and fair treatment 
by the law enforcement organs.  
As regards the Civic Union’s positioning, the organisation did as of recent not face any 
need to prove its own integrity and that it was acting in the interest of the Kyrgyz people rather 
than any foreign donors. More than anything else this seems to stem from the fact that the 
organisation’s efforts, often carried out by activists who simultaneously work in community 
security and administration structures, are clearly geared towards establishing security, stability 
and transparency on the ground by way of forging cooperation with law enforcement organs. 
Questioned if this activity can be seen as motivated by patriotic sentiments, Timur stated that 
CU members and activists see themselves as representatives of the society, which for some of 
them might also have a patriotic aspect, which is, however, rarely explicated. My analysis of 
community security practices in section VII.3 has shown that patriotism, national spirit and 
other sentiments of pride and belonging going back to the days of the Soviet Union are invoked 
in some cases by local community security working groups. In this sense, the joint community 
security work presented an opportunity to uphold the ideas of modern and Enlightened 
citizenship which some residents from the older generation appeared to see as benchmark for a 
dignified and secure life. In such instances, the liberal imaginary of the Civic Union became 
hybridised with the Soviet modernity discourse and other more critically inclined discourses 
from the ‘politics of sovereignty’ imaginary, while working group members similarly drew on 
tradition and culture to imbue their actions with meaning.  
At times, this productive combination of the different imaginaries and discourses was 
also strategically used by the Civic Union members. On the session in community 2 which I 
attended, Timur introduced me and told the group members that I did research on the 
organisation and this working group in order to write ‘about how we are building up a decent 
		319 
country [kak stroim normalnuiu stranu].’ This statement also had the purpose of putting 
participants at ease that the work that I was doing was aimed at presenting the unique effort of 
the project’s implementation of Co-Security in piloting communities, and that therefore, 
implicitly, no major criticism or inappropriate disclosure of details or shortcomings of the 
group’s work was to be expected. On the other hand, this statement situated the group’s work 
and the Civic Union’s work as a whole in a patriotic register of social ordering and statebuilding 
and thus set the basis for an open and critical discussion among the group, which would only 
be to the best of the community and the wider context.  
It is also necessary to acknowledge, however, that the seeking of cooperation and 
synergies incurred new limitation and possibilities in the actions of the Civic Union and its 
partners.  For instance, with the limited amount of time and resources allocated to the 
community security project in the piloting localities, there was only limited scope to discuss 
the potential and obvious caveats off the working groups’ attempts to analyse security issues 
and devise measures to solve them. A more fundamental reflection on the exclusionary and 
potentially faulty attempts to analyse and tackle violent extremism in community 2, and the 
role of state security services in forming this approach and setting the agenda on this front, was 
deferred into the future cooperation with this community. This demonstrates how ambiguity 
has to be endured by actors is they wish to forge a more constructive engagement and avoid the 
confrontation and possible failure of their efforts. It also shows that the fundamental condition 
of human security still remains an ideal whose realisation is subject to more efforts than are 
currently underway, at least in the two piloting communities examined. More engagement with 
different groups and layers of the local population is needed to really solve issues in a way that 
creates a secure and peaceful environment for all.  
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Chapter VIII	 Conclusion 
 
 
The last three chapters have provided an in-depth empirical analysis of the production of secure 
and peaceful environments, the building of peaceful and tolerant relations among youth, and of 
attempts to reform law enforcement organs, specifically the police, in substantive and people-
centered way. Rather than conceiving of these respective processes in technical, institutional 
and legalistic terms, I have attempted to show how they are embedded in wider trajectories of 
Kyrgyzstan’s post-Socialist neo-liberal transition and corresponding changes in state-society 
relations. In this conclusion, I briefly reiterate and relate these case studies to one another and 
weave them back into to the discursive analysis of imaginaries of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan 
(ch. IV) and the analytical framework and overall approach of the research. Throughout the 
conclusion, I re-visit the research objectives I have defined in I.2.   
In a first step, I recapitulate the key insight the research offers on community security 
and peacebuilding practices in Kyrgyzstan and related discussions on peace, conflict, 
intervention and transition processes and the post-liberal trajectory they are situated in. Second, 
I draw together the findings on how the examined practices and discourses are situated in or 
positioned vis-à-vis different imaginaries of social order and discuss how analysing imaginaries 
of statebuilding can foreground a more substantive understanding of societal processes in post-
conflict transitional countries. In a third section, I revisit the concept of post-liberalism in peace 
and conflict studies and social science more generally, and show its specific materialisations in 
Kyrgyzstan. Fourthly, I discuss how decoloniality and governmentality provide ways to view 
the results from the empirical analysis in a more explicitly normative and critical light. I also 
explain the rationale of the decolonial approach towards this research and the goal to understand 
issues of security, peace and social ordering in depth rather than drawing a heuristic and 
functional picture that is geared towards making recommendations to policy-makers or other 
stakeholders. Based on this reiteration of the guiding approach of the research, I chart out 
		321 
potential future directions for research on peace, conflict and intervention studies in Central 
Asia and beyond.     
 
VIII.1 Community security and peacebuilding practices in Kyrgyzstan  
As stated in the Introduction, all analytical chapters IV-VII were considering processes of post-
liberal statebuilding through practices of peacebuilding and community security. This analysis 
thus serves to fulfil the research objective of answering the question about how specific ‘local 
actors’ such as local government, civil society and the population at large help produce, 
challenge and re-shape post-liberal forms of statebuilding. As has become clear throughout 
the analytical chapters, the post-liberal trajectory in Kyrgyzstan provides less and less room for 
actors to challenge ongoing changes and restructuring in the country. I have implicitly equalised 
such ‘challenges’ to the negative effects of post-liberalism with the idea of producing more 
sustainable forms of peace and security, which would tackle the underlying root causes of 
violence, insecurity and crime. As I have shown, the different actors and initiatives examined 
faced different kinds of barriers and challenges in their attempts to create practices and 
organisational or institutional arrangements that would enable more sustainable and human-
centred forms of peace, security and social order.  
To enable an in-depth and thoroughly contextualised understanding of the ways in which 
community security and peacebuilding ‘are done’ in semi-urban and rural Kyrgyzstan, I have 
analysed the conditions and wider socio-economic and political changes that have shaped these 
processes since the country’s independence in 1991, as well as the Soviet roots of such practices 
and relevant institutions. The contextual analysis of the collapse of Soviet Kyrgyzstan’s 
significant industrial basis and the subsequent plunging of large parts of the population into 
poverty and uncertainty, as well as the discussion of the moral economy of survival and 
translocal livelihoods shed important light on the severe living conditions that the majority of 
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the country’s population is grappling with (V.1). Given the prominent role of informal practices 
and corruption, it is clear that local administration and security provision are not straightforward 
issues but must depend on the networks and corresponding imperatives it is situated in. The 
discussion of local administrative and civil society structures has further elucidated this 
relational understanding, as it showed how historical heritage – by which neighbourhood 
committees or voluntary squads are conferred the authority to call people to order and 
obedience – or administrative dependencies – like that of LCPCs vis-à-vis local administrations 
and Interior Affairs organs for approval of their activities – can create path dependencies and 
entrench certain selective priorities of some entities over those of some groups in the 
community or the population at large.  
The analysis of ‘success stories’ in selected LCPCs (Local Crime Prevention Centres) 
has illustrated how people working in these bodies can successfully mobilise local institutions 
and the population to solve problems pertaining to infrastructural issues or even effect change 
in problems such as high number of divorces and early marriages. It was also shown, though, 
that these successes are often measured in terms of narrow numeric indicators and that 
underlying causes are often too entrenched and complex to be addressed. The destitution and 
poverty for instance, because of which people may prefer to marry off under-age daughters and 
thus feed into the number of insufficiently resourced and potentially abusive marriages, usually 
remain outside the reach of local community security activists and social workers. LCPCs and 
their composite structures may often be constrained to basic mediation and conceptualisation 
of ways forward out of conflict and tension. This was best illustrated by the peacebuilding and 
dialogue measures in Bazar-Korgon, where, as the LCPC representative stated, a lot of work 
remains to be done given the entrenched divisions between different mono-ethnic communities. 
Attempts to instil peaceful coexistence after the Soviet-era idea of ‘people’s friendship’ could 
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only reach a selective part of the population and perhaps, as an art work at the local school 
indicated, bears most potential when promoted among the younger generation.  
Chapter VI further pursued the thought about building peace and tolerance among the 
young generation by looking at the establishment and present activities of Territorial Youth 
Councils (TYC) after the 2010 inter-communal clashes across southern Kyrgyzstan. Another 
theme continued from the previous chapter was that of volunteer mobilisation, which TYCs 
relied on even more heavily than LCPCs. I have shown how the TYCs’ functioning as 
mobilisation conduits for young people to take on leadership positions and develop and 
implement various events and measures put especially high pressure on the TYC leaders to 
deliver on their positions, even if the salaries they received did not secure their livelihoods.  
The key motivation for people to get engaged in TYCs was the idea that through them 
one could contribute to peace and tolerance, but also to the development of the city and the 
country in general, a connection expressed in the references to national symbolism and ideology 
as well as in the contribution of TYCs to celebrations and holidays of national significance. 
These connections to the Kyrgyzstani nation coexisted in relative harmony with expressions 
and performances in different sub-cultural genres, such as breakdance or singer-songwriter 
music. TYCs also made significant contributions to the tackling of security and conflict 
problems, such as racketeering, and organised mutual visits of largely mono-ethnic 
communities and inter-regional exchange between youth from the city and rural areas. While 
this network and its institutional infrastructure expanded further into the country-side, it also 
confronted issues that lay beyond its capacity to address, such as the incapacitation of social 
institutions that leave poor families and especially ‘social orphans’ increasingly helpless. 
Although TYCs and other youth sector NGOs organised significant efforts of solidarity to such 
vulnerable groups, it became obvious that these issues can only be effectively tackled through 
a more systematic youth policy and other sectoral policies. The NGO network ‘Youth Policy 
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in Action’ was about to initiate a national level dialogue in this area, but significant results 
thereof and indications as to whether and how youth vulnerability can be addressed remain to 
be seen.  
 In chapter VII, I examined the question about the possibility of a successful national 
level mobilisation of a progressive policy agenda through the example of the NGO network 
Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ (CURR, Ru. Grazhdanskii Soiuz ‘Za reformy i resultat’). 
Since its official constitution in 2012 and the successful gathering of over 10,000 signatures for 
its ‘Alternative conception for police reform’, the network had successfully seized influence on 
national level policy-makers and given valuable input that led to the creation of a legal-
normative basis for a substantive reform of the way in which law enforcement organs worked. 
I also showed, however, how key demands for reform remained ignored or rejected – such as 
competitive staff recruitment mechanisms or the more systematic filling of positions with non-
military staff. Given this and other forms of resistance towards a more fundamental reform, the 
Civic Union activists started developing projects to implement their Co-Security 
(SoBezopasnost) approach in pilot communities across the country.  
By analysing the project implementation in two of these communities, I showed how 
cooperation and open debate between law enforcement, local administration, institutional 
leaders and population representatives indeed occurred and led to the devising of more 
appropriate measures for crime prevention and security provision than the police would have 
come up with on its own. However, I have also shown how the local security working groups 
were limited in their abilities to include all of their town residents’ points of view and thus 
embraced at times paternalistic, at times objectifying, exclusionary and potentially overzealous 
approaches towards tackling issues such as juvenile delinquency or violent extremism. This 
illustrated how ‘community policing’ is a useful, but not sufficient ingredient for bringing about 
a situation where security is provided in a holistic manner that prioritises human security over 
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national or particular actors’ interests. Both these limitations of local level ‘community 
policing’ and the seemingly endless altercations with policy makers about the reasons for not 
reforming law enforcement organs more fundamentally, got the CU caught up in its position as 
civil society activist, expert body and knowledge producer who constantly demonstrated its 
strength if not superiority in terms of arguments and expertise but were never elevated to 
become a policy-making authority of their own.  
These three case studies were chosen as illustrations of different configurations of 
societal actors, state agendas and institutional affiliations. LCPCs demonstrated how the state 
attempted to directly create a new institution to coordinate other existing neighbourhood level 
institutions (aksakal courts, women’s councils, imams, etc.) and align them under the local 
administration and internal affairs organs. While LCPCs were often, if not mostly, run and 
sustained by volunteers with a sincere concern to bring peace and deal with challenges in their 
communities, and further attracted funding form international organisations such as Saferworld 
and the Foundation for Tolerance International (FTI), the local administration and internal 
affairs organs retained the last say on the activities of these bodies. A similar logic underlies 
the TYCs, which had been initiated by the OSCE and a Kyrgyzstani NGO and were ultimately 
constituted as part of the Committee for Youth Affairs under the Osh mayor administration and 
subordinated under each Territorial Council, i.e. mayor administration sub-unit in the respective 
city districts.  
While this was the way for the institution to continue its activity in the most effective 
and sustainable way, it is important to note that these voluntary and internationally supported 
acts of building peace, instilling tolerance and peaceful coexistence in fact amount to the 
reproduction of peace and order according to the agendas of the mayor’s administration and 
associated political actors. Whether a racketeering prevention measures or a ‘Kids from our 
courtyard’ event, these activities reproduce the social order of the Kyrgyzstani state and thus 
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present a connecting element between peace and order, on the one hand, and the state or 
government and its agendas, on the other. This becomes even more clear in the case of the Civic 
Union, who are not aligned with the state but from the start of their activity were explicitly 
situated in a liberal civil society milieu. Although the goal of all three entities examined is 
obviously the same – sustainable peace in communities throughout Kyrgyzstan – their 
approaches to reach this goal diverge significantly in that the Civic Union aims to bring about 
a significant transformation of law enforcement agencies, while both TYCs and LCPCs have 
the mission to largely work in their local environment as they encounter it. The difference in 
approaches becomes more clearly understandable through a reflection on how these different 
entities are situated within or against imaginaries of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan 
 
VIII.2 Imaginaries of social order as link between practices and wider statebuilding 
trajectories  
To better make sense of the hybrid and often complex processes, practices and discourses of 
social ordering and peacebuilding feeding into the trajectory of post-liberal statebuilding in 
Kyrgyzstan, I have proposed the use of ‘imaginaries’, understood as mental constructs that help 
to better understand why and how actors make sense of their environment and engage in certain 
discursive and practical actions. Imaginaries offer a more productive and nuanced way of 
understanding the hybridisation of different statebuilding discourses and concepts because, as 
I have argued, they can be understood as a higher order of discourse, as semantic entities that 
lie above and beneath different discourses and which structure thinking and action in more 
subtle ways. Hence, I have suggested that different imaginaries can have composite discourses, 
which add more nuance to the general idea of an imaginary but constitute a coherent system of 
signifiers in themselves. These composite discourses make it possible to conceive of the 
overlap, hybridisation and combination of different imaginaries in statebuilding practices or 
discourses. Based on this basic idea, I set out to answer the research question:    
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How do imaginaries of statebuilding shape community security practices in Kyrgyzstan? 
As I have further argued, the link between imaginaries and practices or discourses of 
community security is a circular one. Imaginaries are conceived of as nodes that filter certain 
societal (both nationally and globally circulating) discourses into the domain of community 
security and peacebuilding and are in turn reproduced and possibly changed in the process.  
 
Imaginaries of social order in Kyrgyzstan  
In chapter IV, I have defined the three key imaginaries of statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan on the 
basis of in-depth analysis of literature – both from the country and beyond – on socio-economic 
and political change in Kyrgyzstan and other post-Soviet states, as well as on the country’s 
history, culture and traditions, and by drawing on media coverage and my own observations 
and interviews during fieldwork. To provide more nuance on the reception and roles of the 
‘liberal peace’ in Kyrgyzstan, I have defined a ‘Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary’ which, I 
propose, structures people’s thinking in regards to the perceived features of Western societies 
and social organisation and possibilities to achieve a similar order and wealth via transition 
towards a capitalist economy, realisation of entrepreneurial visions of personhood and 
strategies and practices of coping with the adversities and failures of such societal 
transformation. I have also shown how this imaginary is historically rooted in what Yurchak 
calls the ‘imaginary West’ and thus reproduces the dialectical tension between idealisation of 
the West as a benchmark for social, political and economic development but, on the other hand, 
foregrounds criticisms of the Western way of life and its supposed lack of morals, spirituality 
and equality (Yurchak 2006: 160).  
Even if inaccurate or over-interpreted, these criticisms inform observable discourses and 
positionings of resistance against Western interference and geopolitical dominance – directed 
mostly at US involvement in the country and wider region. This anti-Westernism is augmented 
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by other discourses emphasising Soviet modernity and ethno-nationalist ideas of Kyrgyzstan’s 
affairs being a prerogative of ethnic Kyrgyz, and more generally anti-colonial sentiments 
rejecting the Soviet legacy and other cooperation all along. They form an imaginary which I 
call ‘politics of sovereignty’ and which I use, based on Gullette and Heathershaw’s proposition 
(2015), to denote acts of defiance vis-à-vis international influences and interference of political 
and societal actors domestically. The use of this label captures the fact that such acts of defiance 
often occur in a discursive and performative register that is situated in historical and more 
widely-circulating discourses and thus rarely appears to go beyond the instance of a ‘political 
act’. A more substantive sovereignty, not only in the sense of political positioning, would, it 
appears, rarely if ever reject international cooperation and involvement given the different 
issues that Kyrgyzstani society is subjected to and dependent on – especially in light of its 
constitution as a largely raw material producer and net receiver of transfers from Moscow 
during Soviet times.94  
 ‘Politics of sovereignty’ is thus used as a partial expression of what is conceived of as 
‘the local’ in other peace and conflict research. The other imaginary capturing local positionings 
is that of ‘tradition and culture’, which is denotes the different discourses and practices that are 
understood to carry forward the Kyrgyz historical heritage and customs. As the 
conceptualisation of this bundle as imaginary and the taking together of two concepts that are 
highly complex and contested on their own suggests, ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’ is here understood 
in an emic way, as it is expressed, understood and practiced by people in Kyrgyzstan. Is not 
intended to proclaim any substantial or scientifically accurate notion of these concepts. I have 
                                                
94 Against this background, substantive sovereignty can only be expected to be generated 
through anti-colonial positionings and economic nationalism which would lead to the 
development of a production base and trade networks enabling the country to accumulate 
capital account surpluses and decrease dependence on migration remittances. This is not to say 
that such a substantive sovereignty is feasible. The path dependency of Kyrgyzstan’s strcutually 
conditioned dependency and relationality with other economic and political actors rather seems 
to present a prime case of the post-liberal governance (Chandler 2010b). 
		329 
shown how composite discourses of this imaginary resonate with the ‘politics of sovereignty’ 
imaginary in that they conceive of Kyrgyz ‘traditional’ Islam as something to be shielded from 
foreign influences of orthodox and supposedly harmful Islam and in that tradition coexisted 
with modes of social organisation and administration in the Soviet period and was even 
instrumentalised for such purposes in the post-Soviet era, as best exemplified by the 
institutionalisation of aksakal courts.  
Tradition and culture in Kyrgyzstan are more than that, however. By further exploring 
research on how traditional practices and understandings permeate life of people in Kyrgyzstan 
and present a source of meaning and a sense of belonging, I demonstrated that these 
understandings can have a profoundly existential and individual aspect which traverses into the 
spiritual domain, where traditional ways of life – derived from Kyrgyz nomadic tradition 
– sustain the harmonic co-existence between humans and nature, as propagated by the outlined 
ecosophical worldview. I have indicated how this spirituality and transcendence resonates with 
the idea of ‘deep relation’, which Shilliam defines as the ‘healing of colonial wounds’ and the 
‘bind[ing] back together [of] peoples, lands, pasts, ancestors and spirits’ (Shilliam 2015: 13) 
after these connections have been disrupted or distorted in imperial modes of modernisation 
and post-Socialist neo-liberal transformation.  
This is not to say that traditions and culture have exclusively positive implications. On 
the contrary, I have shown how, when subject to large-scale application and instrumentalisation 
during late Socialist and capitalist eras, traditional financial support schemes spiralled out of 
proportion and have deepened the indebtedness and destitution of the already badly off (V.1). 
Furthermore, an uncomfortable tension is underlying the indulging into and promotion of 
Kyrgyz tradition as the discourse on this topic exhibits an ontological conception of cultural 
heritage and ethnicity as something that is to be preserved against a supposed threat of 
extinction in a globalised world – a view that does not serve to mitigate, but may rather 
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aggravate ethno-nationalist concerns about the rights and prerogatives of the Kyrgyz ‘titular’ 
ethnicity. Thus, I have shown how the composite discourses of the three imaginaries of 
statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan do not only stand in disagreement but can also be complementary 
and exhibit different emancipatory and problematic tendencies. By exploring the history of anti-
colonial discourse and the spiritual and transhumance aspects of tradition, I have also pointed 
to modes of being, acting and knowing that foreground a more radical approach at social 
organisation and national development, and, as in the latter case, may even reject or stand in 
uncomfortable relation to modernity. These discourses thus indicate the boundaries of the 
practical-discursive field of community security and peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan, which, in its 
attempt to build a secure, peaceful and harmonious environment, is unlikely to embrace such 
radical and post-/anti-modern development stances.  
 
Contestation, synergy, ambiguity 
How did these imaginaries shape the way community security and peacebuilding is done in 
Kyrgyzstan? As I have argued primarily in the discussion sections of chapter V-VII, the 
practices and discourses in the cases of different actors can be seen as different combinations 
and iterations of imaginaries and discourses of statebuilding, where the ‘politics of sovereignty’ 
imaginary largely retained the upper hand. This is already apparent in the discussion of the 
different examined entities’ existence within and constitution by the state – or in opposition to 
the government or parts of the state. LCPCs and TYCs can in this sense be seen as a creation 
or expression of politics of sovereignty, a status inscribed in the laws and decrees ordering their 
creation and charters detailing their work and goals. Even if these institutions are run and 
sustained largely by voluntary activists and international capacity building and financial 
support, the order, peace and security they build is in sync with a state conception of security 
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and thus subject, even though largely implicitly, to the priorities, agendas and interpretations 
of deviance, crime and conflict held by governmental, administrative and internal affairs actors.  
This promotion of a conception of social order, peace, harmony and crime prevention 
premised on governmental and other state actors’ views is largely an unconscious practice, 
which, in Bourdieu’s words ‘goes without saying’ given the historical continuity it presents. 
The habitualisation and normalisation of peacebuilding, community security and crime 
prevention practices is rooted, it can be argued, in the idea of Soviet modernity which surfaced 
in the corresponding discourses in all of the three case studies. It is decisive to understand that, 
while ultimately amounting to an expression of politics of sovereignty, this discourse sits 
comfortably next to other ones, thus enabling a hybridisation of unlikely composites into post-
liberal forms of community security. Most important to mention here is the discourse of the 
‘imaginary West’, which justifies ‘liberal peace’ style peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
activities supported by international agencies and donors, which aim to promote good 
governance, institutional accountability and human rights protection.  
The co-existence of such discourses explains how it is possible that one and the same 
project or set of practices can be seen as realising Western donors’ agendas and the ones of 
national and local powerholders at the same time. As I have demonstrated, such 
contradictoriness can also imply a lack of effectiveness of projects and can render them more 
performative and unable to transform entrenched tensions and conflictual relations between 
different communities or between population and law enforcement, as shown in the analysis of 
‘people’s friendship’-style peacebuilding in chapter V. A similar disagreement of state and 
administrative perspectives on the one hand and those of civil society and the wider population 
on the other was apparent in chapter VI, where a more systematic approach at tackling problems 
faced by youth in Kyrgyzstan was seen to be necessary and demanded in different ways. The 
contestation of differing conceptions of institutional design and how it can and should maintain 
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social order was most apparent in the confrontation between the activists of the Civic Union 
and government/policy-makers in chapter VII.  
Given that all three actors examined, and their respective agendas and interests, were 
situated in the imaginaries of statebuilding, it can be concluded that one way in which these 
imaginaries shaped the practices and discourses of statebuilding – whether in the form of 
creation of institutions from scratch, reform or (re-) production of social order after 
state/government-centric blue prints – was through contestation. The idea of contestation 
between different actors is not new, but conceiving of this contestation through the lens of the 
three imaginaries helps to better grasp the complex, hybrid and heteroglossic nature of these 
contestations. Previous debates on ‘post-liberal’ and ‘hybrid forms of peace’ and their critiques 
have exhibited difficulties of conceiving of the hybrid identities of actors. The proposition of 
this research is to shift the focus towards implicit mental constructs that inform different actors’ 
positions as to what kind of order, peace or state is to be built. The use of the ‘politics of 
sovereignty’ imaginary has allowed me to show how local and national administrators and 
policy-makers may not categorically deny the idea of reform, policy and practice along Western 
lines. However, they may disagree about the speed with which such change is to be brought 
about or the conditions and specific areas under/in which it happens. Rather than dismissing 
such a stance as regressive ‘local resistance’, it is important to analyse it in a nuanced way and 
to capture how it thrives on and becomes part of international structures and flows to fortify 
selectively and performatively reformed ways of building peaceful and secure communities 
(see next section).  
‘Politics of sovereignty’ agendas and actors will not only enter pragmatic alliances and 
cooperation with Western ‘liberal peace’ actors. Both they and other imaginaries exhibit 
comprehensive potential for synergy, which the second modality of relation between 
imaginaries of statebuilding. The most significant example in this vein is the synergy between 
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‘politics of sovereignty’ and the ‘tradition and culture’ imaginary.95 Unpacking this intertwined 
relationship and showing how tradition is in many ways instrumentalised by political actors, as 
was done in Beyer’s analysis of the role of aksakals in political life (2016), shows how 
imaginaries of statebuilding can be combined in thoroughly synergetic ways. The 
institutionalisation of aksakal courts, as well as of LCPCs, which act as an umbrella for aksakals 
and other Soviet era social institutions (see chapter V), was also supported by international 
capacity-building and financial support, showing the high potential for a synergetic 
hybridisation of ‘politics of sovereignty and ‘tradition and culture’ imaginaries, on the one 
hand, with the ‘Western liberal peace’ imaginary of statebuilding, on the other.  
In chapter VII, I have demonstrated that even the Civic Union, which had a generally 
critical and controversial stance vis-à-vis government, internal affairs and administration actors, 
managed to draw on this synergetic potential by forging constructive dialogue in different 
communities and by charting an agenda of providing security and preventing crime in sync with 
both more liberal and human rights-focused perspectives and Soviet, paternalistic 
understandings. The activists also drew on a patriotic register in saying that actively 
participating in community security groups ultimately serves to ‘build a decent country’, an 
invocation that can be situated in or close to the ‘politics of sovereignty’ imaginary and explains 
the appeal of the networks’ efforts for law enforcement and local administration staff.  
The analysis of local security working groups’ activity also exhibited that the synergy 
of imaginaries of statebuilding thrives on, and is partly even only possible thanks to, the 
ambiguity of the discussed hybrid practices and discourses of community security, peace- and 
statebuilding. With the limited amount of time and resources allocated to the community 
                                                
95 Even though I have shown that ‘tradition and culture’ are fare more complex and even 
foreground modalities of life that reject modern statehood and capitalist development, the 
current regime and form of statehood are so frequently and intensely intertwined with 
discourses, practices and everyday institutions of Kyrgyz tradition that it may indeed be hard 
to separate the two, as I have indicated. 
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security project in the piloting localities, there was only little scope to discuss the potential and 
obvious caveats of the working groups’ attempts to analyse security issues and devise measures 
to solve them. Thus, while the project fulfilled the purpose of demonstrating that the ‘Co-
Security’ approach can make a decisive difference on the local level, a more fundamental 
reflection on the exclusionary and potentially faulty attempts to analyse and tackle violent 
extremism in community 2, and the role of state security services in forming this approach and 
setting the agenda on this front, was deferred into the future cooperation with this community.  
This demonstrates how ambiguity has to be endured by actors if they wish to forge a 
constructive engagement and avoid the confrontation and possible failure of their efforts. I have 
also argued, however, that such a pragmatic and more lenient approach also brings about new 
tension vis-à-vis more radical lines of argument. In the case of the Civic Union, constructive 
engagement with the MIA also carried an association of being in the ‘lion’s den’ and enabling 
a popularisation or legitimisation of internal affairs organs’ actions in instances when they 
accepted the activists’ recommendations. The irresolvable tension between the unwitting 
support of the politics of sovereignty of the government and policy-makers in Bishkek, on the 
one hand, and a more transformative approach situated in the Western ‘liberal peace’ imaginary, 
on the other, captures well the dilemma of the Civic Union network and thus shows how the 
imaginaries of statebuilding provide a useful framework for understanding the condition of 
post-liberal statebuilding. As a final, overarching answer to the initial research question, How 
do imaginaries of statebuilding shape community security practices in Kyrgyzstan?, it can be 
concluded that through the different modalities of contestation and (ambiguous) synergy, 
imaginaries of statebuilding serve to further entrench community security in a post-liberal 
trajectory of statebuilding, the implications of which I discuss in turn.   
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VIII.3 Post-liberal statebuilding in Central Asia 
The key contribution of this research is to show how the forms of statebuilding shaped through 
the interaction of imaginaries of social order and community security practices present a new 
configuration of the international political economy, international governance institutions and 
organisations and the dynamics of interaction between national governments, local 
administrations, civil society and local populations they produce. In chapter II, I have reviewed 
how this shift is situated primarily in a shift towards post-liberal governance since the end of 
the Cold War, which denotes the distinct nature of the set of international obligations and 
expectations faced by countries constituting themselves as independent or emerging from 
internal conflict or previously ‘undemocratic’ rule (Chandler 2010b). Since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, its successor countries were also confronted with these conditionalities, 
standards and blue prints for rebuilding their polities and transforming societies down to the 
way of thinking and living one’s life. This integration of post-Soviet states into the liberal world 
order has produced few success cases in terms of political and economic development and, 
given the dire conditions and fundamental uncertainty suffered by the majority of people in the 
post-Soviet space, has led to a very selective and reluctant adoption of liberal-democratic 
standards in some countries and different degrees of rejection in others.  
 The past 25 years in Kyrgyzstan present a prime example for the vagaries of transition 
and how the fatigue with Western-style reforms has led to a hybrid, post-liberal form of 
governance, social organisation, administration and also peacebuilding and security policies 
and practices. The first feature of post-liberal politics in the post-Soviet space, I have argued in 
chapter III, is the widespread technocratic and ‘state of emergency’ kind of policy-making, 
which leaves little time for deliberation, dissent or alternative proposals. The resulting top-
down mode of governance is justified and normalised as inevitable both in light of the 
precarious conditions of the global economy, but often also with reference to the cultural 
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specificities of the respective country or region. In my analysis of the Western ‘liberal peace’ 
imaginary, I have shown how this trajectory is foreshadowed by the teleological way of 
perceiving the national economy and its regional and global integration.  
Thus, and based on a routine perception of Soviet-era technocratic policy-making, 
people focus on how companies and individuals can best adapt to economic conditions instead 
of publicly engaging in or initiating debate on economic policy-making and regulation. 
Although a lot of trust in politics has been lost and nowadays people are aware that elites are 
unlikely to bring about radical change to how their country is positioned, this does not mean 
that more public debate is occurring. Rather, people try to secure their existence by having the 
right networks for developing their business or receiving support in hard times and leave 
engagement with politics to a select few. This makes for harmony among those who are able to 
make a good living under adverse conditions but, for many smallholders and the gradually 
increasing unemployed population, inappropriate economic and social policies have entrenched 
their precarious living conditions.  
Community security and peacebuilding actors and practices come into play in situations 
where the destitution and dependence of people on domestic of international labour migration 
lead to issues of theft, deviance, violence and mental illness. I have shown how LCPCs and 
TYCs can often only do little but try to mediate or mobilise help and solidarity in case of 
domestic and neighbourhood conflicts emanating from ‘badly-off families’ (neblagopoluchnye 
semi). More systematic action to tackle the reasons for widespread poverty and destitution, 
beyond promoting better education and better attitudes among youth to shield them from such 
trajectories, seems to be beyond the scope of these community security institutions. The 
autonomisation and responsibilisation of local administrations and community security actors 
in this sense further facilitates the entrenchment of post-liberal technocratic policy-making, 
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which benefits a select few while community security volunteers call people to be virtuous and 
perseverant in face of the challenge of survival and social reproduction.   
 This pattern is further entrenched as calls for more accountability and more equitable 
policies are rejected as forms of Western or Western-backed intervention or interference 
through discourses situated in the ‘politics of sovereignty’ imaginary. These are especially 
salient – both in Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries and beyond – when justified 
with cultural and geographical specificity, such as with references to the nomadic tradition 
which was used to justify a supposedly specifically Kyrgyz variant of ‘consultative democracy’ 
(Bakiev, see Omelicheva 2015: 83). On the other hand, critiques of political processes in 
Kyrgyzstan often appear to be framed in too Western-centric terms such as ‘corruption’ or 
‘crime’ which, even if technically correct, make it easy for elites to brandish commentators and 
reassert their dominance.  
Put bluntly, the idea of explicit criticism and controversial debate is simply not well 
established in politics in Kyrgyzstan, a fact well illustrated by the alienation the Civic Union 
caused with their critiques of the state of law enforcement organs. If criticism (kritika) should 
better be minimised or not be voiced at all, it becomes obvious that different projects and 
activities as they have been analysed in this research only present one layer of the reality of 
community security and peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan. This might be understandable given the 
first-hand experience of physical violence by people in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010, and by 
Bishkek’s inhabitants on the occasions of two revolutions in 2005 and 2010. It appears equally 
clear, however, that the more fundamental social problems underlying tensions and conflict 
cannot be addressed without allowing an explicit debate about what is going on in the country 
and what can be done better. In this sense, statebuilding in Kyrgyzstan and the region is post-
liberal as ideas of explicit criticism, debate and a multiplicity of interests are usually 
disfavoured. Rather, both policy-makers and people working in local administrations and 
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security working groups prefer to stress the adverse conditions they face, the relative success 
they have achieved, and the difficulty of affecting more fundamental change.  
This leads to the third element of post-liberal social ordering as I observed it in my 
research. Rather than merely rendering the question about the desirability of debate and 
criticism subject to cultural and national belonging, in some interactions that I have surveyed it 
became obvious that the status of expertise, knowledge and even facts and ‘truth’ became 
contested and viewed differently depending on people’s positions. This concerns mostly the 
altercations between the Civic Union and ministerial and governmental decision makers, in 
which unclear reasons were given for such decisions as for example the maintenance of the 
secrecy protection of data on law enforcement bodies. There might indeed be reasonable 
justifications for such decisions but instead of putting any such forward, the officials in Bishkek 
not rarely resort to simply defending their line in a rhetoric position battle rather than engaging 
in a substantive debate. This was also reflected in the responses to the CU that their lack of 
expertise and experience of working in law enforcement or military organs disqualifies them 
from understanding, let alone shaping policies in the law enforcement sector. Sluggish or non-
reform has persisted despite the over-burdening amount of project activity and the evidence 
delivered by the CU that more substantive reform is possible and necessary. This interaction 
thus presents an epistemic shift from the neo-liberal episteme foregrounding discussion and 
conceptualisation on commonly accepted facts and frameworks to a post-liberal episteme, 
where knowledge is recognised as relevant or true only insofar as it supports the agendas of a 
given actor.  
A final reflection is necessary in regard to these seemingly tenuous attempts to reject 
expertise on law enforcement and community security reform or to withstand the idea of using 
criticism and open debate to bring about more progressive politics and social relations. These 
forms of resistance appear to emanate from the internationalised condition in which Kyrgyzstan 
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is constituted since 1991 and which have exposed it to a host of influences and agendas. This 
has brought about an ‘assemblage’ state of which different parts of governance, administration, 
the economy and other domains are outsourced to international actors or internationally 
supported and funded actors, such as the Civic Union but also LCPCs and TYCs, albeit in 
different ways. The frontier at which control over decisions and agendas is asserted in this 
situation now runs through the very activities, projects, practices and discourses of these actors. 
It is not surprising that they exposed different degrees of subordination to and alignment with 
governmental, local administrative or internal affairs priorities, as such positioning appeared to 
potentially be the license for these actors to exist in the first place. Post-liberal statebuilding is 
thus a condition in which the constellation of actors, practices and discourses that (re-) produces 
state-sanctioned social order is internationalised and shaped by geographically, culturally and 
historically specific imaginaries, whose equilibrium informs the degree to which statebuilding 
can become radical and deviate from a premediated path. In the final section, I critically reflect 
on the implications of this shift towards post-liberalism through the lenses of governmentality 
and decoloniality.  
 
VIII.4  Governmentality and decolonial entry points for peace, conflict and intervention 
analysis  
The fourth objective I set in the Introduction was to use the critical normative concepts of 
governmentality and decoloniality to evaluate the instantiation and reproduction of regressive 
forms of social order and hierarchy in the practices and processes examined. The idea behind 
this is to go beyond a mere theorising of post-liberal statebuilding and related processes in 
Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia. As the critical debates examined in chapter II have indicated, 
peace, conflict and intervention researchers need to acknowledge that they become complicit 
with the current global order if they confine themselves to looking at current events and possible 
future pathways through an academic and theoretical perspective only. Rather, the depth and 
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entrenchment of inequality, hierarchy, exclusion and violence need to be inquired with as much 
contextual perspective as possible, so as to identify possible entry points for challenging 
existing conditions and devising new ways of building peaceful and just societies.       
 My contribution to this agenda is a tracing of governmentality and decoloniality in the 
different concepts and approaches through which peace, conflict and intervention can be 
researched – namely, imaginaries and community security (chapter III); to the imaginaries of 
discourses of statebuilding that I have identified as key in Kyrgyzstan (chapter IV); to the 
practices of community security and peacebuilding which were situated in these imaginaries 
and contributed to their enactment and reproduction (chapters V-VII). In so doing, I have not 
used these concepts in order to simply criticise as inadequate or distorted the respective 
imaginaries, discourses and practices. Rather, I have tried to show how the dialectic between 
governmentality (or, coloniality, see Mignolo 2011) and decoloniality is paramount throughout 
space – as community security practices exhibited problematic exclusionary and essentialising 
tendencies in their application in Anglo-America, as well – and time – as governmentality is a 
modality rooted in the historical modes of social ordering and the habitualisation and 
normalisation of the violence and injustice they bring about.  
 In the Kyrgyzstani case, this reproduction of internally established forms of hierarchy, 
exclusion and inequality was especially apparent in relation to the role of Soviet modernity in 
structuring civil society and voluntary engagement. Being active in the community and 
contributing to the solution of its problems is seen – both now and in Soviet days – as a high 
value in itself and is thus also perceived as moral obligation or expectation towards elderly 
and/or people who are well-off. The extra labour that voluntary communal workers invest also 
often puts them in a position of arbiter between the population and the local or higher-level 
administration, law enforcement and security organs. Especially in the event that potentially 
problematic residents or groups of residents are hard to access or not ready for conversation, or 
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when decisions are hard to take and contested, voluntary local groups and social institutions 
become constituted as the defenders and upholders of government or local administration 
policy, unless they challenge the latter themselves. The Local Crime Prevention Centres 
examined in chapter V, territorial youth councils in chapter VI and community security working 
groups in chapter VII thus become decisive actors in the new governmentalisation of the 
community, which Rose described as follows:  
Community, rather than the ‘social’ is the new territorialisation of political thought, the 
new way in which conduct is collectivised ... in a double movement of autonomisation 
and responsibilisation. Once responsibilised and entrepreneurialised, they would govern 
themselves within a state-secured framework of law and order (1999b: 475). 
The decisive aspect facilitating this autonomisation, responsibilisation and thus 
governmentalisation is the work of imaginaries of statebuilding, through which the promotion 
and implementation of governmental, local administration and other agendas is secured in non-
obvious ways and not rarely packaged as that which is, by all measures of appropriateness, the 
right thing to do. This way, promoting tolerance through the ‘people’s friendship’ approach 
despite deep cleavages between mono-ethnic communities (V.3), tackling racketeering or 
devising restrictive measures against religious radicalism (VI.2), and re-creating events and 
platforms which would introduce local youth with past achievements and civilisational virtues 
(VII.3) all seemed to be perfectly reasonable solutions to community security problems. At the 
same time, however, they also served, even if unwittingly, to reproduce the current order, 
stabilise existing hierarchies and distracted from ways to deal with the more fundamental causes 
of insecurity, crime and violence.  
 As a counter-pole to governmentality, and in place of the concepts usually used in peace, 
conflict and intervention studies to think about progressive change (most frequently 
‘emancipation’ and ‘agency’), I have introduced the concept of decoloniality. Being aware that 
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it is unlikely to come across a decolonial ‘political project’ or forms of decolonial political 
‘subjecthood’, I approached decoloniality as a diffuse, amorphous form of being, acting and 
knowing, which is often only faintly present in the narratives and practices observable in 
people’s lifeworlds. Analogously, I have shown how Castoriadis and other theorists could find 
little indication that radical social and political practice and thinking were possible, at least as 
long as the ‘social imaginary’ is embedded and fully conditioned by modernity and 
Enlightenment worldviews (III.3).  
Correspondingly, decoloniality was only sometimes faintly imaginable, let alone 
observable in the community security and peacebuilding initiatives examined in the empirical 
chapters. It can be seen to be underlying attempts to bring back together people from different 
ethnic communities in Bazar-Korgon analysed in chapter V. In chapter VI, young people’s 
efforts to bring together their peers from separate parts of the same town, or across the distance 
between the urban centres and faraway mountainous areas, and the attempts to organise 
networks and common efforts to help the needy, present the empathy and readiness to accept 
others as equal counter-parts which is characteristic of decoloniality. Furthermore, the Civic 
Union’s efforts to help people from rural localities across Kyrgyzstan to form groups and find 
better ways to provide security in their towns can be seen as inspired by a decolonial sentiment. 
Ultimately, however, all these initiatives are situated within the institutions, practices and 
knowledges associated with the Kyrgyzstani nation state and the modern social system, and are 
thus liable to reproduce the colonial tendencies of ordering, hierarchising, stratification and 
subjugation, even if indirectly and unintentionally.  
Why is decoloniality strictly defined absent from the different community security and 
peacebuilding practices examined? Why not use a broader definition of decoloniality as 
extension of the ‘emancipatory’ or ‘empowering’ trajectories that other scholars in peace, 
conflict and intervention studies have tried to uncover in recent years? The point of this 
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analytical strategy, of defining decoloniality as an extreme, radically critical vantage point from 
which to look into the processes of social ordering and statebuilding is to acknowledge and 
enunciate the ‘coloniality of being’ as it pervades life in the current late capitalist period, as 
well the historical processes of the production of this coloniality. In the context of Central Asia, 
this means to acknowledge the historical forms of oppression and governing of people by way 
of creating hierarchies and divisions between them while providing frameworks that 
communicate an equality among supposed equals and common future goals, as well as the 
contemporary materialisations of the epistemic frameworks underlying these governing 
approaches (Tlostanova 2010, 2012).  
Much in the same way as critical criminology and governmentality scholars have 
examined community safety and crime prevention debates in Western Europe and North 
America (see III.3), the point of my analysis was to show how local level security and 
peacebuilding initiatives cannot be seen as more inclusive or potentially emancipatory than 
their supposedly more top-down, state-sanctioned equivalent. Rather, what this research tried 
to show is that even people who take the responsibility and investment to define and deal with 
security concerns in their community are liable to develop constrained and exclusionary 
perspectives and corresponding security and peacebuilding measures. Once again, the point is 
not to say that people are necessarily unaware of these shortcomings. It is to show how given 
the limited possibilities of building peaceful and secure communities available, people choose 
to engage in these potentially exclusionary and not quite perfect ways of doing something, 
rather than doing nothing. While this is understandable in the cases examined, it is equally 
important to point out how the aggregation of the examined initiatives and many more can lead 
to such levels of exclusion and marginalisation that the overall trajectory this feeds into is one 
of conflict management and neo-authoritarian governmentality and not peacebuilding and 
security provision. While decolonial ways of being, acting and knowing might exist in the 
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interstices of the capitalist-colonial nation-state system in which the examined initiatives 
operate, it seems that more large-scale, radical forms of decoloniality are only possible in 
localities that are to an extent ‘de-linked’ from this system and thus sufficiently independent of 
its imperatives and modes of operation (Mignolo 2007).     
In chapter IV, I indicated how the discourse (and practice) on spirituality and 
transhumance rooted in Kyrgyz traditions presents ways to approximate decoloniality. The 
ecosophical worldview, taking unity with and wholesomeness of nature and the connection of 
practices and life-styles with those of previous generations as central premise resembles, I have 
argued, Shilliam’s concept of ‘deep relation’ (Shilliam 2015, see above). Both in this chapter 
and the empirical ones, I have also shown how a realisation of this potential is limited and 
distorted by the way in which tradition and culture have been instrumentalised – first during 
the transformation of Central Asia into national Soviet republics and then in the post-Soviet 
period of independence – to mobilise, order and structure society after the needs of the nation 
state system and (state) capitalist production. There still is potential of decolonial knowledge 
and action that my analysis could only point at, such as the existence of spiritual and traditional 
concepts in domestic and social life, which seems to be escaping the instrumentalisation and 
commodification problematised above. These potentials need to be explored in future research 
however, for which I indicate further directions in turn.    
 
VIII.5  Towards a decolnial agenda in peace research in Central Asia and beyond 
Three aspects of this research are especially worth pointing out for the future of peace, conflict 
and intervention research – decolonial or otherwise – in Central Asia but also beyond. They 
require addressing also for the purpose of indicating possible alternative ways of approaching 
the research presented here. Throughout the project, I have adapted its scope to the changing 
circumstances in the field and during the process of interpreting and writing up the data. Various 
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ways of doing this research otherwise have emerged which I needed to leave unexplored. On 
the other hand, I also made the choice to leave the scope of this thesis more exploratory and not 
go down specific avenues of theorisation and analysis in more exclusive manner – a decision 
which may at times have led to cloud the conclusions for the different bodies of scholarship I 
seek to contribute to. I have nevertheless decided to maintain the orientation of the thesis as it 
is because my goal is to connect loose ends of scholarship in peace, conflict and intervention 
studies, decolonial theory and Central Asian post-Soviet studies.  
 A first avenue for further inquiry is clearly identifiable in the methodological and 
general approach to research. As I have explained in the introduction, a multi-sited approach at 
inquiring a range of organisations and initiatives – through interviews, participatory observation 
and cooperative research – proved the most practical and comfortable way for me to gather as 
much data as possible. It also served to establish a relative distance to my research partners, 
which allowed me (and partners) to reflect on and preliminarily analyse the interactions and 
data gathered in each case study. On the other hand, it also precluded a more in-depth data 
gathering and mutual reflection on the process. It also meant that agreeing on my analytical 
conclusions necessitated tedious exchanges and discussions of drafts via email and Skype; a 
process that is still underway with research partners in all three areas.  
An alternative for this and future research is to establish intense partnership with only 
one organisation/initiative and work on establishing a common vision of the outcomes of the 
research already during the field research itself. In this sense, feedback and discussion of 
research content should ideally be planned as part of field research itself, although this is also 
difficult given the significant amount of time that it requires on part of the researcher to prepare 
preliminary drafts. Another pathway in this direction would be more classically anthropological 
research, which would inquire the ways in which peace, security and social order are produced 
in people’s everyday conduct and communal activism. Such an ‘anthropology of security’ 
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(Maguire et al. 2014) could unpack in more depth and nuance the dilemmas and ambiguities 
faced by people engaging in community security and peacebuilding practices. On the other 
hand, as I have argued in chapter II (see also Lottholz 2017b), anthropological inquiry into 
peace, conflict and intervention also requires more critical reflection as to the ways in which it 
may be complicit in reproducing the categorisations, divisions of labour and epistemic 
frameworks that underlie the current global order. It seems high time to confront and overcome 
the – usually implicit – ideas about the neutral ethnographer who can accurately capture things 
and does not require further dialogue and discussions with their subjects. The practice-based, 
cooperative and dialogical approach I have developed is intended to mitigate the one-way street, 
unilateral and often extractive logics of data gathering underlying much anthropological 
research and ethnographic inquiry into peace, conflict and intervention.  
 This leads to another concern about capturing dynamics of peace, conflict and 
intervention more accurately and in depth. Besides questions about data gathering, analysis and 
the lack of feedback and discussion thereof, there is also a question about the sources and 
material used by researchers. Given the fact that a lot of research in the field is conducted in 
the classical cases of post-conflict peacebuilding intervention, such as Timor Leste, Sri Lanka, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, it is questionable to what extent 
such inquiries can draw on the full range of knowledge available in these countries. An in-depth 
‘ethnographic preparation’ – i.e. getting to know the context by reading material on the context 
from a range of disciplines and sources, including domestic ones (Millar 2014a: ch. 4) – is not 
only time-intensive but also requires knowledge of language and area-studies and domestic 
scholarship which is simply too vast to be fully accessed by the primarily political science and 
IR scholars in the field.  
On a basic level, this indicates the need for a synthesis of peace, conflict and 
intervention studies with area studies and various disciplinary fields which produce grounded 
		347 
knowledge on a respective context. The corresponding fiction that better understanding 
dynamics in a country is merely a matter of accessing the vast library of scholarship on it in 
different languages is to be avoided, however. Rather, a synthesis is to be forged with ongoing 
processes of knowledge production in the respective localities, so that research on them is able 
to capture the contestations around the ways a place, its history, people and ways of life are 
portrayed by different disciplines and genres. In concrete terms, this means that social inquiry 
into a specific country has to engage with ongoing debates in academic, political, societal and 
civil society and activist realms.  
This thesis has partly accomplished this by basing the analysis imaginaries of 
statebuilding and their manifestations (chapters IV, V) on contributions to domestic debates on 
the role of traditional knowledge in society and everyday life (Botokanova 2015) or the 
anthropology of late capitalism in Central Asia (Kapalova 2015, see also Botoeva 2015), among 
others. To further explore the potential for decolonial ways of knowing and acting, especially 
in the context of the region’s Soviet history, discussions about the ways to understand this 
heritage (Mamedov and Shatalova 2016) and ways of recovering the radical, emancipatory, 
futuristic and utopian potential of Communism (Mamedov and Shatalova 2015, 2014, 
Shatalova and Mamedov 2016, Nurulla-Khodjaeva 2016, Abashin 2015) present intellectual 
engagements that share many concerns with decolonial theory and in fact partly identify its 
potentials in Central Asia. Other aspects that require further analysis in light of previous 
contributions are the gender dimensions of peace, security and order in the Central Asian 
context (Tlostanova 2010, Kamp 2011) and a detailed analysis of the spread and sophistication 
of decentralisation of governance and security leading to the responsibilisation and 
autonomisation of community level structures throughout the region (e.g. Sulmon 2017, 
Nurulla-Khodjaeva 2012, 2011, Sievers 2002).  
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This research is based on these and other analyses of the historical processes of the 
creation, consolidation and normalisation of state institutions and the associated ethnic, 
professional, gender and other identities which foreground dynamics of coexistence, peace, 
conflict and violence in the contemporary period. Instead of drawing a heuristic and functional 
picture foregrounding concise conclusions and recommendations as to what is to be done, I 
have attempted to provide an in-depth study of the complexity and heteroglossia of 
statebuilding, peacebuilding and community security and the post-liberal trajectory they have 
embarked on.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
		349 
Bibliography 
 
Abashin, S. (2015) Советский кишлак. Между колониализмом и модернизацией [The 
Soviet village: Between colonialism and modernisation], Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe 
Obozrenie.  
Ablezova, M., Nazritdinov, E., Rahimov, R. (2008) The impact of migration on elderly people 
Grandparent-headed households in Kyrgyzstan, Social Research Center of American 
University of Central Asia.  
Abrahamsen, R., Williams, M. C. (2011) Security beyond the state: Private security in 
international relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Abraliev, K., Kushchubekova,, J., Musabaeva, A., Giffen, J. (2011) Decentralisation in 
Kyrgyzstan, International NGO Training and Research Centre Report, accessed 13 November 
2017, http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/726/Decentralisation-in-Kyrgyzstan-report-
for-Swiss-Development-Cooperation.pdf  
Abramzon, S. (1990) Киргизы и их этногенетические и историко-культурные связи 
[Kyrgyz people and their ethnic and genetic and historico-cultural ties], Frunze: Kyrgyzstan. 
Adams, L. (2008) Can we apply postcolonial theory to Central Eurasia?, Central Eurasian 
Studies Review, 7(1): 2-7.  
Adler-Nissen, R. (2012) Bourdieu in international relations: Rethinking key concepts in IR, 
London: Routledge. 
Agathangelou, A. M., Ling, L. H. (2009) Transforming world politics: From empire to multiple 
worlds, London: Routledge. 
Aitmatov, C. (1988 [1980]) The day lasts more than a hundred years, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Akaev, A. (2002) Trudnaia doroga k demokratii: Pamiatnoe desiatiletie [Difficult road to 
democracy: A memorable decade], Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia.  
Albrecht, P., Buur, L. (2009) An uneasy marriage: non-state actors and police reform, Policing 
& Society 19(4): 390-405. 
Albrecht, P., Kyed, H. M. (2014) Policing and the politics of order-making, London: Routledge. 
Alexievich, S. (1992) Zinky boys: Soviet voices from the Afghanistan war, London: W. W. 
Norton & Company. 
Alexievich, S. (2016 [2013]) Second-hand time, London: Fitzcarraldo.  
Alisheva, A.  R. (ed.) (2015) Postroenie mira i mezhetnicheskogo soglasia v Kyrgyzstane –  
Posobie dlya islamskogo dukhovenstva OMSU i aktivistov mestnykh soobshestv [Building 
peace and  interethnic understanding in Kyrgyzstan –  A  guide  for  the  Islamic  clergy,  organs 
of  local  self-governance  and  activists  of  local  communities],  Bishkek:  UN Peacebuilding    
Fund. 
Althusser, L. (2008 [1970]) On ideology, London: Verso. 
Alymkulov, E., Kulatov, M. (2001) Local government in the Kyrgyz Republic, in Munteanu, 
I., Popa, V. (eds.) Developing new rules in the old environment, Budapest: Open Society 
Institute Europe, 522-600. 
Amsler, S. (2007) The politics of knowledge in Central Asia: Science between Marx and the 
market, London: Routledge. 
		350 
Andersen, L.R. (2012) Statebuilding as tacit trusteeship: The case of Liberia, in Blieseman de 
Guevara, B. (ed.) Statebuilding and state-formation: The political sociology of intervention, 
London: Routledge, 132-148.  
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined communities: Reflections on the growth and spread of 
nationalism, London: Verso. 
Andersson, R. (2016) Here be dragons: Mapping an ethnography of global danger, Current 
anthropology 57(6): 707-731. 
Appadurai, A. (2002) Deep democracy: Urban governmentality and the horizon of politics, 
Public Culture 14 (1): 21-47. 
Appadurai, A. (1996) Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Art, D. (2012) What do we know about authoritarianism after ten years?, Comparative 
Politics 44(3): 351-373. 
Ashwin, S. (ed.) (2012) Gender, state, and society in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, 2nd ed., 
London: Routledge. 
Aubert, A., Soler, M. (2007) Dialogism: The diagotic turn in the social sciences, in Kincheloe, 
J.L. Horn, R.A. Jr. (eds.) The Praeger handbook of education and psychology, Westport: 
Praeger, 521–529. 
Autesserre, S. (2014) Peaceland: Conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international 
intervention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Azimov, U., Azimov, T. (2009) Discrimination against internal migrants in the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Analysis and recommendations, Social Research Center, Bishkek: American 
University of Central Asia.  
Babajanian, B. (2015) Promoting empowerment? The World Bank’s Village Investment Project 
in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey 34(4): 499-515. 
Bachmann, J., Bell, C., Holmqvist, C. (eds.) (2014) War, police and assemblages of 
intervention, London: Routledge. 
Bagdasarova, N., Marchenko, L. (2017) Resurfaced and disappearing past: National heroes in 
history textbooks of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, in Zajda, J., Tsyrlina-Spady, T., Lovorn, M. 
(eds.) Globalisation and historiography of national leaders: Symbolic representations in school 
textbooks, Dordrecht: Springer, 245-260. 
Baker, B. (2002) Living with non-state policing in South Africa: the issues and dilemmas, 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 40(01): 29-53. 
Bakhtin, M.M. (1981) The dialogic imagination: Four essays by M. M. Bakhtin, ed. Holquist, 
M., trans. Emerson, C., Holquist, M., Austin: University of Texas Press.  
Baktygulov S. (2012) Opportunities for Kyrgyzstan in the modern world, in Nogoibaeva, Ch., 
Iskakova, Ch., Neubauer, A. (eds.) 20 years of democratic development in Kyrgzystan: Internal 
and external perspectives, Bishkek: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.  
Balhorn, L. (2016) Three hours to midnight, Jacobin, 9 July 2016, accessed 17 April 2017, 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/09/germany-die-linke-afd-xenophobia-right-merkel/  
Bargués-Pedreny, P. (2016) From promoting to de-emphasizing ‘ethnicity’: Rethinking the 
endless supervision of Kosovo, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10(2): 222-240. 
		351 
Barkawi, T., Laffey, M. (1999) The imperial peace: democracy, force and globalization., 
European Journal of International Relations, 5(4): 403-434. 
Becker, J. (2004) Lessons from Russia: A neo-authoritarian media system, European Journal 
of Communication 19(2): 139-163. 
Bedelbek kyzy, V. (2015) XI курултай политической партии "Бутун Кыргызстан – Эмгек" 
(список) [The 11th kurultai of the political party ‘Butun Kyrgyzstan – Emgek’], 21 August 
2015, accessed 17 April 2017, 
http://www.gezitter.org/vybory/42784_XI_kurultay_politicheskoy_partii_butun_kyirgyizstan
__emgek_spisok/  
Behr, H. (2014) Politics of difference: epistemologies of peace, London: Routledge. 
Beichelt, T. (2013) Forms of rule in the post-Soviet space: hybrid regimes, in Stewart, S., Klein, 
M., Schmitz, A., Schröder, H.-H. (eds.) Presidents, oligarchs and bureaucrats: Forms of rule 
in the post-Soviet space, Aldershot: Ashgate, 15-28.  
Beishenbek kyzy, E. (2014) V Oshe priostanovlena deiatel’nost’ Freedom House [Freedom 
House’s work is suspended in Osh], Radio Azattyk, 7 October 2014, accessed 17 April 2017, 
http://rus.azattyk.org/a/26624129.html  
Bekmurzaev, N., Lottholz, P., Meyer, J. (2018) Navigating the security implications of doing 
research and being researched: Cooperation, networks, framing, Central Asian Survey, 37(1): 
100-118. 
Bellamy, A. J., Williams, P., (eds.) (2005) Peace operations and global order, London: 
Routledge. 
Bennett, W. (2016) “Everything can be tolerated – except injustice.” Osh: Saferworld, accessed 
17 April 2017, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1050-ldquoeverything-
can-be-tolerated-ndash-except-injusticerdquo  
Berdal, M., Zaum, D. (eds.) (2013) Political economy of statebuilding: Power after peace, 
London: Routledge. 
Bhabha, H.K. (1994) The location of culture, London: Routledge.  
Bhambra, G. K. (2016) Postcolonial reflections on sociology, Sociology 50 (5): 960-966. 
Bhambra, G. K. (2014) Connected sociologies, London: Bloomsbury. 
Beyer, J., Girke, F. (2015) Practicing harmony ideology. Ethnographic Reflections on 
Community and Coercion, Common Knowledge, 21(2): 196-235. 
Beyer, J. (2016) The force of custom: Law and the ordering of everyday life in Kyrgyzstan, 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Beyer, J. (2014) “There is this law...”: Performing the state in the Kyrgyz courts of elders, in 
Reeves, M., Rasanayagam, J., Beyer, J. (eds.) Ethnographies of the state in Central Asia: 
performing politics, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 99-123.  
Beyer, J. (2013) Ordering ideals: accomplishing well-being in a Kyrgyz cooperative of elders, 
Central Asian Survey 32(4): 432-447. 
Beyer, J. (2006) Revitalisation, invention and continued existence of the Kyrgyz aksakal courts: 
Listening to pluralistic accounts of history, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law 38(53-54): 141-176. 
		352 
Biard, A. (2010) The religious factor in the reification of “neo-ethnic” identities in 
Kyrgyzstan, Nationalities Papers 38(3): 323-335. 
Bichsel, C. (2005) In search of harmony: repairing infrastructure and social relations in the 
Ferghana Valley, Central Asian Survey 24(1): 53-66. 
Bierschenk, T., Olivier de Sardan, J-P. (eds.) (2014) States at work. The dynamics of African 
bureaucracies, Leiden: Brill. 
Bigo, D. (2008) Globalized (in)security: The field and the ban-opticon, in Bigo, D., Tsoukala, 
A. (eds.) Terror, insecurity and liberty. Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11, 
Abingdon: Routledge: 10 - 48. 
Björkdahl, A., Höglund, K., Millar, G., van der Lijn, J., Verkoren, W. (eds.) (2016) 
Peacebuilding and friction: Global and local encounters in post conflict societies, London: 
Routledge.  
Bliesemann de Guevara, B., Götze, C. (2012) The statebuilding habitus: UN staff and the 
cultural dimension of liberal intervention in Kosovo, in Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (ed.) State-
building and state-formation – The political Sociology of intervention, London: Routledge, 
198-213. 
Bliesemann de Guevara, B., Kostić, R. (2017) Knowledge production in/about conflict and 
intervention: finding ‘facts’, telling ‘truth’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11(1): 1-
20. 
Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (2012) (ed.) State-building and state-formation: The political 
Sociology of intervention, London: Routledge. 
Boatcă, M. (2007) The eastern margins of empire: coloniality in 19th century 
Romania, Cultural Studies 21(2-3): 368-384. 
Boege V. (2011) Hybrid forms of peace and order on a south sea island: Experiences from 
Bougainville (Papua New Guinéa), in Richmond, O.P., Mitchell, A. (eds.) Hybrid forms of 
peace: From everyday agency to post-liberalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 88-106. 
Boege, V., Brown, M. A., Clements, K. P. (2009) Hybrid political orders, not fragile 
states, Peace Review 21(1): 13-21. 
Bogaards, M. (2009) How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral 
authoritarianism, Democratization 16(2): 399-423. 
Bonacker, T., Daxner, M., Free, J. H., Zürcher, C. (2010) Interventionskultur: Zur Soziologie 
von Interventionsgesellschaften [Intervention culture: On the sociology of intervention 
societies], Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Bond, A. R., Koch, N. R. (2010) Kyrgyzstan, interethnic tensions, and relations with 
Uzbekistan: A political geographic perspective, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 51: 531-
562. 
Borubashov, B. (2015) История государства и права Кыргызской Республики [History and 
laws of the Kyrgyz Republic], vol. 1, Bishkek: Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University. 
Borubashov, B. (2013) Kurultai – otrazhenie kyrgyzskoi  demokratii [The kurultai – a reflection 
of Kyrgyz democracy], Вестник Академии государственного управления при Президенте 
Кыргызской Республики [Journal of the Academy of State Administration under the President 
of the Kyrgyz Republic] 18: 25-31. 
		353 
Botokanova, G.  (2015) Traditsionnye znania kyrgyzov [Traditional knowledge of the  Kyrgyz], 
Bishkek: Kurt-Ber.   
Bourdieu, P. (1979) La distinction: critique sociale du jugement [Difference: A social critique 
of judgement], Paris: Éditions de Minuit. 
Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a theory of practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brogden, M., Nijhar, P. (2005) Community policing: National and international models and 
approaches, London: Willan.  
Broome, A. (2010) The currency of power: The IMF and monetary reform in Central Asia, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Brubaker, R. (2011) Nationalizing states revisited: projects and processes of nationalization in 
post-Soviet states, Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(11): 1785-1814. 
Brubaker, R. (1994) Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet 
Eurasia: An institutionalist account, Theory and society 23(1): 47-78. 
Brunner, C. (2016) Gewalt weiter denken in der Kolnialität des Wissens, in: Ziai, A. (ed.) 
Postkoloniale Politikwissenschaft [Postcolonial political science], Bielefeld: Transcript. 
Brunner, C. (2015) Das Konzept epistemische Gewalt als Element einer transdisziplinaeren 
Friedens- und Konflikttheorie [The concept of espistemic violence in a transdisciplinary theory 
of peace and conflict], in Wintersteiner, W., Wolf, L. (eds.) Friedensforschung in Österreich 
Bilanz und Perspektiven, Klagenfurt: Drava, 38-53.  
Brunner, C. (2014) Kassandras Dilemma–Oder: Was kann Friedens-und Konfliktforschung? 
Vortrag zur Eröffnung des Studienjahrs 2014/15 des Masterstudiengangs 
„Sozialwissenschaftliche Konfliktforschung” der Universität Augsburg [Cassandra’s dilemma 
– or: What is peace and conflict research able to do? Inaugural lecture of the 2014/15 study 
year of the Masters degree ‘Social scientific conflict research’ of the University of Augsburg], 
Accessed 20 October 2017, http://www.presse.uni-
augsburg.de/publikationen/unireden/unireden_pdfs/UR_70_Brunner_FuKF.pdf 
Brusina, O. (2005) Die Transformation der Adat-Gerichte bei den Nomaden Turkestans in der 
zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts [The transformation of adat courts among the nomads of 
Turkestan in the second half of the 19th century], in Kemper, M., Reinkowski, M. (eds.), 
Rechtspluralismus in islamischen Ländern. Gewohnheitsrecht zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft 
[Legal pluralism in Islamic countries. Customary law between state and society], Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 227-253. 
Büger, C., Bethke, F. (2014) Actor-networking the ‘failed state’: an enquiry into the life of 
concepts, Journal of International Relations and Development 17(1): 30-60. 
Büger, C., Gadinger, F. (2015) The play of international practice, International Studies 
Quarterly 59(3): 449-460. 
Büger, C., Gadinger, F. (2014) International practice theory: New perspectives, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Büger, C. (2014) From expert communities to epistemic arrangements: Situating expertise in 
international relations, in Mayer, M., Carpes, M., Knoblich, R. (eds.) The global politics of 
science and technology - Vol. 1: concepts from international relations and other disciplines, 
Berlin: Springer, 39-54.  
Bunce, V. J., Wolchik, S. L. (2011) Defeating authoritarian leaders in postcommunist 
countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
		354 
Burrell, K. (2011) The enchantment of western things: children’s material encounters in late 
socialist Poland, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 36(1): 143-156. 
Cameron, A., Palan, R. (2004) The imagined economies of globalization, London: Sage. 
Campbell, S., Chandler, D., Sabaratnam, M. (eds.) (2011) A liberal peace? The problems and practices 
of peacebuilding, London: Zed Books.  
Canning, E. (2014) The two films inside Kyrgyzstan's 'Kurmanjan Datka', RFE/RL, 20 
December 2014, accessed 17 April 2017, http://www.rferl.org/a/kurmanjan-datka-queen-of-
the-mountains-kyrgyzstan-film/26769501.html  
Cárdenas, M. (2016) Mainstreaming decolonialism? Zum Mehrwert einer dekolonialen FuK, 
Wissenschaft & Frieden, 2016(1): 20-23.  
Carlson, R. (2013) The failure of democratisation in Kazakhstan the role of international 
investment and civil society in impending political reform, in Akyildiz, S., Carlson, R. (eds.) 
Social and cultural change in Central Asia: The Soviet legacy, London: Routledge, 127-144.  
Carothers, T., Ottaway, M. (2000) Introduction: The burgeoning world of civil society aid, in 
Carothers, T., Ottaway, M. (eds.) in Funding virtue: Civil society and democracy promotion, 
Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3–17. 
Castoriadis, C. (1989) ‘Fait et a faire’, Revue Europeenne des Sciences Sociales, 86 (December 
1989): 457-514; ‘Done and to be done’ (1997), in The Castoriadis reader, trans. & ed. Curtis, 
D.A., Oxford: Blackwell.  
Castoriadis, C. (1987) The imaginary institution of society, trans. Blamey, K., Cambridge: 
Polity Press, originally published in 1975 as L'institution imaginaire de la société, Paris: du 
Seuil. 
Castoriadis, C. (1982) The crisis of Western societies, Telos 53: 17-28. 
Central Asian Survey (2007) Special Issue: Locating the (Post-) Colonial in Soviet History, 
26(4): 465-623. (check this doesn’t look right) 
Chandler, D., Reid, J. (2016) The neoliberal subject: Resilience, adaptation and vulnerability, 
New York: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Chandler, D., Richmond, O. (2015) Contesting postliberalism: Governmentality or 
emancipation?, Journal of International Relations and Development 18(1): 1-24. 
Chandler, D., Sisk, T.D. (eds.) Routledge handbook of international statebuilding, London: 
Routledge.  
Chandler, D. (2014a) Resilience and the ‘everyday’: Beyond the paradox of ‘liberal 
peace’, Review of International Studies 1-22. 
Chandler, D. (2014b) Beyond neoliberalism: Resilience, the new art of governing 
complexity, Resilience 2(1): 47-63. 
Chandler, D. (2014c) Resilience: The governance of complexity, London: Routledge. 
Chandler, D. (2013) Peacebuilding and the politics of non-linearity: rethinking ‘hidden’ agency 
and ‘resistance’, Peacebuilding 1(1): 17-32. 
Chandler, D. (2011) The uncritical critique of liberal peace, in Campbell, S., Chandler, D., 
Sabaratnam, M. (eds.) (2011) A liberal peace? The problems and practices of peacebuilding, 
London: Zed Books, 174-190. 
Chandler, D. (2010a) The uncritical critique of ‘liberal peace’, Review of international 
		355 
studies 36(S1): 137-155, reprinted as Chandler (2011) 
Chandler, D. (2010b) International statebuilding: The rise of post-liberal governance, 
Abingdon: Routledge.  
Chandler, D. (2009a) Critiquing liberal cosmopolitanism? The limits of the biopolitical 
approach, International Political Sociology 3(1): 53-70. 
Chandler, D. (2009b) Hollow hegemony: rethinking global politics, power and resistance, 
London: Pluto Press. 
Chandler, D. (2007) The security: development nexus and the rise of ‘anti-foreign 
policy’, Journal of International Relations and Development 10(4): 362-386. 
Chandler, D. (2008) Review essay: Human security: the dog that didn't bark, Security Dialogue 
39(4): 427-438. 
Chandler, D. (2006a) Empire in denial: the politics of state-building, London: Pluto. 
Chandler, D. (ed.) (2006b) Peace without politics? Ten years of international state-building in 
Bosnia, London: Psychology Press. 
Chandler, D. (2004) Constructing global civil society: Morality and power in international 
relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Chandler, D. (2002a) (ed.) Rethinking human rights: Critical approaches to international 
politics, Baskinstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Chandler, D. (2002b) From Kosovo to Kabul (and beyond): Human rights and international 
intervention, London: Pluto Press. 
Chandler, D. (2000) Bosnia: Faking democracy after Dayton, London: Pluto Press. 
Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ (CURR) (2016) Bezopasnost soobsha - Itogi programmy 
po razvitiu sotsialnogo partnerstva v podderzhanii pravoporiadka i profilaktike pravonarushenii 
- finalnyi otchet [Security together – Results of the programme for the development of social 
partnership in support of the rule of law and crime prevention – Final report], Bishkek: CURR 
(2016), accessed 13 November 2017, http://reforma.kg/sites/default/files/analytics/crime-
prevention-report-web.pdf 
Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ (CURR) (2015) ‘Public security. Analysis of the 
situation and prioritiy problems. Preliminary report [Общественная безопасность. Анализ 
ситуации и приоритетные проблемы Сводный отчет по исследованиям в пилотных 
территориях]’, Civic Union ‘For reforms and result’, Bishkek, October 2015, unpublished 
document. 
Clements, K. P., Boege, V., Brown, A., Foley, W., Nolan, A. (2007) State building 
reconsidered: The role of hybridity in the formation of political order, Political Science 59(1): 
45-56. 
Collier, S. J. (2011) Post-Soviet social: Neoliberalism, social modernity, biopolitics, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Collier, S. J., Ong, A. (eds.) (2005) Global assemblages: Technology, politics, and ethics as 
anthropological problems, London: Sage. 
Collins, K. (2006) Clan politics and regime transition in Central Asia, Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
		356 
Comaroff, J., Comaroff, J. L. (1999) Occult economies and the violence of abstraction: notes 
from the South African postcolony, American Ethnologist 26(2): 279-303.  
Comaroff, J., Comaroff, J. L. (1997) Postcolonial politics and discourses of democracy in 
southern Africa: An anthropological reflection on African political modernities, Journal of 
Anthropological Research 53(2): 123-146. 
Comaroff, J., Comaroff, J. L. (1992) Ethnography and the historical imagination, Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
Cooley, A., Sharman, J. C. (2015) Blurring the line between licit and illicit: transnational 
corruption networks in Central Asia and beyond, Central Asian Survey 34(1): 11-28. 
Cooley, A., Snyder, J. (eds.) Ranking the world: Grading states as a tool of global governance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cooper, N. (2007) Review article: On the crisis of the liberal peace, Conflict, Security & 
Development 7(4): 605-616. 
Cooper, N., Turner, M., Pugh, M. (2011) The end of history and the last liberal peacebuilder: 
A reply to Roland Paris, Review of International Studies 37(04): 1995-2007. 
Cornis-Pope, M. (2012) Local and global frames in recent eastern European literatures: 
Postcommunism, postmodernism, and postcoloniality, Journal of Postcolonial Writing 48(2): 
143-154. 
Cox, R. (1981) Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory, 
Millennium 10(2): 126-155.   
Crawford, A. (1998) Community safety and the quest for security: holding back the dynamics 
of social exclusion, Policy Studies 19(3-4): 237-253. 
Das, V., Poole, D. (eds.) (2004) Anthropology in the margins of the state, Santa Fe: School of 
American Research Press. 
Das, V. (2015) Corruption and the possibility of life, Contributions to Indian Sociology, 49(3): 
322-343. 
Dauderstädt, M., Schildberg, A. (2006) Dead ends of transition: Rentier economies and 
protectorates, Campus Verlag. 
de Certeau, M. (1984) The practice of everyday life, trans. Rendall, S., Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
de Herdt, T., Olivier de Sardan, J-P. (eds.) (2015) Real governance and practical norms in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The game of the rules, London: Routledge. 
de Waal, A. (2014) The political marketplace: Analyzing political entrepreneurs and political 
bargaining with a business lens, World Peace Foundation (Seminar Memo), 17 October 2014, 
accessed 17 April 2017, http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2014/10/Political-
Marketplace_de-Waal.pdf  
Denney, L., Jenkins, S. (2013) Securing communities: The what and the how of community 
policing, Overseas Development Institute Background Paper, accessed 17 April 
2017,  https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/8491.pdf  
Denney, L. (2015) Securing communities? Redefining community policing to achieve results, 
ODI Report March 2015, accessed 17 April 2017, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9582.pdf  
		357 
Denskus, T., Kosmatopoulos, N. (2015) Anthropology & peacebuilding: An introduction., 
Peacebuilding 3(3): 219-223. 
Denskus, T. (2007) Peacebuilding does not build peace, Development in Practice 17(4-5): 656-
662. 
DeYoung, A. J. (2010) Embracing globalization: university experiences among youth in 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey 29(4): 421-434. 
DeYoung, A. J. (2007) The erosion of vospitaniye [social upbringing] in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan: Voices from the schools, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40(2): 239-
256. 
Dick, B. (2006) Action research literature 2004-2006: Themes and trends, Action research 4(4): 
439-458. 
Distler, W. (2016) Intervention as a social practice: Knowledge formation and transfer in the 
everyday of police missions, International Peacekeeping 23(2): 326-49. 
Donais, T. (2009) Empowerment or imposition? Dilemmas of local ownership in post-conflict 
peacebuilding processes, Peace & Change 34(1): 3-26. 
Dostal, W. (1972) Declaration of Barbados, in Dostal, W. (ed.) The situation of the Indian in 
South America, Geneva: World Climate Impact Studies Programme, 376–381.  
Doucet, M. G. (2016) Global assemblages of security governance and contemporary 
international intervention, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10(1): 116-132. 
Doyle, M.W. (1986) Liberalism and world politics, American Political Science Review 80(4): 
1151-1169. 
Doyle, M.W. (1983) Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs, Philosophy & Public Affairs: 
205-235. 
Duffield, M. (2010) Risk-management and the fortified aid compound: Everyday life in post-
interventionary society, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4(4): 453-474. 
Duffield, M. (2007) Development, security and unending war: governing the world of peoples, 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Duffield, M. (2001) Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and 
security, London: Zed books. 
Dyner, A., Legieć, A., Rękawek, K. (2015) ISIS and its presumed expansion into Central Asia, 
PISM Policy Paper, 19 (121) 
Edgar, A. L. (2007) Marriage, modernity, and the ‘friendship of nations’: interethnic intimacy 
in post-war Central Asia in comparative perspective, Central Asian Survey 26(4): 581-599. 
Egnell, R., Haldén, P. (eds.) (2013) New agendas in statebuilding: Hybridity, contingency and 
history, London: Routledge. 
Elliott, A. (2002) The social imaginary: A critical assessment of Castoriadis's psychoanalytic 
social theory, American Imago 59(2): 141-170. 
Ellison, G., Pino, N. W. (2012) Globalization, police reform and development: Doing it the 
Western way?, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Engels, B. (2014) Repräsentationen, Diskurse und Machtfragen:Postkoloniale Theorieansätze 
in der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Zeitschrift fuer Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 3(1): 
130-150. 
		358 
Engvall, J., Laruelle, M. (2015) Kyrgyzstan beyond "democracy island" and "failing state": 
Social and political changes in a post-Soviet society, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Engvall, J. (2016) The State as investment market: Kyrgyzstan in comparative perspective, 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Engvall, J. (2011) The state as investment market: An analytical framework for interpreting 
politics and bureaucracy in Kyrgyzstan, PhD Thesis, University of Uppsala, accessed 12 
February 2012, http://www.fergananews.com/archive/2011/kyrg_corruption.pdf 
Engvall, J. (2007) Kyrgyzstan: Anatomy of a state, Problems of Post-Communism 54(4): 33-
45. 
Escobar, A. (2006) Post-development, in Clark, D. (ed.) The Elgar companion to development 
studies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 447-451. 
Escobar, A. (1995) Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third World, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Etzioni, A. (1998) The new golden rule: Community and morality in a democratic society, New 
York: Basic Books. 
Etzioni, A. (1993) The spirit of community: The reinvention of American society, New York: 
Simon and Schuster.  
Exo, M. (2015) Indigene Methodologie als Stachel für die Friedens-und Konfliktforschung, in 
Bös, M., Schmitt, L., Zimmer, K. (eds.) Konflikte vermitteln? Lehren und Lernen in der 
Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Wiesbaden: Springer, 281-304.  
Exo, M. (2009) Die Gewalt der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung und Moeglichkeiten des 
Widerstands, in Imformationsstelle Militarisierung (IMI), Krisenmanagement: 
“Sicherheitsarchitektur” im globalen Ausnahmezustand, documentation of the 12th IMI 
congress, Tubingen: self-published, 42-29. 
Fairclough, N. (1992) Discourse and social change, London: Wiley.  
Farnsworth, K., Irving, Z. (2012) Varieties of crisis, varieties of austerity: social policy in 
challenging times, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 20(2): 133-147. 
Féaux de La Croix, J., Ismailbekova, A. (2014) Ethnographies of belonging and the future in 
Kyrgyzstan. Introduction to themed section of AEER, Anthropology of East Europe Review 
32(2): 1-16.  
Féaux de la Croix, J. (2013a) Grounding mobile ideas: Kyrgyzstani NGO-leaders and the notion 
of knowledge transfer as a source of social cohesion, Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 138(2): 217-
233. 
Féaux de la Croix, J. (2013b) How to build a better future? Kyrgyzstani development workers 
and the ‘knowledge transfer’ strategy, Central Asian Survey 32(4): 448-461. 
Féaux de la Croix, J. (2011) Moving metaphors we live by: Water and flow in the social 
sciences and around hydroelectric dams in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey 30(3-4): 487-502. 
Ferreira, B.R. (1996) The use and effectiveness of community policing in a democracy, in M. 
Pagon (ed.) Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparing firsthand knowledge with 
experience from the West, Ljubljana: College of Police and Security Studies. 
FIDH (International Federation for Human Rights) (2016) Kyrgyzstan women and children 
from Kyrgyzstan affected by migration. An exacerbated vulnerability, Report No 675a, 
		359 
September 2016, accessed 20 October 2017, 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_kyrgyzstan_uk-2-web2.pdf  
Finlay, A. (2015) Liberal intervention, anthropology and the ethnicity 
machine, Peacebuilding 3(3): 224-37. 
Finlay, A. (2010) Governing ethnic conflict: Consociation, identity and the price of peace, 
London: Routledge. 
Fischer, M. (2008) Friedenswissenschaftliche Evaluierungs - und Aktionsforschung, 
Wissenschaft & Frieden, 4: 36-38.  
Fisher, J. (2017) Reproducing remoteness? States, internationals and the co-constitution of aid 
‘bunkerization’ in the East African periphery, Journal of intervention and statebuilding 11(1): 
98-119. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can 
succeed again, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Foucault, M. (2008) The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the Collége De France, 1978-1979, 
ed. by Michel Senellart, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Foucault, M. (2007) Security, population, territory: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-
8, London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-77. 
London: Pantheon Books. 
Franks, J., Richmond, O. P. (2008) Coopting liberal peace-building, Cooperation & Conflict 
43(1): 81-103. 
Fryer, P., Nazritdinov, E., Satybaldieva, E. (2014) Moving toward the brink? Migration in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Central Asian Affairs 1: 171-198.  
Fukuyama, F. (2005) “Stateness” first, Journal of Democracy 16(1): 84-88. 
Fukuyama, F. (2004) State-building: governance and world order in the 21st century, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Fukuyama, F. (1992) The end of history and the last man, New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Gaetz, S. (2004) Safe streets for whom? Homeless youth, social exclusion, and criminal 
victimization, Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 46(4): 423-456. 
Galdini, F. (2016) Kyrgyzstan is manipulating the threat of “terrorism” for its own benefit, 
Muftah, 11 February 2016, accessed  17 April 2017, https://muftah.org/kyrgyzstan-
manipulating-terrorism-threat/  
Ganyeva, N. (2016) Курултай новый - проблемы старые [New kurultai, old problems], 12 
March 2016, accessed 17 April 2017, http://24.kg/perekrestok/28996_kurultay_novyiy_-
_problemyi_staryie/  
Garland, D. (2001) The culture of control: Crime and social order in contemporary society, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Gezitter.org (2015) Прошел курултай партии «Кыргызстан» [The party ‘Kyrgyzstan’ held 
its kurultai], 20 August 2015, accessed 17 April 2017, 
http://www.gezitter.org/vybory/42726_proshel_kurultay_partii_kyirgyizstan/  
Ghani, A. and C. Lockhart (2008) Fixing failed states, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
		360 
Goode, J. P., Stroup, D. R. (2015) Everyday nationalism: Constructivism for the masses, Social 
Science Quarterly 96(3): 717-739. 
Gook, B. (2015) Divided subjects, invisible borders: Re-unified Germany after 1989, London: 
Rowman & Littlefield.  
Gordon, C. (1991) Governmental rationality: An introduction, in Foucault, M., Burchell, G., 
Gordon, C., Miller, P., The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1-52. 
Gordon, P. (1987) Community policing, in Scraton, P. (ed.) Law, order and the authoritarian 
state, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.  
Graef, J. (2015) Practicing Post-liberal peacebuilding: Legal empowerment and emergent 
hybridity in Liberia, Baskingstoke: Palgrave. 
Grävingholt, J., Doerr, B., Meissner, K., Pletziger, S., Rümker, J. V., Weikert, J. (2006) 
Strengthening participation through decentralisation: Findings on local economic 
development in Kyrgyzstan, Bonn: German Development Institute. 
Grimm, S., Lemay-Hébert, N., Nay, O. (2014) ‘Fragile states’: introducing a political concept, 
Third World Quartlery 35(2): 197-209.  
Jones, B. G. (ed.) (2006) Decolonising international relations, New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield.  
Gullette, D., Heathershaw, J. (2015) The affective politics of sovereignty: Reflecting on the 
2010 conflict in Kyrgyzstan, Nationalities Papers 43(1): 122-139. 
Gullette, D. (2010) Institutionalized instability: Factors leading to the April 2010 uprising in 
Kyrgyzstan, Eurasian Review 3: 89-105. 
Gullette, D. (2008) A state of passion: The use of ethnogenesis in Kyrgyzstan, Inner Asia 10(2): 
261-279. 
Gunitsky, S, (2015) Lost in the grey Zone: Competing measures of democracy in the former 
Soviet republics, in Cooley, A., Snyder, J. (eds.) Ranking the world: Grading states as a tool 
of global governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 112-150. 
Gunitsky, S. (2014) From shocks to waves: Hegemonic transitions and democratization in the 
twentieth century, International Organization 68(03): 561-597. 
Gupta, A. (1995) Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and 
the imagined state, American Ethnologist 22(2): 375-402. 
Hale, C. R. (ed.) (2008) Engaging contradictions: Theory, politics, and methods of activist 
scholarship, Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Hale, C. R. (2006) Activist research vs. cultural critique: Indigenous land rights and the 
contradictions of politically engaged anthropology, Cultural anthropology 21(1): 96-120. 
Hameiri, S. (2010) Regulating Statehood: State building and the transformation of the global 
order, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Hameiri, S. (2007) Failed states or a failed paradigm? State capacity and the limits of 
institutionalism, Journal of International Relations and Development 10(2): 122-149. 
Hansen, T. B., Stepputat, F. (eds.) (2001) States of imagination: ethnographic explorations of 
the postcolonial state, Durham: Duke University Press. 
		361 
Hansen, T. B., Stepputat, F. (eds.) (2005) Sovereign bodies: Citizens, migrants, and states in 
the postcolonial world, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hardenberg, R. (2017) Introduction. The study of socio-cosmic fields, in Hardenberg, R. (ed.) 
Approaching ritual economy: Socio-cosmic fields in globalised contexts, RessourcenKulturen, 
vol. 4, Tubingen: Collaborative Research Centre 'ResourceCultures', 7-36. 
Harrison, G. (2001) Post-conditionality politics and administrative reform: Reflections on the 
cases of Uganda and Tanzania, Development and Change 32(4): 657-679. 
Harrowell, E. (2015) From monuments to mahallas:  contrasting memories in the urban 
landscape of Osh, Kyrgyzstan, Social & Cultural Geography 16(2): 203-225.  
Haugen, A. (2003) The establishment of national republics in Soviet Central Asia, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Heathershaw, J., Cooley, A. (2015) Offshore Central Asia: An introduction, Central Asian 
Survey 34(1): 1-10. 
Heathershaw, J., Herzig, E. (eds.) (2013) The transformation of Tajikistan: The sources of 
statehood, London: Routledge. 
Heathershaw, J., Lambach, D. (2008) Introduction: Post-conflict spaces and approaches to 
statebuilding, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2(3): 269-289. 
Heathershaw, J. (2014) The global performance state: A reconsideration of the Central Asian 
“weak state”, in Reeves, M., Rasanayagam, J. Beyer, J. (eds.) Ethnographies of the state in 
Central Asia: Performing politics, Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 29-54. 
Heathershaw, J. (2013) Towards better theories of peacebuilding: beyond the liberal peace 
debate, Peacebuilding 1(2): 275-282.  
Heathershaw, J. (2012) Conclusions-neither built nor formed-the transformation of post-
conflict states and international intervention, in Blieseman de Guevara, B. (ed.) Statebuilding 
and state-formation: The political sociology of intervention, London: Routledge, 246-259. 
Heathershaw, J. (2011) The practical representation of peacebuilding: An (auto) ethnography 
of programme evaluation in Tajikistan, in Richmond, O. P., Mitchell, A. (eds.) Hybrid forms of 
peace: From everyday agency to post-liberalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 162-188.  
Heathershaw, J. (2010) Central Asian statehood in post-colonial perspective, in Kavalski, E. 
(ed.) (2010) Stable outside, fragile inside? Post-Soviet statehood in Central Asia, Farnham: 
Ashgate, 71-86. 
Heathershaw, J. (2009) Post-conflict Tajikistan: The politics of peacebuilding and the 
emergence of legitimate order, London: Routledge. 
Hehir, A. (2011) Hyper-reality and statebuilding: Baudrillard and the unwillingness of 
international administrations to cede control, Third World Quarterly 32(6): 1073-1087.  
Hehir, A. (2006) Autonomous province building: identification theory and the failure of 
UNMIK, International Peacekeeping 13(2): 200-213. 
Held, D. (2007) Global inequality: patterns and explanations, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Helman, G. B., Ratner, S. R. (1992) Saving failed states, Foreign Policy 3-20. 
Hirsch, F. (2005) Empire of nations: Ethnographic knowledge and the making of the Soviet 
Union, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
		362 
Hobsbawm, E. J., Ranger, T. O. (eds.) (1983) The invention of tradition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hobson, J. M., Seabrooke, L. (2001) Reimagining Weber: constructing international society 
and the social balance of power, European journal of international relations 7(2): 239-274. 
Hobson, J. M. (2012) The Eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international 
theory, 1760-2010, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hobson, J. M. (2007) Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? 
Beyond Westphilian towards a post-racist critical IR, Review of International Studies 33(1): 
91-116.  
Hobson, J. M. (2004) The Eastern origins of Western civilization, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Holbraad, M. (2013) Turning a corner: Preamble for “the relative native” by Eduardo Viveiros 
de Castro, transl. Sauma, J., Holbraad, M., HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3 (3): 469-
471. 
Hönke, J., Müller, M. M. (2012) Governing (in) security in a postcolonial world: Transnational 
entanglements and the worldliness of ‘local’ practice, Security Dialogue 43(5): 383-401. 
Hönke, J. (2013) Transnational companies and security governance: Hybrid practices in a 
postcolonial world, London: Routledge. 
Horkheimer, M. (1972) Traditional and critical theory, in Horkheimer M. (ed.) Critical theory: 
Selected essays, 2nd ed., New York: Seabury Press [1st ed. 1937], 188-243. 
Horkheimer, M., Adorno, T. W. (2002) Dialectic of enlightenment: Philosophical fragments, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press; original publication: Dialektik der Aufklärung, 
Gesammelte Schriften (Selected writings), Frankfurt, Germany; first English publication in 
1947, Amsterdam: Querido.   
Hughes, C. (2009) Dependent communities: aid and politics in Cambodia and East Timor, 
Studies on Southeast Asia No. 48, New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications. 
Hughes, G. (2013) Plotting the rise of community safety: critical reflections on research, theory 
and politics, in Hughes, G., Edwards, A. (eds.) Crime control and community: The new politics 
of public safety, London: Routledge, 20-45.  
Hughes, G., McLaughlin, E. (2003) Towards a new paradigm of sovereign power? Community 
governance, preventative safety and the crime and disorder reduction partnerships, British 
Society of Criminology 6: 1-14. 
Hunt, C. T. (2014) UN peace operations and international policing: negotiating complexity, 
assessing impact and learning to learn, London: Routledge. 
Ibañez-Tirado, D. (2015) ‘How can I be post-Soviet if I was never Soviet?’ Rethinking 
categories of time and social change: a perspective from Kulob, southern Tajikistan, Central 
Asian Survey 34(2): 190-203. 
Ibraeva, G.K. (2008) Из опыта посков национальной идентичности и легитимных 
структур управления в Кыргызстане [On the experience of searching for a national identity 
and legitimate governance structures in Kyrgyzstan], Социологические исследования 
[Sociological Research] 1: 85-90.  
		363 
Igamberdiev, B. (2016) Экономическая политика Кыргызстана 1991-2010: Опыт и 
Результаты [Economic policy in Kyrgyzstan from 1991 – 2010: Experiences and results], 
Bishkek: n.p.  
Igmen, A. (2012) Speaking Soviet with an accent: Culture and power in Kyrgyzstan, Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 
IRIN (2015) Hope and fear: Kyrgyz migrants in Russia, 24 April 2015, accessed 17 April 2017,  
http://www.irinnews.org/report/101398/hope-and-fear-kyrgyz-migrants-russia  
Isakov, B., Schoeberlein, J. (2014) Animals, kinship, and the State: Kyrgyz Chabans rebuilding 
herds and reorienting belonging after the Soviet collapse, Anthropology of East Europe Review  
32(2): 33-48. 
Isakova, Z. (2015) The consolidation of peace in southern Kyrgyzstan: the effectiveness of the 
strategy after five years, 15 June 2015, accessed 1 April 2017, http://cabar.asia/en/the-
consolidation-of-peace-in-southern-kyrgyzstan-the-effectiveness-of-the-strategy-after-five-
years/  
Isakova, Z. (2013) Understanding peace processes in the aftermth of ethnic violence in the 
South of Kyrgyzstan: The Kyrgyz and Uzbeks happily ever after? MA Dissertation. Bishkek: 
OSCE Academy, http://osce-academy.net/upload/file/Master_Thesis_Zamira_Isakova.pdf  
Ismailbekova, A., Karimova, B. (2018) Ethnic differentiation and conflict dynamics: Uzbeks’ 
marginalization and non-marginalization in southern Kyrgyzstan, in Chappatte, A., Freitag, U., 
Lafi, N. (eds.) Understanding the city through its margins: Pluridisciplinary perspectives from 
case studies in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, London: Routledge, 161-184.  
Ismailbekova, A. (2017) Blood ties and the native son: poetics of patronage in Kyrgyzstan, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Ismailbekova, A. (2015) Single mothers in Osh: Well-being and coping strategies of women in 
the aftermath of the 2010 conflict in Kyrgyzstan, Focaal 71: 114-127. 
Ismailbekova, A. (2013) Coping strategies: public avoidance, migration, and marriage in the 
aftermath of the Osh conflict, Fergana Valley, Nationalities Papers 41(1): 109-127. 
Jackson, P., Albrecht, P. (2011) Reconstructing security after conflict: security sector reform 
in Sierra Leone, Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Jackson, P. (2011a) Security sector reform and state building, Third World Quarterly 32(10): 
1803-1822. 
Jackson, P. (2011b) Decentralised power and traditional authorities: How power determines 
access to justice in Sierra Leone, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 43(63): 207-
230. 
Jackson, R. (2015) How resistance can save peace studies, Journal of Resistance Studies 1(1): 
18-49. 
Jahn, B. (2007) The tragedy of liberal diplomacy: democratization, intervention, statebuilding 
(Part I), Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1(1): 87-106. 
Jenkins, T. (2008) The international institute on peace education: Twenty-six years modelling 
critical, participatory peace pedagogy, Journal of Peace Education and Social Justice 2(2): 
166-174. 
Jones, L. (2012) Statebuiling versus state-formation in East Timor, in Blieseman de Guevara, 
B. (ed.) Statebuilding and State-Formation: The political sociology of intervention, London: 
		364 
Routledge, 95-113. 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding [JISB] (2017) Special issue: Knowledge production 
in conflict and intervention: Finding “facts”, telling “truth”, 17(1): 1-139. 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding [JISB] (2015) Interventionism as practice, Special 
section, 9(4): 425-518.  
Jutila, M., Pehkonen, S., & Väyrynen, T. (2008) Resuscitating a discipline: an agenda for 
critical peace research, Millennium-Journal of International Studies 36(3): 623-640. 
Kalinovsky, A. M. (2013) Not some British colony in Africa: the politics of decolonization and 
modernization in Soviet Central Asia, 1955-1964, Ab Imperio (2): 191-222. 
Kamp, M. (2011) The new woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, modernity, and unveiling under 
communism, Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
Kapalova, A. (2015) Неформальная экономика на службе социальной защищенности [The 
informal economy the service of social protection], in Shatalova, O., Mamedov, G. (eds.) 
Бишкек утопический. Сборник текстов [Utopian Bishkek. Essays], Bishkek: ShTAB Press, 
252-261.  
Kaplan, R. (1994) The coming anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation and disease are 
threatening the social fabric of our planet, Atlantic Monthly February: 44-74 
Kappler, S., Richmond, O. P. (2011) Peacebuilding and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Resistance or emancipation?, Security dialogue 42(3): 261-278. 
Kargiannis, E. (2005) Political Islam and social movement theory: The case of Hizb ut-Tahrir 
in Kyrgyzstan, Religion, State and Society 33(2): 137-150. 
Kasymov, U., Nikonova, V. (2006) “Made in Kyrgyzstan”: Innovative approaches to 
sustainable industrial development, Mountain Research and Development 26(2): 119-123. 
Kay, R. (2006) Men in contemporary Russia: The fallen heroes of post-Soviet change?, 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Kenzheeva, M. (2016) Nekotorye problemy mestnogo samoupravlenia i pluchenia 
territorialnykh dokhodov v Kyrgyzstane [Some problems of local self-administration and of 
local revenue generation in Kyrgyzstan], Territoria nauki [Territory of science] 1(2016): 99-
105.  
Khalid, A. (2007) Islam after communism: religion and politics in Central Asia, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Khamidov, A., Marat, E. (2011) The danger of ethnic nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute Analyst, 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/resources/pdf/issues/20110316Analyst.pdf  
Khamidov, A., Megoran, N., Heathershaw, J. (2017) Bottom-up peacekeeping in southern 
Kyrgyzstan: how local actors managed to prevent the spread of violence from Osh/Jalal-Abad 
to Aravan, June 2010, Nationalities Papers, Online First. 
Khamidov, A. (2013) The lessons of the ‘Nookat events’: central government, local officials 
and religious protests in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey 32(2): 148-160. 
Kirmse, S. B. (2010) In the marketplace for styles and identities: globalization and youth culture 
in southern Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey 29(4): 389-403. 
		365 
Kirmse, S. B. (2009) Leisure, business and fantasy worlds: exploring donor-funded ‘youth 
spaces’ in southern Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey 28(3): 289-301. 
Kleinbach, R., Salimjanova, L. (2007) Kyz ala kachuu and adat: non-consensual bride 
kidnapping and tradition in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey 26(2): 217-233. 
Koddenbrock, K. (2015) The practice of humanitarian intervention: Aid workers, agencies and 
institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, London: Routledge. 
Koddenbrock, K. (2012) The international self and the humanitarianization of politics: A case 
study of Goma, DR Congo, in Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (ed.) Statebuilding and state-
formation: The political sociology of intervention, London: Routledge, 214-229. 
Kozhonaliev, S.K. (2000) Обычное право кыргызов [The traditional law of the Kyrgyz], 
Bishkek: Soros Foundation Kyrgyzstan. 
Kraidy, M. (2005) Hybridity, or the cultural logic of globalization, Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 
Krause, K. (2005) Human security: An idea whose time has come?, S&F Sicherheit und 
Frieden)/Security and Peace, 23(1): 1-6. 
Kudaibergenova, D. T. (2017) Rewriting the Nation in Modern Kazakh Literature: Elites and 
Narratives, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Kudaibergenova, D. T. (2016) Eurasian Economic Union integration in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. European Politics and Society, 17(sup1): 97-112. 
Kuehnast, K., Dudwick, N. (2002) Better a hundred friends than a hundred rubles? Social 
networks in transition–the Kyrgyz Republic, in Devarajan, S., Rogers, F.S. (ed.) World Bank 
Economists’ Forum, Vol. 2, 51-88. 
Kühn, F. (2008) Aid, opium, and the state of rents in Afghanistan: Competition, cooperation, 
or cohabitation?, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2(3): 309–27. 
Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (2011) Report of the independent international commission 
into the events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, accessed 7 September 2012, 
http://www.kgzembind.in/Report%20(English)pdf  
Laclau, E., Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and socialist strategy. Towards a radical democratic 
politics, London: Verso. 
Langford, L. (2015) “There was a case”: gender-based violence, property rights, and the data 
dilemma in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia Policy Review 1(3): 5-10.  
Laruelle, M. (2008) The concept of ethnogenesis in Central Asia: Political context and 
institutional mediators (1940–50), Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 9(1): 
169-188. 
Laruelle, M. (2012) The paradigm of nationalism in Kyrgyzstan. Evolving narrative, the 
sovereignty issue, and political agenda, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45: 39–49. 
Laszczkowski, M., Reeves, M. (2015) Affective states: Entanglements, suspensions, 
suspicions, Social Analysis 59(4): 1-14. 
Law, D. M. (2005) Human security and security sector reform: Contrasts and 
commonalities, Sicherheit und Frieden (S+ F)/Security and Peace, 23(1): 14-20. 
		366 
Lemay-Hébert, N., Freedman, R. (2017) Haiti’s cholera victims still can’t get what they need 
from the UN, The Conversation, accessed 20 October 2017, https://theconversation.com/haitis-
cholera-victims-still-cant-get-what-they-need-from-the-un-75788  
Lemay-Hébert, N., Mathieu, X. (2014) The OECD’s discourse on fragile states: Expertise and 
the normalisation of knowledge production, Third World Quarterly 35(2): 232-251. 
Lemay-Hébert, N., Murshed, S. M. (2016) Rentier statebuilding in a post-conflict economy: 
The case of Kosovo, Development and Change 47(3): 517-541. 
Lemay-Hébert, N., Onuf, N., Rakić, V., Bojanić, P. (eds.) (2013) Semantics of statebuilding: 
Language, meanings and sovereignty, London: Routledge. 
Lemay-Hebert, N. (2014) A Sisyphean exercise of SSR: Examining the role of the UN in Timor-
Leste, in Heiduk, F. (ed.) Security sector reform in Southeast Asia: From policy to practice, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 201-224. 
Lemay-Hebert, N. (2013a) Review essay: Critical debates on peacebuilding, Civil Wars 15(2): 
242-252. 
Lemay-Hebert, N. (2013b) Rethinking Weberian аapproaches to statebuilding, in Chandler, D. 
and Sisk, T.D. (eds.) Routledge handbook of international statebuilding, London: Routledge, 
3-14. 
Lemay-Hebert, N. (2013c) The semantics of statebuilding and nationbuilding: Looking beyond 
neo-Weberian approaches, in Lemay-Hébert, N., Onuf, N., Rakić, V., Bojanić, P. (eds.) (2013) 
Semantics of statebuilding: Language, meanings and sovereignty, London: Routledge, 89-105. 
Lemay-Hebert, N. (2013d) Everyday legitimacy and international administration: Global 
governance and local legitimacy in Kosovo, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 7(1): 
87-104. 
Lemay-Hebert, N. (2012) Coerced transitions in Timor-Leste and Kosovo: managing 
competing objectives of institution-building and local empowerment, Democratization 19(3): 
465-485. 
Lemay-Hebert, N. (2011a) The “empty-shell” approach: The setup process of international 
administrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, its consequences and lessons, International 
Studies Perspectives 12(2): 190-211. 
Lemay-Hebert, N. (2011b) The bifurcation of the two worlds: assessing the gap between 
internationals and locals in state-building processes, Third World Quarterly 32(10): 1823-1841. 
Lemay-Hebert, N. (2009) State-building without nation building? Legitimacy, state failure and 
the limits of the institutionalist approach, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3(1): 21-
45. 
Lemon, E.  J.  (2016a) Building resilient secular citizens:  Tajikistan’s response  to  the  Islamic 
State, Caucasus Survey 4(3): 261-281. 
Lemon, E. J. (2016b) Governing Islam and security in Tajikistan and beyond: The emergence 
of transnational authoritarian security governance, PhD Thesis, University of Exeter.  
Leonard, P. (2015) Kyrgyzstan joins Eurasian Union, takes leap into the dark, 7 August 2015, 
accessed 17 April 2017, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74591 
Levitsky, S., Way, L. (2010) Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
		367 
Lewis, D. (2016) Central Asia: Contested peace, in Richmond, Oliver, Pogodda, S. and J. 
Ramovic (eds.) The Palgrave handbook of disciplinary and regional approaches to peace, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 387-397. 
Lewis, D. (2015a) ‘Illiberal peace?’: Authoritarian approaches to conflict management, 
Working paper, New York: Harriman Institute, 
https://www.academia.edu/18044370/Illiberal_Peace_Authoritarian_Modes_of_Conflict_Ma
nagement  
Lewis, D. (2015b) Reasserting hegemony in Central Asia: Russian policy in Kyrgyzstan after 
2010, Comillas Journal of International Relations, 2(3): 58 – 81. 
Lewis, D. (2012) Sovereignty after empire: The colonial roots of Central Asian 
authoritarianism, in Cummings, S., Hinnebusch, R. (ed.) Sovereignty after empire: Comparing 
the Middle East and Central Asia: Comparing the Middle East and Central Asia, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 178-197. 
Lewis, D. (2011a) Security sector reform in authoritarian regimes: The OSCE experience of 
police assistance programming in Central Asia, Security and Human Rights 22(2): 103-117. 
Lewis, D. (2011b) Reassessing the role of OSCE police assistance programming in Central 
Asia, Open Society Foundations. 
Lidén, K., Mac Ginty, R., Richmond, O. P. (2009) Introduction: beyond northern epistemologies 
of peace: peacebuilding reconstructed?, International Peacekeeping, 16(5): 587-598. 
Lidén, K. (2011) Peace, self-governance and international engagement: From neo-colonial to 
post-colonial peace-building, in Tadjbakhsh, S. (ed.) Rethinking the liberal peace: external 
models and local alternatives, London: Taylor & Francis, 57-74. 
Lidén, K. (2009) Building peace between global and local politics: the cosmopolitical ethics of 
liberal peacebuilding, International Peacekeeping 16(5): 616-634. 
Lipovsky, I. (1996) The awakening of central Asian Islam, Middle Eastern Studies 32(3): 1-21. 
Liu, M. Y. (2014) Massacre through a kaleidoscope: fragmented moral imaginaries of the state 
in Central Asia, in Reeves, M., Beyer, J., Rasanayagam, J. (eds.) Ethnographies of the state in 
Central Asia: performing politics, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 261-284. 
Liu, M. Y. (2012) Under Solomon's throne: Uzbek visions of renewal in Osh, Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Loring, B. (2014) “Colonizers with party cards”: Soviet internal colonialism in Central Asia, 
1917–39, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 15(1): 77-102. 
Lottholz, P., Kluczewska, K. (2017) Ever wondered why practitioners treat researchers like a 
nuisance? The challenges of accessing expert knowledge, from two perspectives’, LSE Field 
Research Method Lab, accessed 1 November 2017, 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/fieldresearch/2017/10/30/why-practitioners-treat-researchers-like-a-
nuisance/  
Lottholz, P., Lemay-Hébert, N. (2016) Re-reading Weber, re-conceptualizing state-building: 
from neo-Weberian to post-Weberian approaches to state, legitimacy and state-building, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 1-18. 
Lottholz, P., Marschall, T. (2017) Knowledge transfer, inspiration, (over-)reflection: A 
discussion of potentials and limits of cooperative research, The CESS Blog, accessed 20 
October 2017, https://thecessblog.com/2017/08/18/knowledge-transfer-inspiration-over-
reflection-a-discussion-of-potentials-and-limits-of-cooperative-research  
		368 
Lottholz, P., Meyer, J.R. (2016) “‘Friend’ or ‘Foreign Agent’? On the Limits of Field Research 
in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan”, Exeter Central Asian Studies Network, accessed 1 November 2017, 
https://blogs.exeter.ac.uk/excas/2016/04/14/friend-or-foreign-agent-on-the-limits-of-field-
research-in-post-soviet-kyrgyzstan/ 
Lottholz, P. (2018) A negative post-liberal peace? Inquiring the embeddedness of everyday 
forms of peace in Central Asia, in Owen, C., Juraev, S., Lewis, D., Megoran, N., Heathershaw, 
J. (eds.) Interrogating illiberal peace in Eurasia:  Critical perspectives on peace and conflict, 
New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 97-119. 
Lottholz, P. (2017a) Nothing more than a conceptual lens? Situating hybridity in social inquiry, 
in Lemay-Hébert, N., Freedman, R. (eds.) Hybridity: Law, culture and development, Routledge: 
London, 17-36. 
Lottholz, P. (2017b) Critiquing anthropological imagination in peace and conflict studies: From 
empiricist positivism to a dialogical approach in ethnographic peace research’, International 
Peacekeeping, Online First.  
Lottholz, P. (2016a) ‘Reproducing the Soviet policy paradox? The problem of restrictive 
approaches to regulating religion and countering violent extremism’, Central Asian Policy 
Review 2(1): 22-6. 
Lottholz, P. (2016b) Review essay: Exploring the boundaries of knowledge via 
hybridity, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 10(1): 136-42. 
Lottholz, P. (2016c) Polizeireform in Kirgistan: Mechanismen der Gemeindesicherheit als 
Schritt zum fundamentalen Wandel?, Zentralasien-Analysen, No. 99, accessed 10 April 2016, 
http://www.laender-analysen.de/zentralasien/pdf/ZentralasienAnalysen99.pdf  
Lottholz, P. (2016d) Police reform in Kyrgyzstan: Community security mechanisms as a step 
towards fundamental change?, Central Asia Policy Review 3(1): 22-27.  
Louw, M. (2013) Even honey may become bitter when there is too much of it: Islam and the 
struggle for a balanced existence in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey 32(4): 514-
526. 
Louw, M. (2012) Being Muslim the ironic way: Secularism, religion and irony in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan, in Bubandt, N. O., Van Beek, M. (eds.) Varieties of secularism in Asia: 
Anthropological explorations of religion, politics and the spiritual, London: Routledge, 143-
162.  
Luckham, R. and Kirk, T. (2012) Security in Hybrid Political Contexts: an enduser approach, 
Justice and Security Research Programme Paper 2, accessed 10 May 2016, 
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/JSRP/downloads/JSRP2.Luckham
Kirk.pdf  
Mac Ginty, R., Richmond, O. (2016) The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders: a 
reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding, International Peacekeeping 23(2): 219-239. 
Mac Ginty, R., Richmond, O. P. (2013) The local turn in peacebuilding: A critical agenda for 
peace, Third World Quarterly 34(5): 763-783.  
Mac Ginty, R., Richmond, O. P. (2009) (eds.) The liberal peace and post-war reconstruction: 
Myth or reality?, London: Routledge. 
Mac Ginty, R., Sanghera, G. (2012) Hybridity in peacebuilding and development: An 
introduction, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 7(2): 3-8. 
		369 
Mac Ginty, R. (2014) Why do we think in the ways that we do?, International Peacekeeping 
21(1): 107-112. 
Mac Ginty, R. (2013) Hybrid statebuilding, in Egnell, R., Haldén, P. (eds.) (2013) New agendas 
in statebuilding: Hybridity, contingency and history, London: Routledge, 13-31. 
Mac Ginty, R. (2011) International peacebuilding and local resistance: Hybrid forms of peace, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Mac Ginty, R. (2010) Hybrid peace: The interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace, 
Security Dialogue 41(4): 391-412. 
Mac Ginty, R. (2008) Indigenous peace-making versus the liberal peace, Cooperation and 
Conflict 43(2): 139-163. 
Maguire, M., Frois, C., Zurawski, N. (eds.) (2014) Anthropology of security: Perspectives from 
the frontline of policing, counter-terrorism and border control, London: Pluto Press. 
Makarychev, A., Medvedev, S. (2015) Biopolitics and power in Putin’s Russia, Problems of 
Post-communism 62(1): 45-54. 
Makovicky, N. (2014) Me, Inc.? Untangling neoliberalism, personhood, and postsocialism, in 
Makovicky, N. (ed.) Neoliberalism, personhood, and postsocialism: Enterprising selves in 
changing economies, London: Routledge, 1-16. 
Mamedov, G., Shatalova, O. (eds.) (2016) Понятия о советском в Центральной Азии. 
Альманах ШТАБА № 1 [Understandings of the Soviet in Central Asia. ShTAB Almanac No. 
1], Bishkek: ShTAB Press.  
Mandel, R. Humphrey, C. (eds.) (2002) Markets and moralities: Ethnographies of 
postsocialism, London: Berg.  
Manolova, P. (2017) On the way to the ‘imaginary West’: Bulgarian migrations, imaginations 
and disillusionments, Phd Thesis, University of Birmingham.  
Maranhão, T. (1990) Introduction, in Maranhão, T. (ed.) The interpretation of dialogue, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Marat, E. (2015) Global money laundering and its domestic political consequences in 
Kyrgyzstan, Central Asian Survey 34 (1): 46-56. 
Marat, E. (2013) March and after: what has changed? What has stayed the same? in Cummings, 
S. (ed.) Domestic and international perspectives on Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolution’: Motives, 
mobilization and meanings, London: Routledge, 7-18. 
Marat, E. (2008) Imagined past, uncertain future: The creation of national ideologies in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Problems of Post-Communism 55(1): 12-24. 
Marat, E. (2006) Prospective joining of HIPC provokes fierce debates in Kyrgyzstan, Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, 13. 
March, A. F. (2003) State ideology and the legitimation of authoritarianism: The case of post-
Soviet Uzbekistan, Journal of Political Ideologies 8(2): 209-232. 
Marcus, G. E. (1998) Ethnography through thick and thin, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Marcuse, H. (1964) One-dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced capitalist 
society, Boston: Beacon. 
		370 
Marquette, H., Beswick, D. (2011) State building, security and development: State building as 
a new development paradigm?, Third World Quarterly 32(10): 1703-1714. 
Martin, T. D. (2001) The affirmative action empire: Nations and nationalism in the Soviet 
Union, 1923-1939, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Maschietto, R. H. (2016) Problematizing the ‘local’ in Peacebuilding, International 
Peacekeeping 23(3): 505-512. 
Matveeva, A. (2009) Legitimising Central Asian authoritarianism: Political manipulation and 
symbolic power, Europe-Asia Studies 61(7): 1095-1121. 
Matveeva, A., Savin, I., Faizullaev, B. (2012) Kyrgyzstan: Tragedy in the South, Ethnopolitics 
Paper No. 17, accessed 7 September 2012, accessed 10 June 2016, 
http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics-papers/EPP017.pdf   
McBrien, J. (2009) Mukadas’s struggle: veils and modernity in Kyrgyzstan, Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute 15(s1): 127-144. 
McBrien, J., Pelkmans, M. (2008) Turning Marx on his head missionaries ‘extremists’ and 
archaic secularists in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, Critique of Anthropology 28(1): 87-103. 
McLaughlin, E. (2002) The crisis of the social and the political materialisation of community 
safety, in Hughes, G., McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J. (eds.) Crime prevention and community 
safety: new directions, London: Sage, 77-100. 
McNay, L. (1996) Foucault: A critical introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Megoran, N., Harris, C., Sharapova, S., Kamp, M., Townsend, J., Bagdasarova, N. Tlostanova, 
M. (2012) Author - critic forum: Decolonial theory and gender research in Central Asia, Central 
Asian Survey 31(3): 355-367 
Megoran, N., Satybaldieva, E., Lewis, D., Heathershaw, J. (2014) Peacebuilding and 
reconciliation projects in Southern Kyrgyzstan, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute and Open Society Foundations Working Paper, June 2014, accessed 10 June 2016, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/security/afghanistan/central-asia-security/publications/sipri-osf-
working-paper-megoran-et-al-june-2014 
Megoran N. (2017) Nationalism in Central Asia: A biography of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan 
boundary, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Megoran, N. (2013) Shared space, divided space: narrating ethnic histories of Osh, 
Environment and Planning A, 45(4): 892-907. 
Megoran, N. (2012) Averting violence in Kyrgyzstan: Understanding and responding to 
nationalism, Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper 3: 971-986. 
Mets, S. (2015) Umar Farooq i kirgizskoe “delo pravozashitnikov”: glavnoe - iziat’ dokumenty 
i deportirovat [Umar Farooq and the Kyrgyz “case of human rights activists”: the main goal - 
to confiscate documents and deport], Fergana.ru, 30 March 2015, accessed 17 April 2017, 
http://www.fergananews.com/articles/8471  
Migdal, J. S., Schlichte, K. (2005) Rethinking the state, in Schlichte, K. (ed.) The dynamics of 
states: the formation and crises of state domination, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1-40. 
Mignolo, W. D., Escobar, A. (2013) Globalization and the decolonial option, London: 
Routledge. 
Mignolo, W.D. (2012) Local histories/global designs: Coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and 
border thinking, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
		371 
Mignolo, W.D. (2011) The darker side of western modernity: Global futures, decolonial 
options, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Mignolo, W. D. (2007) DELINKING: The rhetoric of modernity, the logic of coloniality and 
the grammar of de-coloniality, Cultural Studies 21(2-3): 449-514. 
Millar, G. (2014a) An ethnographic approach to peacebuilding: Understanding local 
experiences in transitional states, London: Routledge. 
Millar, G. (2014b) Disaggregating hybridity: Why hybrid institutions do not produce 
predictable experiences of peace, Journal of Peace Research 51(4): 501-514. 
Montgomery, D.W. (2007) Namaz, wishing trees, and vodka: The diversity of everyday 
religious life in Central Asia, in Sahadeo, J., Zanca, R. (eds.) Everyday life in Central Asia: 
Past and present, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 355-370.  
Moreiras, A. (1999) Hybridity and double consciousness, Cultural Studies 13(3): 373-407. 
Morris, J., Polese, A. (eds.) (2015) Informal economies in post-socialist spaces: Practices, 
institutions and networks, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Mosse, D.  (2006) Anti-social anthropology? Objectivity, objection, and the ethnography of 
public policy and professional communities, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 12 
(4): 935-56. 
Mosse, D. (2005) Cultivating development: An ethnography of aid policy and practice, London: 
Pluto.  
Mukasov, Y.M. (2010) Философская мысль в контексте развития кыргызской культуры 
[Philosophical thought in the context of Kyrgyz cultural development], Bishkek: Ilim.  
Murzakulova, A., Schoeberlein, J. (2009) The invention of legitimacy: struggles in Kyrgyzstan 
to craft an effective nation-state ideology, Europe-Asia Studies 61(7): 1229-1248. 
Müller, M. M. (2016) Penalizing democracy: punitive politics in neoliberal Mexico, Crime, 
Law and Social Change 65(3): 227-249. 
Müller, M. M. (2014) De-monopolizing the bureaucratic field: internationalization strategies 
and the transnationalization of security governance in Mexico City, Alternatives 39(1): 37-54. 
N.a. (2016) A job at UN HQ? Goodbye principles and philanthropy, hello power and privilege! 
The Guardian, Global Development, 4 June 2016, accessed 13 November 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jun/04/working-for-the-united-
nations-power-privilege-principles-philanthropy 
Nachtwey, O. (2016) Die Abstiegsgesellschaft: Über das Aufbegehren in der regressiven 
Moderne [Society in decline: The revolt of regressive modernity], Berlin: Suhrkamp. 
Nader, L. (1990) Harmony ideology: Justice and control in a Zapotec mountain village, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Nader, L. (2001) Harmony coerced is freedom denied, The Chronicle of Higher Education 47, 
B13-B16. 
Nazritdinov, E., Esenamanova, N. (2017) The war of billboards: Hijab, secularism, and public 
space in Bishkek, Central Asian Affairs 4(2): 217-242. 
Nazritdinov, E., Schenkkan, N. (2012) A portrayal of absence: Households of migrants in 
Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek: HelpAge International.  
		372 
Nazritdinov, E., Zhumakadyr kyzy, B., Asanalieva, D. (2015) Myths and realities of Bishkek’s 
novostroikas, in Laruelle, M., Engvall, J. (eds.) Kyrgyzstan beyond" democracy island" and " 
failing state": Social and political changes in a Post-Soviet Society, Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 143-164.  
Newman, E., Paris, R., Richmond, O. (2009) New perspectives on liberal peacebuilding, 
Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
Nicolson, D.J. (2017) Academic conferences as neoliberal commodities, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Nikolaev, A. (2010) "НГ": "Совещательная демократия" К.Бакиева. Президент Киргизии, 
похоже, уже задумался о "наследнике по прямой" [“NG”: K. Bakiev’s “consultative 
democracy”: Kyrgyzstan’s president, typically, already thought about a “follower of his own”], 
Centrasia.ru, 26 March 2010, accessed 17 April 2017, 
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1269579840  
Nurulla-Khodjaeva N. T. (2016) Деколониальность исторических знаний и 
межкультурный «дахлез» в Центральной Азии [The decoloniality of historical knowledges 
and intercultural 'dakhlez' in Central Asia], Критические исследования [Critical inquiry], 
Moscow: MGIMO, 4(49): 16-25.  
Nurulla-Khodjaeva N. T. (2012) Община в мусульманской традиции Центральной Азии, 
[The community in the Muslim tradition of Central Asia], Moscow State University for Arts 
and Culture Bulletin 4 (48): 67-71. 
Nurulla-Khodjaeva N. T. (2011) Община и государство в центральной Азии [Community 
and state in Central Asia], Moscow State University for Arts and Culture Bulletin 2(40): 66-70.  
O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C. (2013 [1986]) Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative 
conclusions about uncertain democracies, 2nd ed., Baltimore: The Johns Hopinks University 
Press. 
O’Neill Borbieva, N. (2013) Anxiety, order and the other: well-being among ethnic Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks, Central Asian Survey 32(4): 501-513. 
O’Shea, L. (2015) Informal economic practices within the Kyrgyz police (militsiia) In Morris, 
J., Polese, A. (eds.) Informal economies in post-socialist spaces: Practices, institutions and 
networks, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 270-293.  
Olivier de Sardan J.-P. (2005) Anthropology and development. Understanding contemporary 
social change, London: Zed Books. 
Olivier de Sardan J.-P. (2015) Epistemology, fieldwork and anthropology, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Omelicheva, M. Y. (2015) Democracy in Central Asia: competing perspectives and alternative 
strategies, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 
Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and El-Pikir (2013) 
«Инициатива Общественной  безопасности» Программы ОБСЕ по  реформированию 
ОВД КР  [‘Public Security Initiative’ Programmes of the OSCE for the reform of Internal 
Affairs Organs of the Kyrgyz Republic], Bishkek: El Pikir.   
Ortmann, S., Heathershaw, J. (2012) Conspiracy theories in the post-Soviet Space, The Russian 
Review 71(4): 551-564. 
Owen, C., Juraev, S., Lewis, D., Megoran, N., Heathershaw, J. (eds.) Interrogating illiberal 
peace in Eurasia: Critical perspectives on peace and conflict, New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
		373 
Owen, C. (2014) “Obshchestvennyi kontrol’ (Public scrutiny) from discourse to action in 
contemporary Russia: The Emergence of Authoritarian Neoliberal Governance, PhD Thesis, 
University of Exeter.  
Owen, T., Martin, M. (2014) Routledge handbook of human security, London: Routledge.  
Paasi, A. (2015) Hot spots, dark-side dots, tin pots”: The uneven internationalism of the global 
academic market, in Meusburger, P., Gregory, D., Suarsana, L. (eds.) Geographies of 
knowledge and power, London: Springer, 247-262.  
Paffenholz, T. (2015) Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: A critical assessment towards 
an agenda for future research, Third World Quarterly 36(5): 857-74. 
Paffenholz, T., Reychler, L. (2005) Towards better policy and programme work in conflict 
zones: introducing the 'aid for peace' approach, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 2(2): 
6-23. 
Pannier, B. (2014) Who was Kurmanjan Datka and what does she mean to the Kyrgyz people? 
RFE/RL, 31 December 2014, 31 December 2014, accessed 17 April 2017, 
http://www.rferl.org/a/qishloq-ovozi-who-was-kurmanjan-datka/26770979.html  
Paris, R. (2004) At war’s end, Cambridge: CUP.  
Paris, R. (2010) Saving liberal peacebuilding, Review of International Studies 36: 337–365. 
Paris, R., Sisk, T. D. (eds.) (2009) The dilemmas of statebuilding: confronting the 
contradictions of postwar peace operations, London: Routledge. 
Parry, B. (1987) Problems in current theories of colonial discourse, Oxford Literary Review 
9(1): 27-58.  
Patomäki, H. (2001) The challenge of critical theories: peace research at the start of the new 
century, Journal of Peace Research 38(6): 723-737. 
Pelkmans, M. (2017) Fragile conviction: Changing ideological landscapes in urban 
Kyrgyzstan, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Peshkopia, R. (2010) A ghost from the future: The postsocialist myth of capitalism and the 
ideological suspension of postmodernity, Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 23-
53. 
Peterson, J. H. (2012) A conceptual unpacking of hybridity: Accounting for notions of power, 
politics and progress in analyses of aid-driven interfaces, Journal of Peacebuilding & 
Development 7(2): 9-22. 
Pétric, B. M. (2005) Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan or the birth of a globalized protectorate, Central 
Asian Survey 24(3): 319-332. 
Petrov, K. (2014) The concept of transition in transition: Comparing the post-communist use 
of the concept of transition with that found in Soviet ideology, Baltic Worlds 7(1): 29–41, 30. 
Pfadenhauer, M. (2005) Ethnography of scenes. Towards a sociological life-world analysis of 
(post-traditional) community-building, Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative 
Social Research 6(3): n.p. 
Pieterse, J. N. (2001) Hybridity, so what? The anti-hybridity backlash and the riddles of 
recognition, Theory, Culture & Society 18(2-3): 219-245. 
		374 
Pilkington, H., Omelchenko, E., Flynn, M., Bliudina, U. I., Starkova, E. (2002) Looking West: 
Cultural Globalisation and Russian Youth Cultures, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University. 
Pomerantsev, P. (2016) Why we’re post-fact, Granta, 20 July 2016, accessed 17 April 2017, 
https://granta.com/why-were-post-fact/  
Pouligny, B. (2006) Peace operations seen from below. UN missions and local people, London: 
Hurst.  
Pratt, J. (1986) Diversion from the juvenile court: A history of inflation and a critique of 
progress, British Journal of Criminology 26(3): 212-233. 
Prozorov, S. (2016) The biopolitics of Stalinism: Ideology and life in Soviet socialism, 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
Pugh, J. (2014) Resilience, complexity and post-liberalism, Area 46(3): 313-319. 
Pugh, M. (2004) Peacekeeping and critical theory, International Peacekeeping 11(1): 39-58. 
Pugh, M. (2005) The political economy of peacebuilding: A critical theory 
perspective, International Journal of Peace Studies 10(2): 23. 
Pugh, M. (2006) Post-war economies and the New York dissensus, Conflict, Security & 
Development 6(3): 269-289. 
Pugh, M. (2011) Local agency and political economies of peacebuilding, Studies in Ethnicity 
and Nationalism 11(2): 308-320. 
Pugh, M., Cooper, N. and Turner, M. (eds.) Whose peace? Critical perspectives on the political 
economy of peacebuilding, Basingstoke: New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 390-397. 
Quijano, A. (2000) Coloniality of power and Eurocentrism in Latin America, International 
Sociology 15(2): 215-232. 
Rabikowska, M. (2009) The ghosts of the past: 20 years after the fall of communism in 
Europe, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 42(2): 165-179. 
Radnitz, S. (2010) Weapons of the wealthy: predatory regimes and elite-led protests in Central 
Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Randazzo, E. (2016) The paradoxes of the ‘everyday’: Scrutinising the local turn in peace 
building, Third World Quarterly 37(8): 1351-1370. 
Rausing, S. (2002) Re-constructing the ‘normal’: identity and the consumption of western 
goods in Estonia, in Mandel, R. Humphrey, C. (eds.) Markets and moralities: Ethnographies 
of postsocialism, London: Berg, 127-142.  
Reckwitz, Andreas (2002) Toward a theory of social practices. A development in culturalist 
theorizing, European Journal of Social Theory 5 (2): 243–263. 
Reason, P., Bradbury, H. (eds.) (2001) Handbook of action research: Participative inquiry and 
practice, London: Sage. 
Reeves, M., Rasanayagam, J., Beyer, J. (eds.) (2014) Ethnographies of the state in Central 
Asia: Performing Politics, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.   
Reeves, M. (2015a) Academic integrity and its limits in Kyrgyzstan, International Higher 
Education 37: n.p. 
Reeves, M. (2015b) In Search of tolerantnost’: Preventive development and its limits at the 
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan border, in Engvall, J., Laruelle, M. (eds.) Kyrgyzstan beyond 
		375 
'democracy island' and 'failing state’: Social and political changes in a post-Soviet society, 
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 79-98.  
Reeves, M. (2014) Border work: Spatial lives of the state in rural Central Asia, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Reeves, M. (2013) Clean fake: Authenticating documents and persons in migrant Moscow,  
American Ethnologist 40(3): 508-524. 
Reeves, M. (2011) Staying put? Towards a relational politics of mobility at a time of migration, 
Central Asian Survey 30(3-4): 555-576. 
Reeves, M. (2005) Locating danger: konfliktologiia and the search for fixity in the Ferghana 
Valley borderlands, Central Asian Survey 24(1): 67-81. 
Region.kg (2015) Kyrk Choro –  kyrgyzskie bliustiteli sovesti? [Are  "Kyrk  Choro"  the  kyrgyz  
conscience “custodians”?], 6 February 2015, accessed 17 April 2017,  
http://www.region.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1312:l-r--lr-
&catid=5:obshestvo&Itemid=6 
Restrepo, E. and Escobar, A. (2005) Other anthropologies and anthropology otherwise. Steps 
to a world anthropologies framework, Critique of Anthropology 25(2): 99-129. 
RFE/RL  (2016)  Kyrgyz  migrant  women  brutally  assaulted  in  'patriotic'  videos,  12 March         
2016, accessed 17 April 2017, http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyz-migrant-women-brutally-
assaulted-in-patriotic-videos/24599390.html 
RFE/RL (2012)  Kyrgyz  women  beaten  by  Kyrgyz  men  in  Russia -  How  the story became        
part        of        one        reporters        life,        24        August        2012, accessed 17 April 
2017, http://www.rferl.mobi/a/24687354.html 
Richmond, O. P., Franks, J. (2007) Liberal hubris? Virtual peace in Cambodia, Security 
Dialogue 38(1): 27-48. 
Richmond, O. P., Franks, J. (2009) Liberal peace transitions: between statebuilding and 
peacebuilding, Edignburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Richmond, O. P., Mac Ginty, R. (2015) Where now for the critique of the liberal peace?, 
Cooperation & Conflict 50(2): 171-189. 
Richmond, O.P., Mitchell, A. (eds.) (2012) Hybrid forms of peace – From everyday forms of 
peace to post-Liberalism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Richmond, O. P. (2014) New approaches to peacebuilding, International Peacekeeping 21(5): 
696-700. 
Richmond, O.P. (2013) Failed statebuilding versus peace formation, Cooperation and 
Conflict 48(3): 378-400. 
Richmond, O.P. (2012) A pedagogy of peacebuilding: Infrapolitics, resistance, and 
liberation1, International Political Sociology 6(2): 115-131. 
Richmond, O.P. (2011a) A post-liberal peace, Abingdon: Routledge.  
Richmond, O.P. (2011b) Critical agency, resistance and a post-colonial civil 
society, Cooperation and conflict 46(4): 419-440. 
Richmond, O.P. (2011c) De-romanticising the local, de-mystifying the international: hybridity 
in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands, The Pacific Review 24(1): 115-136. 
		376 
Richmond, O.P. (2010b) Resistance and the post-liberal peace, Millennium Journal of 
International Studies 38(3):665-692. 
Richmond, O.P. (ed.) (2010a) Palgrave advances in peacebuilding: Critical developments and 
approaches. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Richmond, O.P. (2009a) The romanticisation of the local: Welfare, culture and 
peacebuilding, The International Spectator 44(1): 149-169. 
Richmond, O.P. (2009b) Becoming liberal, unbecoming liberalism: Liberal-local hybridity via 
the everyday as a response to the paradoxes of liberal peacebuilding, Journal of Intervention 
and Statebuilding 3(3): 324-344. 
Richmond, O.P. (2009c) A post-liberal peace: Eirenism and the everyday, Review of 
International Studies 35(03): 557-580. 
Richmond, O.P. (2008) Peace in international relations, London: Routledge. 
Richmond, O.P. (2005) The transformation of peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Roche, S. (2014) Domesticating youth: Youth bulges and their socio-political implications in 
Tajikistan, New York: Berghahn. 
Romanchuk, N. (2002) Bribery in Kyrgyz state universities. Is there anything to worry about?, 
unpublished research paper, American University of Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.  
Rosaldo, R. (1989) Culture & truth: The remaking of social analysis, Boston: Beacon Press. 
Rose, N. (2001) The politics of life itself, Theory, Culture & Society, 18(6): 1-30. 
Rose, N. (2000) Community, citizenship, and the third way, American Behavioral 
Scientist 43(9): 1395-1411. 
Rose, N. (1999a) Governing the soul: The shaping of the private self, Free Association Books.  
Rose, N. (1999) Inventiveness in politics, Economy and society, 28(3): 467-493. 
Rose, N. (1996) The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government.’, International 
Journal of Human Resource Management 25(3): 327-356. 
Rotberg, R. (2003) Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: Causes and indicators, in 
Rotberg, R.  (ed.) State failure and state weakness in a time of terror, Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press. 
Rotberg, R. (2004) When states fail: Causes and consequences, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Rothman, J. (1997) Action-evaluation and conflict resolution in theory and practice, Conflict 
Resolution Quarterly 15(2): 119-131. 
Roy, O. (2007) The new Central Asia: Geopolitics and the birth of nations, New York: NYU 
Press. 
Rush, F. (ed.) (2004) The Cambridge companion to critical theory, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Russo, A. (2014) Why grounded theory is not for emotional PhD students, Security Praxis, 11 
April 2014, accessed 17 April 2017, https://securitypraxis.eu/grounded-theory-emotional-phd-
students/   
Ruteere, M. and Pommerolle, M.E. (2003) Democratizing security or decentralizing 
repression? The ambiguities of community policing in Kenya, African Affairs 102: 587-604. 
		377 
Ryan, B. (2011) Statebuilding, security-sector reform and the liberal peace: the freedom of 
security, London: Routlegde. 
Sabaratnam, M. (2017) Decolonising intervention: International statebuilding in Mozambique, 
New York: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Sabaratnam, M. (2015) Staging a battle, losing the wars? International studies, ‘science’ and 
the neoliberalisation of the university, Millennium-Journal of International Studies 43(3): 975-
979. 
Sabaratnam, M. (2013a) Avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace, Security 
Dialogue 44(3): 259-278. 
Sabaratnam, M. (2013b) History repeating? Colonial, socialist and liberal statebuilding in 
Mozambique, in Chandler, D., Sisk, T.D. (eds.) Routledge handbook of international 
statebuilding, London: Routledge, 106-117. 
Sabaratnam, M. (2011a) IR in dialogue… but can we change the subjects? A typology of 
decolonising strategies for the study of world politics, Millennium 39(3): 781-803.  
Sabaratnam, M. (2011b) The Liberal Peace? An intellectual history of international conflict 
management, 1990-2010, in Campbell, S., Chandler, D., Sabaratnam, M. (eds.) (2011) A liberal 
peace? the problems and practices of peacebuilding, London: Zed Books, 13-30.  
Sabaratnam, M. (2011c) Re-thinking the liberal peace: Anti-colonial thought and post-war 
intervention in Mozambique, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political 
Science. 
Saferworld (2016) Success stories. Local crime prevention centres in Osh, Jalal-Abad and 
Batken Provinces, Osh: Saferworld.  
Saferworld (2015a) Enhancing existing security structures in Kyrgyzstan, 9 February 2015, 
accessed 07 July 2016, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/news-and-views/case-study/57-
enhancing-existing-security-structures-in-kyrgyzstan 
Saferworld (2015b) Democratisation, conflict prevention and increased security of local 
people. Lessons learnt from community security approaches in the Ferghana Valley, Osh: 
Saferworld.  
Saferworld (2014) Community security handbook, London: Saferworld, accessed 07 July 2016, 
http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/806-community-security-handbook 
Saferworld (2007) Philosophy and principles of community-based policing, 3rd ed., London: 
Saferworld, accessed 07 July 2016, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/55-
philosophy-and-principles-of-community-based-policing  
Sahadeo, J. (2007) Druzhba Narodov or second-class citizenship? Soviet Asian migrants in a 
post-colonial world, Central Asian Survey 26(4): 559-579. 
Sandstrom, K. (2014) Remoteness and “demonitored space” in Afghanistan, Peacebuilding 2 
(3): 286–302. 
Sanghera, B., Ablezova, M., Botoeva, A. (2012) Attachment, emotions and kinship caregiving: 
An investigation into separation distress and family relatedness in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstani 
households, Families, Relationships and Societies 1(3): 379-396. 
Sanghera, B., Ilyasov, A. (2008) The social embeddedness of professions in Kyrgyzstan: an 
investigation into professionalism, institutions and emotions, Europe-Asia Studies 60(4): 643-
661.  
		378 
Sanghera, B., Satybaldieva, E. (2009) Moral sentiments and economic practices in Kyrgyzstan: 
the internal embeddedness of a moral economy, Cambridge Journal of Economics 33(5): 921-
935. 
Sanghera, B. (2010) Wanted: economic equality to mend Kyrgyzstan, Open Democracy, 27 
August 2010, accessed 20 October 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/balihar-
sanghera/wanted-economic-equality-to-mend-kyrgyzstan  
Sassen, S. (2006) Territory, authority, rights: From medieval to global assemblages, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Satybaldieva, E. (2017) Working class subjectivities and neoliberalisation in Kyrgyzstan: 
Developing alternative moral selves, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 
online first. 
Satybaldieva, E. (2015a) Political capital, everyday politics and moral obligations: 
understanding the political strategies of various elites and the poor in Kyrgyzstan,  Europe-Asia 
Studies 67(3): 370-387. 
Satybaldieva, E. (2015b) Why class matters in Kyrgyzstan: Everyday experiences, class and 
moral sentiments, in Engvall, J., Laruelle, M. (eds.) Kyrgyzstan beyond "democracy island" 
and "failing state": Social and political changes in a post-Soviet society, Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 99-122. 
Schatzki, Theodore R., Cetina, K. K. and von Savigny, E. (2001) (eds.) The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory, London: Routledge. 
Schmidt, M. (2013) Mensch und Umwelt in Kirgistan: Politische Ökologie im postkolonialen 
und postsozialistischen Kontext [Humans and the environment in Kyrgyzstan: Political ecology 
in the post-colonial and post-Socialist context], Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.  
Schoch, N., Steimann, B., Thieme, S. (2010) Migration and animal husbandry: Competing or 
complementary livelihood strategies. Evidence from Kyrgyzstan, Natural Resources Forum, 
34(3): 211-221. 
Schröder, P. (2013) Ainuras Amerikanische Karriere – Räumliche und Soziale Mobilität einer 
jungen Kirgisin [Ainura’s American career – Social and spatial mobility of a young female 
Kyrgyz], Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, 138(2): 235-257. 
Schröder, P., Stephan-Emmrich, M. (2016) The Institutionalization of mobility: Well-being and 
social hierarchies in Central Asian translocal livelihoods, Mobilities 11(3): 420-443. 
Schwartz, C. (2013) The relics of 1991: Memories and phenomenology of the post-Soviet 
generation in Akyildiz, S., Carlson, R. (eds.) Social and cultural change in Central Asia: The 
Soviet legacy, London: Routledge, 188-200.  
Seithel, F. (1990) Action anthropology, in A. Gehling (ed.) Ethnoreader 1: Jahreshefte für 
transdisziplinäre Ethnologie [Ethnoreader 1: Annual journal for transdisciplinary ethnology], 
Emsdetten: Andreas Gehling, 47–77. 
Shigaeva, J., Kollmair, M., Niederer, P., Maselli, D. (2007) Livelihoods in transition: changing 
land use strategies and ecological implications in a post-Soviet setting (Kyrgyzstan), Central 
Asian Survey 26(3): 389-406. 
Shatalova, O., Mamedov, G. (eds.) (2016) Квир-коммунизм это этика [Queer communism 
is ethics], Moscow: Free Marxist Publishing House.  
Shatalova, O., Mamedov, G. (eds.) (2015) Бишкек утопический. Сборник текстов [Utopian 
Bishkek. Essays], Bishkek: ShTAB Press.  
		379 
Shatalova, O., Mamedov, G. (2014) Вернуть Будущее. Альманах ШТАБА № 1 [Return to the 
future. ShTAB Almanac No. 2], Bishkek: ShTAB Press.  
Shilliam, R. (2015) The black Pacific: Anti-colonial struggles and oceanic connections, New 
York: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Sievers, E. W. (2013) The post-Soviet decline of Central Asia: sustainable development and 
comprehensive capital, London: Routledge. 
Sievers, E. W. (2002) Uzbekistan's mahalla: from Soviet to absolutist residential community 
associations, Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law 2(1): 91-158.  
Simon, G. (1991) Nationalism and policy toward the nationalities in the Soviet Union, Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
Sisk, T. (2013) Statebuilding, Cambridge: Polity.  
Smirl, L. (2008) Building the other, constructing ourselves: spatial dimensions of international 
humanitarian response, International Political Sociology 2(3): 236-253. 
Smirl, L. (2012) The state we are(n’t) in: Liminal subjectivity in aid worker auto-biographies, 
in Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (ed.) State-building and state-formation – The political sociology 
of intervention, New York: Palgrave, 230-245.   
Smirl, L. (2015) Spaces of aid: how cars, compounds and hotels shape humanitarianism, 
London: Zed books. 
Sneath, D., Holbraad, M., Pedersen, M. A. (2009) Technologies of the imagination: An 
introduction, Ethnos 74(1): 5-30. 
Sörensen, J.S. (2012) War makers and state makers: on state-formative networks and illiberal 
political economy in Kosovo, in Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (ed.) Statebuilding and state-
formation, London: Routledge, 40-56.  
Souillac, G., Fry, D. (2016) Anthropology: Implications for peace, in Richmond, O. P., 
Pogodda, S. and Ramovic, J. (eds) Palgrave handbook of disciplinary and regional approaches 
to peace, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 69-81.  
Steimann, B. (2011) Making a living in uncertainty: Agro-pastoral livelihoods and institutional 
transformations in post-socialist rural Kyrgyzstan, Zurich: University of Zurich.  
Stewart, S., Klein, M., Schmitz, A., Schröder, H.-H. (eds.) (2013) Presidents, oligarchs and 
bureaucrats: Forms of rule in the post-Soviet space, Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Stringer, E. T., Agnello, M. F., Baldwin, S. C., Christensen, L. M., Henry, D. L. P. (2014) 
Community-based ethnography: Breaking traditional boundaries of research, teaching, and 
learning, 2nd ed., London: Psychology Press. 
Suárez-Krabbe, J. (2009) Introduction: Coloniality of knowledge and epistemologies of 
transformation, in Special issue: Epistemologies of transformation: The Latin American 
decolonial option and its ramifications, Kult 6, 1-9. 
Sulmon, S. (2017) Махалла – узбекский прототип гражданского общества? [The mahalla 
– the Uzbek prototype of civil society?], in Laruelle, M., Kurmanova, A. (ed.) Центральная 
Азия - 25: Мысли о прошлом, проекция будущего. Сборник эссе из Центральной Азии 
[Central Asia 25: Thoughts on the past, projections of the future. A collection of essays from 
Central Asia], Washington DC: Central Asia Program, 74-77.  
Szostek, J. (2017) Popular geopolitics in Russia and post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Europe-Asia 
Studies 69(2): 195-201.  
		380 
Tadjbakhsh, S. (2009) Conflicted outcomes and values: (Neo) liberal peace in central Asia and 
Afghanistan, International Peacekeeping 16(5): 635-651. 
Tadjbakhsh, S. (ed.) (2011) Rethinking the liberal peace: external models and local 
alternatives, London: Routdledge. 
Tadjbakhsh, S., Richmond O.P. (2011) Conclusion: typologies and modifications proposed by 
critical approaches, in Tadjbakhsh, S. (ed.) (2011) Rethinking the liberal peace: external 
models and local alternatives, London: Routldedge, 221-241. 
Tate, S. A. (2007) Foucault, Bakhtin, ethnomethodology: Accounting for hybridity in talk-in-
interaction, Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research 8(2): n.p. 
Taylor, C. (2007) On social imaginaries, in Gratton, P., Manoussakis, J. P., Kearney, R. (eds.) 
Traversing the imaginary: Richard Kearney and the postmodern challenge, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 29-47. 
Tellidis, I. (2012) The end of the liberal peace? Post-liberal peace vs. post-liberal states, 
International Studies Review 14(3): 429–435. 
Thieme, S. (2008) Sustaining livelihoods in multi-local settings: Possible theoretical linkages 
between transnational migration and livelihood studies, Mobilities 3(1): 51-71. 
Tietze, S., Dick, P. (2009) Hegemonic practices and knowledge production in the management 
academy: An English language perspective, Scandinavian Journal of Management 25(1): 119-
123. 
Tilley, N. (ed.) (2005a) Handbook of crime prevention community safety, London: Willan 
Publishing. 
Tilley N. (2005b) Introduction, in Tilley, N. (ed.) Handbook of crime prevention community 
safety, London: Willan Publishing, 1-13.  
Tishkov, V. (1995) ‘Don't kill me, I’m a Kyrgyz!’: An anthropological analysis of violence in 
the Osh ethnic conflict, Journal of Peace Research 32(2): 133-149. 
Titeca, K., de Herdt, T. (2011) Real governance beyond the ‘failed state’: Negotiating education 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, African Affairs 110(439): 213-231. 
Tiulegenov, M. (2017) Contentious engagement of civil society in policy making in post-Soviet 
Kyrgyzstan: Comparing post-2005 and -2010 periods, in Bellak, B., Devdariani, J., Harzl, B., 
Spieke, N. (eds.) Governance in conflict. Selected cases in Europe and beyond, Zurich: LIT, 
153-170.  
Tlostanova, M. V., Mignolo, W. D. (2012) Learning to unlearn: Decolonial reflections from 
Eurasia and the Americas, Columbus: The Ohio State University Press. 
Tlostanova, M. (2012) Postsocialist ≠ postcolonial? On post-Soviet imaginary and global 
coloniality, Journal of Postcolonial Writing 48(2): 130-142. 
Tlostanova, M. (2010) Gender epistemologies and Eurasian borderlands, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Tőkés, R.L. (2000) “Transitology”: Global dreams and postcommunist realities, Central 
Europe Review 2(10), accessed 7 May 2016, http://www.ce-review.org/00/10/tokes10.html 
Toktogulova, M. (2007) Syncretism of religious beliefs (Kyrgyzchylyk and Musulmanchylyk), 
in Aitpaeva, G. (ed.) Mazar worship in Kyrgyzstan: Rituals and practitioners in Talas, Bishkek: 
Aigine Cultural Research Center. 
		381 
Toktomushev, K. (2015) Regime security, base politics and rent-seeking: the local and global 
political economies of the American air base in Kyrgyzstan, 2001–2010, Central Asian 
Survey, 34(1): 57-77. 
Tom, P. (2015) A ‘post-liberal peace’ via Ubuntu?, Peacebuilding, Online First.  
Trevisani, T. (2014) The reshaping of cities and citizens in Uzbekistan: The case of 
Namangan’s “New Uzbeks”, in Reeves, M., Rasanayagam, J., Beyer, J. (eds.) Ethnographies 
of the state in Central Asia:  Performing  politics,  Bloomington:  University  of  Indiana  Press,  
243-260. 
Trifonas, P. P., Wright, B. (Eds.) (2012) Critical peace education: Difficult dialogues, Springer 
Science & Business Media. 
Tromble, R. (2014) Securitising Islam, securitising ethnicity: the discourse of Uzbek radicalism 
in Kyrgyzstan, East European Politics 30(4): 526-547. 
Tucker, N. (2011) “Ordinary People” and the violence of collapse (Osh, Part III), registan.kg, 
26 June 2011, accessed 7 May 2016, http://registan.net/2011/06/26/ordinary-people-and-the-
violence-of-collapse-osh-part-iii/  
Tulebaeva, B. (2017) In search of the good life. Value conflicts and dilemmas in the practice 
of Islam in Kochkor, Kyrgyzstan, in Hardenberg, R. (ed.) Approaching ritual economy: Socio-
cosmic fields in globalised contexts, RessourcenKulturen, vol. 4, Tubingen: Collaborative 
Research Centre 'ResourceCultures', 71-104. 
Turner, M., Kühn, F. P. (eds.) (2016) The politics of international intervention: The tyranny of 
peace, London: Routledge. 
Turner, M. Cooper, N., Pugh, M. (2010) Institutionalised and co-opted. Why human security 
has lost its way, in Chandler, D., Hynek, N. (eds.) (2010) Critical perspectives on human 
security: rethinking emancipation and power in international relations, London: Routledge, 
83-96. 
UNDP (2009) Community Security and Social Cohesion. Towards a UNDP Approach, Bureau 
for Crisis Prevention and Recovery concept paper, Geneva: UNDP, accessed 7 May 2016, 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/CommSecandSocialCohesion.pdf  
Urmanbetova, J. K., Abdrasulov, S.M. (2009) Истоки и тенденции развития кыргызской 
культуры [Sources and tendencies of the development of Kyrgyz culture], Bishkek: Ilim. 
Valaskivi, K., Sumiala, J. (2014) Circulating social imaginaries: Theoretical and 
methodological reflections, European Journal of Cultural Studies 17(3): 229–243. 
van der Heide, N. (2015) Spirited Performance: the Manas epic and society in Kyrgyzstan, 
Bremen: EHV Academic.  
Väyrynen, T. (2001) Culture and international conflict resolution, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Veit, A., Schlichte, K. (2012) Three arenas: The conflictive logic of external statebuilding, in 
Bliesemann de Guevara, B. (ed.) Statebuilding and State-Formation, London: Routledge, 167-
181. 
Verkoren, W. and B. Kamphuis (2013) State building in a rentier state: How development 
policies fail to produce democracy in Afghanistan, Development and Change 44(3): 501–533. 
Visoka, G. (2016) Peace figuration after international intervention: Intentions, events and 
consequences of liberal peacebuilding, London: Routledge. 
		382 
Visoka, G. (2015) Peace/knowledge: The promise of new epistemologies of peace, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding 9(4): 542-550. 
Visoka, G. (2013) Three levels of hybridisation practices in post-conflict Kosovo, Journal of 
Peacebuilding & Development 7(2): 23-36. 
Visoka, G. (2012) Three levels of hybridisation practices in post-conflict Kosovo, Journal of 
Peacebuilding & Development 7(2): 23-36. 
Visoka, G. (2011) International governance and local resistance in Kosovo: the thin line 
between ethical, emancipatory and exclusionary politics, Irish Studies in International 
Affairs 22(1): 99-125. 
Visoka, G., Gjevori, E. (2013) Census politics and ethnicity in the Western Balkans, East 
European Politics 29(4): 479-498. 
Vrasti, W. (2008) The strange case of ethnography and international relations, Millennium-
Journal of International Studies 37(2): 279-301. 
Way, L. A., Levitsky, S. (2006) The dynamics of autocratic coercion after the Cold 
War, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39(3): 387-410. 
Weber, Max (2004 [1904]) The ‘objectivity’ of knowledge in social science and social policy, 
in Whimster, S. (ed.) The essential Weber: a reader, London, United Kingdom: Routledge,359–
404. 
Whitehead, J., More, N. (2007) Revanchism in Mumbai? Political economy of rent gaps and 
urban restructuring in a global city, Economic and Political Weekly 42(25): 2428-2434. 
Wigell, M. (2008) Mapping ‘hybrid regimes’: Regime types and concepts in comparative 
politics, Democratization 15(2): 230-250. 
Wilkinson, C. (2014a) Imagining Kyrgyzstan's nationhood and statehood: reactions to the 2010 
Osh violence, Nationalities Papers 43(3): 417-436. 
Wilkinson, C. (2014b) Kyrgyzstan's anti-gay bill: Just following in Russia's footsteps?, 
Eurasianet.org, 30 October 2014, accessed 17 April 2017, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70676  
Wilkinson, C. (2011) Giving a state a bad name? Kyrgyzstan and the risk of state failure, Global 
Dialogue (Online) 13(1): 108-119. 
Williams, M. (2007) Culture and security: Symbolic power and the politics of international 
security, London: Routledge. 
Wisler, D., Onwudiwe, I.D. (eds.) (2009) Community policing: International patterns and 
comparative perspectives, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Wolff, J. (2013) Towards post-liberal democracy in Latin America? A conceptual framework 
applied to Bolivia, Journal of Latin American Studies 45(01): 31-59. 
Wolters, A. (2014) The state and Islam in Central Asia: Administering the religious threat or 
engaging Muslim communities? PFH Forscungspapiere/Research Papers, No. 2014/03. PFH 
Private Hochschule Göttingen.  
Young, I. M. (1990) The ideal of community and the politics of difference, in. Nicholson, L. 
(ed.), Feminism/postmodernism , New York: Routlegde, 300–323. 
Young, J. (1999) The exclusive society: Social exclusion, crime and difference in late 
modernity, London: Sage. 
		383 
Young, R. J. (2005 [1995]) Colonial desire: Hybridity in theory, culture and race, 2nd ed., 
London: Routledge. 
Yurchak, A. (2006) Everything was forever, until it was no more: The last Soviet generation, 
1st ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Zanca, R. (2013) Asianizing Russia after 'the friendship among peoples', Zeitschrift für 
Ethnologie 138(2): 285-293. 
Zartman, I. W. (1995) Collapsed states: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate 
authority, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Zaum, D. (2012) Beyond the “liberal peace”, Global Governance 18(1): 121-132. 
Zaum, D., Cheng, C. (eds.) (2011) Corruption and post-conflict peacebuilding: Selling the 
peace?, London: Routledge. 
Jogorku Kenesh (2011) Ob Otchete Mezhdunarodnoi nezavisimoi komissii po issledovaniyu 
sobytii na iuge Kyrgyzstana v iiune 2010 goda. No. 500-V, 26 May  2011, accessed 11 March 
2016, http://www.kenesh.kg/RU/Articles/6310-Ob_Otchete_Mezhdunarodnoj_nezavisimoj 
_komissii_po_issledovaniyu_sobytij_na_yuge_Kyrgyzstana_v_iyune_2010_goda_500V_ot_2
6052011_goda.aspx  
Ziai, A. (ed.) (2016) Postkoloniale Politikwissenschaft [Postcolonial political science], 
Bielefeld: transcript. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
		384 
	385 
		386 
		387 
Geographic map of Kyrgyzstan; research sites indicated (Source: Wikimedia Commons) 
 
 Bazar-Korgon (ch. V)     Community 1 (ch. VII)    Tokmok (ch. VII) 
 
 
Community 2 (ch. VII)    Community 3 (ch. VII, appendix 8)     
 
 
Satellite map of Kyrgyzstan (Source: Wikimedia Commons)  
 
 
 
 
  
		388 
		389 
		390 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		391 
		392 
		393 
		394 
		395 
		396 
		397 
Appendix 4 From positivist to dialogical perspectives on hybridisation 
 
This discussion provides further background on the possibility of unpacking the ambiguous 
potential of post-liberal statebuilding through a dialogical perspective (III.1) and by 
conceptualising and analysing the role of social imaginaries therein (III.4). Based on a critical 
reading of the use of ‘hybridity’ in democratistaion and transitology scholarship and peace and 
conflict studies debates, I develop the idea of hybridisation in the conceptual/ideational realm 
and the analytical endeavour to capture a multiplicity of meanings of language, and their 
manipulation and slippage. I argue that such inquiry is key for understanding processes of 
peace-/statebuilding and transition.  
Before making its way into debates in peace, conflict and intervention studies, the 
concept of hybridity informed many conversations within transitology and democratisation 
literature, which dominated the discourse on post-Cold War political, economic and social 
changes. Here, the use of the word ‘hybrid’ arguably implied connotations of negative, impure 
characteristics, describing different authoritarian or otherwise undemocratic or insufficiently 
democratic regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010, Way and Levitsky 2006, Stewart et al. 2013, 
Collins 2006). This scholarship has been focusing on the so-called ‘third wave’ of democ-
ratisation, i.e. mostly countries situated in Latin America and the former Eastern bloc. 
Apparently convinced of the evolutionary force that would put all countries on the trajectory 
towards liberal democracy, this strand of inquiry was preoccupied with understanding the 
emergence, resilience, ‘durability’ and general nature of authoritarian or otherwise non-
democratic political regimes well into the third decade after the collapse of communism (e.g. 
Bunce and Wolchik 2011; O’Donell and Schmitter (2013 [1986]).  
Kristian Petrov captures this Hegelian determinism bz defining this specific kind of 
research as ‘teleological transitology’, which he defines as ‘transition research in which regime 
change appears as purposeful, preordained and therefore predictable, virtually unstoppable’ 
(2014: 30). From this position, hybridity is seen as an attribute of regimes which are 
incompletely democratised or have failed to develop a ‘democratic’ modus operandi. This 
approach is limited if not flawed as it is based on the assumption of universal drive towards 
democratisation and a universal logic according to which such processes occur or can be made 
to occur (Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 12). In other words, whether they are ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’ or other attempts to grapple with the problem of non-democratic, ‘hybrid’, 
regimes, this literature applies a universal logic that disregards cultural variations in the 
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practices of collective decision-making and perceptions of what is a legitimate social or political 
order. As Stewart and colleagues (2013: 3) have suggested, transitology scholars did not take 
into account the possibility that hybridity in the sense of incomplete transition towards 
democracy might indeed be a hardly, if at all, eradicable condition.  
 This logic of using hybridity as an in-between state or continuum between authoritarian 
and democratic political regimes applies to a large litertare on ‘hybrid regimes’ and transitology 
scholarship in general (Wigell 2008, Bogaards 2009; Petrov 2014, Tökés 2000). Although in 
different ways and to different degrees, it is undeniable that these scholars are united by the 
same ‘‘end of history’ thinking’ (Egnell and Haldén 2013: 5) that informed the institutionalist 
statebuilding scholars to claim legitimacy for different recipes for the building up and 
stabilisation of well-functioning, effective and accountable state institutions (see section II.1). 
As already stated in the previous chapter, this view that hybrid state institutions would in the 
long term be transformed into ‘proper’, Weberian state institutions after a Western model, was 
criticised both for its Eurocentric and racist undertone (Hobson 2007, Sabaratnam 2013a) and 
its inherent contradictions and practical failures (Richmond and Mac Ginty 2009, Hameiri 
2007, 2010, Lemay-Hébert 2009).  
An alternative application of hybridity is offered by a group around the scholars Kevin 
Clements and Volker Boege. Echoing the critics of neo-institutionalist statebuilding and ‘failed 
state’ analysis (Boege et al. 2009), they argue that social order should not be preconceived by 
an evolutionary logic of graduation to liberal democracy but that, on the contrary, statebuilding 
should be reconsidered by taking into account the ‘strength, resilience and persistence of 
custom and tradition both as a source of identity and as a means of organising social, economic 
and political systems’ (2007: 46). Such forms of social order (researched in mulple contexts in 
the South Pacific), they argued, need not be at odds with modern, Weberian state institutions 
but might be compatible or even work in complementarity with them. This research has created 
a touchstone – and an ‘aura of hope’ (Peterson 2012: 16) – for scholars of peace and conflict 
studies and given rise to the ‘hybrid’ and ‘post-liberal forms of peace’ research agendas (Mac 
Ginty 2010a, 2011, Richmond and Mitchell 2012, Richmond 2011a, see II.1 and next section).  
While this scholarship has offered a valuable alternative reading of post-conflict 
reconstruction and more general political and societal transition processes and appreciate the 
positive potential that hybrid political orders bear, it has also struggled to address or settle 
certain questions. Roger Mac Ginty’s monograph International peacebuilding and local 
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resistance: Hybrid forms of peace1, for instance, presents a typology of different modalities of 
interaction between international and local actors, which produce hybrid forms of peace through 
the following four main vectors of: 1) The compliance power of the liberal peace; 2) the 
incentivising power of the liberal peace; 3) the resistance of local actors, or the ability ignore, 
subvert, and adapt liberal peace interventions; and 4) the ability of local agents, networks, and 
structures to provide alternatives and modifications to the liberal peace (2011a: 77-78). 
While providing some good insight into how local resistance takes place in various, not 
always identifiable forms and how hybrid forms of peace thus are not only a normatively 
desirable alternative but also an empirical reality, different shortcomings have been pointed out 
about this model. First, it has been argued that this research assumes and reifies the distinction 
between the ‘local’ and ‘international’ actors which are usually identified as liberal peace agents 
(see also Paffenholz 2015: 868, Graef 2015: ch. 1). On the other hand, Richmond and Mac 
Ginty assert that (2015: 180): ‘The non-acceptance of established political categories allows us 
to reassess boundaries and identify the connections, networks and co-constitutive elements that 
comprise the context for contemporary peace-support intervention.’ This controversy points to 
the difficulty of discarding well-established categories all along, which would make a 
discussion unviable, at least in the hitherto dominant frames of political science and IR debates, 
in which the debate on the ‘liberal peace’ has largely remained throught the years. Given this 
apparent impossibility of realising the ambitions for a critical, post-liberal agenda for lack of a 
language2 in which this research may be conducted, what remains to be done is to inquire the 
effects and uses of categories and labels. As I have shown in the review of critical discursive 
research (e.g. Grimm et al. 2014) as well as practice theory and knowledge production (Büger 
and Gadinger 2014, Büger and Bethke 2014), a decisive step for peace, conflict and intervention 
research is to not accept this established language but to further investigate how these categories 
reproduce governmentality and conflict (Finlay 2015: 225).   
Second, and relatedly, the literature on hybrid forms of peace has been criticised for the 
insufficient conceptualisation and exploration of the spectrum between Western-dominated 
‘liberal peace’ approaches and the different forms and phenomena of resistance countering it. 
Paffenholz, for instance, argues that research has already shown how ‘the local is as divided 
along power, hierarchy, ethnic and gender lines, and as capable of displaying radical images 
                                                
1 A similar approach is taken in Oliver Richmond’s work (esp. 2011a, 2011c, 2010b, 2009a). 
2 This is further explicated by Mac Ginty’s (2014: 107) observation that it seems to be the nature 
of language, and knowledge itself that urges us to try to map and categorise the world. 
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and behaviours as is the international’ (2015: 862). However, she argues, such complexity and 
the counter-hegemonic trajectories affected by national/local elites’ reistsance against 
progressive reform and reconstruction ‘takes place in all forms all the time but is massively 
understudied in critical peacebuilding research’ (2015: 866). Furthermore, Sabaratnam argues 
that research on hybrid peace fails to engage in sufficient manner with the voices that seek to 
empower the ‘local’ populations, thus ‘reinstat[ing] Europe as the implicit subject of world 
history and historical sociology, and occludes the contemporaneous and necessary involvement 
of the wider world’ (Sabaratnam 2013a: 261). These and other critics (e.g. Graef 2015, 
Randazzo 2016) agree that such simplification can only be overcome if the complexity and 
negotiated nature of conetxts of international intervention is engaged with through in-depth and 
long-term field research as well as through a research agenda that synthesises area studies and 
other disciplines’ knowledges and conceptual approaches (Paffenholz 2015: 868, Brunner 
2015).3  
How then, is it possible to research hybrid and post-liberal forms of peace and overcome 
the fixation with simplistic categories and labels as well as the tautological focus on the power 
of the ‘liberal peace’ versus local resistance? The conceptual entry into hybridity research on 
peace- statebuilding and development studies most useful at this point is provided by Millar 
(2014b, see Peterson 2012, Visoka 2013, Pieterse 2001 for similar approaches). He describes a 
spectrum ranging from structural to the ideational realms, with the four dimensions of 
‘institutional’, ‘practical’, ‘ritual’ and ‘conceptual’, in which hybridity and hybridisation can 
be analysed. Millar takes this approach to critically interrogate the way in which international 
peace- and statebuilding processes are to be understood in more nuanced ways than through 
two-dimensional models of international-local interaction. In particular, he problematises the 
notion of cultural difference in the concepts and notions with which different actors operate:  
[O]ften unacknowledged is the mediating role that local concepts, beliefs, and ideas 
about the world play between the administered institutions and the local experiences of 
those institutions. (Millar 2014b: 502) 
                                                
3 A third limitation of hybrid and post-liberal approaches is their (somewhat unconscious) 
operation within the registers of a capitalist international economy. More conversation is 
needed on ideas of defying neoliberal capitalist transformations of post-conflict and post-
Socialist societies and on how sustainable livelihoods can be created outside of this orthodoxy 
(see Sabaratnam 2011c: ch. 8, Mignolo 2007, 2011).  
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He further defines his framework for analysing processes of hybridisation in transitional justice 
and institutional reform processes in Sierra Leone as focusing, ‘not on local agency, but on the 
inherent and unconscious resistance that local concepts place in the path of international 
planning and administration’ (2014b: 504). He further argues that that there are ‘some areas of 
social life in any context that are inherently resistant to purposeful planning – the ritual and the 
conceptual – but which do not demand willful action on the part of local actors to serve as 
points of resistance.’ (ibid.) In this sense, the conceptual or ideational realm appears to be a 
prime locus for examining processes of state- and peacebuilding and transition. Inquiry into 
this realm will not only look at power and resistance, however, but also other occurrences of 
friction, misunderstandings, ignorance and problems of translation. For instance, Julian Graef’s 
(2015) analysis of a ‘legal empowerment’ programmes in Liberia applies this approach and 
thereby manages to shed light on the multiple processes occurring during the translation of 
concepts into a specific context. Thus, implementers constantly appropriate and re-appropriate 
concepts, imposing certain meanings and interpretations on them that make them applicable in 
their specific context (2015: 57).  
Focusing on the concepual realm also allows to put the subjectivities or worldviews of 
people in a specific context into the focus of analysis and inquire the way in which they receive, 
appropriate and utilise concepts and categories. This also makes it possible to reflect on what 
kind of inquiry, specifically which research questions and what kind of overarching interest, 
subjects are open to in the first place. There is a simple problem, for instance, that subject area 
and terms of engagement of one’s research might not be shared by particular people in the focus 
of this research. This might lead people to turn down requests to participate in research, which 
can pose a major challenge in the field. More so, however, and more problematically for the 
researcher, people may also hold completely different understandings of the research topic and 
the proper way to approach it. This requires a thorough and sustained engagement with people’s 
lifeworlds in order to facilitate conversation in a space of shared understandings. 
Anthropologist Martin Holbraad captures this problematique of different worldviews, indeed 
ontologies, in the following phrase: 
[T]he difference between [...] analyst and [...] subject lies not in the different 
perspectives each may take upon the world (their respective ‘world-views’ or even 
‘cultures’) but rather in the ways in which either of them may come to define what may 
count as a world [...] in the first place. (2013: 470)  
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Analysing hybridisation processes in the conceptual realm makes it possible to explore this 
complexity of different factors influencing interactions and practices of peace- and 
statebuilding. This realm can be seen as a filter through which real-world action is mediated 
with the respective context or what Millar, in Bourdieu’s terms, calls a deeply historical, 
socially embedded and inter-subjectively constructed ‘self-evident and natural order which 
goes without saying’ (Millar 2014b: 505, Bourdieu 1979: 166). It is clear that local subjectivi-
ties are not only rooted in local history and sociality, but that they will inevitably be affected 
by processes of global integration, media consumption and political and economic dynamics. I 
further explore this dynamic aspect of the ‘interpellation’ and embedding of subjectivities and 
worldviews in global knowledge regimes in my discussion of the imaginary (section III.3). 
Crucially, and in contrast to the hybrid and post-liberal peace literature, putting the focus on 
subjectivities rather than identities makes it possible to show how their ‘embeddedness’ is 
concealed through the institutions and frameworks of territorial and political governance, 
culture and, ultimately, language which are habitually used to ‘categorise’, ‘map’ and ‘order’ 
the world, both by ‘ordinary people’ and researchers. This deconstructive perspective enables 
a more radical and deep-reaching reflection on the depoliticisation, normalisation and 
continuation of legacies of violence, displacement and social engineering in post-conflict and 
post-Socialist contexts.  
The key aspects of hybridity’s relevance for a critical approach to inquiry identified 
above – i.e. the different degrees of complexity and anti-essentialism; criticality; and the 
possibility of a dialogical analysis of hybridisation/hybridity in the conceptual/ideational realm 
– can be traced back into the cultural studies literature. For lack of space for a more in-depth 
discussion of the works of Bhabha, Young and Kraidy (see Lottholz 2017a), I focus on the 
conceptualisation of hybridity developed by the Russian philosopher and literary critic Mikhail 
Bakhtin. Attempting to elucidate hybridisation processes in the semantic realm and in 
communicative interaction, and in a similar way to Foucault and Bourdieu, Bakhtin saw 
language as an idiom impregnated with ideology and history. He concurred that,   
... a unitary language gives expression to forces working towards [...] ideological 
centralization which develop in vital connection with the processes of sociopolitical and 
cultural centralization. (1981: 271) 
The inherent counter-pole to such centralisation, which Bakhtin identified in his seminal work 
The diaological imagination (1981), is heteroglossia, a concept emphasising the dialogicality 
and multiplicity of language, discourse and meaning in general, which implies a profoundly 
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relativist and pluralist social ontology. Contrary to de Saussure’s theory of semantics, 
heteroglossia emphasises the multiplicity of meanings that one idiom can refer to. This helps 
to conceptualise the intercultural and non-universalist nature of language in a world inhabited 
by multiple cultures. Most simply, heteroglossia means the ‘prevalence of context over text’ 
(Maranhão 1990: 4). In such a world, any utterance made serves to ‘appropriate the words of 
others and populate them with one’s own intention’ (Bakhtin 1981: 21). The logical 
consequence is that, if interaction is not happening in a cultural and semantic vacuum, ‘[t]he 
subject is surrounded by a myriad of responses, each of which must be framed in a specific 
discourse chosen from this available multiplicity’ (Tate 2007: 9). Further, and in more precise 
perspective than offered in Bhabha’s work, this multiplicity of meanings offers space for 
manipulation for all actors participating in dialogic interaction:  
Discourses and meanings are the sites of struggle as hegemonic social relations attempt 
to fix meanings. ... To resist hegemonic meaning entails the disruption of naturalised 
forms of discourse and power as productive. Bakhtin’s heteroglossia shows us the 
possibility for such a disruption. (Tate 2007: 11)  
This points to a conceptualisation of hybridity that is embedded in an anti-foundationalist 
ontology that emphasises the multiplicity of meaning and knowledge. Most importantly, it 
becomes clear that any statement on the potential or vectors of agency, or on effects of 
hybridity, already comes with a normative or ideological baggage – hybridity can be both 
complicit with hegemonic global discourses and agencies but may also subvert them (Moreiras 
1999). This is especially apparent from a Foucauldian perspective that sees discourse as 
preceding the subject and its agency and thus foreclosing the possibility of genuine resistance. 
McNay refers to this as discursive regulation, by which ‘discursive subject positions become a 
priori categories which individuals seem to occupy in an unproblematic fashion’ (1996: 77), a 
situation reminiscent of Bhabha’s and other cultural studies scholars’ celebration of difference 
and the fragmentation of grand narratives as the apparent, but equally deceptive, emancipation 
and revolutionary agency of hybrid actors and spaces (see Kraidy 2005: 149 ff.). A dialogical 
and heteroglossic conception of meaning also foregrounds the analysis of the hybridisation of 
meaning and the frictions and different degrees and forms of resistance that can occur in 
reception and translation processes discussed above. The application of this approach is 
presented in section III.2, where I argue that particular practices and discourses of peace- and 
statebuilding have to be seen as embedded in a multiplicity of discourses and imaginaries of 
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social order, which they reproduce. In the next section, I develop my approach at 
conceptualising post-liberal statebuilding and its analysis in the Central Asian context.  
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Appendix 5: Research and commentary publications and press coverage on the Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’, 2016-17 
The following table presents coverage on the Civic Union’s community security and research projects as well as press coverage on more general issues of police 
reform. All articles were available online at (accessed 25 November 2017); hyperlinks are provided, where the Russian version of titles can be looked up. Only 
English translations are provided for sake of brevity. The analysis focuses on the period after the end of my fieldwork (January 2016 onwards). The following 
themes are analysed: 1) Reform general: General coverage on reform progress and role of CU; 2) Pilot project: Results and further activities of the community 
security project analysed in section VII.3; 3) Patrol service reform: Commentary and events around this aspect not analysed in the chapter; 4) ICVS research: 
Research project conducted with the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) in cooperation with the Dutch professor of criminology Jan van Dijk ; 5) 
Racketeering: A research project on racketeering in schools in Kyrgyzstan conducted with project support from various donors and in different communities 
throughout Kyrgyzstan.  
Month  Reform general  Pilot project Patrol service reform ICVS research Racketeering   
01/16       United patrol service: Good prospects but it all comes down to the details, reforma.kg 
Activists handed over petition with appeal for a police reform to the Jogorku Kenesh, Azattyk 
02/16  Timur Shaikhutdinov: Ministry of Interior Affairs (MIA) needs to demonstrate real results, 24.kg 
  PM replies to Civic Union recommendations, Facebook post 
In Kyrgyzstan, the Council for Reform and Development of the Rule of Law System might be abolished, reforma.kg 
NGO develops a mechanisms for accountability of state authorities vis-à-vis the population, Zanoza 
Mechanisms for authorities’ accountability towards population will be created in Kyrgyzstan, Vechernii Bishkek 
‘More than 60% of the crime victims do not report to the police’, 
Azattyk 
03/16 Activists: The merging of RPS and Police Patrol Service will not resolve questions related to the fight 
against corruption, Knews 
Only 30 percent of victims  of theft and assault report to the police –
only 2-3 percent report about bribes, 24.kg 
MPs suggest amendments to the law on internal affairs bodies, Azattyk  Activists: Certain parents contribute to the 
burgeoning of school racketeering, Knews 
04/16  Society could be deprived of the right to take part in the police reform, reforma.kg 
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Month  Reform general  Pilot project Patrol service reform ICVS research Racketeering   
04/16  Civic Union presented a report on the progress of police reform in the parliament, Azattyk 
An active fight against violence and extremism is started in all parts of the country, Knews 
Police joins forces with the public and authorities in 12 districts in Kyrgyzstan, Azattyk 
05/16     The police and local self-governance (LSG) organs developed plans for crime reduction, Akipress 
06/16  Djanybek Bakchiev MP: Security should be a key element of modern society, KNews 
  Civic activists handed over dozens of proposals for police reform in Kyrgyzstan, KNews 
07/16  ‘Crime victims’: Is the Kyrgyz police managing its job well?, KNews 
Law enforcement reform attempt №…, Azattyk    Crime victim documentary, Youtube release 
Law enforcement agencies in Kyrgyzstan will be fundamentally reformed, 24.kg 
The mechanical transfer of the functions of the GSKN to the MIA carries great risks, Akipress 
Issue 4. Timur Shaikhutdinov on the police reform, ResPublica Research: Teens at school are divided into 
‘observers’ and ‘crowd’, Zanoza; Report 
release 
Civic Union ‘For reforms’: School racketeering 
adapts to external conditions, Azattyk 
In Kyrgyzstan, the problem with violence in 
schools remains extremely worrying, 24.kg 
Activists: A new form of school racketeering 
has emerged – exploitation, KNews 
08/16  International expert: Kyrgyzstan lags behind its neighbours when it comes to police reform, KNews 
Joint plans made possible the mobilisation of societal and authorities’ efforts for crime prevention (final report), 
reforma.kg 
  Experts: The Minister of the Interior and his apparatus should be civilian, KNews 
‘The authorities’ initiative to change the Constitution pushed back the reform of law enforcement agencies’, Azattyk  
09/16 According to survey results, 40.4% of people learn about the work of the police from media and the internet, - Civic Union, Akipress 
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Month  Reform general  Pilot project Patrol service reform ICVS research Racketeering   
09/16  The police draft law might be prepared behind closed doors, KNews 
10/16              No to school racketeering!,  
ELTR on youtube 
12/16  Concerns about crime prevention in Bishkek, KNews 
12/16  The Civic Union ‘For Reforms and Result’ worked out positions and recommendations on the package of reform measures for the law 
enforcement system of the Kyrgyz Republic, reforma.kg 
  The police reform that society wants and the results which are not there, Golos.kg 
01/17  Activists call for speeding up the development of new legislation on law enforcement agencies, Akipress 
02/17  Waiting for the reforms of the MIA by Ulan Israilov. How long do we need to wait?, Azattyk 
Results of the survey ‘How do you assess the work of the police?’: 52% of the readers believe that the police is doing a terrible job, Akipress 
03/17       NGO: The new road service will stop cars without a reason, KNews 
In Kyrgyzstan, a model for preventing crime has been developed, KNews 
Bishkek residents are asked to take part in internet voting on law and order issues, Golog.kg, see KNews, Kaktus 
    In Bishkek, people fight against crime in a joint effort, KNews 
Civic Union calls for a dialogue of political forces, Kaktus 
04/17         Expert: Victims are more comfortable talking to  
a policewoman, Akipress 
Timur Shaikhutdinov: There is a huge social potential for maintaining law and order, KNews  
Civic Union: Authorities should be responsible for the "Safe city" initiative, Zanoza 
  Parliament urges for implementation of ‘Safe city’ initiative as soon as possible, KNews 
       The foot patrol will be separated from the patrol police, Akipress 
05/17  Officials should take personal responsibility for ‘Safe city’ and the police reform as a whole, Akipress 
One step forward, two steps backward? GUPM [Main Administration for Patrol Police] under the MIA 
wants to abandon the foot patrol, Akipress 
In Kyrgyzstan, victims of sexual violence are 
afraid to contact the police, Zanoza  
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Month  Reform general  Pilot project Patrol service reform ICVS research Racketeering   
06/17  There are only 5.9 % women among internal affairs organs staff, Akipress 
07/17     12 projects on security and crime reduction start in Kyrgyzstan, Azattyk 
08/17     Joint plan: Bishkekians define priorities for crime prevention, Kaktus  
  Renaming does not mean reform, reforma.kg 
     How the neighbour can ensure your safety, Azattyk 
09/17  The future president has the power to determine the vector of reforms in the law enforcement sphere, reforma.kg 
  Six tips for the president candidate for police reform, Kaktus 
10/17     What needs to be improved in Bishkek? Online survey, Kaktus 
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Appendix 7: Analysis of Civic Union involvement in Community 3 (Chapter VII) 
 
Status of working group 
This territorial council in the centre of Osh that was not part of the Civic Union’s community 
security project but its chair, an outspoken supporter of the movement’s efforts to promote a 
new approach at police reform, was open about participating in the research project. Comparing 
the CU’s impact in the above communities with this one yields significant insight into the 
implications of my collaborative approach to research, i.e. the fact that I visited communities 
as part of the CU team. Secondly, it illustrates the long-term effects of large-scale conflict as it 
had happened in Osh and the need for trustful personal relations between community leaders 
and the NGO/researcher to secure open collaboration. 
I was initially surprised at how welcoming Akmali, the territorial council representative, 
was about my request to talk to him and include his unit into my project and was equally 
impressed with the impact that the Civic Union had had according to him. ‘We collected more 
than 10,000 signatures in Osh. The population wanted the police to change [chtob militsiia stala 
drugoi]. We submitted the petition and the signatures to the Jogorku Kenesh [Parliament] and 
they started to talk about the reform. … Now every neighbourhood inspector is accountable to 
the population.’ii He presented this accountability as the most important result of the Civic 
Union’s and other NGOs’ efforts in the years after the 2010 clashes, after which the police 
maintained its notorious reputation of wrongly handling the persecutions and investigations on 
people’s involvement with the interethnic violence.iii Akmal offered me to participate in 
community security briefings between police and local administrators and community security 
actors to establish a picture for myself.  
It turned out, however, that it was not possible to engage with the community security 
and administration workers, at least not without making investments to build trust which I could 
not afford time- and funding-wise. When I approached different workers and administrators 
from the neighbourhood committees after the meeting on which Akmal had introduced me and 
my research, I was either ignored or met with a combination of polite conversation and 
unspoken rejection of my request to conduct interviews, focus groups and participatory 
                                                
i Name altered. 
ii Interview, Osh,   
iii Allegations, which are mostly discussed in international coverage, include extortion and 
bribery as well as the impunity of perpetrators of violence.   
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observation. These reactions to my efforts to include this community into my research through 
interviews and accompanying them in their everyday work allow an interpretation of the 
standing of the Civic Union within this community. Akmal was not only of the opinion that the 
Civic Union and other NGOs had reached a major achievement in bringing about a 
reconfiguration of the relation between law enforcement organs and the population, but was 
also convinced that I would find unambiguous evidence of this transformed relationship by 
myself. When he introduced my research and my cooperation with the Civic Union in the local 
community security meeting, which was attended by ca. fifteen people including police men 
and other security officers, he did not seem to spur any interest. The demeanour of most 
attendees remained as tense and cold as during the rest of the meeting. Beyond a performative 
welcome and small talk, it was obvious how the different askakals and district committee heads 
did not feel as comfortable with my presence as Akmal might have wished, and it sometimes 
felt as if they would have disagreed with his inviting me if they had been given the chance to. 
After all, this appeared more like a personal initiative of Akmal himself and the absence of 
higher-level decision makers’ approval made it legitimate for all community workers not to 
answer my requests.  
The official justification for inviting me and giving me a chance to recruit research 
participants, according to Akmal, was the Civic Union’s activity in the community and Akmal’s 
and many other attendees’ membership in the organisation. Given the Civic Union’s efforts and 
success in re-negotiating the police’s work ethic and accountability towards society, 
participating in research that aimed to show how this progress was felt on an everyday level 
seemed only reasonable. Most community workers, however, either ignored or rejected my 
requests for interviews more or less openly. This suggests that for them this sort of reasoning 
was not all that straightforward. Some of them confirmed that they were Civic Union members, 
but they did not tell me any more details or reasons for it, let alone any opinions about the work 
of the Civic Union in this community. Neither Akmal’s role as the head of the territorial council 
administration nor my own association with the Civic Union could make the local community 
workers overcome the discomfort or consequences they were associating with an engagement 
with me.iv  
                                                
iv This might also have been due to my own too high expectations or inability to be more 
convincing in introducing and engaging the people in my research, but interviews with other 
Civic Union activists have confirmed that the success of the CU’s activities in this territorial 
council and the access to community workers is mainly due to Akmal’s own efforts and 
promotion of the Civic Union. 
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Normality and professionalism 
Instead of discarding the interaction with representatives from this community as worthless, it 
is possible to draw observations on how they reacted to my requests to participate in research 
and what they replied to questions I posed. As regards the former, no one explicitly said they 
did not want to participate or I should leave them alone. The different district committee heads 
and aksakals I spoke to simply made sure not to commit to anything. It seemed that such non-
engagement was seen as a way for these local community workers to make sure that their 
statements would not be abused or misrepresented in media reports or other outputs. Different 
coverage on the post-2010 human and minority rights situation and, more recently, on the 
spread of radicalisation and violent extremism in southern Kyrgyzstan has portrayed 
communities in unfavourable and or inaccurate ways.v The corresponding risk of objectification 
and misrepresentation of the community and abuse of the statements and information that I was 
asking was thus apparently seen as too high when weighed against the Civic Union and Akmal’s 
vouching for my research. It is also possible that suspicions went well beyond that, as ‘many 
think that international researchers are spies’, as Akmal had explained in an earlier 
conversation.vi Foreigners who speak good Russian and are in Kyrgyzstan to conduct research 
on political and security issues are generally associated with foreign intelligence services and 
the possibility that I might have had such an association might have seemed realistic for some 
of the community workers. The consistency with which questions in this direction were directed 
towards mevii suggests that these ideas had at least some purchase and that, while they did not 
                                                
v In a recent blog post, Heathershaw and Montgomery challenge the ICG’s reports on 
recruitment of Kyrgyz citizens by radical Islamist organisations, among other things, on the 
grounds that the core information in its report titled ‘Syria calling: Radicalisation in Central 
Asia’ is usually attributed to anonymous and thus unverifiable sources. Available here: 
http://www.cedarnetwork.org/2015/02/17/who-says-syrias-calling-why-it-is-sometimes-
better-to-admit-that-we-just-do-not-know-by-john-heathershaw-and-david-w-montgomery/  
See also discussions on the contestations around the ‘Osh events’ in IV.3.  
vi Osh, 14 October 2015.  
vii Whereas such suspicions and conspiracy theories might appear irrational, they are 
omnipresent in Kyrgyz society and fuelled by footage on the widespread Russian television 
channels and in popular imaginaries. They were also apparent in people’s reaction when 
meeting me for the first time: I was asked if I was working for the FBI or CIA on multiple 
occasions by taxi drivers, even research particiapnts, and how I was fending for myself 
otherwise. 
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necessarily lead people to distrust me, at least made them think twice.viii Therefore, given the 
more or less paranoid or reasonable concerns as to my real identity and potential connections, 
not engaging too much with me and giving too much information appeared almost to be a part 
of a professional habitus or even good citizenship of the community workers present after the 
planning meeting.  
Furthermore, remarkably, all persons involved tried to maintain a picture of normality 
and of doing their job. One neighbourhood elderly court member agreed to talk to me and let 
me sit next to him when he and colleagues received district residents who arrived for a dispute 
settlement session, which eventually was cancelled due to the absence of one of the parties to 
the conflict. All I got from this man in his 50s was generic information, e.g. how the 
neighbourhood was preparing for the Day of the city of Osh (see VI.2.1), and after conversation 
was interrupted he left without saying anything more. Another neighbourhood committee leader 
was more open, but not less generic in his explanation of current issues including the negative 
effects of internet clubs on youth, the problem of early marriages which are not registered with 
the administration (ZAGS, see V.4.2).ix He agreed to meet up the next day, but he kept 
postponing our meeting during the following days so I had to give up on trying to meet him. 
The risk associated with talking to me and opening up their world for me was apparently 
perceived to be too high for these community workers.  
While not ready to engage in more depth, the community security workers were keen to 
demonstrate that things were on track and that work was being done. This was most apparent 
in Akmal’s explanations of the current agenda and his repeated referral to the fact that the 
community’s dialogue with police and other law enforcement was already an achievement. ‘As 
you can see, we have two neighbourhood inspectors here with us and we deal with the different 
issues together with them’, he pointed when explaining telling me about a few exemplary cases 
that had been addressed in this joint approach.  ‘Today we will sort out a drinking action 
[pianitsa], which is going on at one house’, he gave an example. ‘This man even locked out his 
87 years-old mother and it is already cold outside. We will go there and tell him to stop this.’ 
                                                
viii Being aware of this general situation, I had made an extra effort to present my research, the 
processes it included and the foreseeable results in an accessible and understandable was. I had 
drawn up leaflets explaining the purpose and content of my research in simple words and 
illustrated possible results with sample prints of book covers and screen shots of online 
publications. These extra efforts appeared to be completely in vain as they were completely 
ignored. 
ix In this light, his opening statement that ‘the main thing is that our people are healthy’ almost 
seemed ironic.  
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If the person did not heed the warning, he further explained, the police inspectors would open 
an investigation (sostavit protokol). This was one of many cases which the territorial council 
and its Local Crime Prevention Centre (LCPC) were solving on a daily basis. Such cases usually 
involved minor deviant behaviour and was referred to, as in the meeting I had attended, as 
neblagopoluchnye semi, which means families which are badly-off economically but also 
implies misfortune, i.e. an uncontrollable component in their predicament. The LCPC with the 
community security workers and police men served as vehicle to bring the situations springing 
up in such families into order and settling disputes between residents, which was the main task 
of aksakal courts.  
Thus, while there was little scope for me to inquire these activities and processes in 
depth without a long-term investment into building trust with the community workers, they 
attempted to present me how things were running smoothly and they were doing their job. 
Akmal tried to explain my failed to recruit research participants with the lack of mutual 
understanding. ‘For them, I am something like a superintendent [nachalnik], they tell me all of 
this in their own way’, he posited. ‘Maybe they don’t really like to talk to you because of the 
language, maybe they’re a bit embarrassed [to tell things in Russian].’ I was not convinced, but 
had to admit to my inability to gather any meaningful data for the reasons discussed above.   
 
 
The construction and representation of ‘good cooperation’ 
Even though there was no scope for me to gather data and security practise in community 3, I 
had been present on the community security briefing and seen how police men, neighbourhood 
committee leaders and aksakals court workers were controversially discussing solutions to 
problems affecting the security and public order. Indeed, Akmal and other neighbourhood 
leaders had managed to present me with evidence for their good cooperation with law 
enforcement. On the other hand, I still harboured doubts about this, especially given the 
reluctance of the community workers to really engage in discussions. It seemed hard to say if 
the people I approached were merely uncomfortable to talk to a foreign researcher or if this 
discomfort might have been based on the fact that more concerning and dangerous security 
questions were overshadowing the good cooperation with the police.  
I met Akmal again on a small conference during which the Civic Union worked out a 
mechanisms to further consolidate its structures on the local level and mobilise potential for 
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policy changes on the ministerial and governmental levels.x As I reiterated my gratitude towards 
him in an attempt to emphasise the positive aspect of my engagement in his community – after 
all I was thankful that he had given me access and that I was able to make the experience – he 
responded with the same friendliness and assured that my research was important and valuable 
in promoting the Civic Union’s efforts. He also asked what my research was exactly about 
again. This seemed to point to the fact the engagement with me as a researcher as such mattered 
much more for its symbolic meaning than for the actual content of my research. Akmal even 
used this ‘cooperation’ in his plenary presentation of group work on plans on the establishment 
steady CU working groups in different communities, including his own territorial council. 
Towards the end of his input, he added: ‘I will already not talk about how our LCPC is working, 
as Philipp was with us and saw how we are working. He directly participated in a meeting.’ In 
this sense, the mere fact that I was part of one community security briefing and witnessed the 
interaction between police and community security workers sufficed to classify this community 
as being open and having progressed to an open and transparent modus operandi. I would not 
contradict this assessment based on what I could see – the discussion between the different 
attendees had been open, controversial and meaningful. But as already stated, it would be 
equally far-fetched to declare all issues as solved based on my very symbolic visit to this 
community.  
This points to the need felt by Akmal, and other colleagues of his, to construct and 
represent an interaction as cooperation which certifies the progress the CU has reached in a 
given community; even if the same interaction can be seen as failed attempt at doing meaningful 
research from the researcher’s point of view. Given the dire need to improve things in Osh’s 
densely populated urban districts in the aftermath of the 2010 events and the continued lack of 
post-conflict justice, the police’s willingness to cooperate with local self-governance and to be 
accountable to the population can legitimately be presented as success of Kyrgyzstan’s civil 
society. Such pragmatic and short-term orientation does not, however, answer questions about 
the more deep-reaching issues such as post-conflict justice and the feelings of insecurity on the 
part of individuals who have been affected by the past large-scale clashes. Although addressing 
such issues may not be in the hands of community security practitioners but be dependent on 
the readiness of higher-level administrative bodies and the political climate in general, it is 
                                                
x Seminar: ‘Developing Co-Security on the local level’, Ak-Tash, Chui Province, 4-6 
December, 2015. See below for more details.  
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important to draw attention to the pragmatism and mere conflict management, rather than 
transformation, that LCPCs and community security actors are limited to in this situation.  
It can thus be concluded that in this community the practice of and discourse on ‘good 
cooperation’ between the community leaders and law enforcement combines and hybridises 
ideas of participatory and bottom-up approaches, as well as transparency and accountability, 
with an apolitical and silencing stance regarding the past damage and violence (at least in the 
situation described above) in order to shield the community but also the wider context (the city, 
region and ultimately the country as a whole) from misrepresentation and accusations that past 
injustices have not been addressed. Whether it was the presence of police men after the planning 
meeting or the sense of professionalism and citizen’s duty of the neighbourhood committee 
members, their choice not to talk openly or even raise criticism about the present situation 
presents thus an alignment with the ‘politics of sovereignty’ which have led to a sanitisation of 
the public discourse since 2010.  
 
 
 
